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## INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OF

Philosophy, Psychology,
Psychical Research, Religion,
Mysticism & Sociology

109

MORADABAD
(India)

VOLUME XXVIII JANUARY 1988 NUMBER 1

# DEDICATION

*This 109th issue of the* **Darshana International**
*is most respectfully* **dedicated** *to*

**Dr. RAMNARAYAN VYAS**
*M A. LL B Ph.D., D Litt. & Sahitya Ratna*

Retired Professor of Philosophy, Government Colleges, Madhya Pradesh, Director Academy of Social Thought, Indore, Director Sah Chintan Indore, an eminent Astrologer and distinguished Scholar of Madhya Pradesh who has to his credit several important works of Philosophy, Psychology Religion which include, *Essentials of Psychology, The Universalistic Thought of India, Dharma Darshan, Shiksha Darshan ki Pramukha Pravrattiyan Tatha Samanjasyavad, The Synthetic Philosophy of the Bhagavata, The Bhagavata Bhakti Cult and Three Advaita Acharyas, Indian and Western Psychologies and their Synthesis, Nature of Indian Philosophy, From Consciousness to Super Consciousness, The Bhagavatagita And Jivan Yoga, Applications of Psychology in the Physical and Spiritual Domains, Indian Wisdom and International Peace, The Nature of the Real : 'I' Or The 'It.*

We wish Dr. Ramnarayan Vyas a very Happy, long and active life to serve the cause of Philosophy in India.

**Anurag Atreya**
**Managing Editor**

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An International Quarterly
OF
Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

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# The Twenty-eighth Year of
# DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

*Darshana International* after completing twenty seven years of its existence is now entering in its twenty eighth year with this number.

It is gratifying to note that this Journal *Darshana International* has done splendid work to serve the cause of Philosophy and allied disciplines, and has been admired by scholars all over the world and has attracted the attention of scholars from several countries and has attained an enviable status in the domain of Philosophy, being the only Journal of its kind being published from India which has international readership, authorship and Editorship, It is all due to God' Grace or some Supernormal Powers which has been responsible in instigating its editor to continue this venture. Besides this supernormal power there were many factors which were responsible in keeping this Journal alive for more than 27 years. It is all due to sincere and untiring efforts of the distinguished scholars on the Editorial Board who are taking keen interest in bringing *Darshana International* to the lime light. Several scholars have been instrumental in inciting scholars to contribute articles for this Journal. Beside the active interest taken by the members of the Editorial Board, the scholarly contribution of the scholars from all over the world is a welcome sign for the Journal. Without whose active efforts of the scholars the Journal could not have survived so long and it would have metted the same fate which many other Journals had met.

We are grateful to our Readers and subscribers who have played their distinct role in helping directly in its continuance since 1961, the year when the Journal was started and came into existence.

We are thankful to many publishers who never forgot to send books for Review which made our readers well informed about the new books which are being published and made our readers acquainted with them.

Our Printing Staff of the *Darshana Printers* under the able leadership and guidance of Shri Suresh Kumar Agarwal deserve congratulations in keeping the Journal alive, without whose active help and co-operation this Journal might not have lived for such a long time.

This Journal with the help and active co-operation of Members of the Editorial Board, the Contributors, Subscribers, Publishers, Staff of the *Darshana Printers* and office staff, who all are instrumental in helping the Journal to live, to grow, to become well known, The Journal has played the vital role and lived so nicely and wonderfully and has been able to attract the people from all over the world.

We have to thank the two newly distinguished scholars who have recently joined the Editorial Board of the *Darshana International*. The one is Professor Dr. Marietta Stepaniants, Head Department of Oriental Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and the second one great Polish Philosopher, Professor Dr. Jerzy Pelc, Professor of Philosophy, Warsaw, Poland who have agreed to be on our Editorial Board. We have been enriched by their joining us.

We cannot forget our old association with late Shri Kowtha Surynarayan Row, founder of the Swadharma Swarajya Sangha, and his grandson Shri B.V.S.S. Mani a great philanthropist from South India, who in the early years of the *Darshana International* came themselvs to support the cause of the *Darshana International*, without asking for it. Our source of inspiration have been these two great figures.

It is gratifying to note that the *Darshana International* is the only Journal in the field of Philosophy and its allied disciplines in the world which is being published for such a long time by any individual member of teaching community, who by his own resources run this journal creditably for more than 27 years. We appreciate his perseverance and efforts of Dr. J. P. Atreya, General Editor of the *Darshana International* in getting this Journal going on well without break. It is really very creditable and we admire his sincere efforts in this direction.

we are quite aware of the shortcomings, hurdles and difficulties which have not yet been overcome due to financial obstacles. We are not very happy for not being able to maintain the desired standard as we envisaged. We hope if the position improves we shall be able to make our journal more impressive comparable to any good Journal of the world.

We Wish all our Members of the Editorial Board, Contributors, Readers, Well Wishers and all those who have directly or indirectly helped us in continuing our adventure, a Very Happy and Prosperous New Year.

ANURAG ATREYA
Managing Director

*Editorial*

# The Illusion of the good

To what object does the question of ethics relate.

To the good and, its contrary, evil.

And what does ethics do with this object.

Ethics seeks to understand it, that is, not to produce neither the concept of the good, nor the actions that fall under this concept.

Thus, the question that seems to follow is:

What is the good? Or, strictly speaking, what is the definition of the good ?

But the defintion asked for, as any other definition, is related, necessarily, to the science of language, as G.E. Moore has pointed out in his *Principia Ethica*, But language, itself, is a social phenomenon. Consequently, the definition of any concept implies the quest of the social roots of this concept. In this sense, the quest of the roots is prior to the quest of what is.

Read *The Republic* and you will find out that the main issue is not about the definition of the good, but about the root of the good. The good is represented as the highest absolute end of all reality, as the One to which all the rest are subordinate in the sense of means to end. Thus the good illumines the whole circuit of humanity as species and not as individuals, and the form in which this species appears is the organic unity, that is, the state. And the state is divided, in accordance with the three parts of the soul, into the ruling class, the warroir class and the working class. The state belongs to the first class, and especially, to the philosopher king whose function is to realize his heavenly vision of the ideal city. And this city, onc established, will continue to be stable. In this sense, the philosopher becomes godlike himself in the sphere of politics. Thus, Montesqieu was right when he stated that the ancient Greeks had raised the knowledge of politics "almost to the level of a cult." Following from this, the ethical, according to Plato, is reduced to the political as its root and not vice versa, for the vice versa conceals an illusion that the good is the prime mover which goes against Plato's intention.

The same case with Freud. In his book *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud was clearer than Plato. He sought directly for the root of the good and the bad, and he found it in the sense of guilt. Then he went deeper to reveal the origin of the sense of guilt in the fear of the loss of love which is, strictly speaking, the fear of authority which then, is internalized through the establishment of a super-ego.[1] This means that Freud reduces the dichotomy good/bad first to the political, then to the psychoanalytic.

A third and last example. Schlick's book *Problems of Ethics*. In the fourth chapter entitled "What is the meaning of moral?". Schlick enumerates the various definitions of the good according to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, then he gives his own definition, that is, "the meaning of the word "good" is determined by the opinion of society ...which is the lawgiver formulating moral demands." Consequently, "moral valuations of modes of behaviour change when the structure of human society changes."[2] But, in fact, this is not a definition of the moral, for it is reduced to the social. In this case, the real issue is to ask about the structure of the society and the social norms that emerge from such a structure, and not the pseudo moral norms.

Anyhow, these three examples reveal that the root of the so-called"the good", of the ought to be done, is either in the state or the super-ego or the society. This means that the origin of the good lies outside the good itself. Hence, we canot speak of the good per se, of the good as an autonomous entity. And if we do speak as such we are apt to fall into an optical illusion.

Now, the question is :

How did this optical illusion come about ?

Behind and beneath the human experience of the good we find the myth. It is by discovering the motivations of the invention of the myth that we can reveal the illusory path to the good. But the invention of the myth is involved in the invention of civilization. So let us begin with the concept of civilization. Whatever way we may define this concept, it is a certain fact that the word civilization describes the whole sum of the achievements which distinguishes our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serves one purpose namely to master nature, or strictly speaking, to accomodate nature to human needs. As regards this purpose there can be scarcely any doubt, If we go back far enough we find that the first act of civilization was the invention of the technique of agriculture accompanied by the invention of the myth to fill in the gaps left by the limitations of the technique.

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[1] S. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents.* (transl.) J. Strachey, W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1961), pp. 71-72.

[2] Schlick, *Problems of Ethics*, (transl.) D. Rynin, Dover Publications, 1961, pp. 90-91.

Thus, it was believed that by the worship of the sun and the stars the earth will be fertilized, consequently the priests emerged adopting the myth as the central organizing principle, and accordingly it gained absolute authority in all fields of human activity. Through the myth the priests created taboos which became rules of conduct. Hence, the dichotomy good/evil emerged and from this dichotomy followed the so-called moral law "Thou shalt",and"Thou shalt not", which is exprsssed in Kant's categorical imperative, and which demands that one act wholly independently of one's inclinations and needs.

Hence, in accordance with this dichotomy, the technique of mastering nature is restricted, and instead man's activity develops in a new direction, that is, seeking a pseudo satisfaction in internal psychological processes, and considering nature as the sole enemy and as the source of evil. Not only nature is evil, but also man as long as the dichotomy good/evil has been interiorized, and homo-homini lupus is the inevitable outcome.

Nevertheless, real development ran against this illusory dichotomy. The industrial revolution in Europe was proceeded by religious critical thinking and the liberation of human reason from any other authority save that of reason itself. Hence, this revolution reveals that real development is realized with the help of technology guided by science in mastering nature for the sake of satisfying man's needs.

*Murad Wahba*

# Philosophy and Belles - Lettres

*Pravda Spassova*

When the place of philosophy in culture is discussed, usually widely acknowledged are the close link between the prevailing philosophical views and the art of the same period as well as the beneficial influence and the priority of philosophy. Examples in support of that belief are sought even in the antiquity, when quite often the most profound and complicated philosophical discourse is expressed in a poetical or aphoristical form.

It is usually pointed out that French classicism is a reflection of Cartesian philosophy in aesthetics; such is the case with Schopenhauer and modernism. In a similar way many authors explain romanticism, where philosophy is often made by literature; the novels of Voltaire and, of course the existentialists are mentioned.

The comparative analysis between the national philosophical tradition and the main ideas expressed by belles — lettres could be also used as a proof of the mutual interaction of philosophy and art. There is undoubtedly a great closeness between the general ideas and even the concrete thesis of e.g. Russian Christian Philosophy and the novels of Tolstoy or Dostoyevski. For that reason such an authoritative critic as Lev Schestov argue that those famous writers are not only great artists, but, above all serious philosophers, and, comparing them with Nietzsche seeks to estimate the philosophical value of their ideas.

Undeniably, there are grounds for such acknowledgements, as far as philosophical trends have partisans among the artists. The impact of the theoretical preferences on the artists creative work

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This article is a little part of the monographical work — "Art between aesthetical theory and reality".

must not be neglected. However, if we want to discuss without simplification not the mere presence of philosophy in the artistic culture in general, but its particular role in art, we should first make clear what we understand by "philosophy" in that context.

The wide influence of philosophy and its presence in art is connected with its function as a world view (or Weltenschauung). There is no other science which deals with -- or at least feels obliged to explain why it does not deal with the most general questions — about Being, place of the man in the world, knowledge, or the hierarchy of values. In that broad meaning, and as far as philosophy is Weltschauung, everybody is a philosopher in one way or another, because either occasionally or on purpose, everbody expresses some views about those traditional philosophical questions. Among those who are especially inclined to discuss them, are the writers : often the longevity and popularity of their work is due to their ability to make the reader think just about the universal problems. while offering him a certain point of view. In that sense "War and Peace" is philosophical book and Tolstoy or Dostoyevski are outstanding philosophers. The same, it seems, can be said about many literary masterpieces. Often a book is considered valuable at least partly, because of the authors philosophical knowledge, which provides the profundity of thought in the artistic work.

Thus, we are told that Thomas Mann was influenced by Schopenhauer, by Freud, that to certain extend Nietzsche's philosophy is also present in his works. Falkner is also supposed to be obliged to the psychoanalysis and if it was not for Bergson the works of Proust would lack some important notions (about "duree" for example).

Such assertions could be in some way true, but as for me — I doubt that the presence of philosophy could so directly improve the value of an art work.

Besides the artist usually is only superficially acquainted with the philosophical concepts and is not closer to the philosophy than the average educated person. It is natural, that being present in the (so called after Scheler) Zeitgeist, certain ideas — philosophical ones as well sometimes badly deformed — penetrate art as one of the elements of its social context.

However, that does not mean that the science of philosophy (philosophy as an attempt of systematical investigation with specific categories) is at its place in the theatre, or the cinema, or in the belles — lettres (excluding the Ancients when the universal knowledge often is expressed only by the means of art). The so called "philosophical" works of art have all the defects of propaganda art — tendentiousness and thematical achromatism. Or, the theoretical content is so heavy and specialized, that the reader has to be especially educated in order to understand and enjoy the work. The circle of conoisseurs is closed. usually those are people who are adepts to certain intellectual fashion. Such works of art are rarely remembered in the history of art — unless they are points of departure of later widely spread artistic trends and therefore they loose their elitism.

I have in mind here the "roman nouveau" type of literature but other examples of the damaging influence of philosophy can be found as well — especially of the type of propaganda art. The literary value of Voltaire's famous novels is considered to be great. The language is light and the wit of the author is amusing. But would we really enjoy ' Candide" if we read it just as a history of the adventures of the hero and his beloved Cunegonde, if we did not know anything about for example, the ontological optimism of Leibnitz ?

Even if it is possible for us to like one of the novels, knowing nothing about the ideas it suggests — the enjoyment is hardly going to continue, if we decide to read the others — "The Voyages of Scarmentado", "Zadig", "Babuk" — everywhere the narration is exactly the same. The hero travels, gets in touch with different cultures—all of which repeat one or another defect of XVIII-century France. The adventures, as well as the suggestions are repeatedly the same. That is inevitable, because, although some say voltaire is a great writer who even develops a new genre — the hero—idea novel, the aim here seems to be just to criticize philosophical concepts or social events by using the means of literature On the other hand, even the most philosophical of the novels, "Macromegas" (which certainly is not understandable, if the reader does not know the main philosophical concepts of the epoque) is nothing more than a sort of philosophical journalism — a criticism offered in a light form. That way, with the help of the novelistic form, Voltaire escapes the necessity to give a strong logical argumentation to his scepticism or to show the reasons of his social beliefs — e.g. in the educated monarch. A belief, which collides with his scepticism, but is compatible with his rationalism. At any case, he does not take the trouble to present his views in a consistent way.

That is the reason why in my view those famous philosophical novels are neither good novels, nor original philosophy.

In our century. the existential philosophy undoubtedly provoked the presence of certain themes in belles — lettres: the alien motif; about the relations between individual and society; about the free will etc. But those questions are eternal in literature. They are expressed not only by XIX-century writers like Dostoyevski, but by Shakespeare and by the ancient greek dramatists. And something more — is not the art of the most philosophical among the existentialists—

J. P. Sartre just boring with the repeated illustrations of "mauvaise foi", the need of authenticity, etc., etc.

I have a suggestive example of the damaging influence of philosophy upon art, and I shall stop a little longer on it. That is the art of St. I. Witkiewicz — a polish dramatist, novelist, philosopher, aesthetician and painter.

He worked in the first half of our century. This partly explains the variety of his interests, because at that time the intelectual atmosphere in which he lived was very rich and interesting. Intellectuals who later became world known not exactly as Polish scholars, were still in their native country at that time. To give just a few examples—the famous sociologists—St. Ossowski and Fl. Znaniecki (who is thought to be American as far as he started the experimental sociology in States), the mathematicians of the Lwowian school — Banach and Ajdukiewicz, Tarski in Warsaw; economists as O. Lange and L. Krzywicki some later M. Kalecki. As well as the best friend of Witkiewiczs youth — the well known latter as British anthropologist — Br. Malinowski. If I am to add the writers — the list would be too long.

Growing up in such a spiritual climate, educated by an ambitious father, Witkacy (as he prefered to be called) tried different fields of artistic creativity; in some of them he succeeded. He began writing plays as a child, at his teens he already was a promising painter, in his early twenties he had finished his first novel. But he wanted still something more.

What can be more than art ? He thought — philosophy. Witkacy began with essays — on Schopenhauer, dualism. He wrote critical articles — against Russell, Carnap, Bergson, Husserl— And all the time he was preparing his philosophical Hauptwerk (as he ironically called it).

Obsessively caught by his philosophical passion, he tried to make philosophy by his art.

The heroes of all his works participate in a long metaphysical discourse and often the author himself adds some remarks. This is not disastrous in the plays, because a good director always succeeds to get rid of the prolonged monologues when putting on stage. That way he finally became famous — he was 'rediscovered" twice — in the sixties in Poland and in the seventies — all over the world. He is still staged in many European capitals, in New York, in Australia and Japan. In his novels, however, the combination between philosophy and art is damaging — for art and ... for the reader. To do Witkacy justice, if should be mentioned here that he denies the novel the right to be called a work of art, because it does not satisfy the principles of his aesthetics — for it is too long, it contains too much "real events" etc. (If I want to be precise, I would have to present Witkiewicz's whole aesthetical theory.) But his novels function as works of art, they can not be called anything else. They are bad works of art though, and exactly because of the philosophy forced into them, in my view.

To make clear what I have in mind I will show Witkiewiczs best known and widely discussed novel — "Insatiability". It is in a way a remarkable book — one of the first antiutopias of our century — after "We" of Zamiatin, but before Orwell's "1984" and "The Brave New World" of Huxley.

Let us see how the narration goes, when philosophical notions and conceptions are directly included.

The hero is going to spend his first love night. He is sure that heaven and the most audacious dreams for happiness is nothing as compared to the diabolical charm of the naked woman he is waiting for. And that is what he thinks at that time: "Only in this world it (the naked body, he means) is an inadequate conglomeration of arbitrary pieces... such an invincible pyramid, which looks nonsensical, the synthesis of which is not a principle, floating somewhere in the "ideal being", but which is something real. That was so simple as any quality (colour, sound, smell) for all of us, and so simple as the sides is for (He, He) — Husserl. And this mankind, which, in the course of so many centuries (naturally from the point of view of rationalism (which, as we know, not always and not for everybody comprise the most clever is acceptable) has entered into the most beautiful religious nonsense and has been deluged lasciviously in it, is now (that's mankind, I guess) indignant at the last convulsions of art, which can not create its dying away world of forms, without slightly deforming the "sacral reality" — that is to say, the vision of the world and the emotions according to the mind of the most banal standard common man of today."

This is a short version — the monologue in the book begins on page 105 with the undressing of the heroine and continues that way up to page 109 — where at last we arrive to the sexual act (of course unsuccessful after much a long philosophical meditations). One can find here almost everything: criticism of Husserl, criticism of the art criticism of that time, Witkacy's own conceptions of the end of art, a "common sense" definition of art, etc., etc.

At the beginning that is amusing — it makes impression of a strange, but original style. But those digressions — one followed by another in with French and English phrases added in brackets and all that philosophical stuffing continues on almost one third of the book. It is easy to imagine how dull it sounds... Even for the educated reader, who not only knows the views of Husserl or Bergson, but who is able to understand the critics against them.

As for me, I think that the real philosophical load of Witkacy's novels is in the general pessimistic mood of solitude and confusion, but to feel that, one does not need any special philosophical knowledge.

Maybe from all that you have got the impression, that Witkacy just lacks talent, that is why, he pushes philosophy in such a way. I do not think that is the case: he was a very interesting painter, his plays are still played all over the world. That is an evidence of talent.

Unfortunately, he is so eager to present his philosophical conceptions, that he simply spoils the effect of his art.

To make it brief — how such books can be evaluated seriously ? They are neither an accomplished philosophy, which supposes scientifical argumentation, nor interesting as art. And it is not only Witkacy's books, but the novels of Voltaire, some of the novels of the Romanticism as well ...

Naturally, those examples are not sufficient for a general rule, but that is not necessery — fortunately the writers with special interests in philosophy are quite few. But I hope, I did provide some doubt in the persuasion of the always positive influence of philosophy on art.

Of course for the comprehension of a work of art one needs some kind of theoretical schooling or at least there has to be some cultural effinity between the artist and his public. Therefore, even in the contemporary world, where because of the mass-media the access to the artistic events is easy the cultural consumers remain distinctive. It is natural that some genres, styles or authors are delightful and understandable to ones and obscure to others. But when the demarcation line between making art and making philosophy or any other sort of science, religion or ideology-vanishes, one gets rarely happy results. Although it happens to exist masterpieces made to order, the straight tendentionsness collides with the aesthetical values. When in addition in order to understand the work of art one needs a philosophical, linguistic or any other specific jargon, the direct emotional impact is lost. That way art looses also its public.

If art tends to be an emotional mediator between the different social groups, the nations, the cultures and it seems to me that is the real prospects of the contemporary art, it has to be communicable. and exactly here — as much as its philosophical content, in the broadest sense of the term, helps by making the work of art universal and commonly accepted, so the excessive commitment to concrete philosophical concepts can be damaging.

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## 11

# An Attempt to Approach the Logical Analysis of Language

*Rajyashri Agrawal*

In the twentieth century, the movemnet of Logical Empiricism, analysis appears to be in the form of Logical Analysis of Language. Logical Empiricists claim that analysis is the one and only legitimate activity of Philosophers. They maintain that, Philosophy is not a doctrine but an activity. They abandon the term *'Philosophy'* altogether as a name, for a distinctive branch of Knowledge, and invent some description for the activity, which they call the activity of Philosophizing, and the activity of Philosophizing is essentially analysis. They claim that Philosophy has to be identified with analysis. In this article, I had made a sincere attempt to approach the Logical analysis of Language in the light of Ayer's analytical Philosophy, because he is known to be the 'Priciple Exponent' of the moment of Logical Empiricism.

Logical Empiricists describe Philosophy in terms of the activity of Philosophizing, and this activity of Philosophizing is the activity of analysis. Now the question is, what do they claim to analyse? Are they sentences of Indicative or Assertive type or Is it the meaning of those sentences called Propositions or Is it the thoughts or beliefs which the sentences express or The statements they are used to make? According to Mr. Strawson[1] analysis of sentences suggests the Grammarion, analysis of thoughts or belief-the Psychologists, analysis of statement-perhaps the Policemen or the Advocate. So, may be, it is best to say that the objects of Philosophical analysis are propositions.

Philosophers claim to analyse propositions. A propositions itself is neither a statement or a sentence, nor is it a judgement, but it is expressed in the form of a sentence, judgement or statement. Thus if a sentence or a statement is meaningful, it expresses genuine proposition.

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[1] Ayer A. J., Revolution in Philosophy, p. 98.

Philosophy is a special branch of knowledge. It is peculiar only by its method, that is the method of analysis. Ayer, the principal exponent of Logical Empiricism, in the very first line of his book, '*The Problem of Knowledge*', writes "It is by its method rather than its subject matter that Philosophy is distinguished from other Arts or Sciences". Every branch of knowledge has its own method of analysis peculiar to its subject matter. Philosophy differs from other Arts or Sciences only by its method of analysis.

Philosophical analysis is neither an analysis as used in science nor is it the type of analysis as of common sense. Philosophers make statements which are intended to be true, and they commonly rely on arguments both to support their own theories as well to refute the theories of others. These Philosophical arguments are peculiar in their character and they differ from Science or Mathematics, for neither the proof of a Philosophical statement consist in informal demonstration as of a Mathematical statement, nor is it tested by observation as of the descriptive sciences. "They are neutral with respect to particular matters of fact."[2]

The function of Science is to describe 'What is fact ?' and the function of Philosophy is to analyse 'What do we mean by fact ?' The Philosopher, as an analyst is not directly concerned with the properties of things, he is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them. Thus Philosophical propositions are not factual but linguistic. They do not describe the behaviour of any physical or mental events but they merely express their definitions. Philosophers ask such questions as 'What is mind ?' 'What is truth ?' 'What is good ?' and so on. It does not mean that they do not know the common usage of these words or expressions. Indeed in doing so, they seek to give an analysis of their meaning.

There is difference between 'the use of an expression' and 'analysis of its meaning'. For example, take the case of 'Knowledge' in the dictionary we see that the verb 'to know' is used in many ways. Such definitions, which a dictionary gives are 'to be aware of or apprised of,' 'to apprehen or comprehend as fact or truth' and so on. To possess the information which the dictionary provides about the accredited uses of the English word 'to know' or the corresponding words in other languages is of course, a necessary qualification for giving an analysis of knowledge, but it is not sufficient. A Philosopher required something more which is not required by a Lexicographer. After having all information Philosophers still ask, 'What is Knowledge?' and then they seek to give an analysis of its meaning.

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[2] Ayer A. J., The problem of Knowledge, p. 7.

Thus Philosophical analysis is essentially the study of language, but it is quite different from that of other important studies of language. Although Linguists, Philologists, Grammarians, Lexicographers, etc. are also involved in a study of language, but Philosophical analysis must not be confused with them For, where as other studies of language deal with scientific questions, such as, how we use our language, what meanings words have, how languages begin, change and die etc. They are interested in discovering facts about these scientific questions. And these scientific questions about language can be answered only through the use of the scientific method. But the analytic Philosopher does not study language in order to formulate such scientific hypothesis about it, because such a study of language is an invaluable tool for him to achieve his primary goal of setting Philosophical questions. The functions of a Philosopher, according to Logical Empiricist, is "to clarify the propositions of Science by exhibiting their logical relationships, and by defining symbols which occur in them."[3]

Logical Empiricism is a combination of Empiricism and Logical Analysis. And it is for this reason that the movement is called Logical Empiricism. The credit for this combination goes to *Wittgenstein*. He felt that there must be a relationship between language and facts. with this aim in view, he wrote '*Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*' which appeared in 1921. This work had a deep impact on the Philosophical thinking of the contemprory Philosophers. Wittgenstein's work is regarded as an attempt to construct the rules of an exact language for the criticism of Metaphysics, because it affirms that "Most of the propositions and questions arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language."[4] According to him "All Philosophy is a critique of language".[5] He says "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."[6] Ayer accepts that the function of philosophy is not to put forward a special set of "*philosophical*" propositions but to make other propositions clear."[7] This was also the view of G. E. Moore. He did use analysis in his philosophical thinking not for the discovery of some 'new facts' about the universe, but only to clarify conceptual confusions. Logical Empiricists themselves accept the contribution of Moore in this context. Ayer maintains that philosophy as a lingulstic analysis "*owes something to the examples of G. E. Moore.*[8] But for Moore analysis was only one of the functions of philosophy. According to him, philosophy is not concerned merely with linguistic expressions but also with the concepts, or propositions or facts, for which they stand. In his view the reduction of philosophy to an enquiry into language was not reasonable consequence of the position which he holds. In Moore's opinion if a philosopher had no mastery of language, he would be as helpless to handle it as a mathematician does not deal with numerals as such but with the numbers which are represented by numerals, similarily a Philosopher's command over language is only a necessary means to the investigation of objective properties of concepts. So Moore shared this with philosophers of other schools. According to Logical Empiricists, the question with which philosophers have really been concerned when they have tried to develop '*Theories of Truth*' are questions of testablity and meaning."[9]

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[3] Ayer, Language Truth & Logic, p. 32.

[4] Tractatus, 4.003.

[5] Ibid, 4.0031.

[6] Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Para 109, p. 47.

[7] Ayer, Language Truth & Logic, p. 26.

Every philosophical movement has its two sides: constructive and destructive. In order to construct his own philosophy a philosopher refutes the view of his opponent. Logical Empiricism has also two sides. Logical Empiricists attempt to destory the metaphsical doctrines of their predecessors and contemporary thinkers, and then they try to construct their own view with the help of the method of logical analysis of a language The aims of logical analysis are-elimination of Metaphysics and the clarification of conceptual confusions. To fulfil these aims Philosophers provide definitions. But it does follow from this that they compile a dictionary. According to Ayer, dictionary definitions are explicit definitions and the definitions which Philosophy is required to provide are definitions in use. In explicit definitions, when we define a symbol, we give another symbol, or symbolic expression which is synonymous with it. The mass definitions which are given by us in every day life are the examples of explicit definitions. Such as 'Occultist is an eye Doctor or Contagious is a disease by contact, or Equanimity is an evenness of mind or Misanthropist is a hater of Mankind.' Philosophy does not concern itself with these explicit definitions, but definitions in use.

A spmbol 'in use' is defined, by showing how the sentences in which it significantly occurs can be translated into equivalent sentences, which contain neither the difiniendum itself nor any of its synonyms. For example a sentence. "The round square cannot exist" is equivalent to "No one thing can be both square and round" and the sentence "The author of Waverley was Scotch" is equivalent to "One person, and one person only, wrote Waverly, and that person was Scotch." By these typical examples, Ayer makes it clear, how 'Definitions in use' is helpful to fulfil the aims of Philosophy. The first example 'The round square cannot exist' provides a typical illustration of the way in which any definite descriptive phrase which occurs as the subject of a negative existential sentence can be eliminated and the second example, 'The author of Waverley was Scotch' was a typical illustration of the way in which definite descriptive phrase which occurs anywhere in any other type of sentence can be eliminated. Philosophical analysis has no use of explicit definitions because it cannot serve the purpose of Philosophical definitions. The purpose of Philosophical definitions is to dispel those confusions which arise from our imperfect understanding of certain types of sentences in our language where the need cannot be met by the provision of a synonym for any symbol either because there is no synonym, or else because the available synonyms are nuclear in the same way as the symbol to which the confusion is due. Ayer claims that a complete philosophical elucidation of any language would consist, first in enumerating the types of sentence that were significant in that language, and then in displaying the relations of equivalence that held between sentences of various types. He explained that two sentences are said to be of the same type when they can be corelated in such a way that to each symbol in one sentence there coresponds a symbol of the same type in the other; and that two symbols are said to be of the same type when it is always possible to substitute one for the other without changing a significant sentence into a piece of nonsense.[10]

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[8] Ayer, The concept of a Person, p. 3.
[9] Ibid, p. 11.

Thus for Philosophical analysis of any language one should know the structure of that language. "A factor which complicates the structure of a language such as English is the prevalance of ambiguous symbols."[11] To say a symbol to be ambiguous is that the signs by which it is constituted are identical not in their sensible form with one another but also with signs which are elements of not such symbol but of other symbol. For it is not merely an identity of form but also an identity of usage which makes two signs elements of the same symbol. Ayer takes the case of the sign "is". If we were guided merely by the form of the sign, we should assume that the 'is' which occurs in the sentence. "he is the author of that book" was the same symbol as the 'is' which comes in the sentence "A cat is a mammal". But, when we translate the sentences, we find that the first is equivalent to 'he, and no one else, wrote the book'

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10 Ayer, Language Truth & Logic, p. 62.

11 Ibid, p. 62.

and the second to 'The class of mammals contains the class of cats'. And this shows that in this instance, each 'is' is an ambiguous symbol which must not be confused with the other, nor with the ambiguous symbols of existence, class, membership, identity and entailment, which also constituted by signs of the form 'is'. In his opinion a symbol is constituted by signs which are identical with one another in their sensible form, and in their significance, and a sign is a sense-content or a series of sense-contents, which are used to convey literal meanings.

But it does not infer from this view that a symbol is collection of sense contents. According to Ayer, when we speak of certain objects b c d ... as being elements of an object e, and of e as being constituted by b c d, we are not saying that they form part of e, in the sense in which my arm is a part of my body. What we are saying is that all the sentences in which symbol occurs can be translated into sentences which do not contain 'e' itself, or any symbol which is synonymous with 'e' but do not contain symbols b, c, d, ... In such a case we say that 'e' is a logical construction out of b,c,d, ... There is a familiar example of a table. The sentence 'I am now sitting in front of a table' can be translated into a sentence which does not mention tables, but only sense contents. To say that tables are logical constructions out of sense-contents is to say, that the symbol 'table' can be explicitly defined in terms of symbols which stand for sense-contents, but only that it can be so defined in use. For definitions in use does not provide a synonym for any symbol but its function is to enable us to translate sentences of a certain type.

Ayer rejects the view, as it is said sometimes that the purpose of such philosophical definitions is to reveal the meaning of certain symbols, or combination of symbols.[12] He objects that it does not give an unequivocal description of the Philosopher's practice, because it implies, in 'meaning' a highly ambiguous symbol. Because of this reason Ayer defines the relation of equivalence between sentences, without referring to 'meaning'. He says that if the sign 'meaning' is to be used in the way in which it is most commonly used, it must not be said as two sentences having the same meaning for any one, unless the occurrence of one always has the same effect on his thoughts and actions as the occurrence of the other. But he says, "It is possible for two sentences to be equivalent, by one criteria, without having the same effect on any one who employs the language. For instance, "P is a law of nature" is equivalent to "P is a general hypothesis which can always be relied on"; but the associations of the symbol "law" are such that the former sentence tends to produce a very different psychological effect on its equivalent".

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12 Ibid, p. 68.

Thus Philosophy is not concerned with the meaning of symbols. Because of its ambiguity "meaning" leads the undiscerning critic to judge the result of a philosophical enquiry by a criterion which is not applicable to it, but only to an empirical enquiry concerning the psychological effect which the occurrence of certain symbols has on a certain group of people. Therefore he concludes, "Such empirical enquiries are, indeed, and important element in sociology and in the scientific study of a language; but they are quite distinct from the logical equiries which constitute Philosophy". Ayer also rejects the view that philosophy tells us how certain symbols are used. For he argues, this suggests that the propositions of philosophy are factual propositions concerning the behaviour of a certain group of people, and this is not the case. For example, "The Philosopher who asserts that, in the English language, the sentance 'The author of Waverley was Scotch' is equivalent to "one person, and one person only wrote Waverley, and that person was Scotch" is not asserting that all, or most of the English speaking people use these sentences interchangeably. What he is asserting is that, in virtue of certain rules of entailment, namely those which are characteristics of "correct" English, every sentence which is entailed by "The author of Waverley was Sctoch" in conjunction with any given group of sentences, is entailed also by that group, in conjunction with "One person and one person only, wrote Waverley, and that person was Scotch". Thus he asserts that "English speaking people should employ the verbal convention; that they do so is indeed, an empirical fact. But the deduction of relations of equivalence from the rules of entailment which characterise the English, or any other language is a purely logical activity; and it is in the logical activity and not in any empirical study of the linguistic habits of any group of people, that analysis consists".[13]

Ayer further tells that in most cases, the definitions are obtained from conventions which do, in fact, correspond to the conventions which are usually observed by some group of people. And it is a necessary conditon of the utility of the definitions, as a means of clarification, that this should be so. But the existence of such a correspondence is never part of what the definition actually asserts.[14] He provides an example "If I wish to refute a philosophical opponent I do not argue about people's linguistic habits. I try to prove that his definition involves a contradiction. For example, he is maintaining that "A is a free agent" is equivalent to "A's actions are uncaused". Then I refute him by getting to admit that a free agent" is entitled by "A is morally responsible for his actions", Whereas "A's actions are uncaused" entails "A is not morally responsible for his actions," Thus he refutes his definitions on the basis that they involve contradiction. "A is morally responsible for his actions." and "A is not morally responsible for his actions" is nothing but a contradiction,

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[13] Ibid, p. 69-70.

[14] Ibid, p. 70.

Ayer remarks that "the process of analysing a language is facilitated if it is possible to use it for the classification of its forms an artificial system of symbols whose structure is known.[15] Russell and Whitehead employed "the best known example of such a symbolism" the so called system of logistic in their famous work *Principia Mathematica.* But the language in which analysis is carried out should not be necessarily different from the language analysed. Ayer differs from Russel when he suggested that "every language has structure concerning which, in the language, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing which the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure. And that to this hierarchy of language there may be no limit."[16] According to Ayer this was written presumably in the belief that an attempt to refer to the structure of a language in the language itself would lead to the occurence of logical paradoxes. But Ayer agrees with Carnap who by actually carrying out such an analysis, has subsequently shown that language can without self-contradiction be used in the analysis of itself.[17] Ayer clearly says, "The view of Philosophy which we have adopted may fairly be described as a form of empiricism. For he says it is characteristic of an empiricist to rescue Metaphysics on the ground that every factual propositions must refer to sense-experience. And even if the conception of philosophizing as an activity of analysis is not be discovered in the traditional theories of empiricists, we have seen that it is implicit in their practice."[18] Thus in the logical empiricist movement, philosophical analysis is shown in the form of logical analysis of language. By the logical analysis they clarify the conceptual confustions, and in doing so, they also eliminate the metaphysical propostions, because they are due to conceptual confusions. But by reducing philosophy into analysis, we make its field too narrow. And it is not much to say that the thesis of logical empiricism is a major attempt to philosophical suicide. All the great Philosophers of the world devoted themselves to an investigation of the basic principles of knowledge and reality. Does it mean that all such investigations which inspired and guided mankind for thousands of years are simply nonsense? C. E. M. Joad in his

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[15] Ibid, p. 70-71.

[16] Introduction to L. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, p. 23.

[17] Language Truth & Logic, p 71.

[18] Ibid, p. 71.

Critque of Logical Positivism, admits that philosophy has had the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue...... if logical positivism is right, philosophy cannot perform this function. It cannot help us to understand the universe, it cannot provide us with a synoptic view of the whole whose different departments are explored by the sciences and it cannot light up the dark places of the world. For there is not universe other than the different departments of natural fact explored by the sciences and the world contains no dark places at least if certain matters are still obscure, that is only because science has not yet pushed its research for enough.[19]

Kalidas Bhattachrya in his philosophy Logic and Language, writes, "...language Is secondary, if philosophy is granted only this secondary task of expressing what is known not only would this be undignified for philosophy, really there would be no task left for it, because every science and concrete discipline is under an equal obligation to express its points precisely. If certain expressions are clumsy or misleading, or if they give rise to puzzles and contradictions, it is for the respective sciences to be on their guard against them and correct them. Philosophy can do nothing here, because precision is to be effected by reference to the reals accepted as data, or established, by those sciences themselves".[20]

Analysis is, of course, a valuable tool for removing certain barriers in the way of clear philosophical thinking and I agree with Ayer that analysis increases our understanding of certain sentences. And this is a benefit which the author of such a definition confers not only on others but also on himself. But when Ayer claims that Philosophy is lingustic analysis, it is not a doctrine but an activity, i.e the activity of philosophizing, and the activity of philosophizing is analysis. I do'nt agree with him. For if it is so, the question arises, can analysis be regarded as an end in itself? If analysis of propositions is an end in itself, then Philosophy is reduced to either linguistic or logic. But it is different from them, and is also more than them. Philosophy is primarily an investigation into truth and values, and both of them are the standards on the basis of which propositions can be declared to be true or false. Analysis ignores the concrete realities of human situations for which all Philosophy is intended. A man cannot remain completely satisfied only with analysis in isolation from the values of life in the light of which an individual tries to realise the potentiality of his personality and seeks truth beauty, happiness, justice, etc... as the highest human values. Philosophy is therefore more concerned with reality and values.

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[19] Joad C. E. M , Critique of Logical Positivism, p. 29-30.

[20] Bhattacharya, Kalidas, Philosophy Logic & Language, p. 11-12.

# The Ontological Foundation of the Agape Phenomenon

*Robert B. McLaren*

Three major traditions which held that values are either decreed by a Divine Being, or are somehow imbedded in the Natural Order, or are Absolutes transcending the Natural Order, were challeneged and considered laid to rest by Hume. Spencer, Nietzsche, and others prior to the opening of the 20th century. The work of Moore, Ayer, and Stevenson have been thought by many to have administered the *coup de grace* to these traditions. Among the values denied any rational basis or objective status, love was especially vulnerable, having been reduced by Freud, Skinner, and their "schools" to biological urges and social conditioning.

The persisting experience of love however, not simply as the passionate drive of *Eros*, nor the fraternal affections of *Phileo*, but as a life sustaining and ennobling force called *Agape*, has prompted challenges to those who would deny its reality. Social scientists and many from the "hard" sciencies are found among the ranks of philosophers who insist that some values, especially *Agape*, are grounded in an *Ontos On* which may in fact be characterised as Personal and purposing.[1] These values include bonds, both natural and spiritual which enhance our human relationships. The *Agape* phenomenon is unique in that it fosters bonds with friend and foe alike, transcending the natural impulses to self defense, retribution and revenge. It is perceived by many to be the one ground for optimism for our species which at present seems bent on self destruction.

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[1] It is well remembered that Albert Einstein, while cautioning about "this concept of a Personal God", nevertheless declared that "All religions, arts and sciences are branches of the same tree", and asked "Are we not all children of one father, as it is said in in religious language?" *Out of My Later Years* New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. On another occasion he affirmed his belief that this Ultimate Reality is personal in nature. *Cf. All*

## I Defining the Ties That Bind

Of the many kinds of bonds that unite human beings in common ventures from the natural, e.g. "imprinting", and "maternal instinct",[2] to such voluntary bonds as friendship and falling in love[3], to the enforced bonds of legal contrivance which seek to reinforce the natural and the voluntary for social stability [4] none has so

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*Church Press*. January 8, 1960. This view was echoed by physicist Arthur H. Compton, *Man's Destiny in Eternity*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1949, and by Psychiatrist Karl Meninger, in *Love Versus Hate*, where he affirms the Ultimate Reality to be "Sovereign power, order and goodness". New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942, p 212 More recently, in *Biology and Ethics*, Basil Mitchel, of Oxford, reflects on the fact that while ethics is often presented as created by society, the major leaders in ethical history were moving against society, in affirming their advanced forms which they believed were revealed from a trans-natural, trans-historical Source. *Biology and Ethics*, edited by F. J, Ebling, London: Academic Press, 1969, pp. 37-42. *Cf.* John Polkinghorn's *The Way the World Is*, London: Triangle, 1983; John Eccles, and Karl Popper *The Self and Its Brain*, Heidelberg: Springer International 1977 The discussion on pp. 555-558 comes to light a bit more clearly in Eecles' 1985 book, *The Wonder of Being Human*, with Daniel Robinson, Boston: New Science Libraray, especially the two final chapters. The temptation to *Argumentum ad verecundiam* is of course painfully evident, but one may at least observe that the conviction that values are ontologically grounded is not simply an exercise of minds untrained in disciplined thought. Cf. Henry Veatch's splendidly argued *For an Ontology of Morals*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.

[2] Cf. Lorenze, K. Z. "Imprinting", in Birney, R. C., and Trevan, R.C. (editors): *Instinct*, London: Van Nostrand, 1961; Bowlby, J., Attachment, New York: Basic Books. 1969.

[3] *Cf.* Rosenhan, D., "Prosocial Behavior in Young Children" in Hartup. W.W., (editor): *The Young Child*, Volume II, Washington D. C: National Association for the Education of Young Children, 1972: Rubin, Z., *Liking and Loving: An Invitation to Social Psychology*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1973.

[4] Aimond, Brenda, *Moral Concerns*. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey Humanities Press International, 1987. In Chapter Three, Dr. Almond raises a question which she also raised at the *Societas Ethica* conference In Debrecen, Hungary, August 1987. She asks whether legislative rigidity is appropriate in a modern society, where people must struggle between fidelity to a once

attracted the interest of humankind as a whole as love. Yet love has many definitions, and most of these bespeak bonds which are wholly different from and in cases antithetical to the phenomenon called love as *Agape*.[5]

To understand the uniqueness of *Agape*, it is not neccssary to examine all other forms of love in detail, though a brief introduction to some of these will prove useful. In essence these all belong to the legacy of *Eros*. In the Theogony of Hesiod (c. 800 B. C.) *Eros* was a minor deity, representing passion and fertility but also (as in Plato's *Phaedrus*, and *Symposium*), the impelling attraction to universal Ideas. *Eros* is boundless desire to find fulfillment not alone in sensual pleasures, but in a variety of expressions religious as well as mundane, and above all in the quest for union with *The All*. It is primitive faith's deepest longing, and came to the medieval and modern worlds through Neoplatonism. But as such it is sharply at variance with *Agape*[6].

*Agape* has been called "spiritual love", but this is a misnomer. *Agape* transcends humankind's "spiritual" capabilities as surely as it transcends the physical. But if this is true, the question of its origin is unavoidable. A brief examination of "pre-loving" bonds, as well as of normative love will be useful as a background for considering *Agape*, and its ontological origin.

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voluntary bond, and freedom to pursue a perceived personal fulfillment in extra marital alliances. The question is not a new one historically, and her appeal for acceptable compromises appears to leave the question unanswered.

[5] The popular three fold division of love into *Eros*, (usually identified as biological passion); *Phileo*, or "brotherly love" which includes love of family as well as of country and even humankind in general; and *Agape* as "spiritual love", derives from the Socratic Greek. To these, Sociologist Lloyd Saxon distinguishes between romantic and passionate love, companionate love, and altruism, and contrasts Erotic love (whose whole aim is sexual fulfillment) with "Ludus love" which is flirtatious but unfocused. Developmental Psychologists Clara Schuster, and Shirley Ashburn, identify as many as thirteen different forms of love. *Cf.* Saxton, Lloyd. *The Individual, Marriage and Family*, Belmont California : Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1982, Chapter 5; Schuster, Clara, and Ashburn, Shirley, *The Process of Human Development*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company 1986, Chapter 30.

[6] De Rougemont, Denis, *Love in the Western World*, Montgomery Belgion, translator, New York : Pantheon Books, 1956 De Rougemont makes virtually all forms of human affection into expressions of earth bound *Eros*, which appears similar in force to Freud's *Libido*, thus setting *Agape* completely apart. See his comment on p. 7, where he admits being accused widely that "I contrast Eros with Agape in too uncompromising a fashion".

## II Pre-Love and the Modes of Eros

Relying heavily on the work of Charles Darwin, ethologists like Konrad Lorenz, John Bowlby, and Burton White have noted that among many lower animals, a phenomenon called "imprinting" (or *Pragung* to use Lorenz' term) binds the newborn to their parents with powerful emotional force. This is a "pre-loving" bond which corresponds to "maternal instinct" and has obviously great survival value for the offspring. A team of researchers at Duke University has demonstrated how the failure of such bonding to take place effects the release of brain peptides which promote or inhibit protein synthesis and hence the growth of the newborn.[7]

While this is not love in the sense of involving conscious loyalty, or an enduring reciprocal affection, "family life" among most animals ceasing as soon as the young can forage independently, Paul Ekman observes such pre-love bonding among humans. He notes that an infant's recognition of, and response to facial expressions of the caregivers. suggests that "the central nervous system of human beings is genetically previred for the facial expression of emotion."[8] Rudolf Schaffer and Peggy Emerson observe that, as with Lorenze' ducklings, which will attach themselves to the first thing in the environment that moves (which may be the mother, but may also be Lorenz himself, or even a football), human infants are "indiscriminate" in their bonding.[9]

Developmentalists are in general agreement with Erik Erikson, that for a child to develop the capacity for matute love, there must first exist a loving environment in which the child can learn to trust.[10] "We are molded and remolden," wrote Francois Mauriac, "by those who have loved us; and though the love may pass, we are nevertheless their work for good or ill".[11] Yet as we mature and experience progressively the many forms of bonds from filial and sibling affection, to friendships which may be as strong as found

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[7] Barnes, Deborah M., "Meeting on the Mind", A Report of the American College of Neuropsychopharmachology, in Science, Volume 239, p. 142.

[8] Ekman, Paul, "Universals in Cultural Differences in Facial Expressions of Emotion", in Cole, J. K. (Editor). Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Volume 19, Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press, 1972.

[9] Schaffer, H. Rudolph, and Emerson, Peggy E., "The Development of Social Attachments in Infancy, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 29 (3), 1964.

[10] Erikson, Erik, Childhood and Society, New York : Norton, 1963.

[11] Mauriac, Francois, quoted in Vander Zanden, James W., Human Development, New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1985, p. 206.

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among those who would lay down their lives for each other, and on to romantic ties celebrated by poets throughout history, we are still in the mode of *Eros*.

The distinction between *Agape* and *Eros* is sometimes made with reference to the sacred and profane. Anders Nygren has argued that *Eros* has nothing to do with the sacred[12], and that even Plato's "heavenly *Eros*", which seeks to transport one to spiritual realms, is a human effort albeit "religious" and not to be confused with *Agape*, which comes to us as a gift from God. As far back as one can go in human history, one finds *Eros*, and at best only a hint of *Agape*. In the *Vedas* of Hinduism, for example, *Kāma* designates desire, wish, striving, but almost always with the notion of worldly achievement implied. In the *Rig Veda*, *Kāma* appears as the bonding force of the cosmos, the force of cohesion and of becoming. It was at times intellectual as well as sensual: "Desire (*Kāma*) ... was the first seed of mind. Sages seeking in their hearts with wisdom found out the bond of the existent and the non-existent".[13] The contrasting word, *Prema*, is the closest approximation to divine love, in that it is "pure and spotless, with no trace of *kāma* in it." But it is not yet analogous with *Agape* because, as the *Vivarta-vilasa* tells us, "*Prema* is derived from *Kāma*". *Agape*, on the other hand does not derive from something lower than itself, but is perceived as a capacity for loving granted to us by the Creator, and whose characteristics are unlike those associated with *Eros*.

## II

The distinctive qualities of love as *Agape* can perhaps best be identified by contrasting them with *Eros* as found in human history. If humankind is assumed to have evolved from lower species of the animal kingdom, it is not surprsing to find that in virtually all behaviors we are akin to the animal, including our affectional bonds. Certainly in our basic hungers for food, procreation, shelter, and other activities related to self-preservation, we are little different. It may even be as Sociobiologists suggest that such virtues as kindness and altruism are biologically based.[14]

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[12] Nygren, Anders, Agape and Eros, translated by Philip S. Watson, New York : Harper Torcobook, 1969 p. 51.

[13] Siegel, Lee, Sacred and Profane Dimensions of Love in India Delhi and London : Oxford University Press, 1978. pp. 68 69.

[14] Cf. Mitchell, Basil, in *Biology and Ethics*, edited by F. J. Ebling, London: Academic Press, 1969, pp. 37f; Wilson Edmund O, *Sociobiology*. Cambridge, Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 1975; Batten, Mary, "Sociobiology, A New View of Human Nature, in *Human Development*, Guilford, Connecticut: Dushkin Publishing Group, 1983, p. 5.

*Eros* gives rise to all these self-preserving activities, whether at the individual or societal levels. One of the most striking expressions of this in human history has been the motif of revenge. Contrary to the romantic tradition of the "Noble Savage", the earliest marks of primitive humanity bear evidence of violent murder. Literature from ancient civilizations reveals that vengeance was an expected response to injury, the episode of Agememnon's reprisal for Trojan "treachery" being a single example : "Let us not spare a single one of them not even the child unborn and in its mother's womb; let not a man of them be left alive, but let all in Ilius perish, unheeded and forgotten."[15] This was said not in wrath alone, but was justified on grounds that love of those earlier slain by the Trojans demanded such revenge.

The themes of love (as *Eros*) and War can be found woven with strains of religious fervor in the Hebrew Scripture : "O that Thou wouldst slay the wicked, O God ... Do I not hate them that Hate Thee, O Lord ? I hate them with a perfect hatred "(Psalm 139:19f). Warfare justified is in the sacred literature of the Hindu tradition,[16] as well as in Islam.[17] Themes of love and revenge in private quarrels, and at levels of State abound in Roman literature[18] and, despite the emphasis on *Agape* among most early Christians, reappears in the knightly tales of the medieval world during Christianity's expansion, and on into the Age of Chivalry and beyond Indeed nothing has so discredited Christianity as the willingness of so many of its adherents across the centuries, to abandon the gift of *Agape*, and return to the strategies of *Eros*, in the pretext of showing love to God, Church, Nation or family. From the enthusiasm with which wars are fought, and violence and lust are celebrated in films, novels and plays, it is clear that the *Agape* phenomenon is still in the emerging state.

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[15] Homer, *The Iliad*, Chicago : The University of Chicago, The Great Books, 1952, p. 40, Book VI, lines 57-60.

[16] In the *Mahabharata*, we read the story of adventures of Arjuna, who argued against the idea of war with the deity Krishna, but was persuaded by the latter that warfare is sometimes justified, and went on to become one of the most battle-experienced warriors of Hindu history.

[17] "Holy war", called *Jihad*, is supported by the *Qur'an* (*S IX 20*), as "fighting in God's cause" (*note 1270*). Mere fighting for i s own sake is condemned, and Allah declares that "When we decide to destroy a population, We first send a definite order (which gives every chance to the wicked to repent)". (*S XVII. 16*; *note 2191*).

[18] Cato, the statesman (234-149 B. C.) who spoke so eloquently about the virtues of Roman life, reveals with striking clarity the double standard of morals in his day : "If you surprise your wife committing adultery, you may kill her without waiting for a legal verdict, and without fear of punishment. But if you are the one who commits adultery she would not dare touch you with the tip of her finger. What is more, she would not have the right to do so". Grimal, Pierre, *Love in Ancient Rome*, translated by Arthur Train, New York ; Crown Publishers, Inc., 1967, p. 102.

### III The Emergence of *Agape*

The *Agape* phenomenon is not the sole province of Christianity though it recieved its first concrete explication in the New Testament. The Second Century scholar, Marcion, erred when he contrasted the Hebrew scriptures as portraying a God of wrath, with the New Testament as revealing a God of love. To be sure there were periods of intense nationalism when the Israelites appealed to their deity for vengeance on their foes, and sometimes justified their violence in the deity's name. But during the centuries of the Prophets, the emphasis was clearly contrary to much of that history, when the Prophets declared the love of God for all humankind (*Hesed*), insisting that as God loves them they must love each other, strangers as well as friends.[19]

The *Agape* phenomenon emerged in the New Testament as complete, self-giving love which extended not only to friends and strangers but to all humankind, including one's enemies. Love for enemies is the most radical expression of love, for it runs contrary to all forms of self-interest or even self preservation.[20] It is thus not a mere refinement of some "natural" impulse, nor could it have emanated (as in Neoplatonism) from an impersonal "Oversoul" because it is the most intensely personal of all human experiences.

Perhaps the most telling aspect of the Agape phenomenon is that among those who have fully apprehended it, it comes neither as evolution nor choice, but as command : "Thou shall love". The

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[19] It is significant that at the time in the ancient world, there was no word in most current languages for "stranger" that did not imply enemy, the Hebrew people were told God's will was that they must love the neighbor as they loved themselves (*Leviticus 19:18*), ..."and love the stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt". (*Deuteronomy 10:19*).

[20] While the Hebrews invoked love of neighbors and strangers, love of enemies is unique to Christianity. "Even the most skeptical of scholars have admitted that the "love your enemies" saying in the form of a command goes back to Jesus... it was not found in Judaism". Klassen, William. *Love of Enemies*, Philadelphia : Fortress Press, 1984, p. 84, Klassen questions Rudolf Bultmann's argument against the concept of love for enemies being found at least latently in Hebrew thought, but notes that no precise statement of it has yet been found.

Source of the command is beyond empirical investigation, because our investigating tools, our epistemologies are of our own contrivance. This is why Paul Tillich insisted that perception of *Agāpe* is a consequence of faith, faith being a form of knowledge of "being grasped by a Spiritual Presence".[21] This can only be understood ontologically, because while all human love (*Eros*) is frought with ambiguities, "*Agape* is unambiguous love and impossible for the human spirit by itself".[22] *Eros* is ego-centric and loves to get; *Agape* loves to give, and requires no response or reward.[23] *Eros* demands that it preserve itself, and above all its honor and spiritual identity. *Agape* is willing to lose itself in service to others, and would choose death rather than inflict death on others. Further, it acknowledges its own inability to sustain such an effort on human terms, and declares "We love (*Agape*) because He first loved us."[24] De Rougemont, reflecting on this, notes that this is a prospect "natural" humanity has always been unable to imagine, because we have always put our faith in *Eros*, to vindicate ourselves, to be conquerers even while we are lovers. But *Eros* can lead, ultimately, only to death, while *Agape* binds us to each other and to that Ultimate Reality which is life and love. Yet *Agape* does not cancel *Eros*; it fulfills that which *Eros*, by itself, could hardly dream of. In this sense, *Agape* rescues *Eros*[25].

In a world at war with itself, with weapons of ultimate destruction, the Agape phenomenon may be our last and best hope.

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[21] Tillich, Paul, *Systematic Theology*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1963, Volume III, p. 134.

[22] *ibid* p. 135. Tillich adds : "*Agape* is an ecstatic manifestation of the Spiritual Presence. It is possible only in unity with faith and is the state of being drawn into the transcendent unity of unambiguous life," (p. 137).

[23] The classic statement in which *Agape* is described (though not defined) and delineated by revealing what it is not : "...is not jealous or boastful; it is not arrogant or rude...does not insist on having its own way..." is in Paul's first letter to the *Corinthians, Chapter 13.*

[24] *I John 4 19*. This chapter is perhaps second only to Paul's letter to the Corinthians in its explication of Agape, and its conviction that Agape comes from God alone.

[25] De Rougemont, *op. cit.*, pp. 311f.

# IV

# Concept of Time in the Philosophy of Bhartrhari

*D. N. Tiwari*

## I

After Pānini and Patanjali the name which is taken with high regards in the philosophy of Grammar is Bhartṛhari. The concept of Time which is proposed here for discussion is based, chiefly, on the first part and the ninth chapter of the third part of Vākypadiya (Kālasamuddesh) which is attributed to Bhartṛhari.

Originally, the approach of Bhartrhari is that of grammarians who deal with letter, word, sentence, language, meaning, analysis and construction of a system of Grammar. The remarkable contribution of Bhartṛhari to Indian Philosophy lies in his search of a well-consistent spiritual philosophy while dealing with the issues of Grammar, Kāla-Samuddesh which presents the philosophy of Time is such an example which proves that the approach of Bhartṛhari is not only that of a Grammarian but it is speculative too. He expounds Time philosophically which is unfamiliar in the system of Grammar.

## II

The word Time is defined differently by different thinkers. It is described as power (Śakti), soul (Ātman) and God (Devatā). Defining soul as Time[1], Helārāja, the commentator, explains that Time is Bhutatman (Individual soul), which stands for power, as there alone appears the sequence. Again, as the time-division results from the soul (Bhūtātman), he, by implication, alone is called Time. Ātman in Bhartrhari is Brahman and the dyanamism of Brahman is called

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[1] Śaktyatmadevatā Paksairabhinnam Kālasya Darasanam/Prathamam tad avidyāyam Yaḍ Vidyāyām na Vidyate, K, S. 62.

Time. Commenting the third alternative Helārāja explains that as the Time is a great power it is called God (Devatā) 'Devatā', here, is used in singular number and it indicates the singleness of the Great power (Time). Viewing these opinions, Helārāja confirms Bhartṛhari's opinion of Time as independent power of Brahman[2]. The term 'independent power' may be explained in three ways. First. Time as the dynamic power or dynamism of reality is the nature of Brahman. Due to this power, Brahman creates the world and even when there is no creation, Time, in inherent Form (as the nature of reality) is 'there' in the reality and does not depend on any other reality for its existence and knowledge.

Secondly, the powers of Time power like sequence, present, past, future, decomposition etc., as the expression of Time power, depend upon Time but the Time power itself is independent of all these powers. For example the currents, bubbles etc., are the creations of water which depend upon water but they do not create any change in water. The water is independent of all these changes.[3]

Thirdly, Bhartṛhari himself uses Time as an independent power of Brahman on account of its creativity.[4] Bhartṛhari does not explain any difference between the Time-power and the power of creation. The creation is in sequence and that is due to Time. Brahman, on account of this power which expresses itself into divisions like moments, minutes, hours, years etc., owing to which modes like birth, death etc. take place, is called ommipotent.[5] Time power plays permission as well as prevention like sport, independent of any purpose to fulfil and that is why it seems justified to accept the Time as independent power of Brahman. Time is substratum on which objects and their condition play and which in all the movements remains the same. The walkers and their movements pass away but the road remains the same. In order to clarify it, we can take the example of seasons like spring, autumn etc. When we say that spring has started and the autumn has finished, we mean the end of activities associated with Autumn and (starting of activities associated with spring). The Time running in all the activities associated with different seasons remains independent of all those changes.[6]

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[2] Svātantrya Śaktihkālah. K.S. 14 and H C. on K.S. 62.

[3] V. P. Bhāva pradipa commentary Introduction, p. 13-84.

[4] Kālakhyena hi svatantryena sarvah partantrā Janmavatyah Śaktyah Samāvistah Kālaśaktivṛtti V.P. 1/3 Harivṛiṭṭi.

[5] Advāhitakalām Yasya Kālaśaktimupaśṛitah/Janmādaya Vikārāh Sada Bhāvabhedasya Yonayah, V.P. 3. Bhāvapradip on V.P. 3

[6] Nirabhāsopagama Yoam Kramavāna eva dṛsyate. Akramasyapi Viśvasya ṭaṭ Kālasya vicestitam, K.S. 46.

## III

This is a special contribution of Bhartṛhari that he, admitting the empirical divisions of Time, elucidates the Time as a transempirical or transcendental category (Anuṭṭara). Even at the state of void of the oneness, the Time, in the inherent form (we mean suspending creation) is there in the Brahman as His nature.[7] If the Reality is dynamic and the creation is the dynamism of Reality, the dynamism without a sequence, and the sequence without the Time is unthinkable. The fact of dynamism implies Time and in tune with this logic, Bhartṛhari accepts the transcendental existence of Time-power of Brahman. Time, as, the power of Brahman is there in Brahaman with expression and without expression. The reason is that like permission, suspension for Bhartṛhari, is also a power of Time-power and again excluding permission and suspension both, he accepts the existence of the Time-power; and that is why like Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika Time in Bhartṛhari is eternal though unlike Vaiśeṣikas he does not admit the external existence of Time. A later Naiyāyika Raghu Nātha Śiromani like Bhartṛhari accepts the Time as power of God[8] Sānkhya and Buddhism do not accept the external existence of Time but they deny Time as a transcendental category. For them, Time is mere conventional and therefore only an empirical phenomenon. In Advaita Vedānta, Time is a product of Māyā and has a Prātibhāsika existence only. Bhartṛhari is only such a thinker with whom alone the thinking on Time is philosophised consistently. He accepts the immanent and the transcendent, both aspects of Time. As Bhartṛhari accepts the creation and prevention both as the powers of Time-power, there is no logical difficulty in accepting the existence of Time power suspending creation.[9] Abhinavagupta, a Kāśmiri Philosopher of the 10th century who has shared and extended the philosophy of Bhartṛhari also accepts the reality as a dynamic one. Śiva and Śakti are identical. Śiva ceases to be Śiva in the absence of power (Śakti) which is the creativity of Śiva[10] While discussing thirty six substances of creation, Abhinavagupta places Time on tenth in succession and that is one among the five creations of Māyā. He like Bhartṛhari accepts permission and suspension as the powers of Time which through present, past and future appears as having sequence.[11] According to him sequence or succession is Time.[12] The power which produces the appearance is called Kāla Śakti or Parameśwari Śakti.[13].

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[7] K.A.S. Iyer's comment on V.P. K.S. 75.

[8] Padārtha tattva Nirupaṇa, p 1-2.

[9] Helārāja commentary on V.P. K.S. 74

[10] Tantrāloka, AA. L, P. 109.

[11] I.P.V.B. 2, p. 208.

Now it is clear that Abhinavagupta like Bhartṛhari describes Time as a power but. unlike the opinion of Bhartrhari, this power is not an independent power of reality but a product of Māyā which is the sixth creation. Abhinavagupta like Bhartṛhari elucidates that Time is associated with objects and their activities but unlike Bhartrhari' he does not accept Time as a transcendental category (Anuttara).

Now a question arises, if the Time is tenth subsequential creation among thirty six substances (from Śiva to Panca Mahābhuta) the creation may logically be acknowledged in sequence (only when Time is created i e. after ninth creation), is there any reasonable ground, to describe the subsequential creation of Śakti, Sada·śiva, Īśvara, and śuddhavidyā tattva and the three elements of Aśuddha Adhvā i.e. Kalā, Vidyā, Rāga which are prior to the creation of Time ? The sequence in creation is there, in creation of the substances, prior to Time. Is sequence possible without Time or sequence itself is the Time ? If sequence itself is the time then he has to accept that the Time is a creative power of reality like Bhartṛhari. Abhinavagupta accepts sequence as Time. If sequence is Time, it is there in the reality before all creation then why Abhinavagupta and other Kāsmir Philosophers confuse the whole phenomena by accepting the creation of Time as tenth among thirty six creations ? If Time is the tenth, we should not notice the creations and sequence in creations prior to the creation of Time. Abhinavagupta has tried to solve this problem by saying that the creation prior to Time is sequenceless and this sequence lessness appears as if having sequence.[14] This is not atleast a logic but an excuse that goes against the consistency of this thinking on Time.

## IV

The Time, in Bhartṛhari, is called an Instigating power (Prayojaka); as the creation, manifestation and prevention of things depend on the impulsion of Time[15]. An Exact discrimination between two ending activities inherent in separate objects is possible only if there is a linking factor.[16] Activities are the collections of many movement and as these movements are not simultaneous, the activity has a sequence.[17] It is Time which is the cause of 'done quickly' or 'done slowly'. Like different activities or some activity and

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12 Krama eva ca kālo, I.P.V.B. 2, p. 9.

13 I.P.V.B. 2, p 13.

[14] Sattrinsattva samdoha, p. 1.

[15] V.P.K.S. 17.

[16] V.P.K.S. 27.

[17] V P K.S. 30.

different beings. Time is not different. If the Time is different, the continued apprehension is not possible[18] This character of Time power removes the differences of cause and effect and thus they are indifferent substantially[19] as, For example, the spring season and the activities associated with it.

Time in Bhartṛhari, is a measuring power of every activity. He gives the analogy of a balance or an expert hand.[20] Just as the weight of various elements can be measured by a balance or by export hands in the same way the single Time employing its powers measures the series of activities of which diversity appears through the differences of actions. For example the growth[21] of *Palm Tree* and that of *bamboo* Here Time is taken as divided in 'Palm-growth' time and 'bamboo-growth time'.

The Word kāla represents all the characteristics maintained above. The literal meaning of the word Time (Kāla) is that which turns out (Kālayati) all the beings (Kalāh) (sentient and insentient). As a constant course of change, like Waterwheel, the Time turns out (Kālayati) all the Beings (Kalāh). In a different sense the word Kāla is interpreted as one that creates all kinds of effects (kālāh) in the cycle (Kālayati). Through this Time power Brahman expresses (Kālayati) his dynamism[22] Bhartṛhari writes 'all the effects are attached to the string of Time just as the bird baits are attached to the string of a hunter.[23] As the actions of the bird like flying away' and again 'coming back' is convened and controlled by the hunter, this power of Brahman, by overflowing and inflowing, manifests and suspends the manifestation. The world is taken as the effect of this operation of the dynamism of Brahman[24] In Kāla-Sammuddeśa. Bhartṛhari uses the word Time in the sense of that which passes (jahāti) or abandons the actions associated with it and that is why it is Hāyana (year).[25] Thus time is the creative and controlling power which is associated with the changes in objects or action and surpassing them all. Only in this case, Time is all pervasive (Vibhu). Bhartṛhari has used the word 'EKAM' (Single) in two senses.[26] The First :— the Time power is one and the divisions like past, present, future, moment, hour, yesterday, today, spring, winter, month, year etc. are the expressions of it; and the differentiation of divisions is conventional.

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[18] V P K.S. 21-22.

[19] V P.K S. 18.

[20] V. P.K S 28.

[21] V.P.K S. 73.

[22] V.P.K S. 14.

[23] V.P.K.S. 15.

[24] Adyāhita kalām Yasya Kālaśaktimupāśṛtah, V.P, Bramakānd, 3.

[25] V.P.K.S. 29.

[26] V.P.K.S. 13.

Secondly, the singleness of Time and the divisions of Time represent, the immanence and transcendence both aspects of Time power which are required to explain the conceptual perfection of Time power at a rational level). The power of Brahman and the powers of the power of Brahman are ultimately nothing but Brahman.

## V

Commenting on the creativity of Brahman Helārāja comments that consciousness (Brahman) in Paśyanti-stage appears as if it has expressed in a sequence through Time and revealed changes from one stage to another in due order.[27] For the Bhartṛhari was the word Vivarta[28] and Pariṇāma[29]. Generally the commentators and scholars of Bhartṛhari confuse the word 'Vivarta' as illusion and interprete Bhartṛhari in the line of Vivartavādins (Illusionists). Word 'Pariṇāma' is confused as transformation of consciousness in the line of Yogācāra idealism. Bhartṛhari uses these words (Pariṇāma and Vivarta) as synonym. The word 'Vivarta', is not used for in the sense of illusion as 'Vivarta' in Bhartṛhari is used for real creation (expressions) and not for illusion.[30] So far the word 'Parināma' is concerned Bhartṛhari uses this word for creation but he, nowhere uses this word in the sense of Transformation theory of the Yogācāra Idealism. The word Parināma' is used for the water currents, bubbles etc. which are not transformation of water, rather, expressions of water. In the Yogācāra transformation the ensuing evolutes are not manifestations of consciousness rather a newly emergent moment, the unity of the series[31], while in Bhartṛhari the later and the further both expressions are the powers of Time-power and it is the pervading unity apart from the courses of change. Here the will of Brahman or power of Brahman and the creation is not two moments in which the further leaves its impression upon the later but they are the two powers of the same Time, we mean the expression is a two fold process of permission and prevension like the thread of the bird bait of the hunter.[32] In the statement 'Yadekam prakritya-

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27 Commentary of Helārāja on V.P. 143 and K.S. 62.

28 V P. 1, 18, 117, 120.

29 Śabdsya Parināmoayam, V.P. 120.

30 Śabdasya Parināmoayamityamnayāvido Viduh. Chandobhya eva prathamametat Viśwam Vyavartat, P.V. 1/120 and Bhāva pradipa commentary on it.

31 Yogācāra Idealism, p. 21.

32 V. P. K. S. 15.

bhedaih bahudhā Prabibhajyate[33] 'Prabibhajyate' does not mean the division apart, as consciousness may be explained diversified in two ways. First, consciousness is a unit whole and it can not be accepted divided as the parts of the whole and that the diversification is the expression of the power of Brahman or the dynamism of Brahman. Secondly, the diversification of the consciousness is conventional and not real divisions while Yogācāra transformation theory accepts that the difference is ultimate. Dr. A K. Chatterji writes 'difference is ultimate, as in all Buddhism and not merely modal. The logic of the Ālaya is that of pure difference not identity in difference.[34] Again when Bhartṛhari writes "Asminneva tamasi jvotih Suddam Vivartate"[35] he means to support that the divine will first of all revealed or expressed as the Vedas and later when he states "Śabdsya Pariṇāmoayamityamnayavido Vidub-Chāndobhya Eva Prathamametavisvam Vyavartata[36] the world is expressed by the power (mātra, vowel) of (word) which in Bhartṛhari is Brahman and, 'it goes to be suspended in him', refers creation of the world like the creation of a Yogin or that of a poet. If the world 'Vivarta' stands for illusion, the real creation of the world by real power of Brahman would not be accepted but this is not conducive to Bhartṛahi. The world as the creation (Vivarta) of Brahman is real. If Vivarta is transformation it would not be conventional but ultimate while in Bhartṛhari it is not ultimate. The ultimate is only Brahman which is void of all dualities. Again in the transformation theory of Yogācāra idealism the consciousness (Alaya) is a stream of discrete moments while in Bhartṛhari the reality is one without moments The movements are the dynamism of reality which is a transcendental category but not ultimate absolute. Thus on account of some similarities between Yogācāra and Bhartṛhari it is inconsistent to interpret him in the line of Yogācāra Idealism.

Now something about illusion, Illusion has neither past nor future while creation in Bhartṛhari envolves all the three stages of future, present and past'. The creation means the expression of that which is not yet expressed but prevented so far and that' by permission is expressed in present and later on falls into past and the process of permission after prevention and prevention after permission is sequence [37] In more clear words the thing which is in future is expressed in the present and later on falls in past and that is why the object in Bhartṛahari is 'associated object' which, in the midst of all

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33 V.P. 22.
34 Readings in Yogācāra Buddhism, p. 21, para II.
35 V.P. 18.
36 V.P. 120.
37 K.S. 30.

these process, is the same[38] But illusory is not associated object. The rope is, not expressed or permitted but the 'snake' which is not 'associate rope' but different from rope. Again in this case there is no continuity of Prevention and permission because here the thing prevented is not permitted. This way, the illusory has no future and as the illusory is not prevented i.e. it does not fall into past, it has no past even.

If 'Vivarta' is illusion, it is impossible to explain the cause and sequence of it. If the illusion has neither future nor past, it is not an effect having a cause, means it is causeless while creation in Bhartṛhari is causational and therefore we can say that the world Vivarta' in Bhartṛhari is not illusion but expression. So far the problem of sequence is concerned, the operation of the two powers permission and prevention is not accepted in illusion and therefore sequence which is noticed as a succession of prevention and permission is not possible in illusion and therefore illusory is sequenceless[39]. If there is sequence in illusion, it will be illusion no more but real. That is what distinguished Bhartṛhari from the illusionists. The creation is 'Vivarta' of Brahman and thus it has Brahman as its cause and this creation, as the 'Vivarta' of Brahman, is real which for us appears as having objective reality and to whom we know by its empirical effects. Now it is clear that the word 'Vivarta' in Bhartṛhari is not applied for illusory but for expressions which, as the expression of the reality, is not false but real.

## VI

Following the modes of Time power, all powers depending on their cause and having a starting point are governed by this creative power (Svātantrya). Time controls the entire universe through its powers like permission (Avyanujna) and prevention (Pratibandha). According to Bhartṛhari Time is like the wire-puller of the world machine[40] It regulate the universe through it's powers like permission and prevention[41]

Permission is the first and opening, it is the manifesting or expressing power and extends upto the continuity of an object.[42] Prevention is the power of suspension, second and closing[43]. The power of prevention suspends the objects and permission repells the suspension and this operation is a universal phenomena. For example while the leaves are suspended bud is permitted and again when bud is suspended leaves are permitted in a plant. Some thoughts are obstructed while others permitted and later thoughts are obstructed while the previous thoughts permitted[44]. Through prevention, which is opposed to permission, the capacity of objects is obstructed and thus objects are no longer able to fulfil their purposes (Expression). Contrary to it, the opposite qualities like dullness etc., in the case of beings, appear If Time would not suspect and would not remove the suspension i.e. if all were born at the same time, the states of beings would be confused deprived of priority, and posteriority. Divisions like opening and closing, sequence etc. are caused by these two powers of Time. As objects are in a changing course or in a constant change something is always produced and something else is always perishing. That course is known as sequence.[45] If there would have been no permission and prevention, sequence may not be noticed and actions without sequence would be unthinkable. These all are possible through Time and this is the reason Bhartṛhari describes Time as a constant course like water-wheel,[46]

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[38] K.S. 21.

[39] Bhartṛhari has explained sequence in the context of the expressions of the sabda. It is the power on the basis of which associated objects are expressed again in their segments and the appearance of segment in sequence is the power of sequence. Prevention in sequence and permission insequence are the operation of time power. V.P.3.

[40] K. S. 4, 26, 30.

[41] Pratibandhavyanujnabhyam Vṛtt Yasya 'saśvatim, Taya Vibhajyama noasau bhajate Kramarupatam, K. S. 20.

[42] K.S. 23.

There are other three powers of Time known as past, future and present through which things appear and disappear on account of which these three, as a matter of fact, be reduced to two i.e. opening (Unmilana) and closing (Nimilana). Unmilana includes present and Nimilana includes past and future and again unmilana and nimilana are nothing but permission and prevention[47]. Past and future conceal being therefore they are the power of prevention and present reveals them and therefore it is the power of permission. Time according to Bhartṛhari, is the substratum on which objects and their conditions play. The latter may come and go but the time remains the same. The path remains the same even though walkers and their movements pass away.[48] The thing in future has to come in present and lastly fall into past and this with everchanging things is a regular course which does not admit any change in these powers in particular and in the Time power in general

These powers operate on objects like 'light' and 'darkness', hiding or manifesting them and thus bringing about birth, death, sequence etc.[49] When its causes are active a thing becomes present when its causes have stopped functioning the thing becomes absent (it is pas·) and when the cause of an object are not ready to produce thing, it is said to be in future. The causes are active and the thing is illustrated in present (unmilan) therefore it is said as light. The cause is active here Opposite to it, the thing is obstructed, in past and future, therefore it is said as darkness. The causes stop functioning and the thing is not visible in past and the causes are not ready to produce the objects, it is future. As in future and past. the thing is prevented, both of them together are considered under the category of Nimilana. Now, it is clear that there is no logical difficulty in accepting that past and present being opposite are the powers of the same Time power. Not only permission but prevention too is the power of Time by which it hides something and manifests something.

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[43] K.S. 11.
[44] K.S. 3.
[45] K,S. 4.
[46] K.S. 14.
[47] K.S. 49, 56
[48] Helārāja on K.S. 53.

Bhartṛhari is not only concerned with philosophical explanation of Time but also the notion which is the basis of tense distinction in Sanskrit language.

These three powers (past, future and present) are again divided into eleven-forms (K. S. 38) in which past is of the five kinds (General, Immediate, not-immediate, combination of the immediate and not-immediate, and past in the sense of future). Future is of four kinds (General, mediate, not immediate, combination of the later two, and present is of two kinds (Primary present and the future used in the sense of present),

Now on sequence. Bhartṛhari has described sequence theory of many classical philosophers. In Sāmkhya, what is called sequenee is nothing more than the activity of three powers (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) of objects by which things appear and disappear, Creation of objects and the withdrawal of it are the two functions of these powers. There is really no difference between existence and non-existence rather they are the two states of the samething.[50]

In Nyāya Vaiśesika, sequence is the successions, the relation of priority and posteriority.[51] According to Bhartṛhari a thing is never completely destroyed but hidden (like Śamkhya) and the differences of existence and non-existence is created through the powers like permission and prevention (like Vaiśesika). A thing which is still hidden (unexpressed that is in future) dawns in the present and falls in past. This course is noticed as sequenee. Bhar ṛhari writes, Time has an eternal course through permission and prevention. Being

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49 K.S, 53 and the commentory of Helārāja on it.

50 K S 57.

51 Kālah parāparavyatikarayaugapadyaciraksiprapratyayalingam Prasāstapāda Bhāsya, p 332.

divided by this, Time obtains the form of sequence.[52] In changing things Time expresses itself as sequence. Sequence is the principal quality of activity but activity too is defined with the relation of Time. Priority, posteriority, slow-quick, favourable-unfavourable, beginning, functioning and completion, sun's progress to the North and to the South, the fixed movements of the planets, creation, destruction of elements all are the expressions of Time which are noticed in sequence[53],

Bhartṛhari is of the opinion that there is no sequence of a non-existing thing.[54] The logic of sequence is that where there is differentiation, there is a sequence. As the decision of far and near' has space as its support so also the decision of 'quick' and 'slow' has time as its support.[55] As non existence cannot be differentiated, there is no sequence [56] Sequence is the basis of these changes. The Time divides the universe in diversity through the power of sequence. This classification is also noticed in a sequence.

There is another power of Time which is called Decomposition[57] (Jarāt which obstructs the power of permission and prevention). It is noticed as ceasing point where there is no action like functioning in creation, existence and growth. This power suspends the powers like strength to exist and to grow. With the disappearance of permission and prevention the nature of being which has performed the function, depart from it and all disappears when the self perishes.

Now, it is concluded that through various powers, Time, like Brahman, sports with beings causing their creation, existence and destruction and thus Time is inevitable to the being possessing birth etc.

## VII

Bhartṛhari conception of Time may be summed up in these words. The single Time is an undivided whole. The Time power and the powers of Time like permission, prevention, past, future and present, sequence, decomposition etc remain unchanged while causing all changes. Just as the currents of a river tosses about grass, leaves and creepers. This way it displaces something and puts other things in their places, Time, creates objects and brings about changes in the created objects without a change in itself.[58]

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[52] K.S. 30.
[53] Helārāja on K.S. 65.
[54] K.S. 36.
[55] K.S. 27.
[56] K.S. 26.
[57] K.S. 24.
[58] K.S. 21 and Helārāja on K.S. 13.

There is no difference in Time with the differences of actions etc. as the differences in the movements of the walker on the road neither differentiate the road nor his stopping finishes the road. Long duration, short duration etc. depend upon the long durability or short of the course of action. Time like road is undivided, uneffected. The distinctions like 'the day has passed' 'the night has fallen', 'the spring has passed' and again the starting of day, night and spring etc are the indications of a course of prevention and permission of a particular action. In clear cut words, the end of season is the end of activities associated with the season. The same thing is looked upon as future, past and present in relation to this quality or that as the same person may be a father uncle, husband brother, son, teacher etc., in relation to this for that quality. The existence of Time, as it is not an object of perception is inferred by these courses of particular actions. Bhartṛhari writes 'without a separator, the 'slow' or 'quick completion' of actions having two different associates and similar rising or falling cannot be known and this separator (Paricchedaka) is Time. This is one of the cause of inference of Time.[59] The increase (Upacaya) and decrease (Apacaya) are also helpful in the inference of Time.[60] Thus Bhartṛhari accepts Time as a transcendental category, a creative power of Brahman which is inferred by the effects which it creates. He does not accept Time as an external substance like Vaiśesikas nor does he accept Time as conventional only like Sāmkhya. Bhartṛhari accepts the Reality as dynamic. In his philosophy, Time is a transcendental category, an Independent power of Brahman and the time-divisions are the various expressions of the same. In other words the Time is the dynamism of Brahman and this dynamism results in various divisions which bring about all the changes without a change in themselves.

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59 K.S. 27 and Helārāja on K.S. 27, 71.

60, K.S. 70 and Helārāja commentary on it.

## V

# Small Knowledge and Great Knowledge — A Restudy of Zhuang Zi's Epistemology

*Feng Yu*

Any scholarly study on Zhuang Zi's philosophy cannot but involve the textual research in the respective authenticity of the three parts of which the *Works of Zhuang Zi* consists : the "Inner Chapters", the "Outer Chapters" and the "Random Chapters". Although most scholars trend to ascribe the first part to Zhuang Zi (Zhuang Zhou) himself while consider the rest as being written by either his followers or other Taoists of later times, they have not yet found competent evidence to support their presumption and thereby out argued the completely counter presumption held by a few scholars who persist in ascribing some of the "Outer" and "Random" chapters to Zhuang Zi himself while considering the "Inner Chapters" as the products of later times. And even the well accepted life span of Zhuang Zi (369-286 B. C.) is in great doubt according to my research.[1]

There then arise some questions concerning the methodology of the research in Pre-Qin classics : First, is it possible to find out indisputable proof of the authenticity of a work which is traditionally ascribed to certain Pre-Qin thinker ? Second, even if we could make sure that some chapters of the work are impossible to be written by this thinker, should we therefore ignore their significance in the development of philosophy? My answer to the two questions is negative, especially to the second question. It is just because they are afraid not to be written by Zhuang Zi himself that some of the "Outer" and "Random" chapters, though very important, are disregarded. Trying to study the *Works of Zhuang Zi* in a new way, I compared in the past ten years a series of basic questions, categories and concepts which are discussed in all the three parts of the *Works of Zhuang Zi* in order to know if they are inconsistent. What I have discovered are (1) There is no irreconcilable discrepancies between the three parts and some seemingly contradictions come obviously out of the multilevelled structure characteristic of Zhuang Zi's writing; (2) There are evident differences concerning political thought between different chapters[2] However, the differences do not indicate that these chapters belong to different schools. On the contrary, it seems like that they have the same starting point though discrepancies appear in further explanations. Based upon this consideration, I accept the presumption that with very few exceptions, most of the three parts belong to one system, at least philosophically. Therefore we may put aside the possibly unsolvable question, i.e., which chapters are written by Zhuang Zi himself, and make analysis on the *Works of Zhuang Zi* as a whole. For this sake, I prefer the term "*Zhuang Zi* (the *Works of Zhuang Zi*)'s philosophy to Zhuang Zi (Zhuang Zhou)'s philosophy. Limited by the topic of this paper, I could not give discussion at full length about the consistency of the three parts of the *Works of Zhuang Zi*. Instead, I'll focus my study at its epistemology.

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[1] The presumption of Zhuang Zhou's life span is always based on the fact that he was an intimate friend of Hui Shi. However, Hui Shi's life span cannot be determined because according to the records of *Han Fei Zi*, *Lu Shi Chunqiu*, and *Zhanguo Ce*, his political activities lasted for nearly hundred years and that is of course impossible.

The *Works of Zhuang Zi*, at least its most part, was written in a time characteristic of the so called "Contention of Hundred Schools of Thought". A lot of schools then sprang up and each persisted in the validity of the political concepts, moral tenet and cosmology it preached and the falsity of those of the other schools. In the intense debates, some thinkers tried to establish a criterion of truth. For example, a tripartite criterion was set forth by Mo Zi, the founder of Mohism:

A truth must be "(1) testified in the ancient classics by early kings (2) in consort with what is considered reality seen and heard by the common people; (3) able to benefit the country as well as all under Heaven when put into practice".[3]

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[2] For example, the Chapter 13. "Tao of Heaven" provides detailed policies and principles for government while the Chapter 10. "Openning the Box" takes strong objection to any attempt of government.

[3] "Anti-fatalism", the *Works of Mo Zi*.

But not until the establishment of *Zhuang Zi*'s system, had the Chinese thinkers been clearly aware of a crucial question : Whether or not could we obtain the absolute knowledge which will be ever reliable ? Crystallizing and systematizing Taoist philosophy founded by Lao Zi. the *Works of Zhuang Zi* made comprehensive and multilevelled inquiries into the question above mentioned. And the central clue of *Zhuang Z'is* epistemology, as I understand, is the discrimination between the ' Small Knowledge" and the "Great Knowledge".

## 1. The "Small Knowledge"

The author of the *Works of Zhuang Zi* looked down upon the knowledges that other thinkers were looking for. They are called "small knowledge" or "the knowledges of the small men" and their truthfulness is completely denied because the objects of this kind of knowledges, viz . matters or concrete things, are not reliable themselves. *Zhuang Zi* for the first time in the history of Chinese philosophy gives a definition of matter :

"All those which possess certain appearance, or configuration, or sound, or color are matters."[4]

Due to the appearance, the configuration, the sound, and color they possess, matters cannot but be finite. Supposing something is round in form, it cannot be square at the same time. Since matters are finite, the knowledges of them are certainly relative. For example, a mountain is great and a hair is small in common sense. The two judgments are by no means absolute and reliable truths because, in comparison with things which are greater than the mountain and things which are smaller than hair, we can state that a mountain is small and a hair is large. Based upon this consideration, *Zhuang Zi* asserts a series of statements against the common sense. For example :

"Those who die at newborn period are the most longevous while Peng Zu (who died according to legend at the age of 800) died young."[5]

These statements imply that any judgment about matters is no better than its counter judgment to be reliable.

Further, anything belonging to matter must be subject to change. "As soon as matters come into existence, the speed of their development will be as fast as the running of a horse. Changes take place in every action of them, and transformations happen to them at every moment."[6] Sometimes there seems to be no change in something such as a still mountain but changes do take place in an underlying way. *Zhuang Zi* gives a metaphor to explain it : A man kept a mountain in a lake and he thought it was very safe. At the mid-night, however, a potent man carried it away without being found by that keeper. According to Guo Xiang, one of the most important interpreter of *Zhuang Zi* of the Jin dynasty, the potent man is the personification of change and the metaphor implies that today's mountain is no longer than that of yesterday's although they look alike.[7] This idea is almost the same as the saying of Heraclitus :

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[4] The *Works of Zhuang Zi*, Chapter 19.

[5] bid., Chapter 2.

[6] ibid., Chapter 17.

"It is not possible to step twice into the same river."

For this reason, our knowledge about matters cannot be even reliable. "Some statements might be right at this moment, it will certainly be wrong at the next moment and vice versa"[8] because things are always in change.

Furthermore. matters are not independent, so that they do not really exist. *Znuang Zi* uses a metaphor of shadow to illustrate it. The existence and motion of a shadow depend upon the existence and motion of the body. Shadow cannot exist independently and therefore is not a real existence. But is the body a real existence ? No. Because it cannot act itself freely but depends upon some conditions. These conditions will again depend upon other conditions In fact, nothing is different from shadow as long as it is finite. In this sense, the differences between myriad things are indifferent. At that time, Gongsun long. a famous logician, was trying elaborately to prove a statement . "A white horse is not a horse." According to *Zhuang Zi*, it is rather the non-horse than horse that can be used to prove that a horse is not a horse because "All things are tantamount to one horse" and of course at the same time nothing is horse.[9]

Since matters are finite, relative, and even unreal, it is quite foolish to hold matters as objects to cognize. "Those who are engaged in the inquiries into matters could never be sage."[10]

Shocked by the statements aforesaid, quite a few scholars rate the author of the *Works of Zhuang Zi* among relativists and scepticists and draw a parallel between him and some Greek thinkers such as Pyrro. It is true that there are relativist and scepticist factors in the system of *Zhuang Zi* as the title of one of its famous, might be the most famous, chapters: "The Treatise on the Equality of Things" has indicated However, we cannot attribute the whole system of *Zhuang Zi* to this idea As a matter of fact, *Zhuang Zi* criticizes strongly those who merely put emphasis on the equality of things. It is necessary to cite two paragraphs from the *Works of Zhuang Zi*.

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[7] ibid. Chapter 6.

[8] ibid., Chapter 2.

[9] ibid , Chapter 2.

[10] ibid., Chapter 6.

("Song Rong Zi) did not make encomium to the behaviors appreciated by all the society, nor did he disfavor those to which all the society would take objection. He did not haggle over the poorly human affairs. However, there is still a distance for him to the real achievement."[11]

"Peng Meng, Tian Pian and Shen Dao held the equality of the myriad things as their primary principle, saying, 'Heaven is capable of covering but incapable of sustaining; the Earth is capable of sustaining but incapable of covering; and the Great Tao is capable of all-embracing but incapable of distinguishing' They understood that all things have their capacities and incapacities and therefore stated that selection means not universal and instruction means not perfect while the Tao we follow should be all-inclusive without exception. Hence Shen Dao gave up knowledge and renounced self-consciousness. Instead, he followed nothing but that which he had to follow. He was detached to matters and held it as principle. He set forth that the human cognition could cognize nothing He would disdain knowledge and then exterminate it. ... Hence he maintained that it would not be perfect until one changes himself into a consciousnessless being. For this reason, we ought not to follow the example of sages and worthies but that of a piece of earth because it never loses the Tao. ... What he meant by Tao is not the real Tao and his mistaken sayings could not avoid critiques. Peng Meng; Tian Pian and Shen Dao did not understand Tao. However, they all had some knowledge about it."[12]

What then is the main discrepancy between the epistemology of *Zhuang Zi* and that of Song Rong Zi, Peng Meng, Tian Pian and Shen Dao ? I think it lies in that *Zhuang Zi* establishes the concept of the "Great Knowledge" besides its critique of the "Small Knowledge".

## 2 "The Great Knowledge"

"The Small Knowledge is far from the Great knowledge"[13] because the latter is the cognition of Tao. Here giving a brief introduction to Tao, one of the top categories of Chinese philosophy, seems necessary. Etymologically, the word "tao" at first means a road which leads to only one destination without branches[14]. Later, it was extended to imply certain concrete rules and regulations. For example, "Tao of Heaven" which came in the Spring and Autumn period mainly means the regulation of the movement of heavens. It is Lao Zi who for the first time turned it into an independently philosophical category by asserting that Tao is a universal law to which all things must pay obedience. And the main nature of Tao is movement in circulation, viz., all things are going to their opposites and will return to their starting points when they reach their climax of development. If there is a creator of the universe, it would be nothing but Tao because it pre-exists both Heaven and God, and all things have to transform in accordance with Tao while Tao itself remains changeless. Based upon Lao Zi's idea, the *Works of Zhuang Zi* distinguishes Tao much clearlier from matters and explicates systematically why Tao is the source of the universe. In Chapter 6. "The Grand Teacher", we read :

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[11] ibid., Chapter 1.

[12] ibid., Chapter 1.

[13] ibid., Chapter 1.

[14] *Shuowen Jiezi*.

"It is Tao that manifests and ensures itself; that is not involved in action and configuration; that can be handed down from generation to generations but cannot be held; that can be received but cannot be seen; that originates from and roots in itself; that has ever existed even in the ancient time when Heaven and the Earth have not yet come into being; that makes the spiritual beings and God divine; that give birth to Heaven and the Earth; that precedes the Great Ultimate but does not thereby become too lofty; that underlies the Six Directions but does not thereby become too fathomless; that pre-exists Heaven and that Earth but does not then get outdated; that is elder than the remote antiquity but does not then get old."

In comparison with matters which are temporal, Tao is perpetual without birth and death; in comparison with matters which are finite, Tao is infinite without fixed form; and in comparison with matters which are unreal, Tao is absolutely true. The Chinese cosmology during the Pre-Qin period was focussed at a primary question : Whence come the myriad things ? According to *Zuhang Zi*, that which gives birth to myriad things or matters cannot itself be a matter.[15] In other words, the creater of matter must possess a nature different from matters. Naturally, only Tao qualifies for it.

Since Tao is completely different from matter, the way of attaining the true understanding of Tao is certainly not the same as the cognition of matter. To achieve it, both speculative intelligence and interior cultivation are necessary and the two aspects are interdependent as the Chapter 16. "The Cultivation of Nature" says, "the intelligence and the cultivation are mutual promotive".

The speculative intelligence is oriented to an understanding that the pursuit after matters or concrete things is vain in finding the reliable truth and even a source of the disoders in the society. In this sense, the "Great Knowledge" is just the denial of the "Small Knowledge". "Only when the small knowledge is removed, will there arise an enlightenment of the great knowledge."[16] In that case the tranquility and harmony of the mind is kept from the disturbance of matters and this is what *Znuang Zi* is meant by "promoting the interior cultivation with intelligence".

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[15] Cf. the *Works of Zhuang Zi*, Chapter 11 and 22.

As a matter of fact, however, *Zhuang Zi* puts more emphasis upon the interior cultivation which consists of a series of gradual renouncements.

It begins with the renouncement of intended action or planned practice. One's practice is poorly limited, thus the things left unpractised are surely much more than those he has done. Hence one cannot find Tao through practice just as Lao Zi has asserted : "The further one goes out of his door. the less he knows."[17] The correct attitude then is nonaction in order to get rid of the limitation of practice. It must be pointed out that nonaction, according to *Zhuang Zi's* explanation, does not imply keeping the physical body motionless but an intentionless mind. *Zhuang Zi* rates those who do not intend to do anything and take action completely at random as the ideal sages and appreciates them deeply.

The second step is the renouncement of perceptions. Since Tao is invisible and soundless, our perceptions have nothing to do with the cognition of Tao In some chapters, *Zhuang Zi* sets forth the concepts of great vision and great audition which are completely different from the common vision and audition just like the difference between great knowledge and small knowledge. Only when we stop seeing the five colors outside and hearing the five sounds outside, could the great vision and audition be acquired. For this reason *Zhuang Zi* strongly condemns Shi Kuang, the most famous musician of that time, and Li Zhu, the most famous painter of that time. because their performances bewilder people from the great vision and audition.

The third step is the renouncement of language. There is an inextricable distance between our expression and reality and any statement is a limitation because, when we say something is this, it implies it cannot be other than this. *Zhuang Zi* asserts that 'That which is perfect is certaily beyond speech and that which is spoken of cannot be perfect".[18] Since Tao is perfect, our language is bound to fail in expressing it *Zhuang Zi* in this sense even doubts if there is any difference between our language and the noise from newborn birds in the cognition of Tao.[19] Silence is then better than speech. If one sticks to silence, however, it turns to be a limitation too. For this reason. *Zhuang Zi* states that neither speech nor silence is ideal for the true cognition of Tao.[20]

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[16] ibid., Chapter 26.

[17] *The Book of Lao Zi*. Chapter 47.

[18] The *Works of Zhuang Zi*, Chapter 22.

The fourth step is the renouncement of the consciousness of oneself as the subject of thinking, which seems to be the fundamental characteristic of *Zhuang Zi's* philosophy. In order to get rid of limitations, we should not only stop the activity of sense organs, but also stop that of mind. "The body becomes the same as a withered tree and the mind the extinguished ash."[21] Why should one stop the active thinking ? Because when one ponders over one thing, he will necessarily ignore the other. Then the thing over which he ponders cannot be Tao due to its partiality. When nothing is in mind, nothing is lost. *Zhuang Zi* also describes this mood as "Void", "Whiteness", and the "Abstention of Mind". In this realm, even oneself is forgotten. "My body's eliminated intelligence renounced. Neither my physical existence nor my self-consciousness remains and I thereby identify myself with the Great Infinite (Tao)."[23]

When the four steps are completed, one will obtain and ultimate enlightenment or an intuition of Tao without any medium or impedient. And he at the same time will no longer be an ordinary people but a "Perfect Man", a "Real Man", a "Supreme Man", a "Heavenly Man", or a "God-like Man". who is free from life and death and can even make a journey beyond space and time. The following are descriptions quoted from the *Works of Zhuang Zi* :

"Matter cannot do any harm to him. He will not feel hot even when the weather is so droughty that metals and stones are melted and the mountain burnt; he will never get drowned even when the flood water rises upto Heaven."[23]

"This kind of man will mount the clouds and mists, ride the sun and the moon, and make a journey beyond the four seas. Life and death will make no change for them."[24]

"I (a perfect man) am going to call on the creator. When bored, I will then ride the vast and vague bird to go beyond the Six Direc-

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19 ibid., Chapter 2.
20 ibid., Chapter 25.
21 ibid., Chapter 2.
22 ibid , Chapter 1,
23 ibid., Chapter 1.
24 ibid., Chapter 2.

tions. I will travel in the Villiage of Nonbeing and take rest at the Land of Infinite."[25]

Why these men are so extraordinary? Because they have transformed themselves from finite into infinite and thereby become the same as Tao, the supreme reality. "They are those who have the knowledge of ascending to Tao."[26]

### 3. Discussion

Just like Kant's question "How are the synthetic judgment a priori possible?" being the crux of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, there is an essential question penetrating the whole system of *Zhuang Zi's* epistemology :

One's ability of knowing is finite — obviously, for example, his life span is limited — and what he wants to know is infinite. If that is the case, is it possible then to attain the knowledge of the infinite?

This question is a product of the time when most of the thinkers were intoxicated with their great success in acquiring new knowledge. The author of the *Works of Zhuang Zi* soberly found the opposite through the same fact. If we always find the knowledge we have believed absolute truths imperfect and even completely wrong, for example, the nine districts of China once was believed the whole land under Heaven are but one among the "Great Nine Districts",[27] we then have to examine whether or not we could obtain the ever reliable or absolute truth. This awareness was a great progress in the development of Chinese epistemology. Unlike Greek relativists and scepticists who made entirely negative answer to this question, *Zhuang Zi* tries to find a new way of cognition besides its strong objection against the common knowledge. Though our perceptual and rational knowledges are inextricably contradictable and fail to obtain the infinite, we can obtain the absolute truth in such a way that we stop the pursuit after matters and make the unconditioned and infinite Tao be the sole object of our knowledge and cognize it in the same unconditioned and absolute way. In doing so we identify ourselves with the infinite and thereby become omnipresent and even omniscient. *Zhuang Zi's* discrimination of h "Great Knowledge" from the "Small Knowledge" is just like the attitude toward knowledge that many Indian thinkers took. For example, Sankara, the great advaita thinker, distinguished the "Higher Knowledge" from the "Lower Knowledge" and said :

"What constitutes the highest wisdom? This is thus explained : Knowledge which constitutes the essence of the Dharmas, unborn immutable and identical with atman, is also admitted to be unborn, and immutable. ... Knowledge, being ever unrelated to other objects, is said to be unborn. As knowledge is, thus, unrelated to other objects, it is like the Akasa, called unconditioned or absolute."[28]

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[25] ibid , Chapter 7.

[26] ibid.. Chapter 6.

[27] This discovery is ascribed to Zou Yan.

The similar tradition can also be found in the writings of Mahayana Buddhism and some other schools of India. To obtain the great or higher knowledge, both *Zhuang Zi* and Indian tradition put emphasis upon interior cultivation, mysterious mediation and intuition, which consist of integral experiences and are believed un contradictable. We should look for knowledge inward, not outward. And we have to identify ourselves with the ultimate reality if we want to know it.

Although the interior cultivation, mysterious meditation and intuition might be the general characteristics of mysticisms of all areas and times, it is the Oriental tradition alone to give it comprehensively philosophical explanations. Hegel has noticed the peculiarity of the Oriental approach to the infinite and absolute substance and made a brief analysis of it. But like most of the Western thinkers, he could accept neither the concept of higher knowledge nor the meditation and intuition by which the absolute truth is obtained.[29]

*Zhuang Zi's* theory of knowledge, broadly speaking, the Oriental theory of knowledge, not only discovers the contradiction between Finite and Infinite and the necessity of the identity of the subject with the object, but also links the inquiry into knowledge with the ultimate concern of human life or salvation. The theory of knowledge has never been regarded as a problem of pure reason but that concerning the real meaning and value of life. The pursuit after matter is not only a wrong orientation of cognition but also the source of human frustration and social disorder The realization of the great knowledge, on the contrary, is not only the attainment of absolute truth but also the freedom where all the miseries are re moved. And Even the mysterious meditation and intuition, though seeming inscrutable, are by no means groundless. More and more studies are indicating that they may play a very important role in the process of knowledge besides perception and inference. The emphasis on the great knowledge and the special way in which the great knowledge is gained, however, should not be at the cost of casting away rational or logical thinking. As a matter of fact, *Zhuang Zi's* overemphasis upon the great knowledge and its denial of the small knowledge exerted a harmful influence on the development of Chinese logical thought.

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[28] The *Mandukyopanishad* with Gaudapada's *Karika* and Sankara's *Commentary*. Tr. by S. Nikhilananda, Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, Mysore, 1936. p. 353.

[29] *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Tr, by T. M. Knox and A.V. Miller, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 167.

## VI

# Mind-body Dualism of Descartes and Samkhya : A Comparative Study

*Alpana Chakrabarty*

An attempt is made in this paper to compare and contrast the mind body dualism of Descartes with that of Samkhya. Kapila, the originator of mind body dualism in the East and Descartes, the Champion of mind-body dualism in the West, are considered to be two of the staunchest protagonists of this sort of dualism. I want to establish that though both Kapila and Descartes advocate mind-body dualism, their systems differ from one another in *kind* and not just in *degrees*.

The systems of Kapila and Descartes share certain common characteristics of which the following two are more important than the others. Firstly, both systems belong to the rationalist tradition, and they provide a rational basis for the dualism between mind and body. Secondly, both incorporate the idea that a person is a dual entity, composed of physical processes and mental processes. The physical is public while the mental is private. A person, thus is a complex being with a body, and a mind involving both 'physical events and states' and 'mental events and states'. Further, the realm of the 'physical' is quite different from the realm of the 'mental'. A person, thus, consists of two quite radically different parts, but the mind (soul), the immortal part of person, which is quite different and distinct from the body, will live eternally.

Despite similarities, these two systems differ from one another in a very pronounced manner. Before I embark upon to explicate certain crucial differences I would like to give a brief, but unargued account of Kapila's system with the help of Isvara Krishna's exposition of the same in *Samkhya karika* and of Descartes' system.

The *Samkhya Karika* of Isvara Krishna is the earliest available material on the Samkhya system. I consider *Samkhya Karika* as the most authentic commentary on Samkhya. My exposition of Samkhya system, therefore, is based mainly on this remarkable work. There are seventy two slokas each of which expresses a distinctive principle. I have selected some relevant slokas in order to establish that Samkhya dualism and Cartesian dualism are two different kinds of dualism. The Samkhya dualism begins as follows:

The world is full of pain due to the fact that the soul (Purusa) is in contact with matter (Prakrti). The soul gains an absolute independence when it is cut off from matter. Then it gains self existence, and is not effected by any subsequent change in this world.

The complete and final blessedness of the soul can be gained only by means of philosophical knowledge. The aim of Samkhya, therefore, is a study which tries to define the correct knowledge, the knowledge which gives release from bondage, exemption from exposure to human ills, by the final separation of the soul from the body.

The main purpose of Samkhya is to treat purusa and prakriti as separate and independent of each other. Purusa and Prakrti are ultimately real. Purusa, the supreme, self creates the individual selves (jivas) and Prakrti, the matter, creates the human body. Thu, purusa and prakrti are the two basic concepts in Samkhya philosophy.

The matsrial world including the human beings are evolved from one 'single substance', that is, Prakrti. Prakrti is eternal, independent and ultimate. Its principle is spiritual and only by means of true knowledge (cognition) Prakrti can be known.

Prakrti consists of three different kinds of qualities (gunas) known as Sattva (goodness), Rajas (foulness) and Tamas (darkness) respectively. Prakrti acts by virtue of these internal formations. These three qualities try to dominate each other and as a result Prakrti produces three different kinds of persons known as Sattvika Purusa, Rajasika Purusa and Tamasika Purusa (i.e. Prakrti produces three different kinds of persons).

The first product of evolution is called Mahat, the great, the germ of the vast world of objects including intellect (buddhi), ego and mind. Memories and recollection are started in buddhi. From buddhi, consciousness or egoism is evolved. By means of consciousness or egoism the difference between subject and object is known. Mahat also produces ahankara, the principle of individuation. Its function is to generate self-sense (abhimana). It produces the notion of 'I' or 'mine'. But, consciousness though emanates from intellect, it is a separate entity, and the intellect works without any consciousness of its workings or of its effects. From the Sattvika ahankara arises the conscious mind (manas), the subtle and the central sense organ.

Mind is a product of body and an instrument of action. Mind is the first agent between the outer and the inner world. It helps in collecting and shaping the scattered, indefinite organs of senses. The manas is an internal faculty, the door keeper of the senses which are the doors through which the soul gains a knowledge of the nature. The manas has a formulative power. From the worldly thing (from the outer world) it receives the sensations. There sensations are thereby passed to the consciousness and individualized as mine, then with the help of the intellect (buddhi) these individualized perceptions become 'concepts or judgements' and are thus to be presented to the soul.

> The manas (mind) has the nature of both (classes). It is formulative (or determinative) and as sense organ from having cognate functions (with the other organs). It is multifarious from the specific modification of the modes and the diversity of external things. (Sloka No. 27).

Sattvika ahamkara also produces five sensory and five motor organs. The five sensory organs are the functions of sight, smell, taste, touch and sound. The five motor organs are the functions of speech, apprehension, movement, extension and reproduction.

*Buddhi*, *Ahamkara* and *Manas* represent the three psychological aspects of knowing, feeling and willing, conation and affection respectively. Samkhya calls them material and derives from Prakrti. They shine through the light of Purusa and are apparently conscious.

From the Tamasa Ahamkara arises the five subtle elements which are called *Tanmatras* or things-in-themselves. These are the essence of sight, smell, taste, touch and sound.

This evolution of Prakrti takes place in relation to Purusa (self). Thus, evolution is the play of these principles (tattvas), which together with the Purusa, who is a mere spectator and outside the play of evolution are the twenty-five categories (principles) of Samkhya. Out of these twenty five principles, Purusa is neither a cause, nor an effect. Prakrti is the only cause though it is not the effect. Thus the soul (Purusa) which is totally different from Prakrti is eternally liberated from Prakrti.

> The soul (Atman, Purusa which is totally distinct from Prakrti (Nature), forms, with Nature and its emanation, the twenty-five *tattvas* (categories) in the Samkhya philosophy He who understand them thoroughly has attained to be the highest state of man in the present life, and in lying aside the body in

> death shall know birth no more. He is ever freed from any contact with matter, and therefore from pain. 1
> (Quoted from John Doris : Hindu Philosophy, p. 55)

Purusa is free and pure consciousness. It is only when it mistakes its reflection in buddhi for itself and identifies itself wrongly with the internal organ — the intellect, the ego, and the mind, that it is said to be bound. It is the ego and not the purusa which is bound. When ego realises its own nature, it gets liberated.

> This separation of body being obtained, when nature ceases to act because her purpose has been accomplished, then the soul obtains an obstruction from matter which is both complete and eternal (Sloka No. 68)

For Descartes, there is only one ultimate reality and that is God. God the supreme reality created this world including the human beings. It follows from this that human beings are neither self-existing nor are they authors of their own beings God creates nature and man, and can annihilate them at any time. Thus, a perfect being is needed to give a continuity to human existence.

As a creator of this world God also creates mind (soul) and body to make a composite human being. The mind is the 'thinking substance' completely different from, and independent of the body which is extended. It becomes associated with the body in the living organism and makes a substantial unity. The mind is non spatial, and is different from and independent of the mechanical material world. There is a kind of dualism between mind and body.

Though there are two radically different created substances, one which thinks (mind) and the other which is extended and does not think (body), yet human beings are essentially 'thinking substances' i.e. human beings are minds only. For Descartes minds and bodies are different from each other in the following way.

(1) We have a clear and distinct idea of body as extended and unthinking.

(2) We have a clear and distinct idea of minds as thinking and unthinking,

(3) God has created minds as thinking and bodies unthinking.
Therefore, mind and body are different.

It seems that it is impossible to make such a conception that mind can think independently of the body. Descartes points out that, though mind and body are totally different from one another they are in some way related. The problem arises how can two substances which are essentially different from and independent of each other be related at all ? And if at all related, what kind of relation it is ? In aswer to this, he says that, there is just one point of immediate 'contact' or interaction between 'mind' and 'body'. Through this point of contact the causal effects of the mind are carried to all parts of the body, and the causal effects of the body are transmitted to the mind. Therefore, both 'mind' and 'body' act, react and interact upon each other because there is a causal relation between the two. The spiritual substance of the mind has a definite location in the 'pineal gland' of the brain of living being and from there it exerts an influence upon the body, and it is also affected by the processes. Descartes concludes that though mind and body are different they compose a substantial unity. After the death of the body the mind does not destroy but leaves the body and goes into the world of immortality.

The above illustrations are sufficient enough to prove that the system of Samkhya and the system of Descartes differ not in degree but in kind. Both provide dualism but the basie principles on which these two dualisms are based are totally different in kind. Samkhya provides the dualism between the two co eternal, realities i.e. between Purusa and Prakrti, while Descartes provides the dualism between 'mind and body' and not with these two kinds of co eternal realities stated by Samkhya. No doubt, there are some similarities. But there are marked differences as well, and the differences are more prominent than the similarities. These differences are fundamental and basic which differentiate Samkhya dualism from that of Cartesian dualism in principle, and not just in detail.

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## VII

# Samkhya and Buddhism : A Few Notes

*V. K. Shokhin*

1. The problem of Sāṃkhya system of ideas and its genesis has been one of the most controversial problems in the history of ancient Indian philosophy for over a century. The principal and, at present, foremost part of Sāṃkhya scholars (among those of the second half of the nineteenth century, A. Gough, A. Weber, A. Barth and F. Max Muller, later on J. Dahlmann, P. Oltramare, E. Frauwallner, M. Schneider, in certain respects also H. Oldenberg, A Keith and S. Dasgupta, at present time J. Larson, M. Hulin, A. Sen-Gupta, T. Mainkar and others) have emphasized the Brāhmaṇic sources of Sāṃkhya primarily, that is Brāhmaṇic-Hinduistic contexts of its functioning in the 'middle' Upanishads, the connection of its spiritual principle concepts, purusa, and 'knower of the field' with the Atman of older Upanishads, certain premises of its doctrine about the cosmic evolution of prakṛti found in ancient Brāhmaṇic cosmology, certain tenets of its hierarchy of an individual's psycho-mental elements that can be traced in the discrimination of different strata and levels of Ātman which began in the Upanishads, the Vedic character of some of its metaphors.

About the end of the nineteenth century another group of scholars was formed (the first was R. Garbe joined by H Jacobi, R. Pischel and later, by F. Lipsius, A. Keith and H. Oldenberg came partially to be associated with these, and later on also Th. Stcherbatsky, H. Zimmer, A. Wayman) insisting on the vitally important points of Sāṃkhya conformity with Buddhism (and partly with Jainism too) and raising the question of 'unorthodox' origin of the Sāṃkhya doctrine. The main conformances of Sāṃkhya and

Buddhism these scholars distinguish are as follows : (1) a special proclivity to present lists of elements of being, (2) a definite emphasis on considering life as suffering, (3) accentuation of the moment of formation and change in the phenomenal world, (4) exposure of 'hidden', 'non-evident' bases of the visible world (the guṇas in Sāṃkhya and the dharmas in Buddhism), (5) insistent investigation of impregnable mechanics of the cause and effect relations, (6) a critical attitude to the Vedic ritual, (7) a 'lowering' of the status of gods and an 'aggrandizement' of man.

2. Recent inferences resulting from the study of the philosophic doctrine of the classical Sāṃkhya in the main have been affirmed and specified by the investigation of the ancient Sāṃkhya and of the very composition of "Sāṃkhya-*kārikā*", the canonical record of tradition. It appears thus that Sāṃkhya lists of elements of being as well as Buddhist abhidharmic mātrikas are not merely a mode of setting forth information (similar to Brahmanic registers) but present the very contents of the doctrine, their function being not to evidence the unity of manifestations of microcosmos and macrocosmos (as in the older Upanishads) but to resolve them into constituents. The Buddhist motive of suffering finds a most impressive approximation in the tenets of old Sāṃkhya schools : Arāḍa Kālama on the inseparability of saṃsara and duḥkha (suffering) as that of flame and its heat, Pañcaśikha on suffering and death as the main characteristics of every creature's existence, Jaigīṣavya on a consummate hierarchy of cosmic suffering with its top extremity, the anguish of heavenly spirits, and its tail end, the torments in various hells and within animals' bodies. As regards "Sāmkhya-kārikā", its text is organised in such a way that it is easy to segregate four parts of which the first (verses 1-20) describes the anguish of puruṣa (the spirit) caused by its non-perception of its heterogeneity from its psycho-physical envelope, the second (v. 21—38) explains the reasons of this non-perception, the third (v, 39—55) represents realisation of suffering in the states of senility and desease as depends on two kinds of body, a 'fine one' and an 'indurate one', the fourth (v. 56—68) discloses the way of release from suffering by means of correct self-cognition. The striking likeness of this scheme to the 'noble truths' of Buddhism is manifest. The critical attitude to Brāhmaṇic ritualism, primarily from the position of ahiṃsā, included a more significant and essential feature, a relativist treatment of the Vedas' authority, though in this Buddhists have outstripped the adepts of Sāṃkhya.

3. The concordance of Sāṃkhya with Buddhism may be amplified by adding to the paramount similitudes discussed above certain other remarkable parallels not observed in indology as yet, as far as

we know, and elicited through investigation of the functioning of ancient Sāṃkhya traditions and newly discovered commentaries on "Sāṃkhya-kārikā".

These parallels are as follows :

(a) The presence among hortative traditions of the ancient Sāṃkhya, alongside with narrowly esoteric ones, those of addressing laymen (connected, first of all, with the names of Kapila and Pañcaśikha), of preaching to kings and orthodox Brahmins and converting them. It is possible to suppose—taking into account the epic indications of different rules for ascetics and laymen in Sāṃkhya practical discipline, of the regulations for wandering life and for life in the periods of rain, of the assemblages of disciples for discussing the Sāṃkhya tenets, -- that there existed an embryo of monastic organisation similar to the Buddhist sangha.

(b) The main practical directions of Pañcaśikha's traditions (which has other similitudes as well) are the line of the 'intermediate way' between the extremes of self destruction and intemperance, of 'doing' and 'non-doing', reflected in Pañcaśikha's philosophic doctrine, his anti-metaphysical standpoint manifest in his prohibition to think of solving abstract philosophical problems.

(c) The accounting for Kapila, the founder of Sāṃkhya, as a celestial being descending on earth and, like a Buddhist bodhisattva, full of compassion for the world immersed in suffering and trying to save it by means of his teaching (see the story of Brahmin Āsuri's conversion). This went alongside with depreciating the traditional pantheon.

(d) The method of transferring the tradition. Ancient Sāṃkhya texts (e.g. Ṣ.ṣṭitantra) contains lists of formulae accompanied by teachers' explanations so that they might, in a way, substitute Brahmanic sutras, as it happened in Buddhism. Might not that, I wonder, have conduced to the absence of sūtras in Sāṃkhya up to the XIV-XVth century.

(e) The mode of presenting and interpreting the doctrine. Buddhist device of mātrika characterisation of the dharmas according to the possibility of ascribing to them certain qualities of the type 'duka' or 'tika' finds an exact correspondence in the method of consecutive contrasting of the 'manifested' and 'non-manifested', followed by the addition of the spiritual principle in the tradition of Arāḍa Kālama, and later on in the Sāṃkhya-kārikās itself (compare the mode of describing the three guṇas).

One may add to the resemblances mentioned certain parallel philosophical tendencies (for instance, treating material things as sums of perceptions), analogies in systems of imagery and metaphors (see, e.g. Mahabharata, XII, 290 etc.).

4. Buddhist sources display certain direct contacts of Sāṃkhya teachers with early Buddhists which are reflected in the legends about Buddha's discipleship under Arāḍa Kālama. The data of the Pāli canon allow us to trace the lines of oldest Sāṃkhya teachers' direct influence on Buddhism, primarily in the dhyā as practice and in certain 'ethical' principles.

5 The deep historical connection of the two trends in ancient Indian thought manifests itself also in 'heretical' lines appearing in their further development, such as a clearly 'probuddhic' drift in Sāṃkhya (Sulabhā's line in the epical Sāṃkhya, admitting a spiritual principle within the psycho physical aggregate, Paurika's school asserting the existence of a multitude of prakṛtis corresponding to the multitude of puruṣas) and, in a way, the 'prosāṃkhyaic' drift within Buddhism (vatsiputriyas sammitiyas-pudgalavadins who admitted personality' beside the dharma aggregate) It is characteristic that Buddhists used to prepare commentaries for Sāṃkhya texts even in the Gupta period, the time of the most acute confrontation of Sāṃkhya having become a leading orthodox darśana with Buddhist schools (see data about their polemics in Chinese authors, and also in Paramārtha's 'Life of Vasubandhu'). I mean, first of all, Paramārtha's commentaries to the Sāṃkhya karikas and also implications in the Chinese tradition concerning the explanation of a Sāṃkhya opuscule 'Hiraṇyasaptati' ("The Gold Seventy") by Vasubandhu Even in Middle Age when Sāṃkhya had been long in use functioning as the Hindu darśana there transpired hints about its 'non orthodox' character. It was not only Śankara who spoke of that but evān Vācaspati Miśra, the compiler of the famous commentary to "Sāṃkhya kārikā" (one can recollect here the clearly 'unorthodox' image of Kapila, the originator of Sāṃkhya, as represented in the epic chapters describing his dialogue with Syūmaraśmi, Mahābhārata XII, 260 262).

6 Still it was in the very beginning that Sāṃkhya adepts and Buddhists started bifurcating in their cardinal philosophical creeds, specially in the problem of the spiritual principle independent of the psycho-physical aggregate : the basic line of Sāṃkhya asserted its existence while Buddhists denied it. Then came another point of segregation and controversy, the problem of whether there might be the common origin of the universe.

Come to conclusions. Striking typological similitudes of Sāṃkhya and Buddhism compel us to reconsider the modern sceptical view of the proximity of both traditions, held even by such leading scholars as J Larson. The fact of consonance calls upon us to turn again to the history of Sāṃkhya so very contradictory and entangled and claim clear differentiation of the ancient Sāṃkhya which contains alongside with real features of Brāhmanism a powerful 'non-orthodox' block (with 'probuddhist' components evident even after Sāṃkhya's Hinduanization) and the classic Sāṃkhya. one of the orthodox darśanas. Thus there is good reason to suppose that persistent oral and written disputes of Sāṃkhya teachers and Buddhists in the Gupta period had been partly caused by the propensity of leading philosophers of both Hinduism and Mahāyana to keep clear of their 'family likeness' and withdraw from it. Researchers ignoring this likeness cannot expect to understand either in any adequate way.

## VIII

# J. Krishnamurti's insight into Human Bondage

*A. P. Sharma*

Jiddu Krishnamurti has been expounding his philosophy for almost half a century and its clear and challenging concepts have now come to the notice of millions of people through out the world. But inspite of his great influence created by clarity of thought and untraditional outlook, it seems that he has not been able to accomplish what he desired to achieve. It is a sad fact that such a mighty thinker has not been able to change the world, but he still remains a world-influencer as well as a world teacher. As a mighty original thinker his influence in the 1970's has been quite colossal which induced the new generation to revolt against materialism and devote their lives to a simple and spiritual way of life. In this respect his influence probably has been more profound than that of any other well known gurus who have emerged from the East in recent years.

Although the case of freedom has been debated by a number of philosophers, Krishnamurti's point of view in this respect is quite different. He reckons that there are many impediments on the road leading to human freedom. In this respect, he views three major barriers : human dependence, fear and conditioning. Looking to the size of the present article, the writer desires to limit his discussion to Krishnamurti's views on 'fear as a barrier to human freedom.'

**Fear as a Barrier to freedom :**

In his search for human freedom Krishnamurti regards fear as a big barrier to freedom. He says :

> "What is fear ? Fear can exist only in relation to something, not in isolation. How can I be afraid of death, how can I be afraid of something I do not know ? Can I be afraid only of

> what I know ? When I say I am afraid of death, am I really afraid of the unknown, which is death, or am I afraid of losing what I have known ? My fear is not of death but of losing my association with things belonging to me."[1]

Thus, fear is always in relation to the known, not to the unknown. It is the fear of losing one's family, reputation, bank account and so on. But all such fear is the result of the known.

Krishnamurti clarifies the meaning further;

> "I am afraid of the known, which means I am afraid of losing people, things or ideas; I am afraid of being at a loss, afraid of the pain which might come into being when I have lost or have not gained or have no more pleasure."[2]

So fear generally exists only as long as there is accumulation of the known as it creates the fear of losing. Therefore, the fear of the unknown, in Krishnamurti's opinion, is in real sense the fear of losing the accumulated known. When there is accumulation, the fear of losing things will always persist and it would cause pain. The things which one possesses create fear which in other words is pain too.

In his discussion of consciousness Krishnamurti enlightens us more about the issue of the known and the unknown. He asserts that the known in its efforts to know the unknown merely strengthens itself and gives continuity to itself. The known in its pursuit of the unknown, cannot escape from the known. It moves in the vicious circle of its own making. The misery of the known is like that of a dog who constantly goes on chasing its tail.[3]

Thus the known simply chases the known in its pursuit of the unknown. Commenting on Krishnamurti's views on consciousness D. Rajagopal says that Shri Krishnamurti's insight into the human consciousness is very unique and deep, for he unveils new dimensions of thought in that direction. He quotes Krishnamurti :

> "The known is ever trying to capture the unknown; but it can capture only that which is already known. The unknown can never be experienced by the known; the known, the experienced must cease for the unknown to be."[4]

But it does not happen and the known always lurks in one's mind and ceaselessly accumulates new fears. In that process of accumulation both fear and belief (in something) exist. It further leads to beliefs in reincarnation to prevent one from having the pain of losing something dear as a son. One may unnecessary fear that one's son may die. The belief in reincarnation would give a chain of fear which continues the moment one tries believing in things for the sake of security

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[1] Krishnamurti; The First and Last Freedom; Victor Gollancz Ltd,, London, 1954, p 83.

[2] Ibid., p. 83

[3] G. Vedaparayan; The Known and the Unknown : Jiddu Krishnamurti's Concept of Consciousness; *Darshana International*; Vol. XXVI, Oct. 1986, No. 4, pp. 16-17.

[4] D. Rajagopal; Commentaries on Living; B. I. Publications, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 240 41.

In one of his famous books entitled, ' Freedom from the Known" Krishnamurti explains more about fear. He considers fear one of the greatest problems in life and the mind which is caught in fear lives in confusion and conflict;which could lead it to violence and aggression· This state of mind is bound to lead one to live in particular patterns of thinking which has further problems. He adds

> It dare not move away from its own patterns of thinking, and this breeds hypocrisy. Until we are free from fear, climb the highest mountain; invent every kind of God; we will always remain in darkness[5]."

Living in such a complex society and receiving competitive education almost at each step, we are all burdened with fears of some kind physical and or psychological fears. Therefore, one need to know such fears quite distinctly. Krishnamurti says :

> ' We are all afraid about something; there is no fear in abstraction, it is always in relation to something. Do you know your own fears—fear of losing your job, of not having enough food or money, or what your neighbours or the public think about you, or not being a success, of losing your position in society, or of being despised or ridiculed—fear of pain and disease, of domination, of never knowing what love is or of not being loved, of losing your wife or children..."[6]

Besides the above fears Krishnamurti points out some other dimensions of fear that generally influence men's minds. For example, we all fear death; we fear that we are not living upto the image others have built about us; there are all such innumerable fears in us and as a result either we invent ideas and images to cover them or try to run away from them. But if one tries to run away from fears one may increase them further and therefore, cannot get freedom from them. Krishnamurti thinks that to understand all these and become free from them requires a deep insight, but we generally give into them because inwardly we are frightened. He says : 'You are afraid of not having a good position in life; you are afraid of what your priest will say; you are afraid of not following tradition, of not doing the right thing. But freedom is really a state of mind in which there is no fear or compulsion, no urge to be secure ![7]

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[5] Krishnamurti; Freedom From the Known; Harper and Row Publishers, New York; 1969; pp. 40 41.

[6] Ibid , p. 41.

One of the major causes of fear according to Krishnamurti is that people do not want to face themselves as they are. So they develop a network of escapes to rid themselves of fears. But this does not solve the problem because the process of suppression involves strife and leads to other problems which stop men from achieving freedom. Krishnamurti pleads :

> "If the mind, in which is included the brain, tries to overcome fear, to supress it, discipline it, control it, translate it into terms something else, there is friction, there is conflict and the conflict is a waste of energy."[8]

Krishnamurti looks at fear from various angles. He says that fear comes into being when one desires to be in particular pattern. If one desires to live without fear it would mean to live without a particular pattern. But when one demands a particular way of living, that in itself becomes a source of fear, The main problem is, that since one has been living in a particular pattern for such a long time, one desires to live in that frame. Can one break that frame ? One can do so only if one can see the truth : that the frame is causing fear and that this fear is strengthening the frame. If one says one must break the frame because one wants to be free of fear then one is following another pattern which will cause further fear. Any action based on the desire to break the frame would only create another pattern and therefore, give rise to fear.[9]

Krishnamurti clarifies this issue further :

> "I lead a certain kind of life; I think in a certain pattern; I have a certain belief and dogma and I do not want those patterns of existence to be disturbed because I have my roots in them I do not want them to be disturbed because the disturbance produces a state of unknowing and I dislike that. If I am torn away from everything I know and believe, I want to be reasonably certain of the state of things to which I am going. So the brain cells refuse to create another pattern which may be uncertain. The moment from certainty to uncertainty is what I call fear".[10]

Krishnamurti asks whether one can break the frame without causing fear. This may mean that one must not act, and must not make any conscious or unconscious movement with regard to it. Does it mean then that one must not act and must not try to break the frame or the pattern ? What happens to one when one looks at the pattern without doing anything about it ? Thus he goes deeper

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[7] Krishnamurti; Think on These Things; Perennial Library, Harper and Row Publishers; New York, 1970, p. 19.
[8] Freedom From the Known; Op. Cit; pp. 41-42.
[9] The First and Last Freedom; Op. Cit; p. 85.
[10] Freedom From the Known; Op. Cit; p. 42.

into the problem of fear and tries to explain it in various ways. He reflects:

> "What happens to me when I am simply looking at the frame without doing any thing about it? I see that the mind itself is the frame, the pattern; it lives in the habitual pattern which it has created for itself. Therefore, the mind itself is fear. Whatever the mind does, goes towards strengthening an old pattern or furthering a new one. This means that whatever the mind does to get rid of fear causes fear".[11]

In this way fear persists in form or another and does not allow one to enjoy freedom.

Fear finds various escapes too. According to Krishnamurti the common variety is identification. One identifies with the country, with the society, with an idea even. This can be noticed when one sees a procession such as a military or a religious procession or when one's country is in danger or being attacked by another nation. At that time one identifies with the country, with a being or with an ideology. There are other times when one identifies oneself with one's own child, with one's wife and with a particular form of action.

In fact, identification is a process of self-forgetfulness and so long as one is conscious of 'Self' in this respect, there is always pain and struggle, and fear continues constantly. But if one can identify oneself with something greater, with something worthwhile, with beauty, with life, with truth, with knowledge at least temporarily, there is an escape from the 'Self'.[12]

Thus, identification is a form of escape from the 'Self' as virtue is a form of escape from the self. Krishnamurti thinks that the man who pursues virtue is trying to escape from the self. He does not regard that sort of person as having a virtuous mind, for virtue is something which cannot be pursued. The more one tries to become virtuous, the more strength one gives to the self. Fear, which is common to most of the people in different forms, must always find a substitute and increase struggle. 'The more one is identified with a substitute, the greater the strength to hold on to that for which are prepared to struggle, to die, because fear is at the back.'[13]

So unless the fear is resolved one would live in darkness, as well as in violence. Krishnamurti thinks that 'a man who is not afraid is not aggressive, a man who has no sense of fear of any kind is really a free, a peaceful man'.[14]

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[11] The First and Last Freedom; Op. Cit; p. 85.

[12] Ibid; pp. 88-86.

[13] Ibid; p. 86.

[14] Krishnamurti; You are the World; Perennial Library, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York; 1972, p. 49.

In Krishnamurti's opinion fear involves time. One is afraid of death, that is in the future; or one is afraid of something that has happened; or one is afraid of the pain one has had when one was ill. Thus fear implies time. 'But fear is not only of time. it is also the product of thought, that is, in thinking about what happened yesterday...... which was painful, might happen again tomorrow. Thought produces this fear. Thought breeds fear, and unless thought is absent, the mind cannot see the actual truth, the beauty of the sunset'.[15] So both, time and thought of time must cease first to obtain the state of peace or to observe truth or reach a blissful state.

In fact, what do we mean by the word fear ? Is it not the non-acceptance of what is ? One must understand the word 'acceptance' Krishnamurti does not mean by it something which one makes an effort to accept. He means that when one does not see clearly what *is*, then one brings in the process of acceptance. 'Therefore, fear is the non-acceptance of what is'.[16] How can one who possesses a bundle of all such reactions, responses, memories, hopes, depressions, which are the result of blockage of the conscious movement, go beyond all that ? Can one's mind without this kind of blocking and hindrance be fully conscious ? The simple answer, according to Krishnamurti, would be 'no'.

Krishnamurti states that when there is no hindrance or blocking, one would enjoy an extraordinary joy. It is just like when the body is perfectly healthy one possesses a certain joy, well-being. And when the mind is completely free, without any hindrance and when the centre of recognition as the 'me' is not there, one experiences a certain joy which comes to the 'Self' as the 'me' is absent.

Without that 'me' being absent, neither there will be a complete understanding of the self nor the self will be able to attain freedom. In this process one has to abandon all activities born of desire which is the very expression of thought... for thought is not different from desire. If one can understand that, one will know that there is the possibility of going beyond the restrictions of the self.[17]

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[15] Ibid; pp. 50-53.

[16] The First and the Last Freedom; Op. Cit; p. 86.

[17] Ibid; p. 87.

# IX

# Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, Locke and the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities

*Cemil Akdogan*

A long and deep-rooted tradition in the history of philosophy claims that Descartes, Boyle, and Locke faithfully followed Galileo's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. For instance Stillman Drake, a historian of science, reflects this traditional account when he relates Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities to Galileo's distinction.[1] Also David M. Armstrong specifically says that Locke followed Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle on the issue of primary qualities :

> According to Locke, and here he is following Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Boyle, physical objects themselves have only the properties of extension, figure, motion, solidity and number... Following Boyle, Locke calls these the primary qualities of objects.[2]

An implication of the traditional view is that philosophy, with Locke, got the distinction from science and maintained it intact. For example John Herman Randall, Jr. writes in his book, *The Career of Philosophy* :

> The real basis of this distinction, in Locke as in the science upon which he drew, that primary qualities lend themselves to mathematical treatment, while secondary qualities do not.[3]

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[1] Stillman Drake, *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo*, (New York, 1957), p. 274, n. 19.

[2] David M. Armstrong, ed., *Berkeley's Philosophical Writings*, (London, 1965), p. 13.

[3] John Herman Randall, Jr., *The Career of Philosophy*, (New York and London, 1966), vol. I, p. 607.

To date, no one has been able to free himself from this traditional view is completely untenable and distorts the real picture with regard to primary and secondary qualities. To establish this I will develop Galileo's, Descartes', Boyle's, and Locke's views on the distinction, consequently.

## I

Galileo succinctly proposed his understanding of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in *Assayer* in 1623. To him primary qualities are properties of matter. An object or substance always has a size, shape, motion, place, and number. In no way can we separate these properties from the substance :

> I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation to other things, and in some specific place at any given time; as being in motion or rest; as touching or not touching some other body; and as being one in number, or few, or many. From these conditions I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination.[4]

Although primary qualities belong to objects, secondary qualities reside only in mind. Without sensory organs these qualities would never exist, but primary qualities would remain :

> To excite in us tastes, odors, and sounds I believe that nothing is required in external bodies except shapes, numbers, and slow or rapid movements. I think that if ears, tongues, and noses were removed, shapes and numbers and motions would remain, but not odors or tastes or sounds.[5]

So secondary qualities do not belong to objects. Then can we say that they are properties of mind or exist in mind formally (in *esse naturale*) ? Galileo does not give an explicit answer to this question. But he knows that "a multitude of minute particles having certain shapes and moving with certain velocites" penetrate our bodies by their extreme subtlety[6] and cause in us secondary qualities such as heat, colors, tastes, titillation, and others. Only after an interaction between our body and the minute particles we can have secondary qualities. Therefore, Galileo cannot think secondary qualities as properties of mind or as existing formally in mind. Although he specifically does not use the term "relation," he is aware or should be aware that secondary qualities can be ascribed neither to body nor to mind.

## II

Descartes, as being not only a philosopher but also a scientist, followed Galileo's distinction of primary and secondary qualities.

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[4] Drake, p. 274.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 276 7.
[6] *Ibid*, p. 277.

For him, too, primary qualities are nothing else but properties of objects. However, he mostly uses the term "mode" instead of the term ' property" ? In the medieval sense, a modal distinction is a distinction which concerns substance and the properties of substance.[8] In Descartes there are two distinct substances, namely, mind and body, and these two substances have their own properties, or modes. For instance understanding, imagining, recollecting, and willing are properties of mind, but primary qualities such as figure, situation, motion, and others, are properties of body. As for secondary qualities such as pain, colors, tastes, and others, they are just a result of the interaction between body and mind. Therefore, again they cannot be ascribed to mind or body alone.

> I do not however observe more than two ultimate classes of real things — the one is intellectual things, or those of the intelligence, that is, pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance, the other is material things, or that pertaining to extended substance, i.e. to body. Perception, volition, and every mode of knowing and willing, pertain to thinking substance: while to extended substance pertain magnitude or extension in length, breadth and depth, figure, movement, situation, divisibility into parts themselves divisble, and such like. Besides these, there are, however, certain things which we experience in ourselves and which should be attributed neither to mind nor body alone, but to the close and intimate union that exists between the body and mind as I shall later on explain in the proper place. Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone, as the emotions of anger, joy, sadness, love, etc.; and finally all the sensations such as pain, pleasure, light and colour, sounds, odours, tastes, heat, hardness, and all other tactile qualities. (p. 321-2)[9]

Thus although Descartes also lacks the term "relation", he demonstrates more clearly than Galileo that secondary qualities are just relations between body and mind. Without mind or body there could exist no secondary qualities, since they are not properties of mind or body alone, but the effect of the interaction between body and mind. Therefore, secondary qualities including pain, cannot exist in mind or in objects formally. However, Descartes sometimes uses Galileo's language while talking about secondary qualities. For example, he says at one place that pain does not exist anywhere except in mind.[10] But of course we should not interpret this as meaning that secondary qualities formally exist in mind.

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7 Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*, in *The Essential Descartes*, ed. Margaret D. Wilson, (London, 1969), Part I, principles 64, 65, pp. 329-30.

8 *Ibid.*, principle 61, p. 327-8.

9 *Ibid.*, principle 48, p. 321-2.

10 *Ibid.*, principle 67, p. 330.

As we can easily guess, concerning the interaction between body and mind with regard to secondary qualities, Descartes also brings the minute particles in matter into the picture as the causal basis of our ideas of secondery qualities. He very well knows that there is not a resemblance between our ideas of secondary qualities and the minute particles in matter whatsoever. Then how can these minute particles produce something entirely different such as our ideas of secondary qualities in mind? He says that these minute particles have power to excite our nerves in order to cause in us ideas of secondary qualities. "As we have already seen, Descartes clearly establishes secondary qualities as relations, and now he is adding to this approach a new flavor with the term "power" by which for the first time Boyle convincingly showed to everybody's satisfaction that indeed secondary qualities are nothing else but relations, since with the new term secondary qualities can no longer be ascribed either to body or to mind alone in any way. Body can have a power to affect mind, or vice versa, and as we will see, Boyle defines secondary qualities as powers. Thus secondary qualities can be properties of neither mind nor body, except a relation between them, since power is distinct from mind or body. In other words the term "power" does automatically signal a relation.

### III

Although Boyle followed both Galileo and Descartes with regard to the distindtion between primary and secondary qualities, he was the only person who expounded the distinction much more explicitly than Galileo and Descartes by utilizing the new term "power", concerning secondary qualities, and by devising the basic terms of the distinction, namely, "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities." Furthermore, he, for the first time, used the term "relation" and presented some concrete examples to explicate secondary qualities. Therefore, the literature on primary and secondary qualities generally ignores both Galileo and Descartes, except mentioning their names, and focuses on Boyle and his supposed follower Locke.

Boyle described the distinction in his book, *The Origin of Forms and Qualities*. In the section of his book, "An Excursion about the Relative Nature of Physical Qualities", Boyle first presents his famous key lock example which constitutes the foundation of his distinction between primary and secondary qualities. In this and other examples Boyle identifies primary qualities with properties of physical objects and by using the term "power" he tries to show that secondary qualities are just powers of relations, but not matter or new entities :

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11 *Ibid*, Part IV., principle 198, pp. 351-2.

> When Tubal-Cain or whoever else were the Smith, that invented *Locks* and *Keyes*, had made his first Lock, (for we may Reasonably suppose him to have made that before the Key, though the Comparison may be made use of without that Supposition,) That was onely a Piece of Iron, contriv'd into such a Shape; and when afterwards he made a Key to that Lock, That also in it self consider'd was nothing but a Piece of Iron of such a Determinate Figure: but in regard that these two pieces of Iron might now be applied to one another after a Certain manner, and that there was a Congruity betwixt the Wards of the Lock and those of the Key, the Lock and the Key did each of them now obtain a new Capacity, and it became a main part of the Notion and Description of a Lock, that it was capable of being made to Lock or Unlock by that other Piece of Iron we call a Key, and it was look'd upon as a Peculiar Faculty and Power in the Key, that it was Fitted to Open and Shut the Lock and yet by these new Attributes there was not added any Real or Physical Entity either to the Lock or to the Key, each of them remaining indeed nothing but the same piece of Iron, just so shap'd as it was before.[13]

This passage clearly shows that primary qualities (macroscopic)[14] are the properties of matter. A piece of iron, either key or lock. has 'a Determinate Figure' or shape, a determinate size and other primary qualities as properties Thus, Boyle accepts primary qualities as properties and strictly separates them from powers. But he explains secondary qualities by the relation between the key and the lock, and as a result they are merely powers and distinct from matter, but they exist conjointly with matter The key has the capacity or power to turn the lock, and the lock has the power to be turned by the key. For instance if the lock is changed, then the key will lose its power to turn the lock. Notice that when the other object, the lock is changed, the key loses its own power. Thus, secondary qualities cannot be new entities in matter or matter itself. To relate the key-lock example to secondary qualities, Boyle establishes a connection between sensory organs and matter having primary qualities as properties.[15]

In another example Boyle talks about the relation between the membranes of stomachs of animals and human beings and the beaten glass with its primary qualities such as sharp corners, a determinate size, etc. (Of course these primary qualities are the properties of matter. When mentioning primary qualities with respect to Boyle, the properties of matter are implied.)

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[12] Robert Boyle, *The Origin of Formes and Qualities*, Oxford, printed by H. Hall, Printer to the University, 1667, pp. 28-29.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 11 2.

[14] For Boyle microscopic primary qualities are also properties of matter.

[15] Boyle, p. 13.

When the membranes are strong and glass parts are quite small, like a powder, then the beaten glass will not be able to cut the veins and the membranes of the stomach and cause a bleeding there. But when the beaten glass fits the membrancs like a key's fitting a lock, i.e. when the glass parts are big enough and the membranes are weak, then the relation between the membranes of the stomach and the beaten glass will result in the power of poisoning.[16]

After proving this relation Boyle writes the following passage:

> That the Multiplicity of Qualities, that are sometimes to be met with in the same Natural Bodies, needs not make men reject the Opinion we have been proposing, by persuading them, that so many Differing Attributes, as may be sometimes found in one and the same Natural Body, cannot proceed from the bare Texture and other Mechanical Affections of its Matter. For we must consider each Body, not barely as it is in itself an entire and distinct portion of Matter, but as it is a Part of the Universe, and consequently plac'd among a great number and Variety of other Bodies, upon which it may act, and by which it may be acted on in many ways, (or upon Accounts ) each of which Men are wont to fancy as a distinct Power or Quality in the Body, by which those Actions, or in those Passions are produc'd.[17]

This passage further supports our thesis. Some qualities or attributes to which Boyle refers in the natural body are no doubt primary qualities such as shape, size, and other mechanical affections, and naturally, some other qualities concern only relations, or secondary qualities.

## IV

So far we have seen that Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle all identify primary qualities with properties of matter, and secondary qualities with relation. As has been mentioned before, the literature about the distinction between primary and secondary qualities neglects Galileo and Descartes but puts emphasis on Boyle and Locke. However, we already know that Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle all agree on basics (i.e. primary qualities are properties of objects, and secondary qualities are relations), then whatever we say about Boyle while comparing him with Locke can be generalized to include Galileo and Descartes, too.

Generally Boyle has been consulted to clarify Locke's position with regard to primary and secondary qualities. The underlying assumption here is that Locke accepted the distinction as it is proposed by Boyle, and thus philosophy with Locke got the distinction from science. There are probably two main reasons for such a

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16 *Ibid.*, pp. 16 7.

17 *Ibid*, p. 18.

supposition First Locke was closely interested in the scientific achievements of the seventeenth century, Secondly Boyle, one of the great scientists in the Scientific Revolution, was a close friend of Locke. Also as we mentioned before, Boyle happened to treat the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in his book, *The Origin of Forms and Qualities.*

However, to use Boyle as a point of departure for understanding Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities has not necessarily been advantageous As a matter of fact, seeing Boyle's distinction between primary and secondary qualities as a replica of Locke's distinction, Reginald Jackson and E. M Curley, the recent writers on the distinction, committed some serious mistakes.

In reality a one-to-one correspondence between Boyle's version and Locke's version of primary qualities cannot be established. Although Locke understood primary qualities, differently than Boyle, he understood secondary qualities in the same way. So as we will see, Locke's distinction is found neither in science nor in Boyle as far as primary qualities are concerned. As for secondary qualities, there appears to be no basic difference between Locke and Boyle, or between Locke and others, namely Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle, since all equate secondary qualities with relation.

In Boyle primary qualities are simply qualities in the sense of properties of material objects, but in Locke they (primary qualities) are nothing except powers or relations. Nobody seems to notice this difference between Locke and Boyle, and such a carelessness leads to some important distortions in the interpretations of Locke and Boyle with regard to primary and secondary qualities. Now let us very shortly point out how Jackson and Curley erred in interpreting Locke's and Boyle's distinctions by missing the above-mentioned difference between Boyle and Locke.

First of all, Jackson wrongly projected Boyle's understanding of primary and secondary qualities to Locke. and thus misunderstood Locke's notion of primary qualities[18] In Jackson's understanding both Boyle and Locke identify primary qualities with properties of physical objects.

Jackson also misunderstood Boyle's concept of power.[19] He claimed that **Boyle** sometimes identifies powers (concerning secondary

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[8] **Reginald Jackson,** "Locke's Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities." in C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, *Locke and Berkeley, A Collection of Critical Essays,* (New York, 1968), p. 55.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

qualities) with properties, But this is also not correct. Although Boyle sometimes reduces secondary qualities (as powers) to primary qualities (as properties of matter), he never identifies power with properties or confuses them in any way as Jackson contends. As for Curley, he projected Jackson's misunderstanding of Boyle's concept of power into Locke,[20] and made his correct interpretation of Locke's distinction inconsistent. As we will see, Locke never accepts pseudo properties in powers, or equates power with the properties of physical objects at any time. Due to this misprojection Curley also wrongly claimed that Locke offered a controversial definition of power. In Curley's understanding Locke sometimes defined powers as properties of material objects.[21] Of course, such a contention is not warranted at all. Since Boyle, as we saw, does not identify powers with properties, but does define secondary qualities as powers and primary qualities as properties of matter. Thus Boyle lacks a general definition of quality. But Locke deliberately defines as powers since in him both primary and secondary qualities are just powers.

Not to fall into the traps in which Jackson and Curley fell, we should sort out the difference between Locke and others (Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle) with regard to primary qualities. As we said above, although Locke basically agrees with others on the issue of secondary qualities, he distinctly differs from others on the issue of primary qualities.Summarily what Locke does is to generalize Boyle's understanding of secondary qualities by labeling primary qualities as relations or powers as well.

To begin with, Locke accepts two kinds of ideas "as they are *ideas* or perceptions in our minds and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us".[22] An idea can be a perception in the mind, but how can an idea be in the things? Locke draws attention to the fact that when he says ideas are in the things, he means the causal basis of idea, namely powers.[23] Thus, he gives a definition of powers. But more importantly, he also gives a definition of quality in terms of power. "whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought or under standing, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of subject wherein that power is".[26] Concerning this definition, Locke does not make any distinction between the idea of primary qualities and the idea of secondary qualities Power then is applicable to both primary and secondary qualities, and it produces in us *any* idea.

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[20] E. M. Curley, "Locke, Boyle, and The Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities", *Philosophical Review*, October, 1972, pp. 442-3.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 450.

[22] John Locke. *An Essay of Human Understanding*, ed. John W. Yolton, Everyman's Library, (Dutton. New York, 1974), vol. I. Book II, Chapter 8, Section 7, p. 104.

[23] *Ibid.*, section 8, p. 104.

[24] *Ibid.*,

After making the distinction between idea and quality Locke gives an exampple to further explain his definition. A snowball has power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round. Locke calls "the powers to produce these ideas in us as they are in the snowball" qualities. Notice that roundness is a primary quality, and a power in the snowball produces in us the idea of round. Thus primary qualities are also powers.

Powers are in the body, but they are not body or a part of body. The following is a brief review of how Locke discusses the primary qualities in his book *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* edited by J. W. Yolton :

> II, 8, 9: Qualities thus considered in bodies are : First, such as utterly inseparable from the body... each part has still *solidity extension, figure*, and *mobility*... These I call *original* or *primary qualities* of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.
>
> II, 8. 17: The particular *bulk*, *number*, *figure*, and *motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them.*
>
> II, 8, 18: A piece of *manna* of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the *idea* of a round or square figure; and by being removed from one place to another, the *idea* of motion.
>
> II, 8, 22: *...the qualities in bodies, and the ideas produced by them in the mind...the primary* and *real qualities* of bodies, which are always in them.
>
> II, 8, 23: The *qualities* (primary qualities), then, that are in *bodies...*

In all these phrases Locke does not identify primary qualities with matter or body. He says only that primary qualities are in bodies, and they produce in us the ideas of macroscopic primary qualities. Primary qualities are also not separable from body, since body and powers or primary qualities exist conjointly. Without body we cannot think of a power even though power is distinct from matter. Solidity, extension, figure, and mobility as powers are always "in every particle of matter which has a bulk enough to be perceived "[25]

Our ideas, without exception, are produced by the primary qualities of insensible particles, since we cannot normally perceive the insensible particles, but they cause in us our ideas, including the ideas of primary qualities. So our ideas of both primary and secondary qualities of sensible or perceivable objects depend solely on the primary qualities of insensible particles.

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[25] *Ibid.*, section 9, p. 104.

Locke gives the example of a grain of wheat. He first divides it into two parts, and each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility. He continues to divide it again until the parts become insensible. The insensible parts still have solidity, extension, figure, and mobility. Locke calls these (solidity, extension, figure, and mobility of the insensible particles), original or primary qualities of body. Thus, these insensible particles produce in us the simple ideas of solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. In other words we can say that the primary qualities of insensible particles produce in us the ideas of macroscopic primary qualities.[26] Let us quote from Locke :

> Since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion, which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.[27]

There is a distance between our eyes and the macroscopic qualities, i.e., the extension, figure, number and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, and the only way that bodies can operate on us is by impulse, i.e., by the size, motion and figure of their insensible particles.[28] Necessarily some "imperceptible bodies", which I called microscopic primary qualities, come from the extension, figure, number and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, i.e., macroscopic primary qualities.

Immediately after this, Locke continues :

> After the same manner that the *ideas* of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that *the ideas of sacondary qualities* are also *produced*, viz *by the operation of insensible particles on our senses.*[29]

Notice especially the adverb "also" which clearly signals that both ideas of primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities are produced by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. To the contrary of Locke, Boyle did not explain primary qualities with the insensible particles, and for this reason he took primary qualities (microscopic or macroscopic) as properties of matter. As for secondary qualities, he indeed refers to the texture of atoms or minute particles. He could not connect the ideas of secondary qualities directly to objects because of his notion of minute particles or his understanding that nothing in the object resembles our ideas of secondary qualities. Thus, he called secondary qualities due to the minute parts "powers." Now Locke deliberately makes the insensible particles the origin of our ideas in order to define primary qualities as powers as well.

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[26] *Ibid*.

[27] *Ibid*., section 12, p. 105.

[28] *Ibid*, section 18, p. 107.

[29] *Ibid*., section 13, p. 105.

Of course, in Locke not only primary qualities, but also secondary qualities are powers. Locke admits three kinds of qualities following Boyle. Primary qualities, secondary qualities, and the third sort of qualities. But Locke classifies the tertiary or the third sort of qualities under secondary qualities. The tertiary qualities are barely powers and cause some changes in other objects.Locke constantly compares secondary qualities with the tertiary qualities in order to prove that secondory qualities are also powers.

## CONCLUSION

So far I have established that Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, and Locke all agree on secondary qualities, by indentifying then with relations. As for primary qualities Locke, as a philosopher, is drastically different from Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle, the representatives of the scientific community in the seventeenth century. In Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle primary qualities as properties of physical objects, or macroscopic primary qualities are amenable to mathematical or scientific treatment. But in Locke they are just powers, and are causally dependent upon minute particles like secondary qualities; therefore Locke's primary qualities being on a par with secondary qualities on a causal basis, "do not lend themselves to mathematical" or scientific treatment any longer. As a result neither Locke followed Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle nor philosophy with Locke inherited the distinction from science, as far as primary qualities are concerned. One would scarcely guess this from the traditional account.

## X

# Considerations for an Universal Approach to the Artworks and Transformations of Philosophy

*Josephine Lee*

Considerations for an universal approach to the artworks and transformations of philosophy are a correlation of synthesis of East and West, philosophy of art. Unity is the law of life. All parts are interrelated within the whole as a basis for an applicable universal principle — follows unity and interdependence. The objectives for this synthesis is to review and study the forms of art in chronological perspective and the integration of the forms of art in the perspective life and thought which each society produced. The experiencing of art as a unified experience that all art forms share a common form.

Thomas Munro stated, "There is a need for theoretical and unifying synthesis, of art and psychology and other current developments of thought[1]." In the depth of this quote, rapid cultural integration, communication and science with unparalleled speed of discoveries of various data, foster a need for more integrated organization of East and West endeavor of philosophic thought. At present, scientific formulas of aesthetics are based, but they need a clarified synthesis, a unification of these formulas. Suggestions made by Thomas Munro are, "a large scale program of bibliographies, translations, critical summaries, publications in different languages, and then through integrated synthesis."[2] This synthesis will give a summit view with insight within the single discipline's limitations. To augment this further, we need to incorporate the recognition and to study the conditions of life of both East and West. In there, given periods of cultures in history are relevant to determine the forms of art development. The cooperation of East and West philosophies would ultimately relate to a oneness, because it is universal, similarly the universe is related to everything in it.

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[1] Thomas Munro, "Aesthetics as Science : Its Development in America", JAAC, Vol. IX, No. 3 (March 1951), pp. 172 and 185.

[2] Ibid.

The problem is to have a synthesized system of thought that reflects this universality of East and West; an integrated synthesis. The progress toward a synthesis is needed, regardless of limitations. A correlated synthesis is a sign already noted — an awareness of an universal energy pulse of our era. The contribution of the accomplishment of a dynamism of an era is undoubtedly confronted with impediments. Those who have the clarity will see the contributions of both East and West. The summit of intellectual viewing is being in communication with comprehension of both within a single panoramic thought of the two existing fields of division (disunity). Only then universally we can both reach the highest altitude of thought. We then could view disciplined objectives.

First, unity is the law of life, an universal approach. The modern idea of the universe is wholeness in which all parts are interrelated so that the change of one element produces change within the whole. Second, to clarify and free the impediments of the search for a basis of an applicable universal principle from a universal point of view. Third, recognizing the relevant data to the problem and leading to a postulation of a hypothesis as basis for a principle of synthesis. Fourth, the universe is *One* is the *basis* for a unitary creative fountain which would emanate prolific variety of ideas. Fifth, unification of a correlated synthesis would follow interdependence — all parts tend to join together to form a harmonious whole. For example, the basic building structure of the universe is based upon this principle. Sixth, unity and interdependence will be the basis for synthesis.[3]

Our goal is one and the same with our counterparts. The benefit of one benefits all to some extent. We are dependent upon each other both East and West. Our endeavors are not totally for us alone. The possibility for us to make advances is for all mankind. We all have responsibility both as individuals and to the whole of humanity. Interdependence and unity of human activity governs harmony and great remarkable achievements take place. Likewise the reverse is true. East and West would have innate ideas with broad evolutionary development trend toward the development and growth of individual uniqueness. Our perceptions will be increased in viewing unity and inter-dependence of both East and West considerations.

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[3] Josephine Lee, "The Universal Basis of Ethics or Morals in the One-ness of Life". Lecture. 1983.

Second consideration is to review aad study the froms of art in chronological perspective and the integration of the froms of art in the perspective of the life and thought which society produced[4]. It is necessary to place aesthetics in the context of social science to give meaning to the total body of inquiry regarding the relevance of the individual artist. In specific definitive terms, artworks are seen as the study of man's behavior as it relates to the creation of art in its impact upon aesthetics.

There is a high correlation between the common underlying aesthetics (artworks) as seen in literature,philosophy and religion. These specific characteristics are also inherent in the social structure of governments.

Basically, the principle and procedures which would be utilized in the context of a unified system of artworks can be derived through various aspects of any individual culture and then critically a comparison could be made. What is needed is a basic means for interpretation of a culture as well as for correlating the totality of human knowledge and experience with our view of artworks (aesthetics). The manifestations must be understood to be commonalities throughout all artworks and various cultural pursuits from the ancient to the present time.

Artwork (aesthetics) within a unified system have specific laws which govern cultural activity and determine the nature of the life and thought which the society produces. What must be done is to correlate various cultural expressions, so we can view the similarities of the mental processes involved in history, sociology and economics.

Western writers on art tend to emphasize ihe importance of individuality and personal influence as a foundation for both creative activities as well as artistic (aesthetic) activities, which is produced by emotive experience a reaction which occasioned tha emotion. The traditions of social instiutions may be understood in the light of critical artistic (aesthetic) theory. Viewing from a more integrated emphasis on the collective aspects of cultural life will give us a common denominator in the realization in similarity, in the characteristics of each culture in the artworks, philosophy, religion and literature and so on, with the inclusive of each society's structural thought by comparing each aspect within a given culture. Recognizing commonalities will lead to authentic interpretation of East and west culture giving the correlation of knowledgeable experience. Perhaps the primay impediment of an integrated thought today is the intellectual chasm between our individualistic and our collective poilosophics of life as these integrate with the culture.

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[4] Morrison, Philipson, ed. Aesthetics Today (Article by Walter Abell) "Toward a Unified Field of Aesthetics". World Publishing Co. 1961, pp. 432-463.

Carl Jung's mental imagery in terms of archetypes[5] attributes art oriented activities in terms of mythological themes and imagery which verifies the unconscious of modern man and underlined similarities between the human races.[6] This new principle brings us closer to alignment.

The networks of social scientists working together throughout the world have determined similarities in images and some kind of correlation as seen in terms of various forms of artworks, literature and so on, will have a long-term social and aesthetic implications. Any tendency to select a given artwork from a chronological view, including the artist, links together the complex cultural and historical totalities embodied by a unified system of artworks. All aspects of understanding of reality and artworks must be seen from a premise of underlying common elements.

Some of the characteristics of artworks in totality may be interpreted in some of these terms. This concept would help us determine social standards of a culture of its forms and creative ability. This would lead to a unification of both East and West.

Third consideration, experiencing art as a unified experience, that all art forms share a common form[7]. In terms of art experience, when the combination of the anticipatory past and future is achieved by gratification. When this is achieved, it is an experience, realized by the viewer. The activity is connected with the actual process of living which is universal to both East and West. Art experience in this unified completion is termed an aesthetic experience. The achievement and the devices in terms of effect and cause, organizes the world in terms of needs and environment. Art is a complete organization and this completeness lies at the source of aesthetic pleasures. Experience has to have unity. Dewey states it is no experience without unity. Art is seen as a unification of organized process that the artist employs the viewer, comes in communication with interest of the artist with the same commonality of communication interest of his own reciprocal process, in relation to the artworks. The viewer is creative just as the artist was creative when producing his artworks. We can say according to Dewey experience begins with an impulse, of the whole person moves to satisfy a need, but is determined by the environment and past expeience.

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[5] C. G. Jung, "Psychological Types, or The Psychology of Individuation", trans. H. G. Baynes (New York : 1925), p. 211.

[6] C. G. Jung, "Psychology of the Uneonscious", authorized translation, with introduction, By B. M. Hinkle (New York : 1949), pp. 210-211.

[7] John Dewey, "Art as Experience", (New York, 1934), G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Art is a common base for communication, making a possible unification of experience. All arts share a common form whsch is organized toward a unified experience through the sensory mediums such as stone (in sculpture), water colors, oil paints, words, music (in a more subtle way). They are all related concerns with time and space Dewey claims, "The only media of complete unhindered communication between man and man that can occur in a world of gulfs and walls that limit community experience". Since art communicates, the requirements can be compared to language, a triadic relation (the artist) the speaker, (artworks) the thing said, (the viewer) the listener.[8] It involves what is said, how it was said through form and substance. Substance being the content, the form is the organization of the content. Each medium of artworks fits a kind of communication. Artworks are a fixed order of elements that are perceived. Artworks like an organism; manifests a movement it has a past, present and career of history. What properties do all arts share ? They all share an organized unity of experience. All arts operate through sensory mediums, materials such as stone, watercolors, oil paints, words, music and so on became mediums of expressing a meaning, common to physical existence. Tha next property that all arts share are concerned with time and space. The artworks are dynamic, all related action occurs in time and space. Every medium of artworks has its own power, its own efficacy and value, it communicates by making common related and available what had been isolated and singular. Art is subject and object alike. It has power to unite men through shared celebration to all of the concerns and anticipations of life. Philosophers both East and West need to take the experience in its most complete forn (universal), the integration of the self with the objective order and law of the material that it incorporates then they could use this as a base for understanding experience. We could question does art express the universal or the uniqueness or particular? Dewey sees it as a synthesizing of both. Art is a manifestation of experince unalloyed.

Because of this manifestation it provides a control for imagination of the ventures in philosophy. Human beings and their environment are continually subject to change, operating within the structure of laws. This structure is subject to gradual change. Art must reflect this. The awareness of both East and West is the realization that the rise of industrialism is a source of the new patterns and materials. Art can show there is permanence in the changing and change in the permanent. In a wider view, aesthetic experience of artworks reveals the life and development of the civilization.

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[8] Ibid.

The emphasis of the considerations of a universel approach to artworks and the transformations of philosophy: First by the law of unity, mankind can gain if we correlate all ideas and to help in the synthesis of an idea which would benefit all through unity because we are all part of the whole. This concept does not retard freedom from either culture but, since we are parts of the universe mankind can achieve altitudes yet unsurpassed by unity—ideas and so on With a summit view approach, we could synthesize a system where all could benefit not only specifically in philosophy and art but in other fields of interest We must begin on common base of unity. Both East and West could benefit by keeping freedom, openness to new ideas expressed, not to reject or accept but contemplate — see if there is truth. This would give us interdependence and unity,

In reference to the second consideration, ultimately a unified system of artworks will have a primary goal of finding sommon ground and basic underlying commonalities between various cultures, societies and their differing theoretical approaches to an understanding of an universal approach. A unified system will question the differing systems of interpretations and effect the basis of unity.

The third consideration, the experiencing of art as a unified experience that all art forms share a common form. The art experience brings together conflicting elements found in every period of history both East and West The customs, rituals, of all peoples their communal activities, unite the practical social, and educative nto an aesthetic experience of unity. The art of the past has offerings for the present to be worthy of consideration. Art has something to say to the succeeding generations under various environments; It shows of the disciplined movements of the matter of some experience to a genuine fulfilled experience. We view ancient civilizations in terms of their artworks. The elements of civilization in terms of their artwork, reveals an addition to our world. It enables man to better understand himself through the past, the present and the future. This new synthesis has aesthetic quality. Artworks and their internal function can be combined with man, that yields results. The artist can create physical and moral environment that determines the way of interest and attention of human beings. The art experience can and must shape the future toward universal unity.

In these considerations, all peoples both East and West will have an universal unity in the artworks and the transformations of philosophy. The world cannot wait for competing systeme to reconstruct to solve its problems.[9] The time has come to further the unification of transcending loyalties of inflexible concepts, but to integrate ideas. With openness let us rceognize tte commonalities of philosophical systems of the humanity of all peoples East and West. In this consideration, let us have unity of reason i.e. in our relations with both East and West, which leads to clarity and logic. Unity in expressed action i.e. in our relations with East and West which leads to brotherliness. Unity in the field of art i.e. in our creative relations with objects of both East and West which leads to beauty. Unity in the sphere of psychology i.e. in our relations with ourselves and others which leads to equilibrium and to the conceptions of truth. Unity in the sphere of religion i.e. unity with the One Source (which all mankind emanates from). And finally the experience of unity which is compassion to produce the kind of brotherhood we want in the realm of philosophy. We can share in freedom and unity, to make a harmonious whole.

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[9] Eastman, Roger, "Way of Religion," (San Francisco : 1975) Canfield Press, (Article by Paul Kurtz) "Humanity as a Whole", p. 541.

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# Book-Reviews :

**P. K. Mohapatra :** *Personal Identity,* **Santosh Publications.** Rastrabhasa Road, Cuttack, (India) 1983.

Dr. P. K. Mohapatra's book on 'Personal Identity' is a distinctive contribution to current philosophical literature. It is a solid work, admirably carved out with painstaking labour. There is much in this book that deserves commendation, much that forces the reader to avoid the trap of filthy and misleading pronouncements. The language of the book is the language of analysis, sharp, biting and interspersed with blunt polemics. The book appears to be challenging and provocative in many respects. The areguments are intricately interwoven and generously poised. They build up a complex structure, rich with logical cross-references and connections. We can not say that they are the sort of committed arguments, to some traditional or contemporary school of thought. They appear to be impeccable pieces of good craftsmanship, chiselled out by an independent mind. They reveal an intellectual insight, adding perceptiveness to information. In any case, no one is likely to say that the work contains mere routine arguments or standard points of view; the thesis appears to be an independent work in many respects. It is a discursive work, tersely logical and provocatingly analytical.

The problem of personal identity is no new area of philosophical study. The classical philosopers of the East and the West have grappled with the problem in their own ways. In current philosophy, stripped off its metaphysical obscurities, the problem appears in a new light.. It throws a new challenge to modern minds, accustomed to the urbanised way of logic and analysis.

Dr. Mohapatra sets out to formulate the problem in the light of modern analysis. The problem, he tells us, is one of examining evidences, if any, for the belief that a person $P_2$ and time $t_1$ is the same person as the peoson $P_1$ at an earlier time $t_1$. Evidently he is set upon finding suitable criteria of personal identity judgements could meaningfully be pronounced about persons. By criterion, he means 'justificatory evidence of something to be so". We are told that a *criterion* is not to be confused with *definition* or *necessary condition*. Definition involves entailment but a criterion does not entail. A criterion for something also does not "logically depend on its being a necessary condition for that thing". It follows, therefore, that a criterion need not be a necessary condition and need not entail.

In course of investigation, Dr. Mohapatra covers quite a large area of relevant literature. He makes a careful survey of the area and tells us what he thinks about the motives of different philosophical explanations of personal identity. With remarkable poise, he argues with the traditionalists as with the contemorary thinkers, unsettling some of their ideas and restating some others, whenever he found it necessary. He strikes hard against Cartesianism when it appears pathetically confusing, But he, too, shows his readiness to accommodate the Cartesian 'Cogito Ergo Sum', stripped off its metaphysical coatings, In fact, with Mohapatra, self—consciousness becomes a fact of basic importance. It is a pre-supposition and a must for all that we can think about our logic and language. Dr. Mohapatra appears to have made self consciousness a non-critical base where personal identity is no longer a tedious riddle, but perceived as an elementary fact of experience.

With the coolness of an impassioned critic, Mohapatra then proceeds to make a proper assessment of the traditional approach. He picks up for his purpose some of the best known representative thinkers--Locke and Herme, Butler and Reid, Kant and James, these who made considerable impact in this area of philosophical study.

With further examination of criterial evidence, Mohapatra hits upon two basic criteria—one, the criterion of bodily continuity and the other, the criterion of memory claims. He now enters upon a phase of fruitful dialogue with many distinguished thinkers of the contemporary brand. He discusses the views of Bernard Williams, Godfrey Vesey, Shoemaker and Waggins, Derek Parfit and Norman Malcolm, T. E. Wilkerson and A. M. Quinton and many others in the field including Strawson and Wittgenstein. Subsequently he makes a thorough and searching examination of the criteria of bodily continuity and memory claims with relevent references to the idea of disembodied person.

It is possible to dispute the claims of bodily continuity on important grounds and Mohapatra appears to be keenly aware of the position. He therefore, discusses at some length cases of bodily transfer, modular replacements of bodily components, split-brain transplantations etc.

This position, as Mohapatra contends, does not abnegate the claims of memory criterion as such. It only asserts that memory as an independent criterion of personal identity is not adequate and can not by itself stand the test of logical analysis. In puzzle cases of alleged memory transfer, in what is described as the case of reincarnation, Dr. Mohapatra tells us that we may be inclined to use memory as the sole criterion. But we fail to understand how this new person, having certain memory traces of a person who lived earlier, could be identified as the same person as the earlier one, there being no ostensive ground for such identification. The memory transferred to or transplanted in some physical basis other than the original one creates confusion in meaning requirements of personal identification. This position appears to us not tenable on logical grounds.

But body and memory claims have meaning only if self-consciousness is posited as the basis of what we mean by a person. Mohapatra rightly contends that self-consciousness is basic to our knowing and being The awareness of I as I and as no other lays the foundation of personal identity. The identity consciousness is non criterial and constitutes what may be described as the area of privileged access of Dr. Mohapatra.

Dr. Mohapatra's thesis on personal identity, we believe, will provide sensitive guidelines for further researches in the field.

*Satyabadi Mishra*

**M. P. Pandit :** *Studies in the Tantras and the Veda*, pp. 168, Sterling Publishers Private Limited, L-10, Green Park Extension, New Delhi 110016, Price Rs. 100/— (1988)

Shri M.P. Pandit, the author of this book is a well-known writer on Yoga, Spiritual Philosophy, Psychology, Veda, Upanishads and Tantra. He is an authoritative exponent of Shri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga and Philosophy.

Mr. M.P. Pandit studies in this volume seek to underline the fact that both the Vedic and the Tantric traditions run parallel to each other in the history of Indian Thought. There are many common bases and values that point to a foundational unity. There is also a research into the hymns of the Veda to ascertain if ther is spiritual content in these utterances of the ancient Rishis. Incidentally the unity of consciousness in God, Man and Nature is brought to the fore. Philosophy in India has been a presentation in terms of the intellect of deep spiritual experience and realisation. These writings serve to relate thought to experience, the mind to the soul. The spirit of integrality is quite visible in the eternal traditions of India.

The whole book is divided into two Parts, the first part—The Tantras and the second Part—The Veda. The first part which consists of the Tantras is divided as follows: Preface, Principles of Tantra, Mahanirvana Tantra, Varivasya, Rahasya, Sri Lalita Sahasra Nama, Science of Japa, The Guru-Sisya Tradition, Yoga Kundalini Upanishad, Yoga Anusasanam, Uttara Gita, Rauravagama, Pasupata Sutram, The Mandala, Sri cakra, Sankara and Tantric tradition, Cakras or Lotuses in Sri Aurobindo's Yoga, and lastly Indian Culture and the Tantra.

The Part II: The Veda has been divided into six chapters as follows: Purusa Sukta, Hymn of creation, Godhead in the Rig Veda, The Nivids, Gayatri Upasana, and the Veda and the Upanishad.

In the first chapter Principles of Tantra the author has very ably discussed The Tantratattva, Necessity of the Tantra Shastra, Comparative estimate of the Veda, Vedanta and the Tantra and their interrelation, Guru, Mantra, Gayatri, Shiva Shakti, Image Worship, Devatas, the Institution of Ceremonial worship etc., The Tantra Shastra has certain distinctive features: In the first place it is Catholic and open to all irrespective of their class or sex, Secondly. One need not have to undergo long periods of preparatory training. Tantra shastra is Pratyaksha Sastra, a science which is verifiable at every step. There is a greater stress here on the practical side of the Sastra. Tantra does not ignore the claims of the earth. For the Tantrik this world here is as much real as the world elsewhere. All are manifestations of the One Shakti, One Divine. The Tantra is the only Divine Revelation. The method of spiritual self culture leads him, step by step, to an acquaintance with nature's supersensuous beings, high and low.

In the Tantra Monism and Dualism both take their due place as truths valid at different stages of the development of human consciousness. The Tantra harmonises Vedantic Monism and Dualism.

These studies in the Tantra, Veda and Upanishad, bring out the common features between the traditions of the Veda and the Agams. They also underline the fact that both the Vedic and the Tantric traditions run parallel to each other in the long history of Indian traditions. This terrestrial universe has emanated from the Supreme Divine Being and hence it is as real as the Divine.

The author has very ably discussed all the characteristics of Tantra and discussed diferent aspects of Tantra in Principles of Tantra. Later he has dealt with Mahanirvana Tantra, and other related aspects of Tantra.

Mr. Pandit deserves our most heartfelt congratulations in bringing out quite an exhaustive book "Studies in the Tantras and the Veda" in a very concise manner. The book is an excellent work on Tantras and the Veda written by a great spiritual writer. This will attract attention of scholars both in East and West and other important aspects of Tantra and making them clear. This is a brief introduction to Tantras and Veda by an eminent scholar.

*Param Jeet Kaur*

**His Holiness the Dalai Lama** : *Transcendent Wisdom— A Commentary on the ninth chapter of Shantidevas Guide to the Bodhisattvas Way of Life* (Translated and edited by B. Allan Wallace). Snow Lion Publications, Ithaca, N.Y., 114 Pages (1988). Price US. $ 9.25.

This 114 page book is largely based on teachings given by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, commenting on the ninth chapter of Shantideva's classic guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Bodhicaryavatara), delivered in Switzarland in 1979. Wallace describes his translation of the Bodhicaryavatara as having been done on the basis of commentaries by the authoritative Tshonkhapa and others. One is thus left with just a shadow of doubt as to how much of the work is 'pure' translation of His Holinesses words, and how much is Wallace's interpretation. However, there is no doubting the usefulness of this volume to all who are seriously interested in the Madhyamika Buddhist doctrine of Emptiness, as interpreted by the Gelukpa school of Tibetan Buddhism, or that the Dalai Lama's exposition of it is a masterly one.

The Madhyamika doctrine of Emptiness has always been a slippery thing, not only for Westerners such as myself, but for Tibetans and other Buddhists also and, differing interpretations exist as to exactly what is meant. The doctrine is one of considerable subtlety and depth, and has been given added force by contemporary currents in Western thinking that seek to make a connection between Buddhist and Advaitin descriptions of reality on the one hand, and the findings of contemporary physics on the other.

The Madhymika doctrine of emptiness falls somewhere between naive 'realism' (the doctrine that things are more—or less what we take them to be) and various forms of idealism and nihilism, The Madhyamika doctrine of emptiness is *not* nihilism : It seeks to demonstrate that what we call 'entities' or 'things' (material objects, the self, fundamental particles, spacetime, etc.)—do not exist in the way in which we perceieve them, while conceding that some sort of 'conventional' existence may nevertheless be attributed to them. (i.e., they do not exist, like, say, the son of a barren woman or the horns of a rabit). This theory finds strong parralells in current theories of Quantum Physics, (particularly the 'bootstrap' theory), according to which there are no 'fundamental' particles or forces, but only relationships expressible in various ways, and the perceptions of these—a point of view which has much in common Madhyamikas rival Yogacharya, as well as with Madhyamika theory of emptiness, Viewed in this light, the Madhyamika theory of emptiness expounded in this book can provide profound insights into the nature of reality.

His Holiness proceeds to explain the idea that things do not exist 'from their own side,and that nothing is able to exist except in relation to other things and our perceptions of their relationships. (i.e., a 'father' can exist only in relation to a 'son', for example). He proceeds step by step down a traditional path, rebutting criticisms from realists, from the idealist Yogacharya school of Buddhism, and from the Hindu schools of Samkhya and Nyaya. In doing so, he provides an insight into medieval Indian dialectic. Wallace provides detailed notes, which include references to contemporary physics.

While His Holiness exposition is masterley, it is an exclusively traditional presentation, and I cannot help feeling that a more thoroughgoing attempt is needed by someone to cross—fertilise the traditional madhyamika (and for that matter Yogacharya) view, with the sort of view of contemporary physics exemplified by the work of Fritj of Capra and others. I was a little surprised to see that while Wallace has a degree in physics and makes repeated reference to it in his notes, he doesn't refer Capra at all. Still, this is really a quibble : The Madhyamika view as expounded by His Holiness is a challenging and promising one for anyone interested in the fundamental nature (or lack of it) of the universe. The sooner it is debated by Western Philosophers the better.

*John Hallam*

Dennis Marcellino : *Sweeping it Under the Drug*, A complete Book About 'Recreational' Drugs and How to create a satisfying Life without them, pp. 192, Publishers : Lighthouse Publishing P.O. Box 220, Reseda, Ca. 91335 (U.S.A.) 1988.

Dennis Marcellino was an award winning Mathematics and Engineering student in the middle 1960's.He has attended and received degrees in psychology and engineering from: several U. S. Colleges and Universities.In 1960 he joined the Hippie Movement and was enticed by it. He left his engineering career and became a musician. He being a seeker of the highest pleasures that this life has to offer, he found himself thoroughly engulfed in a search to find where they existed, being driven and guided in and out of many different social groups (and their drug and highness-seeking approaches), driven by his heart's desire for high feelings, and guided by his heart's sense of truth and his mind's ability to stop contradictions. Dennis Marcellino after several years felt that he's discovered enough of life's truths to where drugs are no longer needed or desired. In this important book he wants to show how a person can be free of drugs and have a very satisfied heart and life. He gives all of the minute details, covering every aspect of life, that are needed to create these.

The whole book is divided as follows: Chapters: Preface—An Overview of this book, 1. Sweeping it under the Drug: Defining the Concept. 2. The Current State of the War on Drugs. The Problem: 3. An Overview of the Problem, 4. A Problem of the Heart, 5. Why People take Drugs, 6. A searching Person's Menu of Choices, 7. Some Physiological Realities, 8. The minor Drugs, 9. The Ramifications of Choosing Drugs, 10. Conclusion Drugs aren't a Real Solution. The Inspiration.11. A Natural Life (yields) Not feeling a need for Drugs, 12 What is Love ? 13. Love Inside First, 14. Our Relationships with others, 15. Raising Children, 16· Submitting to the Oneness: *The Solution*,. 17. Making a Commitment to improve your life. 18. The Right Environment. 19. Surviving Withdrawal 20. Knowing your natural self, 21. The Hand book of the Rules of your Heart, and 22. Higher and Higher Naturality. In the end Index and Bibliography has been provided.

Dennis Marcellino has done a splendid work in bringing out such a nice publication which will help and staying off of drugs. This book discusses the various problems with which an individual is faced and become drug addict. The main emphasis in this book is on the Problem, Inspiration and the Solution suggested. In the last section Mr. Dennis Marcellino has very clearly discussed various aspects such as Making a Commitment to improve one's life, the Right Environment, Surviving withdrawal, knowing your natural self, the Handbook of the Rules of Heart and Higher and Higher Naturally.

This book is a must for those who have decided to leave drugs. This book shows how one can keep them off from drugs. This book also gives some solutions as to how it can work and help in staying off from drugs. This is a must book for anyone who is into personal growth.

In this age such books are most welcome and the authorand publisher both deserve congratulations for bringing out such a publication which will be helpful for the modern man and for the betterment of society at large.

*Prakash Atreya*

**K. P. Bahadur :** *The Wisdom of Yoga, A Study of Patanjali's Yoga Sutra*, pp. 116, Sterling Publishers Private Limited, L 10 Green Park Extension, New Delhi 110016 (1988), Price Rs 100/—

The author of this work Shri K. P. Bahadur is a senior official in the Administrative Service in Varanasi. He is also a research scholar in Sanskrit and has to his credit several philosophical and literary works. The main works being The Burning Bush (Bhagavad Gita in verse), Five Verse Upanishads (Commentary), Poems of Love and Wisdom (translation of Bihari's poems, and Rasikpriya of Keshavadas (Analysis and Commentary) Four of his works have been accepted under the UNESCO scheme of translation of Representative Works (Hindi).

The inestimable contribution of Indian Philosophy to world thought is contained in the Six Systems of Classical Indian Philosophy. This study of Patanjali's renowned work is the first of a series of six books based on the six systems of Indian Philosophy : Yoga, Samkhya, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Vedanta and Meemansa.

Mr. Krishna P. Bahadur a great scholar has very ably explained the Classical Yoga School of Indian Philosophy. He explains the theory of science of Yoga and how Samadhi can be achieved by the new aspirant. The practical method and the eight steps leading to Samadhi are described. Further he has described the miraculous powers of concentration and in the end discloses how the aspirant obtains release from the world of mind and body.

The contents of the book have been divided as follows : Preface, General Introduction to the Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Introduction, On Trance (Samadhi). On the Practice of Yoga, On Attainments and On Absolute Independence (Kaivalya), Appendix and Index.

It is a marvellous book written in lucid style and bring before us all the details of Yoga System of Indian Philosophy. The author explained lucidly the 194 Yoga Sutras (aphorisms) in four chapters with the help of Sanskrit composition, where necessary. and an introduction explaining the fundamental concepts of the system of Yoga.

This is a remarkable book explaining the concept of Yoga thoroughly both in theory and practice. Shri K. P. Bahadur has done a great service to the cause of Indian Philosophy specially The Yoga based on the Study of Patanjali's Yoga Sutra. The book will prove to be a good, systematic treatise on Yoga. The style and presentation are good. It is creditable that a man of administrative service has produced such an exhaustive but concise book on Yoga.

Sterling Publishers deserve our thanks for planning to bring out under the Wisdom of India Series five more books to fill a gap on the Classical Systems of Indian Philosophy by Shri K. P. Bahadur.

*Prakash Atreya*

## Editorial

# Philosophy's Obligation in the Nuclear Age

*John Somerville*

We recognize that philosophy, as one of the oldest intellectual disciplines has always included among its most important objects of study, the human world as a whole—its nature, its extent, its meaning and its future possibilities. We recognize also that different schools of philosophy have always existed with different answers to these "world view" questions. In the course of philosophy's long history numerous separate parts and aspects of the human world have become objects of special disciplines or sciences. But philosophy has always remained as the only field that, by definition, accepts the responsibility of dealing rationally with the world as a whole.

In today's world we all recognize that, for the first time in human history mankind as a whole is faced with the fact that arsenals and stockpiles of weapons have been created which will, in one relatively brief conflict, annihilate the human race and all its works. While this fact is, in a certain uneasy sense, widely known, it has not yet been acted upon by the peoples and governments of the world. That is, the qualitatively new, terminally destructive weapons have not yet been abolished. On the contrary, the most powerful governments are increasing their stockpiles daily, and smaller governments vie with one another in their efforts to become producers or buyers of the overkill nuclear arsenals.

We recognize the causes of this lemming like rush to the brink of oblivion: self destructive panic born of inherited fears. These new weapons are mistakenly regarded as weapons of war, and war has characterized all human history. War has always been connected with universally accepted human rights and virtues such as self defense, patriotism and liberation, as well as with some of the worst human vices such as cruelty, rapacity and greed- Thus it is easy for those who have not thought the matter through to feel that they have a right or even a duty to cling to even the most destructive weapons, since other countries have them, and wars of self defense or liberation may still have to be fought.

But we recognize, and must teach others to recognize, that a conflict fought out with unclear weapons could never be a war of self defense or liberation, or even a war of imperialist conquest or plunder or gain of any kind. Suchas onflict would be something that annihilates not only all the people and all the property on both sides, but all the people and all the property on earth. This is clearly not "war," not something that could be argued as good or bad for the people surviving the war. A conflict that no one can survive is not war, but omnicide. It is the human sin so enormous it could be commited only once, the human crime so unspeakable it never even had a name, until now.

We thus recognize that the most important fact about the human world taken as a whole today is that misguided governments possessed of omnicidal weapons are still thinking of these weapons and basing policies upon them as if they were weapons of war. Ironically, even people strongly opposed to nuclear weapons still call them and think of them as weapons of war. They still do not realize that when they call omnicide a war they have deprived themselves of their strongest and most convincing argument. Who but the insane could argue that we must be ready to commit omnicide ?

It is not only professional philosophers who have the duty to call things by their right names, and to teach the truth. When the need is to prevent the omnicide that could now happen at any moment, every human being becomes a philosopher who can understand the problem and contribute to its solution. But professional philosophers, recognizing their special obligation, can take the lead in teaching what needs to be taught in order for our only human world to continue to exist.

## I

# Another Strategy of realism in Quantum Mechanics

*Sava Petrov*

After Bell's inequality (1964) and its experimental confirmations (Aspect, 1982). the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics definitely excluded the local hidden parameters and an opinion arose that the "whole realism is at stake" (Clauser, Shimony 1978), supporting the older viewpoint of a crisis in the realism (materialistic philosophy) caused by quantum mechanics. The remaining possibilities of non local hidden parameters theories are not popular as the nonlocality deprives the attractiveness of the hidden parameters theories with respect to the generally accepted interpretation of quantum mechanics. The obvious question is: what next ?

The most general alternatives seem to be explored in all directions. The choice now is—to which of the alternatives one can give its preferences. A basic classification looks like this :

1. Accepting the fact that "nobody understands quantum mechanics" (Feynman) and "one can only get used to its peculiarities" (Gel-Mann).

2. Concealing the fact that the mathematics of quantum mechanics falls apart if the objective reality of the described dynamical properties of the microobjects before macromeasurements is allowed for. Thus the conflict between quantum mechanics and materialistic philosophy still exists but is not so evident.

3. Back to the hilt the constructed with the available means hidden parameters theories, despite their failures either by introducing unobservable particle trajectories, or by allowing for the existence of objectively real waves, or by assuming centaur like objects

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A talk presented at the III Symposium "Philosophy, Physics, Cosmology" (Kardzhaly, 13 17 May 1987).

with real and not only potential motion before the macro-measurement

4. Direct transformation of the latest achievements in physics into new axioms of philosophy by a generalization of the basic assumptions and results of quantum mechanics into ontological and epistemological statements. Here can be classified the hypotheses (opposed to atomism!) of ontological wholeness of the microworld.

5. Accepting the contradiction between quantum mechanics and realism as a quite natural result from the differences in the subject-matter and the methods of philosophy and physics. In such n case, instead of hasty adaptation of realism to quantum mechanics by doubtful procedures connected with restauration of the Aristotelean potential matter or even more unconvincible adaptation of quantum mechanics to realism with the help of local or non-local—equally artificial-hidden parameters we could more or less quietly wait and see what turn the development of microphysics will take, which eventually will show the way to build an alternative to quantum mechanics macrophenomenology. Meanwhile it is worthwhile to look for realistic (in the philosophical and everyday meaning of the word) explanations of the temporary success of empiricism and instrumentalism of quantum mechanics.

In the present talk are given some arguments supporting the latter position.

The contradictions between realistic philosophy, including dialectical materialism and science sensu stricto are as normal as their unity. First of all, such contradictions are a result of the fact that the philosophy concentrates on far-reaching hypotheses concerning questions, for which the fundamental sciences only give an opportunity to be indicated, but have no means to solve them, On the contrary, the science sensu stricto deals only with trust-worthful solutions of problems, for which they have reliable methods In a sense "philosophy and science are in one boat" (Quine), but the scientists fish behind the stern, while the philosuphers watch the horizon and it is usual to cry "Land" for a mirage.

The main contradiction between quantum mechanics and materialistic philosophy is not the question of causality, though that is discussed more, but the evaslve objective reality of the unobserved micromovements. The probabilistic causality, thought it looks like "noncausal causality" (Kravetz) can be (though with difficulty) swallowed down, hoping that the absolute chances would get some sort of an explanation. The problems with respect to the projection postulate, and the non-physical callapse of the wave function are more or less marginal and are full of misunderstandings. The sufficiently dialectical theory of knowledge not only allows but needs the use of purely theoretical concepts, which do not have their own objective references, though can be successfully used in an adequate theory. The main point, where the contradiction between quantum mechanics and materialistic philosophy cannot be overcome just now is the inversion of the usual interrelation between possibility and actual reality imposed by quantum mechanics, if we give a direct objective meaning to its restrictions Ontologically a possibility cannot kick neither can be kicked, while in quantum mechanics sheer potentialities have to interfere and take upon themselves all wave like properties of the microobjects.

The situation is not much improved if we restrain from ontological generalization of quantum mechanics existential restrictions. The purely instrumentalistic or purely empirical interpretations reduce quantum mechanics to a "theory without ontology" which puts it on the limit of "decency" for an informal theory. According to the orthodox viewpoint of qnantum mechanics, the micro objects before the macromeasurements do not have any actual objectively real dynamical characteristics — neither particle like nor wave-like nor centaur-like but possess only the possibility to show them if an appropriate experiment is realized, but nevertheless they are going through space somehow, and interfere as if the potential possibilities interfere between themselves, It is therefore intuitively unbelievable the only objective reality of the dynamics of microword to be its macro-empirical reality. The unobserved motions of the micro objects must exist.

This conflict between quantum mechanics and materialistic philosophy exists already 60 years and the whole spectrum of theoretical possibilities is covered with propositions, but neither of them has great advantages. The human knowledge is in front of unprecedented barrier.

Navertheless, certain analogies leading to less answers than the questions they arise can be done. With all reserves with respect to the overexertion of the analogy, the understanding of the natural contradiction between the quantum mechanics and the materialistic philosophy can be facilitated by reminding the story of secondary qualities.

Some of the qnalities perceived by human senses, e.g. the different colour tones are so much dispositional, i.e. arising in the process of perception, but not existing before it, that they do not give any notion about their objective causes. Even more because of the intentionality of perception, i.e, the involuntary projection of all —objective and subjective—content of perception on the percieved objects, the secondary qualities cannot be distinguished from the primary qualities, inherent to the objects prior to their pereption. Therefore on the level of the sense cognition, there is no reason for setting the question for the primary causes of the secondary qualities. If the sense knowledge could be put into a mathematical form. theorems could certainly be proven that hidden parameters, i. e. primary causes for the secondary qualities, cannot exist in it. So that the dispositional qualities, coinciding in this case with the subjectivity of the secondary properties set a barrier for the sense cognition of a whole range of actually influencing us primary qualities of the external world.

The theoretical cognition based on experiments overcomes this barrier, as beside the receptor, perceiving the secondary qualities, there is an instrument registrating the primary cause and showing the dispositional content of the secondary qualities. But notice that even after exposing the dispositional character of the colour tones, the sense cognition remains true by its means and within the limits of its validity. Staying at the level of the sense cognition such an exposure is prevented by the fact that each of the secondary qualities is perceived by only one receptor, and the involuntary projection of the perception on the perceived objects completely confuses the tracks. Therefore the direct philosophical generalization of the sense cognition leads to naive realism, which assumes the objective reality of all that can be seen.

If we now put the supposed quantum mechanical hidden parameters, i. e. the dynamical objective qualities of the microobjects such as they really are in their own microworld in the place of the primary causes of the secondary qualities, the quantum mechanics would take the place of the sense cognition through the secondary qualities, which here are not subjective, but macrophenomenological. This is the essence of the widely spread interpretation, best known as Born-Markov's that the quantum mechanics does not study the very movements of the microobjects in their own microworld, but only their macroprojections, which a priori must have highly dispositional, macrophenomenological, macromorphous character.

The actual cause of the macrophenomenological character of quantum mechanics is still ambiguous. The vogue of preferences swings from the physical interactions between microobject and micro-instrument through the general conditions of the experiment towards the logical dependences of the known from the knower. The enormous differences between the micro and macroworlds are spread out equally on the explosion-like effects by which the microobjects can be demonstrated, and on the most general conditions of application of quantum mechanics, and on the inner unity and the outside incompatibility of the principles of classical and non-classical theories

Up to now, at least the whole macroworld reacts objectively to the same dynamical characteristics of the microobjects as two "receptors" — one for the particle-like dispositions and the other for the wave-like dispositions. This dualism is a great advantage over the secondary qualities, each being perceived by one receptor and could all be, without any problems, naively related to the outside object. Thanks to the wave-particle dualism, there is no place for a naive realism in the interpretation of the quantum mechanics. The complementary pictures of the microobject movements mutually exclude literal ontological interpretation of the quantum mechanical results, i. e. the macrodispositional characteristics cannot be mistaken as microsubstantial or microfunctional characteristics as this happens with the secondary qualities in the case of the sense cognition.

On the other hand, the naive empirism, where the objective reality begins and ends with the experimental data. receive an excellent gift from quantum mechanics. The experiments themselves set the barrier disturbing the philosophers with Berkley's associations: "Any phenomenon is not a phenomenon until it is registered (observed) phenomenon" (Bohr Willer). If this quantum mechanical maximum is generalized as an ontological statement — the conflict with the materialistic philosophy is set.

If the problem of macroprojections of the micromovementst is to be solved in a way similar to that with the secondary qualities this would imply that one expects a discovery of unsuspected possibility of micro-microexperiment with still unknown "devices of a third kind. It cannot be excluded that the considered, for some years already (since 1974, Braginsky), undemolishing experiments might give some lead in that direction, but most probably in future things would turn in such a way for which now we do not even have a hint.

What is the best position of the philosophers in the described situation?

After the fruitless efforts of two generations of physicists and philosophers (1927–1987), now should be obvious that a leading assault had to be unsuccessful for an epistemological barrier, whose roots emerge from the hierarchy of the qualitatively differnt levels of matter. A long siege is necessary here: "Patience!" (Einstein, 1949).

A modern scientific theory cannot be constructed only on philosophical premises, no matter how truthful they are. The conflict with philosophy indicates that something has to be done but not "what and how?". As a rule, contradictions with the experiment or in the physical theory itself can supply real premises for an effective alternative theory, but none are yet found in quantum mechanics. Of course, any new possibility should be explored, but with no preliminary definitive commitment of realism with one of the obvious concrete possibilities, which are usually short-lived.

Sometimes, the opinion that "a crisis of realism in modern physics exists" (Heelan, 1965) is brought up. Such a viewpoint is not appropriate, though some authors reached it, becoming aware of the fact that the consistent nature of quantum mechanics is based on juggling with the potential possibilities. As a matter of fact, neither quantum mechanics nor materialistic philosophy is in crisis because of their discrepancies. For the physicists the contradictions that have not shown up in the experiment, or in inconsistencies of the mathematics of quantum mechanics are very abstract, as a crack on the wall, to which a cautious look is granted from time to time As for the philosophers, a conflict with one of the many fundamental theories, whose elimination from their position would necessitate an inversion in principles, leads to speculations as to the further evolution of the considered theory, which would either solve the contradiction or show its inevitable nature. In both cases there is no real crisis, but the normal problems arising of the limit of the known with the unknown.

The best position of the materialistic ontology and epistemology, now is neither the construction of hidden parameters theories with the available means, nor a mimicry of realism on empirism or instrumentalism, but in the search of an explanation for the spontaneous proximity of the assumptions and results of quantum mechanics to the long-time rivals of realism. When the natural development of experimental and theoretical microphysics shows on the science sensu stricto level the drawbacks of quantum mechanical description of the microworld, then their nature would show the way by which physics would get closer to the evading from todays macromeasurements, actual micromovements of the microobjects in their own microworld.

## 2

# Philosophy of Leisure And Recreation

*Bimal Chand Jain*

Leisure is the free time after all duties, obligations and other practical necessities have been attended to. The line of demarcation between necessities and spare time is not rigid. Work is usually considered on the antithesis of leisure.

The Dictionary of sociology defines it "As the free time after the practical necessities of life have been attended to."[1]

The word 'leisure' in English comes from Latin verb LEICERE meaning to be permitted. As a noun it means parmission or opportunity of ease and recreation. For Gower[2] leisure means an "opportunity". William Shakespeare[3] in a narrower sense uses leisure to mean opportunity afforded by freedom from occupation. In this way "If your leisure served I would spent with you". According to T. Veblen[4] leisure is not idleness or inactivity. Leisure implies freedom to engage in any other activity except that centring round the making of a livelihood. Leisure is definitely more than mere idleness. According to Joseph Pieper[5] idleness, far from being synonymous with leisure, is more nearly the inner prerequisite which means impossible. Leisure is possible only when a man is at one with himself, when he acquisscare his own being. R. L. Stevenson[6] concept of idleness and his 'Apology for Idleness' convey the impression of this acquisscare with one's self rather than imply idleness. Stevenson's idler is not inactive but engaged in those activities which are not within the normal span of working time. Leisure never means idleness or inactivity. Leisure implies freedom to do any other activity centring round the activity of making livelihood.

Leisure time as against the hours of work is the only part of his life where the individual is free from all compulsion and control to do what he desires and pursue interests of his own free choice merely for the gratification involved therein and with no economic motive behind.

As a philosophy leisure means an opportunity for each man to discover his personality Leisure time pursuits make life pleasant and more worth living. Leisure activities have vast potentialities for character building and for growth of the socialised personality.

Brightbill and Nayar[7] say "Recreation is as wide in variety and as deep in contact as the whole human endeavour". Because of the wide variety and range of recreation is not merely a seasoning of life but a part of its sustenance, not a certified list of activities but a way of living.

The essence of recreation is best expressed in the attitude of the door, and as such almost any activity can be recreational. What is work for one may mean recreation for another. The same activity may mean recreation at one time and not another to the same individual. Hence no permanent label as 'recreational' can be attached.

The chief motive behind recreational activity is not money but to gain pleasure of muscular, neural and psychological urges and drives.

Types of recreation differ for down dwellers and rural folk for men and women; various age groups; children, adolescents, adults and old. Difference in recreational activities depend upon cultural background, educational achievement, equipment, occupation, age, sex, physical and mental make up.

Dr. S.R. Ranganathan[8] lists human needs under nine heads namely (a) material; (b) bio; (c) emotional; (d) intellectual; (e) ethical; (f) aesthetic; (g) political; (h) economic; (i) spiritual but broadly speaking they may be divided into three categories viz biological, psychological and social integrative personality is the result of proper balance of satisfaction of these needs.

Now it is an established fact that the basic drives and needs of human beings are immutaable and cannot be destroyed. If satisfactory alternative outlets of emotions and basic drives is not there it would result in serious mental, physical ill-health and social tensions. A disciplined and balanced personality cannot be built up by suppression of emotions but by offering them proper adequate and healthy means of expression. Just as the best way to prevent a flood is not to attempt stopping the over rush of water but by regulating its flow through appropriate channels.

Recreation has its impact on all these aspects of human personality as its role should be studied in the context of basic human requirements.

Urges of individuals may clash and satisfaction of all urges is not socially acceptable. Consequently a civilized man has to impose a number of restrictions upon himself. The importance and value of recreation lies in the fact that it provides an outlet for the socially prohibited feelings in socially acceptable ways. An actual romance may not be liked/approved or frowned but a long song depicting similar emotions or romantic scene on the stage may be appreciated.

If considered from social point of view it is the form of expression of human beings that matters and not the urge itself. The same urge due to different forms of expression, results in what we call good or bad acts

The desire to excel others may prompt a person to work harder and make him achieve better results or the same desire may make him jealous and incite him to do injury to the interest of others. In the way an adventurous spirit may find expression in the scientific inventions, mountaineering etc. or in crimes and murders.

The use of sports and games of rivalry has been suggested by William James to discharge drives of man that now find further fulfilment in war.

Usefulnss of recreation can be studied under the following main heads;

(a) Due to social taboos or lack of resources and opportunities many desires are not satisfied. They may be forgotten by the conscious mind. Though a person may have been apparently reconciled to it yet they continue to exist in sub conscious mind as sub conscious cravings often create in the mind of individual resulting in distorted personality. Recreation can help in providing satisfaction to the needs without a sense of guilt which a man is not conscious. Recreation does tremendous service in discharge of represent cravings. Thus it unburdens the subconscious mind and gives a guarantee in the smooth growth of personality.

Recreation is at its best when it gets success in sublimating baser desire into sublime ones. The process of sublimation consists in satisfying the same urge through an entirely different expression with totally different significance for the individual and society. The spirit of sportsmanship is itself a sublimated form of primitive instinct of worsening the adversary. The sublimating role of recreation may thus have a more ennobling influence on human mind than say sermons or advices.

Recreation releases excess energy. No work in the world can consume full energy of human beings. It would be unpleasant as to draw out all the resources of energy. Every individual itches to release them otherwise they create mental tensions. Altruistic impulses, religious and social activities adventured in crimes and anti-social acts are partially a gratification of this need. All types of recreational activities—muscular like folk dances mountaineering etc, and mental outlets like indoor games, public speeches draw energy from unused parts of human personality and by restoring balance make it healthier. They play positive role in correcting anti-social and abnormal behaviour. A person feeling tired does not mean that he has exhausted his energy but it is due to non-utilization of parts of energy which causes an imbalance and is responsible for a feeling of fatigue. A balanced use of energy alone can relieve of all tensions.

Recreation activities are a sort of compensation for boredom. All the persons in the world do not got pleasure out of their work. With the result they seek compensatory pleasure in recreational activities. In a similar way people would like to forget the worries, tensions and boredom of daily routine of life and enjoy for a moment. In the absence of healthier avenues of recreational activities people find themselves addicted to liquor, gambling and other stimulating and absorbing pursuits or other type of anti-social activities.

Recreation play positive and definite role in the growth of creative potentialities. Recreation tends to develop personal and moral qualities like courage, ingenunity, initiativeness, generosity, tolerance, friendship, loyalty and co-operation.

Evey body in this world is gifted with one talent or the other. It remains hidden due to lack of appropriate incentives and opportunities. Recreation implying pleasure and social recognitions provide an opportunity in developing potentialities of many a people. Activities like 'Ram Lila' a dramatic performance, wall saper, fine chats can help in making an actor, a musician, literaturer and a conscious citizen out of ordinary rural folk.

Recreation is one of the best source of satisfaction of hunger for social recognition. It is an established fact that one of the strongest human urge of the individual is social hunger. Every human being in this world in some degree or the other wishes that he /she should be accepted and respected by the community in which he/she lives is one of the basic need of human being is the desire to belong to a group community.

The major contribution of recreation is that it acts as an out come in social life It helps the individual and the society in bringing harmoniou relationship with each other. The play of spirit tends to fuse the personalities in the group. Hence one's status and the conception of self of one's role in the group develop quickly and naturally. The aim of recreation in the growth of human personality and in increasing social harmony. Recreation and social Education are almost synonymous.

Recreation has socializing influence in that it helps to prepare people for making complete sharing in all that is valuable and pleasure in life. Socialization means acquiring a ,we feeling' and loyalty that results in active participation in the affairs of the group,

Without company recreation cannot be enjoyable and entertaining. Even an individualistic hobby like stamp collecting has a social aspect as it creates in the individual to belong to a wider fraternity of stamp collecors. Group activities create feeling of fellowship. Recreation has two social usefulness. It make social life more pleasant and makes the individual fitter for social life.

Pluralistic structure is the bases of democratic society. It has many division based on prestige and power. In such a framework there cannot be a single yardstick of importance, It is clear that only a widespread of recreational activity can help in bringing high and low at the same level and in providing alternative yardstick of importance. It also throws out natural leadership of the communities another prerequisite of democracy,

To sum up leisure and recreation are treated together as they are inseparable. Recreation is leisure time activity and is used in different ways. Recreation plays vital role in discharge of repressed cravings, release of excess energy, compensation for boredom, growth of creative potentialities, satisfaction of hunger for social recognition and in sublimating drives and urges. The ultimate end of recreation is the growth of human personality and in increasing social harmony. Recreation and social Educattion are almost synonymous.

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## 3

# A Plea for Boyle's and Locke's Primary-Secondary Quality Distinctions

*Cemil Akdogan*

Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities has been a heatedly debated topic since Locke wrote his book, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, and yet there has not been a consistent interpretation of Locke's distinction. Amazingly enough, in this ongoing debate, instead of assessing Locke on his own merits, many commentators, among them R.B Jackson (1929), implicitly or explicitly assumed that Locke's distinction is the same as Boyle's. Therefore, to clarify Locke's position, they have constantly referred back to Boyle. However, to use Boyle as the pivotal point for understanding Locke's distinction has not necessarily been advantageous and correct.

Jackson (1929 : 55) alleged also that both Boyle and Locke are sometimes inconsistent on secondary qualities, by identifying them with the intrinsic properties of matter. Even E.M. Curley (1972 : 442-443), a recent and important commentator, took Jackson's charges of inconsistency with respect to Boyle and Locke for granted. The purpose of this paper is to expose the difference between Boyle and Locke on primary qualities and also defend Boyle's and Locke's conception of secondary qualities against these recent allegations of inconsistency or, more succinctly, to present a consistent and correct interpretation of Boyle's and Locke's primary-secondary quality distinctions

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This paper exposes the difference between Boyle and Locke on primary qualities and also defends Boyle's and Locke's conception of secondary qualities against the recent inconsistency allegations of two important commentators, R. B. Jackson and E.M. Curley.

## I

Being a scientist, Boyle accepts that not secondary qualities such as colors, sounds, smells, etc., but only geometrical or quantifiable properties, i.e. primary qualities, do belong to sensible objects. To elucidate the distinction between primary and secondary qualities he presents his famous key-lock analogy:

> When *Tubal Cain* or whoever else were the Smith, that invented *Locks* and *Keyes*, had made his first Lock, (for we may Reasonably suppose him to have made That, before the *Key* though the Comparison may be made use of without that Supposition,) That was only a Piece of Iron, contriv'd into such a Shape; and when afterwards he made a Key to that Lock, That also in it self consider'd was nothing but a Piec of Iron of such a Determinate Figure: but in regard that these two pieces of Iron might now be applied to one another after a Certain manner, and that there was a Congruity betwixt the Wards of the Lock and those of the Key, the Lock and the Key did each of them now obtained a new Capacity, and it became a main part of the Notion and Description of a Lock, that it was capable of being made to Lock or Unlock by that other Piece of Iron we call a Key and it was look'd upon as a Peculiar Faculty and Power in the Key, that it was Fitted to Open and Shut the Lock, and yet by these new Attributes there was not added any Real or Physical Entity either to the Lock or to the Key, each of them remaining indeed nothing but the same piece of Iron, just so shap'd as it was before. (Boyle, 1667 : II·12).

A piece of iron, either key or lock, has a certain shape, a certain size, and other primary qualities. Thus, Boyle accepts primary qualities of sensible objects and strictly separates them from powers. But secondary qualities, i.e. the relations between sensible objects and sensory organs, are analogical to the relation between the key and the lock. The key has the capacity or power to turn the lock, and the lock, has the power to be turned by the key. For instance, if the lock is altered then the key will lose its power to turn the lock. Notice that when the other object, the lock is altered, the key loses its own power. Similarly, alterations in the sensory organs will cause changes in the perception of sensible objects. Secondary qualities are then powers or capacities of sensible objects to produce ideas in us. Thus, secondary qualities cannot be matter itself or new entities in matter. It is essential that secondary qualities should not be identified with properties of matter itself. Although secondary qualities are merely powers and distinct from matter, they exist conjointly with matter. Boyle writes :

> I say not, that there are no other accidents in Bodies than Colours, Odours, and the like; for I have already taught, that there are simpler and more primitive Affections of Mat

> ter. from which these Secondary Qualities if I may in call them. do depend. (Boyle, 1667 :29).

Although secondary qualities do depend on primary qualities, they are not the same thing. Nevertheless. Jackson and Curley mention some passages in which Boyle seems to identify secondary qualities or powess with the properties of matter itself. For example, Jackson (1929: 57) quotes the following passage from Boyle:

> They (secondary qualities) are not in the Bodies that are endowed with them any real or Distinct entities, or differing from the matter its self, furnished with such a Determinate Bignesse, or other Mechanical Modifications. (Boyle, 1667:. 13).

With respect to the last clause in this sentence, Jackson (1929: 57) claims that Boyle came very close to identifying powers with properties of matter. But in fact, what Boyle intends to say in this very passage is that secondary qualities are not new entities in matter but they depend, on or are explained by, the properties of matter itself. In other words, power is explained by, but not identified with, matter and its properties. Although matter and power are distinct, they exist together.

Of course Boyle uses this kind of language deliberately and rightly, and not only once, but several times. Contrary to Curley's contention (Curley, 1972 : 446), even in the following passage Boyle does not identify powers with the properties of matter :

> Now though the powers of Poisons be not only look'd upon as *real* Qualities, but are reckoned among the Abstruest ones: yet this Deleterious Faculty, which is suppos'd to be a Peculiar and Superadded Entity in the beaten Glass, is really nothing distinct from the Glass itself, (which though a Concrete made up of those innocent Ingredients Salt and Ashes, is yet a hard and Stiffe Body,) as it is furnish'd with that determinate Bignesse. and Figure of Parts, which have been acquired by Comminution. (Boyle, 1667 : 16)

Here the power of poisons is not "a Peculiar Superadded Entity in the beaten glass", but is dependent on the matter itself, namely the beaten glass. Boyle is once more *explaining* secondary qualities by means of the primary qualities, which are, according to him, the very properties of matter.

Moreover, after this passage Boyle tries to show the relation between the membranes of stomachs of animals and human beings and the beaten glass : When the membranes are strong and glass will not be able to cut the veins and the membranes of the stomach and cause a bleeding in those tissues. But when the beaten glass fits the membranes like's fitting a lock, i.e. when the glass parts are big eeough and the membranes are weak, then the relation between the membranes of the seomach and the beaten glass will result in the power of poisoning. (Boyle, 1667; 16-17).

## II

Contrary to the general belief, Locke did not copy the scientific account of the distinction from Boyle. While primary qualities are more significant than secondary qualities in Boyle, Locke for the first time puts both primary and secondary qualities into the same footing, by defining both sorts of qualities in the same way, viz, as powers to produce ideas in us.

Locke's definition of a quality is as follows: "The power to produce any idea in our mind, I call *quality* of subject wherein that power is". (Locke: 169). Concerning this definition, he does not make any distinction between the idea of primary qualities and the idea of secondary qualities. Power, then, is applicable to both primary and secondary qualities, and it produces in us *any* idea.

After making the distinction between idea and quality Locke gives an example to further explain his definition. A snowball has power to prodoce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round. Locke calls "the power to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball" (Locke: 169) qualities. Notice that roundness is a primary quality, and a power in the snowball produces in us the idea of round. Thus primary qualities are also powers.

Powers are in the body, but they are not parts or properties of body. The following is a brief review of how Locke discusses the primary qualities in his book, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* edited by A.C. Fraser:

II, 8,9. Qualities thus considered in bodies are, First, such as utterly inseparable from the body... each part has still solidity, extension, figure and mobility... These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.

II, 8,17: The particular bulk, number figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them.

II, 8, 18: A piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure; and by being removed from one place to another the idea of motion.

II, 8, 22: ...the qualities in bodies... the primary and real qualities of bodies, which are always in them.

II, 8, 23: The qualities (primary qualities), then, that are in bodies.

In all these phrases Locke does not identify primary qualities of sensible objects with properties of matter or body. He says only that the ideas of extension, figure, number and motion of sensible objects are all *caused* by the properties of insensible particles. Indeed Locke himself says:

> Since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas which we have of them in us. (Locke : 172).

Immediately after this, Locke continues :

> After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, viz, by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. (Locke : 172).

Notice especially the adverb "also" which clearly signals that both ideas of primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities are produced by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. Contrary to Locke, Boyle did not explain macroscopic primary qualities by means of insensible particles, but rather he considered them as properties of matter itself.

## III

As we have shown, Locke differs from Boyle on primary qualities. Although Locke regards primary qualities as powers, Boyle accepts them as properties of matter. Despite this fact Jackson wrongly claims that Locke's primary qualities are properties of matter, because he interprets Locke through the spectacles of Boyle.

For instance, Locke (p. 178) counts situation among primary qualities and recognizes its relational nature. But for Jackson (1929: 66) only secondary qualities are relational, therefore in Locke situation cannot be a primary quality.

Contrary to Jackson, Curley is right when he (Curley, 1972:45) grants that even Lockean primary qualities are powers. But, unfortunately, he makes this correct interpretation of Locke inconsistent by also claiming that Locke frequently identifies powers with properties of matter. (Curley, 1972: 442-443 ;450). The only evidence that Curley presents to support his last claim is that Locke at one place considers secondary qualities as being reduced to their causes in the absence of any perceivers. (Curley, 1972: 440). However, even in this case Locke does not identify secondary qualilties with properties of matter, but simply explains secondary qualities by means of their causal basis, Furthermore, Curley does not make any sense in the following passage:

> Locke does frequently identify powers with the qualities on which they depend. It is this which makes plausible his definition of qualities as powers which objects have to produce ideas in us, (Curley, 1972 : 450).

Here Curley confuses two different meanings of "qualities". In the first sentence the term "qualities" obviously means propertie fos matter. But in the second sentence "qualities" means powers to produce ideas in us. Surely, these two different meanings of "qualities" are not identical. Therefore, the second sentence cannot follow from the first one in a logical way. To identify powers with the properties of matter cannot make Locke's definition of "qualities" as powers to produce ideas in us plausible, but on the contrary rather implausible.

In conclusion, neither Boyle nor Locke is inconsistent, at least on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, but unfortunately their interpreters, Jackson and Curley, are. They unjustly accuse both Boyle and Looke of being inconsistent, by misinterpreting and even by suppressing the evidence which contradicts themselves in order to justify their incorrect conclusions so far as the distinction between primary and secondary qualities are concerned.

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## 4

# The Concept of Man in Existentialism and Marxism :

*Uday Mohan Singh*

Man has always remained the most important topic for the study of philosophers. Of course, there has never been an agreement regarding the exact subject matter of the philosopical study it self and move recently it has all the more become a subject of controversy as to what exactly the nature of philosophy is. From the beginning of this century the Anglo-Saxon world has taken the analysis of language to be the proper subject matter of philosophy. But side by side in the Continent there have been philosophical throughts like Phenomenology and Existentialism which are out and out factual studies. Besides these, Marxism also has been a dominant note in some areas. Man has been the chief concern of both Existentialism and Marxism. In a way, it can be said that both these thoughts have tried to demarcate the exact place of Man and his role in the Universe Existentialism came in many respects as a reaction against Marxism as is very clear from Sartre's Critique of Marxism. But still there are points of agreement between the two systems of thoughts. The very first point of agreement is that in both of them man forms the central theme of study. Then again, both of them seem to be concerned in their own ways, primarily with the dignity of Man. Therefore, in a broad sense both of them may be characterised as Humanistic philosophies. The early phase of Marxism has even greater affinity with existentialism in as much as like the latter it also emphasizes the freedom of individual man. Of course, the type of emphasis that existentialism has given to human freedom is hardly ever found in Marxism, but in a very important sense, both the systems of thought seem to have developed with the primary concern for upholding the dignity of individual Man. Later Marxism. of course, socialises Man to such an extent that the existence of individual man virtually seems to vanish and, therefore, it stands in sharp contrast to Existentialist concept of Man. But there is a stage atleast in the career of the greatest existentialist Sartre, when he seems to move into the footsteps of Marx himself so much so that the free individual Man, no longer, seems to be the central thing of value for him. However before entering further into a comparison between the Existentialist and Marxist concepts of Man. let us go to some extent into the details of the two concepts of Man somewhat separately.

Although, in general, Existentialism is a philosophy which gives emphasis upon existence in preference to essence, more specifically it is the human existence which concerns the exstentialists most. Although there are theists among the existentialists who, in some sense or other, take God to be the most primordial reality but Existententialists like Sartre take human existence itself to be most primary. Perhaps the demand of consistency also in the context of overall principles of alism is that there should be no reality more primordial or fundamental than Man. Sartre, therefore, rejects both theism and material Existentialism. In fact, he rejects any kind of Essentialism. This is why, along witn the criticism of theism, he also criticises the dialectical materialism of Marx. Man is his own being and has for his end nothing other than realising his own infinite potentialities. Man is absolutely free. In fact, freedom is his nature. Man has to be free even inspite of his willing otherwsse. The freedom of man consists in his capacity of self-transcendence. In a sense, therefore, he is not what he is. He is always capable of transcending his present state ot being. As Karl Jaspers says, "Man is always something more than what he knows himself. He is not what he is simply once for all, but is a process. He is endowed with possibility though the freedom he possesses to make of himself what he will by the activity on which he decides"[1] That is, Man is never guided and regulated by any external essence and aim, rather he can make himself a thing of any value of his own choice by means of personal efforts of realising the possibilities involved in him. By man the existentialist here means every individual Man and not any universal and social man. Each individual is a centre of value for himself and he is absolutely determined by nothing other than himself. Because man as an individual stands alone in the vast universe, he feels sometimes afraid of his unbounded freedom and, therefore, wants to take the plea that he is bound by so many inevitable circumstances. But this kind of plea is not accepted as valid by the existentialists and they call it bad faith.

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[1] Karl Jaspers, *Man in the Modern Age*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1933), p. 146.

So in the eyes of Existentialism Man's freedom is unfettered and any plea of limiting this freedom is the result of "bad faith."

The picture of individual man that may be seen through the above lines is definitely very promising and optimistic. But there is another side of the picture as drawn by the existentialists. The man of existentialism stands helpless and unsupported with his absolute freedom and potentiality to fight against the odds of the vast universe. There is no social life of man and consequently there is no body to help any man. Even individual has to become his own help and his own supporting hand. Every other individual, except the individual himself, is his competitor, his rival and his enemy. He is therefore, as is said, "condemed to be free". That is, inspite of his will, otherwise man has to be free in the sense that he has to be alone with all his capacity and possibilities. He can realise any status but with his own help alone. Analysed further, this status of man in the universe generates within him a sense of dread, anxiety and fear. The picture becomes totally pessimistic.

Man, in his present status, stands alienated in the universe. In his freedom of self-transcendence, he has to experience a vast gap between his being and non-being or nothingness. In other words, he has to face a big gap between what he is as a self conscious individual and what he has to become. As a matter of fact, according to the existentialists, in the depth of man's consciousness, there is a vast realm which produces within man a sense of emptiness. This sense of emptiness is a sense of alienation within man which he wants to remove. He becomes perfect only when he becomes able to do it. As for this, he has to make personal efforts for realising the infinite possibilities that lie within him.

In one sense, therefore, Existentialism is humanism which takes man as the thing of highest worth and value. There is nothing higher than Man's existence and man can make himself a thing of highest value by his own efforts. It is this which prompted Sartre to try to establish in his book *Existentialism and Humanism* that the existentialist philosophy is out and out a humanistic philosophy. But perhaps Sartre was wrong in his impression which he, later on himself seems to realise. One very important aspect of humanism, that Existentialism lacks in, is that there is no aspect of human relationship here. The life of community or what may be called social life is completely absent. Every man stands completely alone in the universe and even in time of deepest crisis, nobody is to extend any helping hand to any other. It is due to this that Existentialism could not make any scope of any humanistic Ethics. Towards the end of his career Sartre seems to have realised it and with a sincere effort of making a room for Ethics Sartre wrote his another famous book

*The Critique of Dialectical eason.* But here Sartre seems to adopt the basic principles of Marxism of which he was once a strong critic and which really goes completely against the spirit of Existentialism. The man of the *Critique of Dialecticnl Reason* is not a free individual man but a socialised man, or as Sartre himself calls, a 'serialised man'. At this stage, Sartre openly concedes that Marxism alone can be the true philosophy and Existentialism is only an ideology within the philosophical system.

We have seen above that the Existentialism as Existentialism lays utmost emphasis upon man as free individual but later on, atleast, in the thought of the great existentialist, Sartre, it degenerates into Marxism. Let us, therefore, see to some extent the Marxist conception of Man.

It seems there are two phases of Marx's thinking about Man. At both the stages however Marx shows a genuine concern for the down trodden, the oppressed Man. In the early stage, however, he seems to be more concerned with the individual Man, his status and dignity. And at this stage, therefore, Marxism does not seem to be very far from existentialism in as much at emphasis on individual human freedom concerned, of course, Marxism at no stage draws such pessimistic picture of nature of man which makes him standing alone and helpless with dread and anxiety in the vast universe. Marx was simply busy with raising the status of individual man who was suffering under the burden of totalitarianism or dictatorship. But gradually Marx's emphais seems to be shifted from the individual man to the social Man. At this stage, Marx seems to hold that Man only exists in and through the society. He is the outcome of social life itself. He has individual peculiarity but his peculiarities themselves are the product of the peculiar place that he occupies in the society. His consciousness is the function of the sociological situation and, therefore, his nature can not be conceived in complete isolation from the society. Speaking more fundamentally, Men along with consciousness is a dialectical product of matter. The true man therefore is the Economic man, the Social man and not the individual man with his unbounded freedom, man is, of course, free but not in the existentialist sense. Freedom in marxism means the knowledge of necessity. The entire course of History is completely determined and man's fate it self is not an exception to it. Due to the qualities of his selfconsciousness man is, of course, superior to the object of the dead nature as well as to the lower animals. He is, in a sense, free also but not in the sense that his will is not determined by factors other than him self. Man is free in the sense that he knows that there is allround determinism. "Freedom consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on the knowledge of natural necessity.[2]

Thus freedom has a totally different meaning for the Marxists. In a sense, freedom within the context of Marxism is a misnomer. There is an over all determinism. The course of History is fully determined which a man by any of his efforts cannot check or alter. He can only retard or accelerate the process of change by his efforts but he can never check it. It is due to this sort of cosmic determinism in all the social spheres, whether political or Economic, that Karl Popper has taken Marx as an enemy of what he calls, an 'open society' and has forcefully criticised Marx.[3] Of course, Marx once remarked that so far philosophers have only interpreted the world, the need however is to change it. But Marx's views themselves do not leave any scope for any Man's efforts to change the world.

In this concept of Man's alienation also, Marxism differs in a very important manner from Existentialism. In its early phase, of course, Marxist concept of alienation seems some-what nearer to that of Existentialism. As Mary Warnock points out, this concept is very much close to the existentialist concept of bad faith. To quote Warnock herself" Alienation in this individualistic theory is surprisingly like bad faith, the false belief that one is bound to go on as one is, the denial of freedom. Later on when Marx in his concept of Man switches over from the individual man to the socialised man, his concept of alienation undergoes a sharp change. It is no-longer an individual's estrangement from himself or from the world but it is a separation of one class of individuals from another class. To be more explicit, it is the separation of the class of the labourers from that of the capitalist. As a matter of fact. in the later Marxist's view an individual man loses his existence altogether by merging it into the class. This concept of individuals, along with the concept of freedom and alienation, goes sharply against the existentialist's concept of the same. It is only when the great existentialist Sartre makes his transition from *Being and Nothingness to Critique of Dialectical Reason* that it seems that the existentialist's and Marxist concept of man have come together.[4] But really speaking, it is not coming together of Existentialism and Marxism rather it is surrendering Existentialism at the altar of Marxism.

As we have said earlier, towards the early phase of his views Marx's concept of man was more Psychological than Sociological

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2 *Capital*, (abridged) p. 203.

3 Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) Volume II.

4 Mary Warnock, *The Philosophy of Sartre*, 1965, p. 158.

like that of Existentialism. There Marx openly speaks of individual freedom and individual salvation. He also speaks of Man's capacity of self creation and his quality of being self conscious. These are all clarly Existentialist predicates given to man. Praising Hegel for realising this self creative and self-conscious nature of Man, Marx writes.

"The outstanding acheivement of Hegel's *Phenomenology* is, first, that Hegel grasps the self creation of Man as a process and that he therefore grasps the nature of labour and conceives objective man as the result of his own labour.[5] At this stage, the only important difference from Existentialism is that unlike Existentialism, Marx takes man as a product of nature itself But later on, as we have said above. he views Man more as a social being than as an individual being. Even in his early writings, Marx shows a tendency of taking man as a product of society but there it does not lose sight of the balance between the two. This is clear from his following statement.

"As society itself produces Man as Man, so it is produced by him. It is above all necessary to avoid postulates in society once again as an obstruction confronting the individual. The individual is the social being."[6] But gradually the individual image of man fades into his social image and the individual man becomes nearly an element of society. Peahaps to improve the lot of the individual labourer, Marx thought it necessary to make him the member of the class. so that he could fight with the members of another class who were the oppressors and the exploiters. And here, Marx presents a picture of man which is radically different from the man of typically existentialist concept.

Taking the above view points regarding Man in Existentialism and Marxism, the over all picture that emerges is that the Man of Existentialist concept, inspite of his unbounded freedom, seems to stand alone in the universe trying to fight with the forces of nature with a necessary sense of fear, anxiety and dread. The man of Marxist concept, on the other hand, of course, having no scope for maintaining a separate ivdividuality and having no sense of real freedom, is still engaged actively along with the members of his class to fight with the members of another class who are trying to exploit the former. In other words, he taies to win over his sense of alienation by means of the class war. The man of Existentialist concept, on the other hand, is trying hopelessly to win over his alienation by realising his potentialities so as to minimise the gap between 'being' and 'nothingness'. The two are thus completely different pictures of Man. one being thoroughly materialistic and economic, while the other is idealistic in one sense of the term.

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[5] Karl Marx, *Early Writings* (London, 1963) p. 202.
[6] *Ibid*, p p. 157-158.

# 5

# If all is Brahman then why Are There any Illusions ?

*Mishka Jamber*

In Indian philosophical writings—particularly recent ones—there has been controversy about the status and purpose of the phenomenal world as presented in the Upanishads.

If we adopt as our fundamental premise that all is Brahman, the Supreme consciousness, in particular everything in the world is Brahman, then we are in agreement with the influential intuition of Vedic philosophy ("one only without the second"—Chandogya 6-2-1).

Given this premise there may be differing positions about the status of the world deducible from, or compatible with it.

In order to discuss this issue let me unpack the idea "all is Brahman" in its relation to such fundamental issues as the following:

—unity or disunity of everything in existence

—the status of our ordinary perception of the world and of ourselves.

## Part A.

I will unpack the "all-Brahman" idea in three points.

I. Given that the material world does not appear to us as Brahman—Supreme Consciousness when we accept that there *is* only Brahman we are bound to search for some reconcilliation of the fact and the hypothesis.

Here are the two most obvious solutions:

1. Each of the multiplicity of forms is a form of Brahman in this case all forms, processes and beings are part of the unity of Brahman. (Sri Aurobindo)

2. The world of *forms* is illusory, only the formless consciousness of Brahman and the formless Self of individual beings in the world (Atman is Brahman) are real. In other words, everything else than the Supreme consciousness is illusory i.e. it appears as a limited thing or a non conscious particle or an organism of a definite form but it cannot be else than consciousness. (Shankara's type of explanation)

I will argue that these two positions, though appearing different are really expressing the same ideas.

The countless forms of Brahman cannot be made out of anything but Brahman's consciousness.

But to the senses a form (of a plant, of a human body or of a vast ocean) appears as something which the mind takes to be something different than Consciousness.

So it is the ordinary mind which is at fault here, it has a mistaken (false) conception about the nature of the world and this mistake of the mind extends itself to the perception of the world which becomes illusory.

The world appears in an illusory way not because it is a world of forms, not because a form is essentially an unreal entity, (perhaps it is, perphaps it is not—this is open for discussion), but because it perceived and conceived of as non-Brahman.

This account of "illusoriness of the world" seems to be common to both positions 1 and 2.

(Position 2. may also include a thesis "any form must be illusory" but this point need not interest us here).

II. Individual beings in the world (people and animals included) cannot but be part of the unity of Brahman according to our fundamental premise; hence their separateness from the Supreme Consciousness and from each other must be false.

When we consider the unity aspect of the world viewed as Brahman we will notice the possibility of the following illusion; to see the world as not a total unity,

But this is precisely what our ordinary mind is based on: on the assumption of separateness, of conflicting interests, and an assumption of separate consciousnesses corresponding to separate bodies.

At this point we need to examine, however briefly, the concept of unity. What kind of unity do we envisage when we refer to the "unity of the world as Brahman" ?

There may be various conceptions of unity; we do not know in advance which would best describe the world-Brahman.

Let us review two notions of unity—one modelled on an example of a machine and another, more abstract one.

(A general definition of The Concise Oxford Dictionary as (an) "individual being formed of parts that constitute a whole due interconnection and coherence of parts" does not spell out any *particular* type of unity.)

In a machine we observe a unity whereby each part is neccessary for the harmonious functioning of the whole. Most parts are different from each other and are connected directly or indirectly.

This type of unity shows itself to be of a lower kind when compared with the following spiritual type : ontological unity, we are told, expresses itself in this profound way whereby one part contains all parts, one individual contains all individuals.

Surprisingly this notion can be grasped without ascending to a mystical experience, it can be comprehended through the example of a hologram.

It might be that the alleged fact that everything in the world is Brahman requires even a higher degree of unification than the one exemplified by the structure of the hologram. However, the popular conception of our world does not assume even the low level of unity which we identified in a functioning machine. On the contrary, people take themselves to be independent agents, *not* dependent on the welare of *all* fellow our human beings, and even more dissociating themselves (and their own welfare) from the welfare of "the lower world": animals and ecological structures.

(It may be that tribal societies have had a more unitarian vision of the world than modern society has).

So now we can approach the issue of illusion again. If the world exhibits the highest degree of unity as befits "the ONE only without the second" then it is illusory to perceive various degrees of disunity and conflict.

All conceptions or separateness–of selves' consiousnesses, objects and processes in the world—must constitute a falsification of the true nature of the world.

One could argue that even though our beliefs are likely to be false, or partially false our perception may nonetheless remain veridical, not illusory.

Such a thesis would go against recent findings in psychology which show that expectations modify perception.

Extrapolating from these discoveries we may hypothesise that a transformed vision of the world–as a total unity instead of separateness–would give rise to a transformed perception. Obviously, we do not know that this transformed perception would be like, but this fact does not invalidate our argument :

(i) If the world is Brahman (or a form of Brahman) then a total unity of everything is the case,

(ii) the world is commonly viewed as a scene of conflict and partial unity.

from (i) and (ii) this conclusion follows :

(iii) The conception/perception of partial unity is false/illusory.

The degree of difference between our present day perception and this transformed perception (which alone would be veridical in the sense of being based on a non false conception of the world) could be viewed as one measure of the *illusoriness* of the world as perceived at present.

Let us reflect on just *one* aspect of the belief in seperateness. We usually do not expect that small events which influence *our* well being (birth of a child, or finding a rewarding job....for example would, in turn, influence *all* beings.

But if we accept as truth that "all is Brahman" we thereby commit ourselves to this idea: anything effecting an individual consciousness does influence all consciousness.

I am not suggesting that we need to investigate the details of such an interrelatedness at this point—here we are simply noticing that our ordinary beliefs about interrelations of beings and processes fall short of the requirement of total unity, this requirement being itself necessitated by this premise "all is Brahman".

In summary—point II brings into focus those aspects of illusoriness and falsity which are likely to be in operation in ordinary human perception and conception of the world when the unity of everything in the world is not recognized.

Even though in this limited space we cannot start examining the nature or extent of these illusions, our main task has been to indicate that some illusion and falsification (in our world-view and perception) must be onerating if truly all is Brahman.

III. For the Vedantins, that most obvious and commonly acknowledged illusion is that which pertains to the identity of an individual being.

This particular type of illusion is relatively easy to grasp even though most of us do not experience the pure Consciousness of Brahman. The illusion involved here seems to consist in the belief about, and distorted experience of. our self. Thus people usually identify themselves with what they experience as closest to themselves: their bodies, or their thinking processes, or their stream of consciousness, or all of these.

But if all is Brahman then true self must be part of, or an aspect of the Supreme Consciousness; and our ordinary consciousness which i. always *of something* (hence it involves duality) would have to be a distorted version of pure consciousness. The difference between our ordinary consciousness and the pure consciousness of Brahman can be treated as a measure of illusion (or delusion) with regard to human identity.

This issue has been frequently dealt with in religious and philosophical treatments of Advaita Vedanta therefore we need not dwell on it any longer.

Let us proceed to conclude the discussion of the three types of illusions (in points I, II, and III).

### General Conclusions

We can elucidate now the dual status of the world and of individual beings in the light of the alleged truth "all is Brahman".

In so far as we consider the true substance or substratum of the world which is Brahman, the world has the highest ontological status.

In so far as it is regarded as an assembly of incompletely harmonized parts and as a conglomeration of basically non-conscious masses of energies and processes, we can figuratively say that the world is unreal.

But of course, it is only the conception and perception of such a world which is at fault. The world remains Brahman. Thus "the world is an illusion" is a figure of speech, a shorthand phrase which *can* be properly explained; the explanation would distinguish the world in its true nature (Brahman) and the perception of the world which is mostly illusory, given the limited human perspective.

Hence, statements that "the world is real" and "the world is illusory" *both* acquire significance in the scheme described here, and *both* describe a certain aspect of the totality of Brahman. When human identity is concerned : it *appears* as something different than pure consciousness and in so for as it appears this way yet another illusion is operating.

### Part B.

### The status of illusion in the totality of Brahman

If we accept the conclusions from the discussion of points I, II, and III, namely that there is a great deal of falsification operating in our conception and perception of the world and of ourselves then the following question arises: what is the status of these illusions in the totality of Brahman ? More specifically, how could there be illusion and falsity (implying imperfection) in Brahman who is Pure Consciousness ?

Let us reformulate this question so that it has more bearing on practical issues of everyday life.

Given that most of human activities spring from the assumption of disunity and separateness, and are attempts to secure for one person or a group some benefit at the expense of other people, what is the status of these pursuits seemingly born of ignorance and half-truths ?

Are such pursuits *distortions*, *misdirected* and *useless* activities in the heart of Infinite Consciousness ?

If Brahman is all, then there cannot be any part or aspect of Brahman which has opposed 'qualities' to these of Brahman. It may be, however, that the difficulty arises because of our inadequate conception of Brahman.

Anyway, here is one proposal which reconciles the two visions : that of the totality of Brahman and that of distortions involved in the world.

> The so called erroneous conceptions and illusory perceptions can only be treated as erroneous from the perspective of a limited individual who seems to be the very being who entertains these notions and perceptions, From the point of view of Brahman all "erroneous" perceptions, notions and illusore in must fit wholly into the totality of Brahman—thus it cannot be truly erroneous. From the point of view of the Absolute Brahman such limitations (ignorance, distorted perception, misconceptions) must only be *self imposed* limitations, creatively accomplished limitations of Pure Consciousness...
>
> As for the individual being who supposedly entertains the illusoriness—it is also only Brahman who enjoys (and suffers) —through awareness which has been limited—all experiences, illusory perception and mistaken views of the world.

This explanation treats illusion as the effect of Self deception (of Brahman). Illusion, Self-created and Self endured, becomes something quite different from what is indicated by our ordinary notion of illurion: illusion is endured but not self created nor self-imposed.

So now we have two notions: Self-deception and illusion.

*Self deception* to what Brahman "creates" in at least part of the Cosmic Manifestation. Simultaneously, deception is what "happens" to Brahman as the self of every being (Atman).

*Illusion*, in the form of mistaken beliefs or illusory perceptions, is what presents itself to those "parts" of Brahman's Consciousness which we see as human consciousness.

From the human perspective, as distinct from Brahman's perspective, illusion and falsity are almost never seen as a self-coosen option.

What has been said so far about the significance of illusion does not exhaust the subject.

Let us investigate just one more issue. The question is:

What is the purpose of the Self-deception (on the level of Brahman) and of illusion and falsification on the level of individual beings ?

Thir question is closely linked with another one–about the aim (or role of the universe of forms in the totality of Brahman.

Let us look at these two issues now

## Part C

**What is the purpose of the universe of *forms* in the totality of Braheman ?**

(What is the role of illusion, and Self-deception in the totality of Brahman ?)

So far we have been using the method of deducing answers to our questions from the premise "all is Brahman". Now I am proposing to change our method because the premise "all is Brahman" does not reveal the aim of particular developments within Brahman (nor does it deny them).

We can discern two general visions of the purpose of the world which have been prominent in Indian religious thought and which is compatible with the vision of all as Brahman. A third one to be developed here is not altogether foreign to Indian thought, but has not been propagated by any influential thinkers.

Let us, then, proceed to elucidate the three visions.

Vision I. The differentiation of the One Reality (or Brahman) into forms and processes and individualized beings is itself to be surpassed by a return to the Reality *beyond* form: to the Pure Consciousness or Pure Self.

There remains an unsolved issue here! what happens to the world after an ascent of individual consciousness into the all-encompassing Consciousness of Brahman ?

Yet another question poses itself :

Why did the differentiation appear (and continue to appear) if it is to be surpassed ?

Anyway, the advice proceeding from this vision is the following : "leave the world, enter the Self (Brahman)".

Vision 2 The differentiation of Reality, even though it involves a limitation/restriction of knowledge and awareness *adds* to the fullness of Brahman.

The purpose of worldly forms (including human consciousness) is their evolution to higher, divinised forms, permeated with liberated consciousness.

The associated advice would be: "evolve, progress to the next stage, involve others in the evolution",

Vision 3. The purpose of worldly forms and processes is to explore possible states, experiences, developments—including the painful ones. The world is a scene of endless exercises of freedom—including a choice to become totally unfree. Associated advice—no uniform advice except: "do what you want" (I will expand on this advice in order to clarify this particular vision of the world's purpose).

—If you want to ascent to the Pure Self you can achieve this;

—if you want to find union with God you will find it;

—if you want to evolve you may evolve;

—if you want to help the poor in Calcutta, you may do so;

—if you want to divert the funds for helping the same poor into your Swiss bank account, you may do so too;

—if you wish to devote your skills to the development of more and more intricate weapons for incinerating the Earth you may do so;

—if you want to teach non violence to bring about world-peace, you may teach it;

—if you wish to incite others to rise against some group of people, you may pursue this too.

The world-view decribed by this vision 3 comes close to what is indicated by the Sanskrit "lila" (play, game). This vision encompasses, in a sense, visions 1 and 2: it allows for, and gives significance to, both the spiritual quest and a moral/mental progress.

Vision 3 seems to enlarge the religious scheme, as it has traditionally been conceptualized—not only religious pursuits are given value—*all* pursuits are seen as equally valuable : It is always Brahman who is involved in every pursuit.

Now we can ask about the significance of illusion in each of these three visions.

In the framework of both vision 1 and 2 illusion (on the level of individual beings) as well as the cosmic Self-deception are to be overcome.

According to vision 3, Self deception, and its effect—experience of illusions, are *primarily* an instrument of creativity. Through Self-deception Brahman experiences a wider range of "ways of being" than It would through truth-consciousness alone (i.e. without Self deception).

Thus vision 3 gives significance to the cosmic illusion not as something primarily to be overcome but as a means for a yet fuller expression of the Absolute – in disguise.

As for the possibly shocking aspect of vision 3 – the tenet that all pursuits are of equal value (including the seemingly most "vile and degenerate") – I would insist that this tenet is compatible with our premise "all is Brahman". Since Brahman is involved in all pursuits it seems arbitrary to assign a higher value to some, and a lesser value to other pursuits.

However, It follows from the position 3 that if the reader elects to view come pursuits as more valuable than others, this particular position will be as much valuable as that of vision 3...

Still, it might be incompatible with the premise "all is Brahman".

# 6

# Neo-Platonism and Sikhism with Special Reference to God

*Paramjeet Kour*

In this present Article, I am trying to explain the concept of God according to Neo-Platonism and Sikhism. First I will explain the thought of Neo-Platonism and then that of Sikhism.

"Generative of all, the unity is none of all, neither thing nor quality nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not at rest, not in place, not in time, it is self defined. uuique in form or, better, formless. existing before Form was, or Movement or rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make Being the manifold it is... we should put neither a This nor a That to it. (VI 9.3)[1].

Neoplatonism is a kind of religious philosophy. By using that which seems to be valuable, It conceived God as the source and goal of every thing. Absorption in God is the real object of divine strivings and religion is the 'heart beat of universe'.

Neoplatonism expresses itself in three stages, (1) Platonian School, (2) Syrian School and (3) Athenian School. All hold that God is the source of all existence—body, mind, matter and form. He is the causeless cause. God, also is Himself One (Infinity, Unity) and excludes all plurality and diversity. God moreover, is understood as the source of emanation.

God, being the source of all existence, is the good who is not in contact with the world of senses. According to Dadd, that this ultimate one is the Neo-platonic Absolute... the One of the good, which is 'God' par excellence; the Divine Intelligence which is 'the Second

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[1] R. Baine Harris, Neo-platonism and Indian thought, p. 28.

God', and Contains the forms, and the General Soul which is 'the Third God' and the immediate creator of the sensible world. All opposite and different things, mind and body, form and matter are derived from God's power[2].

. Neoplatonism in general treats the Absolute on that which is (beyond existene), There are three things to be rememberred:-

1— The nature of the Godhead which is unknown to us: we are unable to form any idea of the Absolute and un-conditioned there, there is a concept of negativistic theology which accordingly, makes God to be the one who is not able to be seen, felt or known.

2— It is a principle of this philosophy that we are not cut off from the highest form of the eternal and universal life of Spirit.

3— We have, in the mystical state, an experience of intuition which is formless and indescribable, and which is, therefore. above the spiritual world of Forms or Ideas.

This is simply to say that there is the One, the highest Spirit which can not be understood by any one of the single human knowledge: and on the other hand, we as human beings, including created things are not away from this highest spirit. That is, there is some force in our State which enables us to feel, at heart, the existence of the One.

This teaching, is like that of Plato, identifies the Good with one which at the same time is called God and wisdom and Plotinus argues that all forms have to be reduced to One which alone, is or exists. By this, it is clear that that which has existence, of the One is beyond human knowledge and existence,of all things are One in One this One has to be God or the Absolute. "All things in God are things". This is parallel or the One and God makes it clear that God is beyond all, beyond activity etc.

The One, being Absolute and beyond Existence, is also "Fundamentally infinity." It does clarify the problem to identify God with this infinity because God does not live in space, but out of it. To this Mr. Rothe says "Absoluteness and infinity merely are in eternity with the idea of self-negation added. It can not, therefore. in any sense be predicted to God. There is no worse. no poorer definition of the Absolute than the word infinite. God in his immanent being is to be considered as entirely outside space and time, and therefore, is just as little as finite".[3]

The God of Neo-platonism is subservient even to the idea and therefore includes thought.

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[2] Dibinge, Theosophies of Plato, Aristotle and plotinus.

[3] Ibid p. 98.

## Sikhism

The God of Sikhism may be had from the opening hymn of the Adi Granth which is known as the Mula Mantra of Sikhism. It is:

"I Onkar Satnam Karta Purukh nirabhav
niravair akal Murat ajuni Saibhang
gur Prasad"

The meaning of this Mantra is, "This is being as One, He is eternal. He is immanent in all things and is the Sustainer of all things. He is the creator of all things. He is immanent in His Creation. He is without fear and without enmity. This being is not subject to time. He is beyond birth and death. He is responsible for his own manifestation. (He is known) by the Grace of Guru."

We see the figure 'I' at the very beginning of the above Mula Mantra. This signifies the very strong Sikh belief in the unity of God. The interpretation appears reasonable given by the first Guru of Sikhism, Shri Guru Nanakji and the whole Sikhism on the unity of God. In this regard Nanak Dev says:- "The Lord is manifest in the three words. He is the eternal Giver and there is no other except Him. Perhaps He refers to Brahma, Vishnu and Siva, but he takes them simply as God's creatures. They have not their own independent status. God is himself the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer and his direct exercise of these functions reduces all dieties to shadows. "He, the, One is Himself Brahma, Vishnu and Siva, and Himself performs all[5]."

The oneness Concept of God in Sikhism does not refer to monism. It refers to monotheism. Guru Nanak says about God as a personal God, as creator sustainer and destroyer. Not only Guru Nanak but also the other Gurus, such as. in the bani of Sari Guru Arjun which characterise God as both (1) Nirguna and Saguna at one place. Guru Arjun Dev ji says that "Nirguna api saguna bhi ohi". But the point must be clearly understood. In his Absolute aspect, when God is not related to world through Creation, he is nirguna in the sense that he is unconditioned, devoid of ordinary attributes and completely beyond the range of human comprehension. He then, by his own will becomes Saguna by revealing himself in the form of the world. As it is said, "From this Absolute condition, He, the pure One, become manifest, from Nirguna. He becomes Saguna. Again although God has been expressed himself in the form of world, but is also transcendent to it. God was there even before creation and he is different from his creation. He goes beyond His creation and so is transcendent. He is also transcendent in the sense of incomprehensibility. He is not comprehensible

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4 N. K. Tiwari, Comparative religion, P. 178.

5 Adi Granth, p. 437.

by human mind. He can be described only in negative terms, as Agam, Agochar, Anant, Apar, Alakh, Akath, and so on, means unfathomable, in creatable, infinite, boundless, imperceptible, and ineffable, God is eternal and beyond the time. He is for every one and will remain for ever.[6] (2) According to the holy book of Sikh religion, Adi Granth. "Beyond human grasp. boundless, infinite, and the all powerful supreme God! He who existed before time, began, who has existed throughout all ages and who shall eternally exist. He is alone true, Spurn all else as false[7]",

God is the inner director of the world by his Grace Shines everything of the world and He is also present in all the things of this world.

"Thou dost pervade the waters, the land and all that is between the heavens and the earth, indwelling in all[8]".

About God's immanent and transcendent in the Adi Granth, it is said, 'Having Created the world. He stands in the midst of it and is separate too.

He is in the midst of all and is yet distinct[9].

Like, other theistic religions, Sikhism also believes in God as Omnipotent. Omniscent, Omnipresent, but some times we see that it very much emphasises the omnipotence of God in the rein of Islam. As omnipotent God's will is taken as sovereign.

"Then art absolute and whatever is in Thy will Comes to pass".

Sometimes, God is also addressed as Master, "wonderous, my Master, are Thy Ways" [10]

In Sikhism God is also in father mother. friend, brother, enlightener, protector, sheltor of the shelterness, helper of the poor etc He is kind, benevolent and loving with. He is really the ocean of all virtues. Sikhism has no faith in God's incarnation.

In this Article namely, Neo-platonism and Sikhism, with special-reference to God, after studying the thoughts of both we see that they strictly believe in God. God is the source of all existence but is not in contact with the world of sense. He is beyond existence. I have seen many similarities between Neo Platonism and Sikhism, as both accept that God is the Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer In conclusion we can say that God is pure One, Absolute, transcendent beyond existence. (Infinity, unity) the highest Spirit which can not be understood by any branch of human knowledge.

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[6] K. N. Tiwari : Comparative Religion, p. 178.
[7] Adi Granth. p. 437.
[8] Ibid. p 504.
[9] Ibid. p. 596.
[10] Ibid, p. 939

# 7

# Europe : Unity Versus Fragmentation

*Panos D. Bardis*

> "In Europe there are also tribes that differ from one another in stature, in shape, and in bravery."
>
> Hippocrates, *Airs, Waters. Places*, XXIV, 2-4.

## I. Introduction : The Dream of Unity

Dr. Peter van den Dungen's "The Evolution of Western Civilization and the Division of Europe"[1] is a briliant essay that contains four main features : first, an excellent analysis of Europe both as a geographical concept and an idea; second, an expert history of European unity and division; third, a somewhat optimistic statement about continental cooperation in the future; and forth, some emphasis on global unity.

## II. The Great Physician's Bellicose Patients

Let me respond with a few random thoughts concerning this essay.

1. Etymologically and mythologically, the name of the continent signifies unity beyond its own geographical boundaries.[2] Indeed. Europa was the daughter of Agenor, a Phoenician king. In other myths, she was the Full Moon, the Great Goddess as mother of the continent, and the Moon cow identified with Io, Hera, Hathor, and Kali. More importantly, the Moon-cow rode Nandi, who was Shiva disguised as a white bull, before Europa rode Zeus also as a

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* Presented at the International Conference on the Common Heritage and Future of Europe, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, October 2, 1987.

[1] Presented in *Ibid*.

[2] Panos D. Bardis, "Heavenly Hera Heroines", in press.

white bull. The name itself, which was the surname of the Mycenaean Demeter, and which is related to the Vedic Uruasi, "the wide-spreading dawn", may derive from the Greek *erebus*, which, like the related Gothic *riqis*, means darkness. Thus, Europe is the land of the setting sun, as opposed to Asia, the land of the east. Two more theories refer to the Greek *eurys* (wide) and *ophrys* (brow) or *ops* (eye or face), as well as *eu* (good) and *rheo* (flow) Accordingly, Europe means broad-browed, broad eyed, broad-faced, or fair-flowing

2. Yes, Europe is both an idea and a geographical concept with protean boundaries. Depending on the criterion that one employs (linguistic, religious, economic, etc ), these boundaries shift in various directions. Besides, modern transportation and communication have changed the Atlantic into a lake and the world into a global village, which makes it parochial to speak of Europe as a self-contained unit. Even much smaller units are often defined by protean boundaries. Chicago's metropolitan area, for instance, has become one economic unit, but it consists of 1,642 independent governments![3]

3. A long time ago, Hippocrates (460 377 B. C ), in his *Airs, Waters, Places*, attributed European unrest and division to the continent's heterogeneity. Let me transtate a relevant passage : "Therefore, I believe that the inhabitants of Europe are more courageous than those of Asia. For where there is uniformity there is slackness, while heterogeneity generates endurance in body and soul. Rest and slackness reinforce cowardice, but endurance and exertion engender manliness. For this reason, the inhabitants of Europe are more bellicose, and also because of their laws, since they are not under kings as are Asians" (XXIV, 23 33).

4. Geographical size has practically nothing to do with cultural attainments. What is the smallest geographical unit that has given us the largest number of great culture centers ? Perhaps the Peloponnesus. Just think of Corinth, Elis, Mycenae, Olympia, Pylos, Sicyon, Sparta, etc.!

5. Professor van den Dungen is right again: artificial political divisions may be imposed even on homogeneous units, and artificial bonds on heterogeneous entities. In ancient times, the history of the Achaean League illustrated these points admirably, especially under Aratus in 228 B. C. and later under the Roman Titus Quinctius Flamininus.

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[3] William Ogburn and Meyer Nimkoff, *Sociology* (New York : Houghton Mifflin, 1940), p. 892.

6. Europe's unity and division cannot be studied without considering the Near East and North Africa. After all, extra-European civilizations were also important and Europe borrowed much from them. Let me only mention the Pythagorean theorem, one of whose many nicknames is hecatomb, a sacrifice of 100 oxen. Why? Because the Pythagoreans considered its proof exceedingly important. Egypt's geometers, however, had discovered this principle long before Pythagoras (530 B.C.). In any event, unity within this entire area seems to have followed a U-shaped curve throughout history, its lowest are covering mainly medieval and early modern times.

## III. The First United Nations and the Cynical Farmer

Nowadays, although it is probably too late, we must always speak of international, not only European, unity and cooperation. Such a dialogue must further be based on genuine moral responsibility which, as David Hume (1711 1766) would explain, makes sense only if the world, which is (descriptive), includes the proscriptive (what ought not to be) and the prescriptive (what ought to be).

But is European, and international, unity gradually intensifying? Perhaps. Despite the countless ups and downs, it seems that, both theoretically and practically, both voluntarily and forcibly, we have moved from international anarchy to relative order and cooperation. The first UN-like organization was the Greek Ampictiony, which was introduced about 900 B.C.[4] Some of its goals were interstate *eunomia*, or good order, economic cooperation, solution of social problems, formation of international law, etc. Later developments include Dante's *De Monarchia* (1310-1312), Francisco Suarez' *Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore* (1613), Huge Grotius' *De Jure Belli et Pacis* (1625), the League of Nations, and the UN. Let us hope that this trend will continue more fruitfully.

Such cooperation, some authors believe, must include free migration, as if national boundaries did not exist. Joseph Carens, for instance, writes: "Many poor and oppressed people wish to leave their countries of origin in the third world to come to affluent Western societies...there is little justification for keeping them out... [we must] respect all human beings as free and equally moral persons".[5] At least three political theories would support this philosophy:

1. Utilitarianism, with its emphasis on "maximizing utility", asserts that, when utility is calculated, everyone counts for one,

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[4] Panos D. Bardis, "Amphictiony : The First United Nations", *The International Journal of Legal Research* 2 (1967) : 11 16.

[5] "Aliene and Citizens : The Case for Open Borders", *The Review of Politics* 49 (1987) : 251.

which implies moral equality.[6] Of course, the problem of defining utility remains.

2. John Rawls stresses social welfare and an activist state.[7]

3. Robert Nozick, a property rights advocate, believes in moral equality and that everyone has the same natural rights, albeit in practice these rights generate material inequality.[8]

Another avenue leading to social justice and cooperation is universal modernization, as there is no excuse for hunger, primitive agricultural techniques, medieval public health. infanticide, clitoridotomy, and the like. Unfortunately, modernization is still a confusing and controversial concept, often identified with Europeanization, Americanization, Westernization, and industrialization. But, first of all, must we speak of the "Western Industrial Revolution" as if English, Dutch, and French history were the same ? Then, is it not offensive to expect Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese technology to be accompanied by nontraditional family systems ? Technology itself does not constitute a panacea, despite Western enthusiasm about it. In Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, an American industrialist bragged ecstatically, as he showed appropriate slides, that his factory could take a cow and change it into cans of meat; An unimpressed African farmer interrupted : "Now, can your factory change those cans into a cow"?

## IV. From Homeric Fate to Elementary Particles

European unity, on the other hand, should be easier than international unity. Heterogeneity, however, has been as obstacle to such cooperation for thousands of years. According to Hippocrates, "The people of Europe differ from one another in both stature and shape, because of seasonal changes, which are great and frequent.... For this reason, I believe, the physique of Europeans varies more than that of Asians and their stature differs very much in each city" (*Airs, Waters. Places*, XXIII, 2-15).

Legends have also been a major impediment. For, unlike myths, which employ divinities to explain nature, legends use heroes and heroines to interpret national history. Chauvinism thus becomes a dominant sociopolitical force.

Absolute unity, of course, is not desirable, for some degree of fragmentation is creative. But is the fragmentation of the United

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[6] Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1982); Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[7] *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 136 142 *et passim*.

[8] *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York : Basic Books, 1974), pp, 12 23, 89 118.

States and Protestantism an unmixed blessing? Is the unity of the USSR and Catholicism an evil? Was Nikita Khrushchev entirely wrong when he asserted that the Soviets, not the West, enjoy true freedom—freedom from decision making? How have Americans used their freedom? In 1980, only 52 percent of all eligible citizens voted; in November 1986, only 37 percent. And who are the most apathetic Americans? Young people, many of whom march and howl in the streets in an effort to solve the problems of the world. In 1976, of those aged 18—20, only 38 percent voted!

But, as Dr van den Dungen has suggested, there is some progress. The European Community of the original Six, the Nine in 1973, and the Ten in 1981 has accomplished much. The Council of Ministers, the Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the Court of Auditors would be envied by the ancient Amphictionic Leagues. The community's Economic and Social Committee and the Consultative Committee are particularly important Rising standards of living, increased education among the masses, and the like will undoubtedly reinforce such cooperation in the future. Once more, however, international unity must be stressed at the same time After all, there is only one race—the human race. And the things that unite us are more important than those that divide us. Even philosophical systems that appear to differ substantially actually converge in many respects[9]. India's *Upanishads* include philosophical dialogues similar to Plato's (427-347 B. C.) The Jains of Mahavira (619-546 B. C.) and Leucippus (450 B C) developed the first atomic theory. Confucius (551-479 B. C.) gave us *Chung Yung* (*The Doctrine of the Mean*) while Solon (639 559 B.C.) one of the Seven Sages, said, "*Meden agan*" (Nothing in excess"). Both Buddha (563-483 B. C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B C.) wisely preached the Middle Way. And so forth and so on.

My final illustration is European science.[10] Unfortunately, European scientists are divided by a common history as the British and Americans are divided by a common language. Some of the specific obstacles are cultural, linguistic, and regional heterogeneity; economic and political rivalries; the difficulty of transferring between social security systems; lack of equivalence in professional qualifications; the high cost of airfares; etc.

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[9] Panos D. Bardis, "The Family, Education, and Absolute Values", in prress.

[10] David Dickson and Colin Norman, "Science and Mutual Self-Interest", *Science* 237 (September 4 1987): 1101-1102, David Dickson, "Networking", *ibid.*: 1106 1107; Colin Norman, "Unsung Force in Science Exchanges", *ibid.*: 1113; David Dickson, "Europe Ends at the Iron Curtain". *ibid.*: 1114.

But cooperation presents advantages. For instance, bringing together former belligerents was one of the original arguments for CERN in the 1950's. Moreover, it is more efficient to pool national resources and skills than to fragment them. Similarly, networking, or linking researchers in existing laboratories, is more economical than creating major ones. And cooperation in technological research with commercial applications diminishes economic competitiveness among European industries, which explains the rise of such cooperation in the early 1980's. The advantages have recently promoted cooperation among European physicists, who now lead the world in the study of elementary particles. In fact, in some respects, European physics is more advanced than American physics. It is also revealing that European scientists were able to send a spacecraft to study Halley's Comet while their American counterparts were doing nothing in this area.

Unfortunately, European science still means Western European science—as Dr. van den Dungen's political argument would lead us to expect—since there is no cooperation with the nations behind the Iron Curtain. The only exceptions are Yugoslavia's membership in the European Science Foundation and the European Physical Society's inclusion of East Europe. In fact, the society's 1987 Hewlett-Packard Europhysics prize went to a Soviet scientist in August.

Finally, one of the most encouraging signs is a development that is not widely known even among scientists, although it involves cooperation between European and other nations. This is a NATO program which began in 1958, and which supports nonmilitary scientific exchanges. No other similar program has ever included more scientists than NATO's has, namely, 250,000 between 1958 and 1987.

It seems, then, that human beings pursue noble goals and ideals slowly, gradually, and in stages. Influenced by Herodotus (484-424 B. C.), Giovanni Batista Vico (1668-1744) speculated about three types of general organization, the divine, the heroic and the human. In a new book[11] of mine. I refer to another kind of triads, which are involved in the development of cooperation, democracy, freedom, and the like. Among the Hebrews, for instance, Jehovah was a tribal god, then national, and finally universal. In poetry, Homer's (800 B C.) epos stressed mythology and fate, while Hesiod's (750 B C.) epic work did the same in *Theogony* but emphasized the beginning of individual emotions and social interaction, which Sappho's (580 B.C ) lyrics cultivated much more extensively and intensively. In politics, the tyrant was absolute, then came Draco (621 B C.), whose harsh code limited even the tyrant, until Solon introduced democracy. Genghis Khan (1162-1227) butchered and bragged about it, today we butcher and use euphemisms about it, but in the future (I hope!) we will both preach and practice love. In the United States, we used to speak of racial inequality openly and practiced discrimination equality openly, now we advocate equality and practice discrimination, but in the future (I hope !) we will both preach and practice equally. In international relations, we used to be apathetic and uninformed *noncritics*, now we are half-informed *monocritics* who attack only one side of each issue, but in the future (I hope !) we will be informed *amphicritics* who will study both sides and then decide wisely. My dream is the same concerning European and global unity. After all, as Plato states in his *Statesman* (270), organisms Prefer gradualism, since they are unable to adjust to cataclsymic changes. Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's 1926 dream in Vienna cannot come true overnight !

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[11] Panos D. Bardis, *South Africa and the World Marxist Movement*, in press.

## V. Conclusion : The Birth of Prometlas

In 1838, in his *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, A Cieszkowski was one of the earliest philosophers to speak of praxis. Epistemology and critical sociology, however, have not achieved much in this area since then. In fact, throughout history, two types of leaders have been prevalent. One is the Prometheus type, who thinks but does not act. The other is the Atlas type, who acts but does not think. Perhaps the problem of unity will be solved when a new kind of leader appears, the kind that both thinks and acts. Let us call him *Prometlas*![12]

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[12] Panos D. Bardis, "Power : Entropic and Syntropic", *Alternatives* 9 (1983) : 483 488.

## 8

# Egoism, Altruism : A Cohabitation in Thomas Hobbes Moral Philosophy

*David Nyong*

## INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no issue is more central in moral Philosophy than that concerning the relative merits of the claims made upon our conduct by our self interest and by the interest of others. Debates have centred not only on the question of the extent to which each of these claims ought to govern our conduct but also on the question of the extent to which each of them actually does govern our conduct. The term 'egoism' is most often used as a label, either for the view that people ought to act in such a way as to best promote their own interests, subordinating the demands made upon their conduct by the interests of others to this primary concern (ethicalegoism), or for the view that people do in fact always act in such a way as to make the pursuit of their own interests their primary and overriding concern (Psychological egoism).

From '*Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society*' (De Cive) 1642 *of the state of Men Without Society* from the 'Moles worth edition' of 1841. Thomas Hobbes (1588 1679) became notoriabis for his so called selfish hypothssis. He is also important for his contributions to the social-contract theory of government. Besides the works on which this paper is based, he also defends egoism (both Psychological and ethical) in *The Elements of Law* (De corpore politico) and *Leviathan*.

In the pages that follow we shall establish the thesis that, given the actual nature of man, given his self-preservation inclination man is necessarily self centered without being selfish. And that his self-love is not incompatible with altruism, where altruism is taken simply to mean the love of others. But where altruism, as is generally conceived to be subordination of one's interest for the good of others it is never desired and in fact, undesirable.

We may at this juncture implore the reader in order to come to grips with the central theme of Hobbes' egoistic thesis keep in mind a number of questions regarding these concepts (Egoism, selfishness, and self interest). For example, what is the relationship between selfishness and self-interest (or self-love)? Is to act out of self-interest always to act selfishly? When I put something away for a rainy day (make Provision for sickness or retirement) I act out of concern for my own interest. Do I also act out of self-interest? Do I act selfishly? What about the cases in which I have my aching tooth extracted or give up smoking? Suppose I do not do these things? Do I then act contrary to my own self-interest? Is to act out of self-interest to pursue a peculiar kind of goal, or is it to pursue whatever goals one has in Particular ways? Is to claim that a man acted out self-interest to ascribe to him a particular motive, or is it rather to level a charge or accusation against him—to deny that he acted from a worthy motive?

No Philosopher is more responsible for arousing the interest of students of moral Philosophy in such concepts as the one we re concerned with than Thomas Hobbes. His espousal of Psychological egoism (his so-called selfish hypothesis) was a tremendous stimulus for much of the profound and subtle thinking concerning the nature of self-love and of its relationships to altruism, benevolence and morality. His assertion, "of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself" is one of the most succinct formulations of Psychological egoism ever produced. And, as we did note on the first paragraph of this paper, Hobbes employed this as a key premise in his argument for ethical egoism. To what extent are these seeming opposing concepts cohabit to make a moral man which according to Hobbes, is the only object fit for society we set out to examine. But first, let us clarify our key concepts, i e egoism and Altruism. Then we shall espouse Hobbes' main thesis before coming to our main argument to the effect that, though Thomas Hobbes' argument appears on the surface, egoistic it cannot. in the final analysis be divorced from altruistic tendencies. And that it is should be understood.

Egoism—concern for one's own well-being-is a position in ethics with hardly any intellectual support of course, that is not the point. What is agreeable to even the most renowned scholars may still be wrong. And the public sector of culture is no less susceptible to error. However, when there is not enough time to study the various competing variations of Egoism as objects of ethical claims[1] the scope of this paper does not, in fact, allow it is perhaps understandable that respectability and popularity become substitutes for independent judgement.

It has become customary among philosophers to apply the label 'psychological egoism' to any theory of human motivation which implies (or is thought by its proponents to imply) that human beings are basically in character and that no voluntary human actions are ever genuinely unselfish or purely altruistic[2]. The most extreme forms of psychological egoism would be those theories which imply that human beings have no direct concern or desire for the good of others, which imply, in other words, that no human being is ever motivated to act by a concern for the good of another as end in itself[3]. A more moderate kind of Psychological egoism would be a theory of motivation which allows that human beings do have some concern for the good of others as an end in itself but implies that a concern for one's own good always outweights, in motivational strength, concern for the good of others.[4]

Altruism on the other hand, is undoubtedly the most widely advocated, defended, and proclaimed moral position within human history and within our culture, as well Among the many philosophically discussed moral positions, this one has achieved the distinction of gaining prominence within the language of non-philosophers.

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[1] Egoistic theories are basically theories of motivation in different versions. We have those that can be said to be monistic in character which claim there is only one kind of ultimate motive, all other motives being in some very subordinate to or derivative from this one. On the other hand, we have the pluralistic versions of psychological egoism which allow that there are a number of ultimate, irreducible motives of conduct but insist that all such motives are to be characterised as egoistic—in the sense that human actions having any one of these as their ultimate motive (or motives) could not be said to be genuinely unselfish or altruistic.

[2] However, to deny that actions are ever genuinely unselfish is not to claim that all actions are selfish Not all actions must be characterized as either selfish or unselfish. For example, brushing one's teeth would be neither selfish nor unselfish in normal circumstances.

[3] Thomas Hobbes has been, rather misinterpreted to hold this position.

[4] For a detailed analysis of this view on psychological egoism, see P. H. Mowell-Smith's *Ethnics* (New York: Philosophical Library. 1957), Ch. 10 *Passion* Also Michael A. Slote, *An Empirical Basis For Psycholagical* Egoism Published in The Journal of Philosophy 61. No 18 (October, 1 1964)

Most people have heard that altruism is the moral code by which we should live our lives. The idea is now virtually synonymous with being morally good.

Altruism is to the effect that the moral good of every human being should be the well-being or good of others. Service to other People alone, or to humanity is general, in the altruistic moral goal, and all the more specific principles of morality (or human virtues) most be geared to the achievement of this goal. The standard of morality consists in whatever others need for their well being.

The argument from altruism comes mainly from the belief that unless people take to their prime moral responsibility to be doing good for others, they would conduct themselves ruthlessly and cruelly toward their fellow human beings.[5] Thus in this respect, altruism stands in opposition to what its proponents believe is a very probable, if not inherent, inclination of people to take advantage of others whenever the opportunity arises. In a way, altruism is a viewpoint that takes as given the evil of selfish pursuits, considering these as leading to conflict among human beings unless restrained by morality, that is, the obligation to serve others, help them, and love them. This is, in fairness, the position of the altruists.

Having made ourselves clear by examinations of the basic concepts, in which we are interested in Hobbes moral philosophy we are now in the position to lay bear, the philosopher's position

Thomas Hobbes moral philosophy and his political thought are not easy is severe apart as they are inter-connected with one another. Yet, both are profoundly influenced by his Scientific Perception, which in effect, Sees man, as an object fit for society in a mechanistic stance. To understand society according to Hobbes, it (Society) must be torn apart imaginatively so as to understand the resolving motions in individual human beings. These motions in turn, must be resolved into an imagined or hypothetical simple forces, which when compounded could be shown to explain them. According to this hypothesis, everything is caused by motion, or more accurately by difference of motions.[6] Thus it is the believe of Hobbes tha the simple forces to which he had in imgination reduced the motions of were thus self-evident. He puts it better :

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[5] C. D. Broad in his, *Ethics and the History of Philosophy*. 1952 exemplify this position. See also, Justin Aronfreed *conduct and conscience* (New York and London : Academic Press 1968), pp. 138 49. It is the position of Aronfreed that human behaviour is tempered more by the spirit of altruism and sympathy.

[6] This hypothesis and the mechanical scientific position which follows from it were set out in the unpublished short Tract in First principle, the date of which is not known but is thought to be between 1630 and 1636 (The Tract was discovered among Hobbes' papers by F. Tommies and published as an appendix to his edition of the *Elements of Law* in 1889).

> Whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, feareth, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are thoughts, and passions of all other men, upon the like occasions... (And) when shall I have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.[7]

Thomas Hobbes' striking scientific hypothesis was that the motivating factor of all human beings could be likened to the workings of a mechanical apparatus consisting of sense organs, nerves, muscles, imagination, memory and reason, which apparatus moved in response to the impact (or imagined impact) of external bodies on it. The apparatus was not, according to Thomas Hobbes' thesis strictly self-moving. but always in motion because other things always impinge on it. To put it in a rather loose sense, it moves because it possess within it, a desire or endeavour to maintain its motion. Hobbes, thereby postulated an [innate impulsion kept on the move, which in its primitive form; was the impulsion to avoid death. He says of this impulsion :

> every man ... shuns ... death; and this doth, by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that where by a stone moves downward.[8]

Yet, Hobbes is still to finish with the use of this propelling impulsion, as he postulate that it pervade, thereby determine the activity of the whole system. For Thomas Hobbes its whole activity consists of endeavours towards what could assist its continued and away from what would impede it. These endeavours, he calls 'appetites and aversions'[9]. Thus according to him, man's complex and refined actions (and this include his moral activity) could be explained and understood as effects of the operations of this mechanical system, not of course, by treating them all as mere reflex actions like blinking an eyelid, or the unconscious muttering of God by the atheist when philosophically, he believes He (God) does not exist, and that the concept of God is meaningless. But this mechanical system is understood by treating all voluntary actions (of willed actions) as results of process of deliberations or, and calcu ations which called into play memory, imagination, and reason as well as sense perception, and put them all to work in the service of appetite and aversion.

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[7] *Leviathan*, Introduction, p. 2.
[8] *Rudiments*, ch. 1, Sec. 7, p. 26.
[9] *Ibid*, p 28.

It is this motion of attraction (appertite) and aversion that has induced scholars and commentators alike, to assert that Thomas Hobbes moral philosophy is not more than a theory of Psychological egoism. Since whatever we do always presuppose, either escaping from a harmful or and distateful situation or moving towards a pleasant experience, his theory has further be likened to a hedonistic exposition.[10] Because of its 'fundamental law of motivation' Moritz Schlick calls it Psychological hedonism.[11]

But then, our question persist: Does it (human interest) necessarily denies service to others ? Or is our self-interest necessarily selfish as the altruists want to claim. Isn't it at all possible to act, even without the least of self consideration, and wholly in the service of others ? It is with these questions in mind that we move on to the next section to appraise Hobbes' thesis.

As we did note when opening the discussion on Hobbes' position, it is not easy, if possible at all, to understand his (Hobbes) moral philosophy without taking into consideration his political thought.

In an attempt to justify political authority Hobbes' postulates by assumption, a state less society where men were free from one another, and were only answerable to their individual self-imposed law. This law in the 'state of nature'[12] is self-preservation. Thus in the 'state of nature' man's natural right is the liberty to preserve his life by any and every means at his diepostal, and to which he could deny no one of the same right. Under this state of affairs, virtue, morality, even justice were unknown as these notions, including that of right and wrong are creation of law in a civil society where there is a common government created by a common agreement. And therein lies human altruism, Yet we are to make the point.

Those who will charge Hobbes for promoting egoism, bothering on selfishness as a rule may, and are justified to seek cover in his self-preservation law, which they have interpreted to mean self interest devoid of any concern for the desire or wish of others. Hobbes' himself gives a tacit support to their claim when he writes:

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[10] This is a philosophical position that enjoin us to seek maximum amount of pleasure to ourselves, for the individual actor. This position rests on the assumption that pleasure has intrinsic value, independence of its value to someone or to something.

[11] Moritz Schlick, *Problem of Ethics* (New York : Dover Publications, Inc., 1939), Ch. 2, p. 45.

[12] This is Hobbes' characterization of a human gathering (Society) without authority where authority means a consciously established institution of government for the purpose of law and order.

> ...there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help upto him. in, Preserving his life against his enemies it follow, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; *even to one another's body*[13] (emphasis mine).

But such charge, apparant as it is must not be considered in isolation of other recommendations of Hobbes. Therefore, in the final analysis, it becomes clear that Hobbes selfish hypothesis is only apparent and not real. Because the same reason that enjoins man to seek the security of life, where there is no common power to prevent the rule of the jungle also ask to seek this common power in a civil society. Aware that his condition in the state of nature (where life was solitary, nasty, brutish and short) was not the ideal one, hence to seek a better situation where his moral potentiality would be realized. Thus from the same fundamental law of nature emerge another which is :

> that a man be willing when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.[14]

Though, it cannot be denied that the need for peace emanate from his self-preservation instinct it cannot equally be denied that in achieving his selfish motive others' needs are not be satisfied. And this altruism on the part of man can be denied, only at the risk of man's self alienation from himself or immolation. Immolation for the sake of others is not act of heroism but a matter for the consideration of the stupid.

Selfishness is considered by most of us to be a bad character trait, a vice, whereas uuselfishness is generally considered to be a virtue, Indeed, many consider selfishness to be the principal moral virtue. Thus, while egoism is widely condemned as immoral, altruism is commended as a virtue. But if this is so, how is altruism to be conceived. If defenders of altruism want us to conceive of egoism as including a disposition to sacrifice the interest of others for the sake of our own (to treat others as mere means to our own happiness), shall we then conceive of altruism as including a disposition to sacrifice our own interests for the sake of others (to treat ourselves as mere means to the happiness of others)?[15] If we conceive of altruism in this way, as involving self-renunciation and self-abasement, it can be argued that altruism is far from a virtue and more like a vice. A.C. Ewing Pervades our thought when he observes !

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[13] *Leviathan*, Ch. 2, Sec. 9, p. 52.

[14] *Ibid*., p. 56.

[15] It is interesting to note that one recent defender of "the virtue of selfishness" does conceive of altruism in this way. (If Avn Band *The virtue of selfishness* (New York : Signet Books, 1964), especially essays 1 and 5.

> A society in which everybody spent his life sacrificing all his pleasure for others would be even more absurd than a society whose members all lived by taking in each other's washing. In a society of such completely unselfish people who would be prepared to accept and benefit by the sacrifice ? And the purposeless surrender of one's happiness is mere folly.[16]

For this reason Ewing suggests that if altruism is to be considered a virtue, it must be conceived of differently: "self-sacrifice is only required ... where it is necessary in order to secure for somebody else a *greater* good than that sacrificed".[17] (emphasis mine). Thus, the altruist is to be characterized not as one who puts the interests of others ahead of his own but as one who puts the interests of others on an equal footing with his own. This obviously is Thomas Hobbes moral Philosophy.

We may end this paper on the claim that though, men motivation for acting may not be wholly unselfish or altruistic it is of course, not reducible to a monistic version of Psychological egoism, to which all other motives are in some way subordinate to, or derivative from. Rather, human actions have at its ultimate different motives, and concern for others well-being may just be one of such human conducts. Thus from Psychological egoism altruism is not a distant, but a derivative motive.

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16 A.C. Ewing, *Ethics* (New York : Collier Books, 1962), p. 34.
17 *Ibid*, p. 38.

## 9

# Rational or Critical Reflection As A philosophical Method

*Chhaya Rai*

Some thinkers accept rational reflection to be the principal method of philosophical investigation; They believe that philosophy starts with the 'experience' of facts or phenomena of matter, life and mind, and seeks to reduce them to a system. The method, which a philosopher adopts to complete this task, is rational reflection. The supporters of this method attempt to clarify its nature by calling it "empirical and transcendental or speculative method." They claim that a philosophical method is and should be 'empirical' because philosophy is not divorced from the world of our common-experience. But, on the other hand, philosophy makes a hypothesis to explain the world and its relation to the soul. This hypothesis as to the ultimate nature of the reality must be rational. Thus, in this second phase, the philosophical method is rational. Further, they state that "rational reflection" is not capable of "verification" by experience or observation and experiment. Nevertheless, it must be "consistent" with all facts or experience. Since a philosophical method must harmonize them with one another and reduce them to a unified system, it has also to harmonize the judgments of facts with the judgments of values. It must explain our life and experience staisfactorily and not explain them away as mere appearance. Not only this, but even our deepest longings and aspirations must be satisfied by it. It must recognize the reality of intellectual, moral, aesthetic and religious values and give them a rational basis.

Sometimes they identify rational reflection with "logical reflection". They inform that the method of rational reflection is not 'entirely' empirical and scientific, but it is pre-eminently rational or speculative. They define 'rational' in terms of "speculative" and commit a mistake of confusing rational with speculative. This method of philosophizing,[a] is not unscientific and non-empirical since philosophy employs rational reflection on the facts of experience in order to explain them adequately by making a rational hypothesis. They also believe that "rational reflection" includes the logical methods of analysis and synthesis like sciences. They describe it as a method of '*observing*' facts, '*inter-relating*' them with one another and '*interpreting*' them by means of rational reflection. Sometimes they say that the method of philosophy is preeminently speculative and "*critical*". Thus they indirectly inform that philosophical method should be "critical". Though the method of philosophy as reasoned reflection is like that of science. yet philosophy differs from science in this respect that while philosophy deals with the ultimate reality, special sciences deal with particular aspects of it and leave all ultimate questions aside.

Sciences do not investigate the nature of ultimate reality and they employ quantitative and numerical methods. But philosophy deals with the ultimate problems of existence in a 'scientific spirit' and it employs "reasoned reflection, critical and systematic analysis of popular and scientific conceptions and a rational synthesis of them". It does not make use of observation and experiment for 'increasing' Our knowledge of particular facts but merely discusses the way in which they are to be "*interpreted*" and made consistent with one another". "It investigate the general conditions to which all reality confirms."[1]

This method is generally advocated by those who believe that intellect is the proper organ of knowledge and that to deny the capacity of the intellect or reason is to make philosopoy impossible. They maintain that the method of philosophy is rational reflection, logical analysis and synthesis and framing of a valid hypothesis. On the other hand, the intuitionists find intellect incapable of comprehending the reality; therefore, according to them, the method of philosophy is not 'rational reflection', but intuition, which is supra-rational or supra-intellectual. But the fact is that they themselves prove the validity of their intuitions by rational reflection and intellectual arguments. Thus intuition cannot be regarded as the proper method of philosophical inquiry. Cunningham tells that the method of philosophy is "rational reflection" like that of science, since philosophy, like science, depends upon intelligence for the solution of its problems and consequently the method of philosophy, in principle, is identical with the method of science, i.e. the method of 'reasoned observation' and explanation. According to him. the method of procedure does not essentially differ from the method of science"[2]. But Cunningham is wrong, because philosopoy is more comprehensive than science. It seeks to harmonize even the ultimate conclusions of sciences with one another. Philosophy does not use quantitative methods. It does not resort to induction and deduction. It only "reflects" philosophical method is incapable of verification by experiment and observation therefore it differs from scientific method Lewis also recommends "reflective method" in philosophy. He accepts a real distinction between the "speculative" and the "reflective or critical" elements. At the same time he believes that this distinction coincides with difference in the method by which the resolution of the problem is to be sought. He claims that it is only the "reflective" element in metaphysical problems which coexists in its nature and in its method.

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[1] A. E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, pp. 5-6,

According to him, "metaphysics is concerned with the nature of the real only so far as that problem is amenable to the reflective method and does not trench upon the field where only scientific investigation can achieve success."[3] He tells that there are "reflective" problems in every special science which constitute the "philosophy" of that science. A metaphysics which takes such problem as that of abstract universal will remain strictly within the reflective method. He takes reflective method as "reflective examination of experience". Lewis tells that the philosophical procedure must be "critical", not descriptive, since philosophy cannot be merely a verbally more precise rendering of commonsense nor a direct-generalization from actual practice. In his own words, "so far as it is to be of use, it must assume the function of sharpening and correcting an interpretation of that experience which is its datum [4]

The next point about his proposed reflective method is that it must, of course, be 'dialectical'. It must be dialectical not in the Hegelian sense but in the Socratic-Platonic sense. That means it should proceed with the assumption that truth is implicit in the mind, which seeks it and needs only to be brought in light. This method recognizes that "definitions or essences" are the philosophic goal. It also recognizes that the hope of "agreement" between minds to be reached by philosophic discussion must rest upon the possibility that such agreement somehow exists already,

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2 Cunniagham, Problems of Philosophy.

3 C. I. Lewis, "Mind and the World Order", reprinted in Introcution To Philosophy, p. 9.

4 Ibid. p 13,

Lewis Warns against a mistake by pointing out that if we recognize "critical reflection or dialectic" as the only method which holds promise in philosophy, we do not thereby commit ourselves to the assumption that coherence and internal consistency is the sole and sufficient test of philosophic truth. He clarifies the nature of this method, further, by stating that it does not take it for granted that all facts follows from the logical structure of thought itself. Not only this but it does not presuppose that what is 'a priori' is wholly independent of the general character of experience. In his opinion, the aim of the dialectical or reflective method is that we should recognize philosophical proof as nothing but conviction.

Reflective-critical analysis was suggested as the sole philosophical method by Harold H. Joachim. According to Joachim,[5] "logic is identical with philosophy due to the concreteness of its subject-matter and the "*consequent*" peculiar nature of its method". An ordinary reader may object that the subject-matter of logic and philosophy is not concrete, but abstract. In reply to this objection he justified his use of the term "*concrete*" by explaining that he uses it for contrasting the king of 'facts' with which all philosophical and logical speculations is concerned, with the 'facts' of special sciences. In his view, the facts of the latter type presuppose a division between subject and object of experience. While the facts of logic or philosophical study are neither abstracted objects of experience, nor abstracted subjects and in this sense they are "concrete or spiritual facts", "totalities". They are unities undrlying between what is known and the knowing of it. He also discloses a pecularity of philosophy by indicating that the subject-matter and method of philosophy are intimately connected. In Joachim's opinion, "nothing but reflective and critical analysis can unlock the secrets of its being". The method contributes to make the subject-matter what it really is.

Joachim rejects the popular notion of logic as the science of thought, or of forms and principles of thought by condemning it as misleading, because it restricted the logic of philosophy to the sph re of thought only, i,e. the subjective faculty of thinking as against the sphere of things or objective realities. In Joachim's opinion, "a logical fact is a spiritual (an intellectual) activity become self explicit, manifest to, and conscious of, itself'.[6] He tells that it is more adequate to call logic as a ' science of knowledge" rather than as a science of thought; since "knowledge" includes all the functions of mind viz., insight, intuition, intellection, demonstration, feeling etc. Later, Joachim identifies "knowledge" with "truths". Truth means objects perceived and he tells that the subject-matter of logic is the fundamental and indispensable condition of knowledge or truth. He also identifies logic with philosophy.

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[5] Logical Studies, pp.1-61.

[6] H. H, Joachim, Logical Studies, p. 15,

After clarifying the subject-matter of philosophy, he speaks of its method as reflective and critical analysis, a method distinctive of all philosophical investigation. But what is meant by 'Analysis'? ordinarily the single principle of analysis is simplification according to which to "explain" is always to "analyse", for to 'analyse' is to "simplify". Joachim refutes this contention by showing that explanation is not analysis in the sense of simplification. He tells that such a definition of analysis presupposes that whatever is to be explained is a whole or complex This assumption is very obvious in Plato's assertion in the 'Theaetetus' that "if anything is a whole, the whole of it must be "all the parts", and in Leibnize's statements that "a compound is nothing, but a collection or aggregate of simple things. But neither Plato nor Leibniz does, in fact, assume that "*everything*" in the universe is either simple or a mere togetherness of simples Further, he tells that if for the sake of defining analysis in terms of explanation, we assume that every "explicandum" is a togetherness of simples, then two alternatives are possible. But both of them will show the inadequacy of this assumption. If we accept the "explicandum" as genuinely 'one' and 'whole' in virtue of the "togetherness" of its constituents, we cannot explain this essential togetherness by explanatory procedure, i.e. analysis, since "togetherness" is not one of the simple constituents. On the other hand, if explicandum is indeed nothing but many simples, their "togetherness" is illusory. This being the case, there is nothing to analyse or explain. Thus Joachim refutes the supposed definition of analysis by showing that within our experience, nothing is simple and nothing is qua simple; and by declaring that no "whole-of-parts", or "one-of many" is ever a mere aggregate. He adequately concludes that whole is always more than all its parts[7].

The second way which he adopts for refuting this definition is to show that the examples, which are presented in support of it imperfectly embody analysis of a different kind. Such examples indicate that the explanatory procedure is not "merely analysis", but it is an analysis accompanied by subsequent synthesis, i.e. construction, composition or combination. Thus the explanation is equal to "analysis and synthesis", not only to analysis. But this description misleads us in understanding the explanatory process, for it suggests that, the explicandum is 'reduced' to an aggregate of mutually exclusive elements and, then, these items are 'reunited' by synthesis.

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[7] Ibid. p. 32.

It is clear that if analysis is such a "pulverization", no synthesis could reunite these elements in a whole. Therefore, Joachim says, if our actual procedure is to elucidate or to explain anything at all, it must embody a very different principle. "Instead of being an analysis into simples followed by a synthesis, it must be (from the start and throughout) a duel movement-a movement of analysis and synthesis in one."[8] Thus the procedure must be two-edged and must be called a "synthetic analysis" or an "analytic synthesis".

He summarizes his suggestion by sayiag that in any genuinely explanatory intellectual procedure, the explicandum must be whole or unitary and must retain this character throughout the process. At first, the explicandum is relatively vague in both respects viz. as regards its wholeness and as regards its diversity. But in and by the explanatory process, it is gradually and simultaneously made more definite in both respects. Hence an Intellectual procedure is genuinely explanatory so far as it is a two-edged discursus, i e. analysing by synthetizing and synthesizing by analysing. Thus for Joachim, the intellect has no other method of explanaing than the duel procedure. Bus can we extend it to the philosophical activities of the intellect? Joachim replies in a negative tone. He tells that though this suggestion is confirmed, yet it is not proved. After admitting this, he guards us against two probable misunderstandings. He states the first misunderstanding in terms of the Cartesian doctrine Descartes attributed to the intellect two irreducible functions, viz. Intuition and deduction. But Descarte's assumption is quite different from Joachim's view because, in Joachim's opinion. intellect's explanatory activity is not "sheerly discursive" as Descartes thinks. Thus an understanding of a complex explicandum is essentially discursive, it is a cognizant activity, an explanatory process. But it is so in virtue of a unitary consciousness, which discloses and develops itself throughout the process. From this point of view, the understanding of a complex explicandum is, in its entirety, an unbroken single comprehension of the explained. Joachim tells that our thought has also an "intuitive" aspect, beside its discursive aspect. Therefore to identify intellect with a faculty which is a mere discursiver movement is a caricature of the intellect[9] Such an intellect is neither 'cognizant' nor contributory to knowledge. On the other hand, any intellectual act thought is not "sheerly immediate", Joachim claims that even if such simple cognizant act e g. intuitions, occured, they could not constitute understanding, since understanding requires that the "object" of understanding should be a many or at least a duality.

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[8] Ibid. p. 38.

[9] Ibid. p. 45.

The second misunderstanding is concerned, as Joachim tells, with the interpretations of the phrases such as "one and one only" and "the same". Joachim says that the phrase "one and one only" must not be interpreted as "therefore in no sense varied or pluralized". Similarly "the same" must not be read as "therefore in no sense different, i.e. differentiated neither in type nor in degree. Therefore he writes : "Every explanatory process embodies a single principle; but the principle lives in its particular embodiments and their differences are necessary to its singleness, to the unity of its life. He criticises the traditional view of conceiving unity and identity abstractly and tells that we are to assume that the *modus operandi* of the intellect is 'one' in the plurality and the "same" in the variety of its explanatory activities and that its unity and identity are concrete, not abstract in any sense. In short, he explains what is concretely 'one', as a 'one' essentially pluralized and what is concretely 'identical' is not the "same without differences" nor is it the "same in differences", but it is a "same essentially differentiated".

After clarifying the sense of "analysis", he tries to explain the sense in which the method of philosophy can be called "reflective and critical". According to him, intellect works at three broadly distinguishable levels of cognizant experience. They are the commonsense level of ordinary intelligent perception, the level of scientific explanation and theory, and the level of philosophical explanation. The final power of mind's 'awakeness', i.e. its reflective and critical self-consciousness throughout its intellectual activity distinguishes the level of philosophy from other two levels. Nevertheless the method of logic in its philosophical explanation of knowledge-or-truth is synthetic-analysis.

In his opinion, the foregoing 'general' description of explanatory process and explicandum does not apply strictly to philosophical explanation and to the explicanda of philosophy, which forms its subject. The subjects of philosophical study are "spiritual realities". They do indeed constitute and maintain themselves in the speculative movement. They are 'one-of-many' and "systems" of a uniquely peculiar kind. Hence philosophical explicandum and philosophical explanatory method determine, and at the same time are determined by one another. Further, he clarifies the sense in which the method of philosophy is reflective and critical by discussing the paradoxical character of the subjects of philosophical study. For the sake of illustration he takes Green's treatment of 'right'. Green tells that "a right is actual only at the level, only in the medium or element of the mutual recognition of self-conscious beings". Joachim tells that if the philosopher is to study rights they must 'exist' and be 'actual'; must have their own independent "nature". And the philosopher's business is not to "make" or "remake". but to understand their nature The "existence" and "actuality" of the rights must imply philosopher's recognition of them, i.e, a conscious recognition; and philosophers thought must go to make them what they are. In this sense, in explaining them, he is reflecting upon the "explicanda" which depend for their nature and actuality, not upon the "explanatory" activity but upon "intellectual activities". He tells that as the philosophical study of these explicanda proceeds, the thought which explains them, *"re-fashions"* the spiritual facts, i.e. right; and hence contributes essentially to their being Thus he discovers the reason why spiritual facts, which emerge in and though a philosophical speculation, are very different from the original explicanda. He is quite right in mentioning that the 'difference' is merely in the philosopher's *"clearness of apprehensian"*. That is to say the explicanda remain what they always 'were', but the philosopher sees them now more clearly. The philosopher recognizes them, not only semi-consciously and instinctively; but, at the same time, "reflectively", the fact of this original and constitutive recognition. In support of his view, Joachim quotes from Spinoza. "Demonstrations (and these alone) are the eyes with which the mind sees things and observes them". Joachim agrees with Spinoza that it is "the demonstrating, it is the speculative movement, and nothing else, which is itself the "seeing", Thus the explicanda, i.e. rights in and through a "philosophical analysis" have been raised to a new and higher level of actuality. They have grown to a fuller stature in virtue of the whole or system, which they constitute and express In Joachim's opinion, such a theory of philosophical explanatory procedure, shows that the explicandum is intimately bound up with and determined by the explanatory procedure.

According to Joachim the "total explicandum" of logic and philosophy is knowledge-or-truth[10]. But here he faces to difficulties. First, whether knowledge or-truth can be regarded as a whole or system at all. The second difficulty is concerned with the spiritual facts which articulate and constitute the total explicandum in the total speculative movement. In his opinion. only logic can furnish an adequate solution of these difficulties. Nevertheless, knowledge-or truth is in any sense a whole, which clearly is a spiritual or ideal reality. He tells further that a truth which lies in nobody's thinking is not truth at all; a knowledge which is affirmed and sustained by nobodys intellectual activity is no knowledge at all. Therefore, in the philosophical procedure, explanatory procedure and explicanda, i.e. method and subject-matter are intimately bound up with one another and the procedure essentially contributes to constitute the explicanda. In his consideration of philosophical methodology, Joachim also distinguishes the thought, which goes "to make and sustain" the explicanda, with the thought which in the form of logical speculation "explains and understands" them Thus there is a clear distinction between the thinking which '*makes*' an explicandum and the thinking which "*reflects*" upon and explains this spiritual fact. Therefore the ordinary thinking must be distinguished from the "*speculative*" thinking of the logicians or philosophers, which "*reflects upon*", "*criticises*" and "*explains*" the spiritual reality and the logical facts. He clarifies the nature of these two different types of thinking. The first type of thinking is a 'process' at once analytic and synthetic, it is instinctive or 'blind', i.e. of which the percipient is not 'aware'. It is a function of imagination, not of the intellect, The second is the "thinking of mind, which is "reflectively" and 'critically' self conscious, and conscious of its own activity. He also points out that the thought of mathematician should not be confused with the thought of a philosopher in so far as he makes mathematical truth or mathematical knowledge his explicandum. He affirms that a philosopher's intellect must be functioning in the constitution of his explicanda, as well as in the reflection and criticism. by which he is trying to explain them. For Joachim, "the intellect in its philosophical explanation of knowledge or-truth is "re thinking" and "re-capitulating" the less developed stages of its self expression". I agree with his view that this re thinking is, to some extent, a "refashioning" and "transfiguring". In fact the philosopher's intellect inevitably modifies the original unsophisticated "nature" of its explicandum. This refashioning, according to Joachim, becomes, more and more clear as the work of philosophical speculation proceeds,

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[10] It is "truth" in the sense of "reality", disclosing itself and disclosed to mind.

# 10

# Hermeneutic and Referential Aspects Of Comparing Theories

*Evandro Agazzi*

## The construction of theories

It can be said that—in the empirical sciences—a theory develops out of a particular 'point of view' which has led to the isolation of certain aspects of reality, aspects that are *intended* to be the object of the investigation. This means that these aspects have already been singled out by means of concepts which enable us to state *what* we intend to study, and these concepts have to be equipped with suitable operational criteria by means of which we can *refer* to reality under the specific point of view adopted. The combined presence of these concepts and operational criteria amounts to the determination of the 'domain of objects' of the inquiry, and at the same time provides us with an initial quantity of empirical evidence concerning these objects, i.e. with a good deal of *data* given by the immediate application of the said criteria to reality. This is what may be called the level of *experience*. It may be also called the level of *observation*, provided we do not consider observation to be a kind of passive 'looking at things'; it is rather a kind of 'looking into things' in the sense that it is performed within the framework of a given 'point of view' and involves the concrete operational manipulation of physical tools'.

Theory emerges as an attempt to describe and understand the domain of objects so identified, by utilizing all the available information, which is concretely constituted by the previously collected data. This attempt cannot avoid being one of interpreting and explaining the data, which implies that it has two aspects: the elaboration of concepts and the formulation of statements by means of these concepts. (These two aspects however should not be considered as successive 'steps', for concepts are always elaborated in mutual connection with other concepts, and this gives rise to statements in which their meanings take shape.) Along these lines, the construction of a theory may be seen as an expansion of the concepts which initially expressed the specific 'point of view' on reality, an expansion which depends in part on the implicit potentialities of these concepts and in part on the information contained in the empirical statements describing the available data. All this amounts to the creation of new concepts and new statements, which deserve to be called "theoretical" not because they are opposed to "observational" concepts and statements (as was supposed to be the case according to a well known but untenable dichotomy), but because they are the product of theory making and exist for the sake of 'theorizing', i.e. for the sake of understanding and explaining the data. By way of summing up, we could say that the purpose of the theory is to provide a 'conceptual space'— a frame of rationality or a condition of intelligibility—which accords with the level of *meaning and intension*, but is still in need of being connected with a *reference*.

### The referential task of experiments

The task of providing a reference for the meanings expressed in the sentences of a theory is the specific responsibility of experiments. This is why any relevant experiment is conceived and designed under the strict supervision of the theory, of which it should express a *referential logical consequence*. Its being a logical consequence of—the theory makes it dependent upon it: but its being referential makes it dependent upon the operational criteria mentioned above and, in this respect, independent of the theory. It is of course true, as we have stressed, that these criteria themselves depend on the specific concepts which constitute the particular 'point of view' adopted. But *these* concepts do not belong to the theory: they are common prerequisites both of the theory and of the operational criteria, and work as guidelines for the determination of the 'domain of objects' of the discipline or theory envisaged. Once this is clear we can see that if the experimental test is successful, it provides the theory with a *guarantee of reference* (at least to a certain extent); if it is not successful, it indicates that the theory has *no reference* (at least to a certain extent).

Some refinements are needed concerning the referential purport of experiments. The most immediate, but misleading idea associated with this claim could be that an experiment puts us into direct contact with the referents of the theory, in the sense that it enables us to observe them. Such a case is not totally excluded in the preliminary steps in which very simple conjectures of very elementary empirical theories are put to the test. However, such instances are rather exceptional and not very interesting. In the case of all mature natural sciences, experiments do not allow us to observe directly the intended referents of a theory, i e. those objects which the theory is 'speaking about' (such as, e.g., elementary particles). Here the experiments simply provide us with what we have intentionally called a 'guarantee of reference', which is usually indirect, but reliable. A not negligible number of 'presuppositions' are involved in every referential claim which goes beyond the mere witnessing of the immediate evidence. Some of them concern matters of fact, others are fragments of causal explanations, and others are sketches of 'theories' in a broad sense. The search for referential guarantees (i.e. the design of experiments) usually involves a very sophisticated theoretical, mathematical, and technological machinery. However the task of this machinery is to bring about those empirical features which we expect as consequences of certain properties of our referents, and which we can understand only as such consequences. But more on this will appear in the sequel.

### The feedback from experiments on theories

It is important to stress that, each experiment being by necessity a very limited logical consequence of the theory, its guarantee or disproof of reference cannot concern but a restricted part of the theory. Or, in other words: a positive result ensures that at least certain parts of the theory are endowed with reference; many positive results edsure that several parts of the theory are endowed with reference, but it remains uncertain whether the whole theory enjoys such a guarantee. Symmetrically, one must say that one or more negative results prove that some aspects of the theory lack reference, but cannot exclude that other aspects have it. This way of looking at things seems to account in a more satisfactory manner for the well known facts that a finite number of 'confirmations' are not sufficient for calling a theory true, while neither are a finite number of 'falsifications' really sufficient for declaring it false. These facts are usually explained by considering scientific theories as equivalent to a logical conjunction of propositions, a point of view which has proved unsatisfactory in several respects. According to the approach advocated here a theory may rather be seen as a more or less faithful representation of its intended referents; it can never be perfectly faithful, but this does not imply its rejection, so long as it is considered to be sufficiently faithful. Experiments exist precisely in order to make such a decision possible. But in order to see this clearly we need to develop some other considerations, which will lead us to a view of scientific theories much more different from the traditional view than we have been able to express thus far.

## A hermeneutic approach to theories

The traditional empiricist view of theories conceived of them as sets of propositions connected through logical links, and it reduced scientific explanation to formal deduction. This view was to a large extent shared also by Popper, whose main difference from the empiricists in this regard was that he did not consider induction, but creative conjecturing as the path leading to the establishment of the general hypotheses from which scientific explanations take their start. Both approaches had in mind the discovery of *single* hypotheses (which were confused with general laws) and considered theories as simply being the *logical conjunction* of these hypotheses. A serious shortcoming of this approach is its inability to account for theory change; and it is well known that a *semantic* integration was introduced, which stressed that the *meaning* of every concept is determined by its links with all the other concepts in the theory. The consequence of this was that there should be no way to compare theories on the basis of experimental tests, for one and the same test would not be considered the same within two different theories, since it would have a different meaning in each of them owing to the "theory-ladenness" of all the concepts involved.

This conclusion stands in conflict with the fact that theories are actually compared and sometimes also rejected, in spite of what is said by the supporters af the 'incommensurability' thesis. This indicates that these authors were right in stressing the global nature of theories, and in seeing that pure formal logical conjunction is inadequate for expressing it, but that they were wrong in believing that this 'wholeness' is of a semantical nature. In addition, they were unable to keep meaning distinct (though not totally separated) from reference. Our claim is that the 'wholeness' of a theory has to do with a *hermeneutic* level, which is connected with the *semantic* and the *referential* levels in different ways. Since it would not be advisable to enter into too many details here, let us simply say that, when we start investigating reality from a certain 'point of view', we already apply to it a particular *interpretation* (hermeneutic level), which guides our choice of concepts (semantic level) and our devising of operational testing procedures (referential level). This means that we begin our inquiry by referring to things and 'seeing them in a certain manner', i.e. having in mind a certain *Gestalt*, or image, or model of them. Then we try to make this model explicit by expressing it by means of propositions; and these are the *hypotheses* which in their *unity* constitute the theory. However, since the model is always a 'seeing as' (which necessarily oversteps the crude evidence of 'seeing that'), it contains elements which can be correctly conceived and expressed, and therefore gives rise to *meaningful* sentences (semantic level), but sentences which might not correspond to actual features of our objects (referential level). This is why we try to check these additional features by means of experiments.

## The hermeneutic approach to experiments

Every time we uncover new facts which are in keeping with our *Gestalt*, or model, we strengthen and enrich it through further details, and this also happens when we check whether all the details of the model are correct, by performing experiments. Therefore the outcome of the experiments *in any case* implies a modification of the model: either in the sense that it is enriched (when the outcome is positive), or in the sense that it has to be altered (when the outcome is negative). The extent of an alteration depends on the *relevance* of the details disproved by the negative result; and, again, this relevance cannot be appreciated on the basis of either logical features (from a logical point of view every proposition is exclusively either true or false), or semantical features (even disproved sentences remain meaningful). An appreciation of this relevance in only possible on a *hermeneutic* basis, i.e. by considering to what extent the unexpected result challenges the whole picture, the whole *Gestalt* or model. It may be that the result simply implies some correction leaving the substance of the model untouched; or it may be that it demands a complete *reorientation* of the interpretation and, thus, the replacement of the old model by a new one. But this is possible because the experiment has a referential purport, which enables it to break the 'hermeneutic circle', instead of remaining prisoner of it.

## Experiments and theory comparison

This is also the reason why experiments usually provide means for comparing theories: indeed theories are compared on the basis of *referents* and not *meanings* and it is quite possible (indeed it is very common) that we are able to refer to the same objects in spite of interpreting them in different ways (hermeneutic level) and of thinking of them through different concepts (semantic level). Of course, the idea of comparison may be understood in different ways, which depend on the 'criterion' adopted for comparing, a criterion which inevitably leads to the formulation of a value-judgment expressed through an assignment of a 'more...' and 'less...' In the case of theories two fundamental criteria have been usually adopted (both of them admitting of a variety of shades): the criterion of truth, and that of usefulness. Unfortunately the criterion of truth did not seem very manageable, since it is intrinsically 'bivalent', it is suited for 'all-or-nothing' statements (reflecting the dichotomy of true and false), and does not allow for a 'more' or 'less' in a proper sense. This is why the criterion of usefulness was often preferred, for it makes full sense to say that a theory is more useful than another, while it does not to say that it is more true than another. However the question is whether a *cognitive* (instead of a *pragmatic*) criterion of comparison could not be proposed, different from that of truth, and this possibility seems to be really the one which is appropriate for comparing theories. Indeed, only under the very implausible assumption that a theory is a logical conjuaction of statements (i.e. that it is equivalent to a single statement) is may be said that it must be either true or false, But if a theory is rather something like a 'picture', then the concept of truth does no longer apply in a proper sense, and we are rather used to speak of 'faithfulness', a feature which admits of a 'more' and a 'less'. But faithfulness to what? The common sense answer would be: faithfulness to the reality (landscape, person, etc.) of which it is a picture. In our case we should say: faithfulness to the *objects* which the theory is *intended* to be about. In this way we are led to see that the *operational* tools, which are the means through which the objects of a theory are *referentially* (and not simply semantically or logically) constructed, will provide us with the criterion for comparing theories. But in order to adequately see that, we need to see that this role is not undermined by the 'theory-ladenness' tenet.

## The Operational—Theoretical Distinction

Every scientific concept is necessarily *theory-laden*: this claim has become widely accepted in recent philosophy of science, marking the extreme reached by the pendular motion which had seen its initial opposite position in the empiricist claim that all scientific concepts must themselves be either observational concepts or be 'reducible' to observational concepts. In particular, the above statement has led to a couple of logical consequences which appear rather disastrous for any empiristically conceived philosophy of science (and not only for such). They are: the thesis that no reliable distinction may be introduced between observational and theoretical concepts, simply because there are no purely observational concepts in a strict sense; and the thesis that, all conceps being in a way 'theoretical', their meanings are relativized to the theory in which they are imbedded to such an extent that they do not allow of any comparison between sentences belonging to different theories, nor, consequently, between the theories themselves (the thesis of the 'incommensurability' of scientific theories). Our first remark is that we intentionally do not speak of *observational* predicates, but of *operational* ones, this fact being justified by our previous discussion concerning the role of operations in science, which can by no means be put on the same footing as observations. We can now formulate our problem in the following way: we are confronted with the fact that all concepts in a science must be conceived of as context-dependent, while at the same time the intimate conviction of every scientist, as well as of the uncommitted philosopher of science, is that *operational* concepts are not context-dependent, as they are somehow related to something which lies 'outside the theory', and which is even a prerequisite for the existence of the theory, in the way that operations are.

The way to reconcile these two opposite claims can be found if we resort to the *intensional* conception of meaning. This conception does not maintain that the meaning of a concept *reduces* to its intension, or that the notion of extension is vacuous or useless; it simply says that, despite the good services that the extensional viewpoint has offered in mathematical logic, intension has a no less important role to play in the methodology at least of the empirical sciences.[2] By the intension of a concept we mean what one intends to express when one predicates this concept of a certain thing or, to put it differently, the complex of attributes (qualities, properties, relations, etc ) which are 'meant' by that concept. The usefulness of this way of conceiving of intension lies in the fact that we can distinguish several *components* in it, and the advantage with scientific concepts is that, at least in principle, their intension can be fairly well determined and limited to a restricted number of components (which are usually identifiable depending on the presence of other concepts, with which the given concept is linked, and by the logical network through which it is bound to them)

If we now consider an operational concept, we see that among the components which are constitutive of its intension are included the operations to which the given concept has been explicitly bound. For instance, if we assume that the concept of mass is 'operationally defined' in classical mechanics with reference to a balance, we can say that this part of its intension remains well distinguished from other components of it, such as the theoretical links which bind mass to space, time, and force via the fundamental laws of mechanics. But now we can go a step further and remark that this operational component remains *unchanged* even when we modify some other parts of the theoretical context. We are therefore entitled to say that every operational concept is endowed with a 'stable core' of intension, which we might also call its ***ground intension***, while the other parts of its intension are, so to speak, **'mutable'**, in the sense that they may change according to different theoretical arrangements[4]. We have in this way the solution to our problem: operational concepts are certainly context-dependent and theory-laden, as the *whole* of their intension (*including* the mutable part) is concerned. But they are context-independent, and thus not theory-laden, as far as their ground intension is concerned, because this is solely related to the operations which enter *directly* into the constitution of the concept.

In this way we have what we need in order to draw a distinction between operational and theoretical concepts, because we can safely admit that no concept in science is totally operational; but this does not prevent us from being able to recognize those concepts which have an operational ground intension (and we shall legitimately call them *operational concepts*), and to distinguish them from those concepts which are only indirectly related to operations (i.e. by means of the theoretical network), which we shall call *theoretical concepts.*

As is clear from the above said, the stable core, or ground intension, of an 0-concept is 'stable' because it expresses a relation of the concept to something which is *external to the theory*. This makes it rather trivial that, as a consequence, this component of the intension not be theory laden. On the other hand, the fact in itself is not at all trivial, as it reminds us that operations belong to *praxis*, even if it is a 'noetically oriented' praxis. This has much to do, by the way, with the fact that it is through these operations that operational concepts are endowed with a reference: as a matter of fact, reference (conceived as something related to meaning, but not coinciding with meaning) must in a way lie outside the context in which meaning is elaborated, though introducing some information into this context by virtue of the referential links (i.e. by means of the ground intension). This is why we are entitled to denominate this 'stable core' or 'ground intension' of the 0-concepts as the *referential part* of their (intentionally conceived) meaning.

A very important feature of the distinction sketched here between operational and theoretical concepts is its being clearly a *relativized* one. No concept is operational or theoretical in itself, but its being the one or the other depends on the theory in which it occurs: if in this theory the concept at issue happens to be introduced by an operational definition, it is then operational and is endowed with a referential intension which is not theory-laden, and to which a further component of contextually determined (or theory-laden) intension will be added. If this is not the case, the concept is simply theoretical. It is therefore no wonder that one and the same concept may be operational in one theory and theoretical in another.

At this stage, it is possible to see why the traditional distinction between 'observational' and 'theoretical' could not do the job. In fact, observations as such do not provide us with any recognizable intensional feature to be attributed to concepts, so that no 'stable core' or ground intension could be given by using them. In addition, observations are observations and nothing else, which oblige us to conceive of the observational-theoretical distinction as an *absolute* one, leading to the well known impasses which can easily be avoided by the relativization of this distinction which we have reached by referring to the explicit, clearly describable and well delimited operations.

## Comparing Theories

The considerations just developed about the possibility of recognizing, within a *particular* theory, its operational concepts, and therefore of affording a stable core of meaning for them, has immediate consequences regarding the problem of the possibility of comparing different theories. Indeed the precondition of this comparison is some stability in the meaning of the sentences which are used for comparing different theories.

How this 'stability' could be granted may result from the particular 'intensional' theory of meaning we have presented above. Indeed, one has to admit that intension necessarily changes with a change of context, and even with the growth of knowledge in which some particular concept is involved. For instance, if we compare the intension of the term "man" today with its intension in the Midle Ages, we would certainly recognize that we 'intend' a lot of attributes by this term which were not even thinkable at that time. However we do not say that we have *substituted* the concept "man" with another concept, or that some unspecified concept was enlarged. We say that it is the concept of man which has been modified, improved, enlarged, and so on, which means that the concept somehow preserves permanence through its variations.

Are we led back to essentialism or substantialism by virtue of these arguments? Not necessarily. It seems to me that we can overcome the difficulty provided we take into account the relationship between meaning and reference: the natural solution, on this way of thinking, could be the following. We accept that an enlargement, or even a modification, of the intension of a concept does not undermine the stability of the concept's meaning, provided that the reference (and, consequently, extension) of the concept remains essentially the same. This means, in our example, that we are entitled to say that we shall be dealing with the concept 'man', even after our increased knowledge has enriched its intension, because we still consider as referents of this concept the same individuals we considered to be referents of it before. With science we are even luckier than with everyday language, for (at least according to the analysis advocated here) we have specific (or specifiable) criteria for establishing reference, and, therefore, for fixing the stable core of the operational concepts.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, which were needed in order to explain the general sense of our position, we may now turn to the problem of comparing theories. In order for this comparison to be possible, both common sense and working scientists require that theories must be concerned with the same 'domain of objects' However this fact is not easy to clarify, because this notion is assumed in a very vague sense. It is therefore quite understandable that the whole problem had uudergone a linguistic reformulation, which essentially coincides with the requirement of 'stability' which we have discussed above. The 'theory ladenness' thesis denies this stability and (being usually accompanied by a lack of distinction between meaning and reference), not only excludes theory comparison, but even makes referents a private and quasi *ad hoc* production of theories. Our solution, on the contrary, recovers on the one side the stability of meaning, which is the *linguistic* condition for comparison, and since the stable meaning happens to be the referential component of the intension, it vindicates at the same time the perfectly legitimate claim that theories are compared on the basis of some common *referents*.

It is not without interest to note that our view can provide an acceptable different interpretation for a claim which is often made in order to deny the comparability of theories. In fact the denial of the possibility of comparing theories is often based on the assumption that there are no independent facts or independent data to provide us with a criterion for comparison, as facts and data are always such 'relative to a given theory'. We too have been claiming the relativity of facts and data with respect to theories, but in the sense that they depend on the particular operational criteria employed by a theory, and we did not take the further step which consists in saying that data and facts are relative to *only one* theory. Now the only possibility of admitting that a concept or a statement, though being relativized to theories, is not necessarily relativized to only one theory, requires one's being entitled to claim that it may happen that two (or more) theories have the *same* tools of relativization *with respect to that concept or statement.*

According to our perspective this may actually happen for a restricted class of concepts and statements, i.e. for the *operational* concepts and for the statements which contain *only* these concepts. This is the case when the two theories are grounded on the same *basic operational predicates*, and differ only because of the different logical networks they apply (and therefore, also because of the different theoretical concepts they use).

We went to stress, however, that what we are maintaining is not that theories are *always* comparable, but only that they *may be* comparable as a matter of principle, and *sometimes* actually are as matter of fact. Therefore, we shall not deny, e.g., that concepts labelled with the same name in classical and quantum mechanics respectively actually possess different meanings, such that one is entitled to say that it is not the same energy, position, velocity, etc., which is being considered in each theory. But besides this example one could consider another one, which seems to offer an instance of comparable theories. Let us take the corpuscular and wave theories of light as they were conceived in the first decades of the 19th century, when they came to a decisive collision which eventually led to the discarding of the corpuscular theory from physics at that time In this case we cannot help admitting that, though the theoretical frameworks were quite at variance with one another, they were both based on the same operational criteria for making light objective. Actually, both theories enabled the empirical deduction of testable sentences concerning actual beams of light travelling through holes, being reflected, refracted, and defracted by means of suitable devices, passing with different velocities through media of different densities, and so on. It is thanks to this *common* stock of empirical facts that eventually some empirical statements were found which were compatible with the wave theory and not with the corpuscular one, and eventually led to the abandonment of the latter.

Of course, one must not be naive and believe that it was the 'corpuscular' feature which was defeated in the corpuscular theory. This was believed to be the case simply because, owing to the 'visualizing' attitude of physics at that time, the intuitively most vivid points of disagreement in the two theories were thought to be the really decisive ones. Today we realize that at least some part of the corpuscular conception of light has to be retained, along with certain of its wave-like qualities. But even this way of putting things risks being naive: in fact, we simply have to do with other *objects*, since the operational criteria of referentiality have, at least partially, changed, so that it is no wonder that also the *Gestalt* for understanding them has to be a new one.

### Why theories depend, after all, on experiments

Once these points are clear, we can understand in which sense it is possible and even necessary to claim that theories depend (in a certain sense) on experiments. This is simply a consequence of the fact that theories, although structurally descriptions of 'possible worlds', are constructed with a view to being descriptions or pictures of the 'real world', at least in the following weak sense. The possible world which a given theory describes must include the features of the domain of objects the theory is about, and this entails not only the empirically known features, but also those which are as yet unknown, but which should exist according to the 'model' of which the theory, as we have seen, is a linguistic expression. But in order to fulfil this requirement, a theory has to undergo certain tests of referentiality concerning these additional features, i.e. it has to submit itself to the judgment of experiments which, besides supporting or weakening its referentiality claims, have the immediate effect of increasing the amount of empirical data it is *obliged to account for.* This is the reason why, without pretending that a theory should be eliminated simply on being confronted with some negative experimental outcomes, we must say that neither can it be considered satisfactory so long as these difficulties exist, and that it is expected to undergo the necessary corrections in order possibly to overcome them But this is also the reason why theories are perpetually subject to change as a result of experiments: since every experiment brings in something *new*, its interpretation produces a further elaboration of the model, which again contains something overstepping the immediate evidence, and calls for further experiments, in an interplay which progresses indefinitely without ever being circular.

But what is this dynamics, other than a continuous comparison between theories ? The picture which has been proposed in the last decades is that of dramatic changes, which occur from time to time in science and are characterized by a kind of total opposition implying the 'victory' of a theory on its rival. However it is very questionable that things be like that. Theory comparison is actually something happening very 'normally' in science, and is characterized by a continuous readjustment, rather than by a succession of quiet conformistic work under the protection of a paradigm, suddenly interrupted by revolutionary subversions. Of course, such changes certainly exist, but they are not such as to totally eliminate the preexisting science. The 'cumulative' view was perhaps too rough, but it contained an hardly deniable aspect: that the referential content of science has a *permanence*, which is capable to survive the hermeneutic framework that made possible to gain it, and this in spite of the fact that this content never remains as a self-contained entity, but always requires a theory which makes it understandable,

## NOTES

1 The claims which have been very sketchily made in the opening sentences of this paper express a view regarding the nature of scientific objectivity which I have developed in several books and articles and which I shall not recapitulate here. As quick references let me mention the few essays quoted in the bibliography

2 For more details see Agazzi (1976).

3 For more details see Agazzi (1985).

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## II

# Hume's Causality— A Modern Analysis

*Ratna Chaudhary*

The concept of causality occupies an important place in the philosophical and scientific discussions. From ancient days to modern times, this concept has assumed different characters and is not accepted unanimously in the same form,

Hume being an empiricist gives a major blow to the traditional concept of causality based on Aristotle's view. For Aristotle each effect is the outcome of four causes, that is, material, efficient, formal and final, which basically points out toat all the four causes must co-operate to bring the change. In the modern sense of the term the Aristotelian causes can be taken as conditions. Aristotle's view influenced the later thinkers and no major break is seen till we come to Hume. The traditional view gets a serious setback at the hands of Hume and it become difficult to recover its reputation. Hume raises certain questions concerning the concept of causality which continue to baffle the succeeding thinkers and one can be doubtful as to whether he has got rid of Hume's raised difficulties. In the recent years with the tremendous scientific advancements in each field of the universe the discussion on causality has assumed interesting and also confusing character. A scholar remarks "Few subjects are so confused in current philosophical thinking as causality",[1] So, the present paper has to restrict itself to the relevant topic so that wide range of speculations concerning this concept may not deviate it.

First, an attempt would be made to analyse the question as to what do we mean when we say 'A is the cause of B'. Hume's analysis would follow this attempt and lastly an attempt would be made to understand Hume in terms of recent thinkers.

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[1] Hawkins D J B., Causality and Implication, P.U.

Causality according to common sense man involves ideas of production, power, force, change etc. "The two fold motion of causality, efficient and final, is applied without hesitation to all the real".[2] An ordinary man also believes that there is some sort of necessity or uniting factor between cause and effect. Philosopher may not give importance to this common sense view still cant reject it as false, rather he gets suggestions from the ordinary use of the term.

Scientific view examines the above view and a rational theory is established. Sciences believe in the universal validity of the law of causation. Every phenomenon happens because of previous happening. In sequence of time one proceeds and another succeeds. "The true name of cause in science is 'antecedent".[3] For scientsts the course of events is uniform, so, causal law is reciprocal. Same cause produces the same effect always. They also believe that the cause includes within it all the factors requisite to be effect. Thus, scientists are busy finding out causes not only for knowledge but for right predictions and control of the forces of nature therein.

Philosophical view proceeds to fix the meaning of this concept. When we say 'A causes B', what precisely do we mean by the word cause ? The answer that to cause something is to produce something or is to bring about something' does not satisfy a philosopher. A further question can be asked as to what is meant when one says, "A produces B'. So, the words 'L produce' and 'L cause' instead of defined in terms of each other have to be explained otherwise. The question remains what traits A should possess that it can be called the cause of the effect 'B'.

Hume handles this question logically and analytically. The analysis is based on his epistemological considerations. The limits of impressions are the limits of our knowledge. "All our ideas are nothing but copies of our impression, in other words......it is impossible for us to think of anything which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal sense".[4] Some impressions and ideas are simple and some complex ideas are made up of simple ones. If any complex idea has parts to which there are no corresponding impression it is then to be taken as without objective validity. Establishing the basis of objectivity, Hume proceeds to analyse

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2 Andre Mumier, 'A manual of Philosophy' Vol. I.P. 126

3 Ibid.

4 Hume 'Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding' p. $9.

the concept of causality forming 'the most characteristic part of Hume's philosophy."[5]

Hendel is of the view that "A host of problems emerges for us, problems about our own personal identity, the reality of substances and world and the existence of a supreme being. The solution of all these questions is seem to depend, however, upon the meaning we can give to this idea of "cause" or "necessity of connection", Hume concentrated therefore upon this pragmatic idea of causal necessity."[6]

The idea of causality is a complex idea of relation according to Hume. In treatise, he takes the word 'relation' in two senses—philosophical and natural. Philosophical relation is of seven types including causation. Natural relation is of three types including causation. Considered as a Philosophical relation cause is defined as 'An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objectives resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter".[7] So, causation consists of three elements of contiguity, succession and constant conjunction between two objects. Obviously there is no occasion in this case to pass from the perceived to unperceived one. Causation as a natural relation is defined as 'An object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other."[8] Causation is constituted by three elements of contiguity, succession and necessary connection, Hume is found busy, in explaining this element of 'necessary connection' because on it depends much of our inferences of the empirical world. All our knowledge concerning 'matters of fact' which enables to go beyond the actual perception is based on causal relation. It enables human mind to draw conclusions beyond the impressions of our senses,

Analysing this idea of causality Hume gets three relations of contiguity. succession and necessary connection as essential. About contiguity he remarks that cause and effect are experienced as contiguous in space and time either immediately or mediately. Though later on he does not view this element as essential to the idea of causation. Hume mentions priority in time or succession as the second element of the causal relation. The view of two events as perfectly simultaneous is discounted by him. If one cause were contemporary with its effect, and this effect with its effect, and so on, obviously there would be no such thing as succession, and consequently all objects would be co-existent which is absurd. So, cause is temporally prior to the effect.

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[5] Radhakrishnan, S., History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western Vol. II p.

[6] Hume, Selections, Edit. by W. Hendel, p. xii.

[7] Hume, 'On Hume's Nature and Understanding' ed. by Antony Flew pp 213 14.

[8] Ibid. p. 214,

Inspite of the above elements one can't proceed further in considering any simple instance as of causal relation. According to Hume "...there is a necessary connection to be taken into consideration, and that relation is of such greater importance than any of the other two above mentioned..."[9] Hume's entire argument aims at showing as to how experience gives rise to this idea of necessary conection That 'A' is followed by 'B', we can know due to their repeated succession in our impression, but that 'A' must be followed by 'B' can never be known in our direct experience. Hume rejects that causation is a logical relation. It implies no contradiction if one says that the events which we have experienced may be attended with contrary effects. All ideas are distinct from each other. So, ideas of cause and effect are also distinct. So causal proportions are synthetic and contingent. Hume thinks 'Perhaps examination of the inference will give us the clue we are seeking and so guide us to the impression which we have failed to find by the more direct method of approach"[10].

In casual inference, constant conjunction and similarity of instances play a significant role. Still, the problem of the justification of the passing from supposed cause to the absent effect can not be solved by constancies, because "for past and pressent experiences can bear witness only to the past and present"[11] and not to the future, One can argue that experience may not guarantee the future, still it may give an indication about the likelihood of occurrence in the future. Hume denies this 'thorough fare'.

Hume's solution to this problem is that when the mind passes from an idea of impression of one object to that of another "it is the imagination which is operating not the understanding. It is custom, and not reason; habit and not evidence, which is at work."[12] Custom or habit operate through the laws of association and 'the inference, therefore, depends solely on the (associative, causally efficacious) union of ideas"[13] 'Causal inference is thus explained as a native determination of the mind itself to find in the future the same pattern

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9 Hume., Treatises, p. 77.

10 Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human understanding, p. 370.

11 Smith N.K. The Philosophy of David Hume : A Critical study of its Origins and Doctrines p. 374.

12 Ibid,, pp. 375 376.

13 Hume, Treatise, edt. by Selby—Bigge I, III, p. 92.

as we have witnessed in our past experience".[14] By observing the constant conjunction of two objects we are determined in mind to expect the one from the occurrence of the other. So, the belief is psychologically and not logically grounded. "We never perceive the cause passing over into the effect. We only see onething followed by another, and if this is constantly repeated, we come to expect the second, whenever the first occurs. This is psychological expectation, not causal connection".[15] Thus, in the final analysis of causatity by Hume the two fold effect of custom or habit is seen, "it determines the mind to pass from a present cause to the idea of that which has been its usual attendant, and in the process of doing so, it also generates a feeling of neceesiated transition".[16] Thus, to talk about necessary connection is not justified on Hume's empirical premise.

Hume's comentators are under misconception that Hume denies the validity of causal maxim. The views which Hume holds obviously rests on acceptance of this maxim. In a letter to John Stewart, who had accused Hume of rejecting causal relation, Hume replies, "...I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause..."[17] Hume only denies that there is a secret tie between cause and effect, He finds a substitute for this alleged power in the 'determination of the mind' which is the result of a natural belief.

Hume's view on causation can be appreciated by putting it in the writings of modern thinkers. The logical positivists agreeing with Hume believe that in causal relation, actually are observed regularity or uniformity of succession between the events. However, there is a difference between temporal sequence and causal sequence. The former says 'this after that' whereas causal sequence says "this because of that". The latter expresses greater regularity which is absent from the former. Suppose, one is sick and takes medicine and recovers and this sequence happens with regularity, one concludes that medicine is the cause of the recovery. If objection is raised that inspite of the regularity between day and night, causation is lacking, answer can be that 'day' and 'night' are not really events in the scientific use of the term, They are series of natural events for which the names day and night are used. So, for a proper view of causation the series have to be examined.

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[14] Hume, Selections, edt. by C.W Hendel, p. XIV.

[15] Lewes, John, An Outline of Western Thought, p. 126.

[16] Hume, Abstract, p. 16.

[17] Hawkins, J.B., Op. cit., pp. 41-42.

Joad remarks' it is on these lines that a short modern statement of the sort of position which Hume sought to maintain would run".[18] The modern analysis though logical and scientific is also inclusive of common sense considerations. Hume may be hard to refute logically, still is impossible to be believed totally on common sense ground which believes that causation is unshakable. Thinkers can argue that in that case the common sense belief has to be abandoned, which is also a difficult proposal for acceptance.

Hospers tries to analyse Hume's views in a more modern way, According to him 'Always if C, then E' is the proper expression of causal relation. The causal relation can be expressed through the statement of an exceptionless repetition. "It is unnecessary to assume that it means more",[19] One observes only the regularity of the sequence and its uniformity, so, it is the necessary and sufficient reason for causal relation. In daily life we talk in terms of 'must' but after scrutiny it seems to be a confused idea. Hospers also rejects the notion of contiguity because it cannot be a defining characteristic of causality but only its accompanying characteristic.

Further cause cannot be identical with a necessary condition. Scratching the match may be followed by flame but flame can occur in many other ways. So, we speak of causes many times without meaning necessary conditions and there can be necessary conditions which cannot be called causes many times. There may be many necessary conditions for a person's presence at a particular moment in a room like he must have been born, his parents must have their parents before them and so on. But, if some body asks for he cause of his presence, he would hardly reply "Because I was born" or 'because mother met father on boardship'.

Causation again cannot be defined in terms of constant conjunction. The red and green lights go in succession but are not related by causality. Actually, there is an apparent and not a real constant conjunction in this case because it is not exceptionless. If one removes the bulb from the green light, the red one will continue to flash intermittently as before and cannot be called the cause of the green light. If the mechanical device is cut short, the succession stops completely. A. J. Ayer speaking in the same tune says 'A change in the barometer is regarded as a sign and not as a cause of a change in the weather, because we accept a theory which expl its them both in terms of other factors and also accounts for their concordance".[20]

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[18] Joad, C,E,M. Guide to Philosophy, pp. 213-214.

[19] Hospere. John, An introduction to Philosophical analysis pp. 224-225.

[20] Ayer A. J,, Central Questions of Philosophy, p. 182.

The above analysis wrongly suggests that Hume supports the view that causation is nothing more than invariable succession. Hume insists that the distinguishing mark between more sequence and causal sequence is the idea of necessitation which is found in the latter as an essential element. The misconception has obviously its reasons. Hume defines cause in terms of contiguity, succession and constant conjunction viewed as philosophical relation. But, causal relation taken as natural one has to include the element of necessity. Frequent experiences of similar sequences, custom produces in us a 'feeling' which working as an'impression' yields to the idea of necessity.

Some scholars point out that "the repetition of experiences is by no means indispensable for establishing the necessity of a link".[21] The element of necessity may appear at the very first moment of experience. If a child burns his finger at the stove, he will run away from it without waiting for invariable succession to convince him that the stove burns.

Smith, supporting the idea says that if necessity is not found in any one instance,is also not found in any number of similar instances. The mere repetition of similar instances cannot guarantee the 'necessity' for future instances. For that enlargement of experience would be needed and not mere addition.

A J. Ayer admits that the use of language where two states of affairs are connected is very complex which cannot be justified on Hume's views. Hume considers causality as a relation between distinct events· But, our language reveals such cases where something else is working, for example when we speak of something stretching because it is made of rubber or we speak of a disposition as the cause of its manifestations. The use of such language needs different explanation. Ayer believes that for inductive reasoning there is no other justification than its success in practice. Hume should have developed this point more. His failure to do so has given the air of paradox to his views which has been the matter of criticism. Ayer remarks "it is either a relic of animism or else reveals an inclination to treat causal connection, as if it were a form of logical necessity".[22]

Some scholars are of the view that to answer Hume's paradox it is essential to show the invalidity of the reasons which forced him to subjectivise the causal relation. The first error consists in accepting the view that we have no idea which is not derived from impression. His second error consists in treating induction genetically rather than logically. Hume was concerned in finding out as to how do we get the idea of causal necessity and in that attempt he leads us to the element of expectation. But the significant question is as to whether the constant conjunction is able to serve as evidence for a judgement of necessity.

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[21] Michette, A , The Perception of Causality, p. 261.

[22] Bhattacharya. Causality in Science and Philosophy—A Historical and Critical Survey p. 92.

Thus, the whole analysis points towards "a sceptical theory of causality, that is to say, one which justifies very much less than our common beliefs on the subject."[23] This leads to many thinkers to dispense with the notion of cause altogether. Russell thinks that causation can be replaced by a purely faciual notion of functional correlation and this change is found in the advanced notions of physics. Prof. Stebbing also speaks of an advance from qualitative laws of causal relation between snbstantive things in defined states to quantitative laws of functional dependence. According to laws of physics it is not a fact as causal law asserts that 'A' as cause is always followed by 'B' as effect. When 'A' is present, there will be certain direction of change, since A changes, the directions of change themselves are constantly changing. In the field of mathematics also, the recent trend is for probability and notifor necessity. In the scientific field, the principle of indeterminacy has been introduced in place of mechanical necessity. The 'necessary' might mean in the new conditions like Mill'as long as the present constithtion of things endure, it will be so". This notion con incorporat both common sense and scientific notion of necessity. Emergence of Quantum theory has brought revolutionary change in the concept of causality. The conceptual framework of causation has bken replaced by empiricism and functionalism. The former seeks to find out the statistical relationship between variables. The latter is not opposed to causation. A theoretical framework has to be provided for an explanation of the changes in the universe. It is obvious that science inspite of its revolutionary ideas seeks uniformities behind the facts. The terms independent variable, dependent variable, contingent upon etc. have implicit reference to cause-effect relationship.

In conclusion, one is led to reflect that it is impossible to refute Hume. Attempts are made no doubt to improve Hume's analysis but hardly with concrete success. The difficulties raised by Hume have continued to disturb the modern thinkers without any convincing solution. So, the demand for new analysis and make it satisfactory by adding suitable elements becomes imperative. Taking suggestions from the ordinary usage of the term, purify ingthese from the empirical anthropomorphism and developing it scientifically a new interpretation can be attempted. The pragmatic attitude, enlargement of experience, analysis on the basis of language can definitely be of great value in giving the direction to this attempt.

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[23] Hawkins D.J.B. Op, cit., pp. 41-42.

# Book-Reviews :

**Arvind Sharma :** *Ramakrishna and Vivekananda New Perspectives*, pp. 141, Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., L 10, Green Park Extension, New Delhi 110016, and G-2, Cunningham Apartments, Cunningham Road, Bangalore 560052 (1989) Price Rs. 125/—

Dr. Arvind Sharma, the author of this book is Professor in Indian Philosophy and Comparative Religion a, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. He graduated from Allahbad in 1958, and did M.A. from Syracuse University (1970), and Masters' Degree in Theological Stduic from the Harvard Divinity School (1974) and a Ph.D. from Harvard University (1978). He has taught in various universities in Austrilia (Queensland and Sydney) and USA (Northeasterm and Temple). He edits two Journals: *Religious Traditions* and *The Journal of Studiesin the Bhagwadgita*, and also the co author of *Religious Ferment in Modern India*.

This book explores the life and achievements of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda from a variety of standpoints. Both exerted a formative and transformative influence on Modern Hinduism. The attitude of modern Hindus towards them is of affection and admiration.

The whole book is written in 25 chapters. The first ten chpaters pertains to Ramkrishna as follows; 1. Introduction, 2 Is Mystical Experience Unitive or Diverse: The Evidence from Ramakrishna, 3 Ramakrishna on the nature of Bhakti and Jnana, 4. Ramakrishna Parmhansa Jnanin or Bhakta? Patterns in Reconciliation 5. Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Shankaracharya: A comparison, 6. Was Ramakrishna an Advaitin ? 7. Was Ramakrishna a Visistadvaitin 8. Ramakrishna Parambansa and Mahatma Gandhi: A Study in Contrastive Theisms, 9. Ramakrishna and Parapsychological Research, 10. Was Ramakrishan Hypnotist ? 11. Ramkrishna from a Buddhist Viewpoint 12. Did Ramakrishna Believe in Reincarnation, 13. Some unresolved qnestions regarding the Return of Ramakrishna, 14. Was Ramakrishna an authentic Guru ? 15. Max Mueller's Ramakrishna: His Life and Sayings: A Study in Motivation, 16. Max Mueller as a Biographer of Ramakrishna, 17. The Logic of Ramakrishna and the Apologia of Max Mueller, 18. Max Mueller as a Biographer of Ramakrishna, 19. Folklore and Modernity; The Case of Ramakrishna, 20 Max Mueller, Ramakrishna, and the Dialogue of World Religions, 21. Ramakrishna paramhansa A Study in a Mystic's Attitudes Towards Women. Then the the next two chapters refer to Swami Vivekananda: 22, Which Mystical Experience of Swami Vivekananda was Really Advaitic ? 23. The Attitude of Swami Vivekananda Towards Prayer, 24. New Myths in Hinduism: The

Saraswati Myth in the life of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, and lastly 25. Ramakrishna and the Spiritual Poverty of Historicism in Hindu Studies. In the end quite an exhaustive Bibliography has been provided and also Index.

The whole book very well reflects on the thoughts of Ramakrishna Parambansa on several points. Mystical experience, Bhakti and Jnana, his views have been compared to Shankara, Ramanuja and Gandhi. Several trends have been examined whether Ramakrisha was a hypnotist Or believed in Reincarnation or was an authentic Guru. In one chapter Ramakrishna's achievement have bee compared to the findingsof Parapsychological Research. Max Mueller's and Romain Rolland were very much influenced by Ramakrishna which made them Biographer of Ramakrishna. Ramakrishna Parambansa was a great mystic and in two chapters the Mysticism of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda have been illustrated. Max Mueller has devoted much to the life and sayings as a great motivation.

The whole book has been fully illustrated by the sayings of Ramakrishna. He has explained everything and every point very clearly for an average man. A survey of the religious experiences of Ramakrishna bring forth to light that inspite of being a Hindu he had the mystical visions of Christ and Muhammed. His first major mystical experience was a vision of Kali – the goddess. Different aspects of Ramakrishna have been taken for consideration. Mystical Experience, Ramakrishna's ideas on the nature of Bhakti and Jnana, Was he Jnani or Bhakta. A discussion has indicated that few regarded him as a Jnani and some as Bhakta. the author discusses Pattern in Reconciliation; Both Advaita and Visistadvaita positions have been witnessed in Ramakrishna's thought, Gandhi and Ramakrishna Parambansa both are theists and represent two types of theisms. Ramakrishna believes in Reincarnation as many people believe in it. He argues in favour of Ramakrishna as a Guru.

Dr. Arvind Sharma in this collection of 25 papers contributed at different times for different journals has very critically argued and discussed the various aspects of Ramakrishna's philosophical and religious outlook along with Vivekananda's ideas very clearly and explained the ideas choosing sayings of Ramakrishna as presented by the biographers of Ramakrishna. The book is very illuminating and thought provoking and brings to light various aspects of Ramakrishna's thoughts. I am sure this book will attract the attention of of scholars who might not be religious in their outlook. It is an interesting and well written book on Ramakrishna. The author and publishers deserve our congratulations on producing such a nice collection of essays which are critical in their presentation.

**Glenn H, Mullin :** *Path of th^ Bodhisattva Warrior, The Life and Teachings of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama,* Foreword by the Ven. Taktser Rinpoche. Prof. Thubten Figme Norbu, pp. 387, Publishers: Snow Lion Publications, Inc., P.O. Box 6483, Ithaca, New York 14851 (U.S.A.) 1988, Price $14.95

Glenn H. Mullin the author of this book is a member of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archieves Research and Translation Bureau, and has published numerous books and Monographs. His special focus has been the life and works of the Dalai Lama.

This is an interesting and important book dealing with the Life and Teachings of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. The book has been divided into six chapters as follows: 1. Heart of the Enlightenment Teachings, 2. Sermons of the Great Prayer Festival; 3. A Guide to the Buddhist Tantras, 4 Poems pointing out the Nature of Correct Practice, 5. The Most Secret Cycle of the Mystical Mandala of Hayagriva divided into three parts: Part one: A Longevity Initiation, Part Two A Rite of Medicinal Consecration, and Part Three: The Conclusion, 6. A vase of Ambrosia to Fulfill All Wishes. Besides these six chapters Acknowledgements, Preface, Foreword by Prof. Tub-ten Norbu (Tak-tser Tul ku), Life of the Thirteenth Dalia Lama are given in the beginning and in the end of the book Appendix: A History of the Dalai Lamas, Footnotes, Bibliography and Index have been provided.

In the Foreword Tak-tser Tul-ku, Tub-ten Jig-Me, Nor-bu he mentions that the thirteenth Dalai Lama truly was his Kyab gon, his "Protecting Lord". Because of his blessings, deeds and compassion his life took the direction that it did. He was not kind to him alone. His wisdom and compassion touched upon all Tibetans, and spread throughout all those regions where Tibetan Buddhism is practiced. His greatness has been recorded by all historians of modern Tibet. He brought benefits not only to spiritual side of life. Politically he managed to free Tibet from the stranglehold of China; from 1933 until his death in 1933 he succeeded in maintaining a free and independent Tibet. He also contributed tremendously on the social level. For example, he abolished capital punishment and other forms of harsh criminal justice. He struggled to introduce modern, ways and ideas to Tibet, sending students to British schools in India and England, and also opening a British School in Gyangtse. He imported technology for electricity, updated the postal and minting systems, and attempted to modernize Tibet in such other ways. His work in tightening the system of monastic education is also well known. As for literary activities, here too he was very active, composing treatises on many different philosophical and devotional subjects, as well as on poetry, meditation, history and so forth. He was constantly engaged in teaching students and transmitting various lineages. He gave sutra discoursee and Tantra initiations to thousands of disciples throughout Central Asia. It was really amazing that one man's accomplishment were like those of ten great people. He was an institution in himself. All the Dalai Lamas have been very special human beings; but the great Thirteenth was special among the specials.

The Fifth and the thirteenth Dalai Lamas stand out above the others. To these two the title of Chen po, or "great" is traditionally applied. The great Thirteenth was very much born from the same mold, making tremendous contributions to the spiritual, cultural and political life of the country. His task was the task of introducing his people to the Western world.

In chapter Life of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama some important portants have been mentioned: A. Death of the Twelvth and Rebirth of the great Thirteenth, B. The Search for the New Incarnation, C. Recognition and Preliminary Ordination, E. The Long Period of training, F. Empowerment and "The Case of the Enchanted shoes". G. Tibet's "Close Door" Policy, H. A Pawn in "The Great Game" I. A Pilgrimage of Convenience J. A Second Forced Pilgrimage, K. An Imperfect Solution, L. A Period of Healing and Revival, M. Written Works of the Great Thirteenth, N. The Pan Chen Controversy, O. The final years. The whole life has been very well divided into several phases and mentioned several details which one after knowing become well conversant with the Life of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama.

After narrating the life of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama the author disluses ie the next Six chapters: (1) Heart of the Enlightenment Teachings — The path that is to be accomplished consists of 84000 teachings of the Buddha. The method of drinking the techings is outlined as follows in the Condensed Sutra on the Perfection of Wisdom (Sher-phyin-sdad pa). The Buddhas of the past, present and future

Take the perfection of wisdom as their path
For there is no other way leading to enlightenment

If we wish to arrive at the city of enlightenment, we must have the aspiration. Then on top of this we must have the map for how to get there, and also the stamina, energy and intelligent awareness necessary in order to be able to translate the map into effective action. Under the topic of the method is found a wide range of spiritual techniques. The three main activities on the Buddhist path to enlightenment are study, contemplation and meditation. Meditation is of two types: analytical (i.e. cursive, reflective) and fixed (i.e. non-cursive, formal). The enlightenment teachings increase or decline in strength depends to a great extent upon the efforts of the spiritual practitioners Very nicely the heart of enlightement is described in this chapter. In chapter 2 Sermons of the Great Prayer Festival it has been clearly mentioned that the root cause of our wandering is that we have not met with a spiritual master capable of showing us the path to liberation. The ten ways in which one should cultivate the guru discipleship relationship. The Ethics play an important role in the spiritual life of Buddhists. The teachings have a great significance. In this chapter views of other Dalai Lama have also been given in this chapter Sermons of the Great Prayer Festival many teachings have been incorporated which are essential for those who wish to lead life according to the Buddhists tradition preached by Dalai Lamas.

In chapter 3 A brief guide to Buddhist Tantras after giving general introduction several Buddhists Tantras have been included such as: The Kriya Tantras, The Charya Tantras, The Yoga Tantras, the Anuttara Yoga Tantras, Tantric Precepts. Much can be accomplished in the Tantra system under the guidance of an accomplished master. In chapter 4 Poems Pointing out the nature of Correct practice: There are quite a few poems which illustarte the nature of correct practice. 5 The most Secret Cycle of the Mystical Mandala of Hayagriva is a ritual text on longevity and the consecration of medicines in accordance with the mystical tradition coming from Lama. And in the end in chapter 6 A vase of Ambrosia to fulfill all wishes—A meditation upon the guru as being inseparable from he three essential Bodhisattvas Several poems have been narrated in this chapter. This is a liturgical text that would serve as a practical guru yoga manual for daily meditation upon the inseparable nature of the spiritual master and the three essential Bodhisattvas.

In the last chapter A History of the Fourteen Dalai Lamas. The author has described the office of the Dalai Lamas of Tibet as one of the truly unique institutions in the world and has described in brief salient points about the 12 earlier Dalai Lamas which is quite informative. In the end Footnotes have been provided and also a good Bibliography.

The book is very interesting, illustrative and conveys to the readers about the Life and teachings of the thirteenth Dalai Lama. It is very informative and very well written book. The author deserves congratulations for producing such a nice book which will enrich our knowledge about the thirteenth Dalai Lama. The Publishers Snow Lion Publications deserve our special thanks for undertaking publication of Tibetan Literature for the use of English knowing readers.

**Peter Gold :** *Tibetan Pilgrimage*, pp. 176, Snow Lion Publications, P.O. Box 6483, Ithaca, New York 14851 (U.S.A.) Price $14.95 (1988)

Peter Gold, the author of this book has great interest in the ways of life of the world's peoples has taken him to three continents, where he has lived and worked with Tibetans. Indians in America and Mexico. Alaskan Eskimos and others. He has to his credit several articles and books and has served as Curator of collections at Indiana University in U.S.A.

This book Tibetan Pilgrimage is a wonderful book on the Tibetan Communities of India and Nepal and offers us an intimate view of Tibetan Life, art, spiritual practices and sacred places. With the help of very good coloured photographs the author has made the book very interesting and creative and lovely. The book gives the lively impression on account of his creative style, The whole book has been written in a beautiful style and covers many things very interesting. The contents of the book have been divided as follows. On Pilgrimage, People in place which consists of 18 subchapters which include several things of interest; Body consisting of three subchapters; Speech is divided into four subchapters; Mind consisting of six subchapters; and lastly Pilgrimage to Kalachakra which consists of the following: Her First Pilgrimage, Into the Mandala, Long Hair, Sacred Mountain Pilgrimage, The Nose knows, The Palace of Rainbow light, Suddenly 156, the Giveaway, A Feast of Sight and Sound, Behind the Eyes, Rare but rarely forgotten, Halls of Rainbow Light, and a Final Thought.

Pilgrimage plays a great role in every religion and culture. Every where we find that people go to distant places to visit the places, shrines, temples and places of divine manifestations. This is a very good collection of Tibetan places of supernormal nature which gives us supernormal knowledge wherein we find such places and such journies may be treated as the places of Tibetan pilgrimage. The author has very ably collected the places of pilgrimage and we are acquainted with such places of intererest.

Peter Gold's Tibetan Pilgrimage is a rare combination and compilation of divine, spiritual and supernormal powers which gives us thorough knowledge of miracles which are related with the various places and which the author himself has verified the testimony of these places. His style and naration makes the reader to think in the same manner in which Peter Gold has witnessed. He travelled extensively and visited several such places of importance. It will not be an exageration if we say that Peter Gold has done a commendable service not only to Tibetans but to all those who wish to acquire knowledge of different cultures, civilizations. This book help the readers to acquaint about this supernormal knowledge which is conveyed here in this book if they took to pilgrimages of places which have bounty of things to witness, Some incidents prove authenicity which can very well be verified.

Peter Gold deserves our most heartfelt congratulations in bringing out in a concise form such events of supernormal significance which are found in the Tibetan traditions. Some such items—The curative power of Tibetan Medicine, The voice of a Goddess speaking through an oracle, a dramatic encounter with the preserved body of Ling Rinpoche.

Snow Lion Publications have done a great service in bringing to light many facts from Tibetan life which were unexplored so far.

## I

# Academician Todor Pavlov – An Eminent Marxist Philosopher And Theoretician of art

*Alexander Atanassov*

During the last decades as the most famous investigators of the Marxist philosophy and aesthetics evolved the Hungarian Georg Lukacz and the Bulgarian Todor Pavlov.

Born on the 14th February, 1890 in the city of Shtip, i.e. that part of Macedonia which at that time still had remained under the Osman yoke, Todor Pavlov was educated by his father—a Bulgarian teacher, in the spirit of love towards people, work, science and freedom. He made his studies in Sofia, where he graduated from the secondary school (with enlarged teaching of Latin and ancient Greek), followed by philosophy and law at the "Kliment Ochridski" University. At the time of the First World War he was a health officer. Acquainted with all the horrors of the war, Pavlov joins a group of members of the revolutionary social-democratic party of the "left wing" socialists. And in 1919, when the party is renamed into the Bulgarian Communist Party, he joins its ranks. At this time he is secondary school teacher, but in 1922 he already takes over the mission of a professional and becomes editor of the central newspaper of the communist youth union. After the cruel suprpession of the delatedly outbroken people's antifasists revolt in 1923, Todor Pavlov is elected a member of the Central Committee of the BCP that had passed into illegality. He worked for the reestablishment of the party organisation, edited progressive newspapers published courageous and talented articles against the monarcho-fasist dictatorship.

In April 1925, after a self-willed terrorist action of a communist group against some representatives of the fasist government that took innocent victims, a mass slaughter of antifasists in Bulgaria began, Todor Pavlov was also arrested and subjected to torments. Only by good fortune he remained alive. Sentenced to many years of prison he was soon freed on political amnesty. In the autumn of 1926 he was arrested again, together with some other leaders of the party. Before the court he castigated the crimes of the dictatorship and highlited the generous aims of the communists in protection of the working people. This brought new longtime sentences upon him.

In spite of the inhuman conditions, Pavlov proceeds to study the Marx/Lenin works in jail and secretly writes his first philosophical books. With them he defends the dialectic materialism and Lenin's comprehension on knowledge as a subjective reflection of the objective reality,whose trust worthiness is proved in practice by logics too. Pavlov polemises with the epigons of the German philosopher Johannes Remke in Bulgaria, convincingly proving that behind the imaginary dualism of Remkeism a subjective idealism is hidden and that his pretensions for "a third time" and "a subpartiality" in philosophy are groundless.

Freed from jail after the amnesty of 1929 Todor Pavlov anew joins the struggle against the governing reaction. Simultaneously he fights also against the ultraleft doctrinarity of the inner leadership of BCP, for an ideologic reorientation of the party in the sense of Leninism.

In the spring of 1932 Todor Pavlov arrives in Moscow with the intention to study at the already famous Institute for Red Professorship. However here he is directly offered a chair of professor on dialectical materialism and later he is also named a honourable doctor of philosophy. In Moscow the Bulgarian scientist writes and publishes in 1936 his fundamental work on "The Theory of Reflection", which brings him world fame.

Before Todor Pavlov there exist foundation laying ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin on reflection as a basis of cognition, but there is no systematically elaborated Marxist gnossiology. The first model of a Marxist systematic theory of cognition is offered by the Bulgarian disciple of Lenin—Todor Pavlov. He discovers and proves the outstanding methodological importance of Lenin's logical assumption that the whole matter possesses the quality of reflection. According to him both people's mind and human practice may be explained in their deepest essence and origin only in the context of the reflection analysis in general. Pavlov proves that reflection is a "special inner state of the reflecting matter", that after the interaction between the things reflection "continues to exist as a "track"", as a simple possibility or as a predisposition in the reflecting matter".

He also follows up the from of reflection in the inorganic matter of human life, in order to discuss at the end the scientific truth as a highest form of reflection. Todor Pavlov's thesis of reflection as an internal track in the reflecting matter has a huge eurisical significance for all branches of science and acquires a still larger acknowledgement by scientists. Todor Pavlov concretises Marx's thought that philosophers are called upon not only to rightly explain the world, but also to give effective prescriptions for its change.

The Moscow period of the Bulgarian scientist's life is both fruitful and dramatical, because just at this time the mishapen cult of personality of Stalin is being established and the hunt after the disciples and cooperators of Lenin begins. Todor Pavlov is already popular as a professor of the independent Leninist thought. In his "Theory of Reflection" he utters such things which sound provocative towards Stalin: that "to the working class the blind faith in the unmistakeability of the party and its leaders" is alien, that there must not be allowed the objective truth to become the ' victim of a ground or personal arbitrariness", Isn't it of wonder that after that he falls into the "black list" of the Ezhovits ? Luckily however, he is warned by faithful comrades that he would be arrested and Pavlov succeeds to escape from the USSR in time.

Then in 1936 returned home Bulgarian Todor Pavlov becomes the favourite of the progressive intelligentsia that thirstily reads one after another all his numerous published books, brochures, articles, comments.

In 1938 he publishes his monography, written still in Moscow, about "The General Theory of Art',. In his book he offers the first model of a systematic Marxist aesthetics. There he critically analyses the views of the classicists of the up-to Marx aesthetics and enlightens the specific nature of art from Marxist positions.

Pavlov reveals the resemblance and the difference between art and science, moral, culture, game, work and all other manifestations of culture. He proves that "between human art and the art-similar activity of animals exist succession and jump. It is wrong to search the origin of art in the realm of biology, but it is all the same not right to dig a gap between man and animal". Outgoing from the position of Lenin that the idea is a subjective image of the objective reality, Pavlov examines art as a dialectically opposite unity of the subjective and the objective. This allows him to delimit himself successfully both from the vulgar sociologism and from the decadent subjectivistic formalism in aesthetics.

Still during the 30's the Bulgarian philosopher argumentates the specific nature of the art-creative method and its relative independence from the view and the temporal political partialities of the artist. This helps him to explain rightly the controversies in creative work and the civil position of a number of great writers and artists Todor Pavlov the dogmatically-sectant negative evaluations of Ivan Vasov, Vladimir Dimitrov—the Master and other famous masters of speech and brush. He becomes the foundation-layer of the Lenin stage in the development of Bulgarian literature and art knowledge.

In the summer of 1941, after the invasion of the hitlero-fashists armies into the USSR, the government terror against the progressive forces is sharply strengthened. The white-haired famous philosopher Todor Pavlov is also arrested and held for two years in concentration camps.

After the victorious people's antifashist uprising on the 9th September, 1944, Todor Pavlov is nominated member of the Regent Council at the infant monarch, up to the proclamation of Bulgaria to be a People's Republic, in 1946. Hardly 54 years of age he is elected honorary president of the Writers' Union. Simultaneously he heads the commission at the Central Committee of the Bulgarian working party (communists) on questions of culture and science.

During the first years after the socialist revolution in Bulgaria the Leninist line of tolerance and pluralism within the field of culture, outlined by Georgi Dimitrov, is carried out, thus rallying the intelligentsia under the banner of the Fatherland's Front. Todor Pavlov is an active co-creator and propagandist of this line. He does not bring over to Bulgaria the dogmatively repressive course, carried out by the Zhdanovists in the USSR, but turns towards the experience of Soviet culture of the 20's, vindicating a policy of free competition among the different methods and schools in the field of literature and art. Of course he declares the attachment of the communist party to the non-vulgarily understood method of the socialist realism, but declares that this method will not be enforced administratively, but will defend its advanlages through creative achievements.

In the mean time Todor Pavlov is elected academician and Professor at the Sofia University, where he founds the desk of dialectical and historical materialism. In 1947, at the suggestion of Georgi Dimitrov, Pavlov is elected president of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Under his patronage the academy enlarges several times and becomes a scientific formation of socialist type, oriented towards the needs of the economic, social and spiritual development of the country. After a fifteen-years long active management Todor Pavlov becomes a lifetime honorary president of BAS. Upto the end of his life he is director of the Institute of Philosophy.

At the time of Stalin's and Chervenkov's personality cult the philosophical and culture-critical deed of Todor Pavlov is being defamed from dogmatic positions. Three Moscowian philosophers attack him in the newspapers, claiming that "The Theory of Reflection" is the result of Hegelianism, objectivism and cosmopolitanism. Pavlov is especially sharply criticised because of his writing that each country will carry out the general principles of socialism in its own way

Like many other communist functionaries, however, Todor Pavlov is simultaneously a victim and...... an agent of Stalinism. Indeed, he does not take part in the arguments of Chervenkov with honest workers in the field of literature and art. It might even be said, that under the then conditions the tacturnity of the great philosopher and critic is in reality a demonstration of disagreement. Something more—in spite of his public praising of Chervenkov, Pavlov criticises him in private conversations thus incurring his hatred. But he has also his delusions.

After the Soviet Union's victory over hitlero-fashism, when the personality cult towards Stalin is spread also over the world communist movement, Todor Pavlov becomes its sincere apologist. Obviously at this time the facts of Stalin's crimes were assiduously hidden and Pavlov could hardly know about them.

After 1948 Todor Pavlov, together with the majority of the Marxist philosophers in the USSR and outside its frontiers, blindly accepts the official claims that the so called Lissenko school within the field of agrobiology has achieved enormous practical results, while the so called formal genetics is "fruitless". Indeed, in the name of Weissman Morgen genetics, a number of ultra reactionary treatments had been made, but instead of separating the speculations with this science from its real problems and achievements, Pavlov also begins to stamp it as an "idealistic" one.

After 1956 Pavlov also condemns the personality cult of Stalin. Putting up a resistance against revisionism in the field of philosophy and aesthetics he sometimes however gets into outsidedness, into an ideological schematism.

But still the main attention of the scholar remains pointed at the problems of philosophy and the methodology of sciences. As president of BAS he deeply penetrates into the matter of more than ten special sciences, enlightening important philosophical aspects of these sciences from the position of the theory of reflection.

*Mathematics* and *physics* are the uninterrupted "soft corner" of Pavlov. He refutes the theories of some philosophers and mathematicians on the unreal "purely ideal" character of the mathematical concepts, proving that the most abstract mathematical symbols have at last its "earthly root". Directing his attention towards the *theory of information* Pavlov proves in his work "Information, Reflection, Creation" (1965) that the concept *reflection* is larger than the concept *information*; that reflection might also be subjective, while information is always an objective process. Pavlov welcomes the real achievements and the amasing perspectives of *cybernetics* but he at the same time defends by means of philosophical arguments the creative priority of man also against the most perfect unlimited and non-socialised homeostasy.

Pavlov finds an especially abundant matesial in support of the theory of reflection in the region of *biology, psychophysiology* and *psychology*. He is the first to highlit from a philosophical standpoint the specificity of the biological reflection and proves that its most estential characteristics is activity; he reveals the different objects of research, which psychophysiology and psychology possess.

The Bulgarian scholar traces up at the zealousliest the development of sociology. He shows the difference between historical materialism and any other social philosophy and sociology, which, according to him, is a most general science of society.

Todor Pavlov is a distinguished Marxist *philosopher of religion*. He shows the qualitative difference between the primitive and the modern religion, pointing out that the last one is a product of conscious ideological activity, that "any religion... has its own subject, its system of ideas and its method to create and develop these ideas".

It is generally admitted that Pavlov has done much for the affirmation of the Marxist ideas in the *pedagogical science*, where he rejects both the child personality smashing authoritarianism and the conception of pedagogical anarchism. Pavlov basically elaborates the problem of the vocational polytechnical school, pointing out that in our scientifico-technical age a student in a large sense is the whole young generation, and a teacher is the whole political, productive, scientific and spiritual vanguard of society. He pays a big attention to the *theory of personality*, proving that "any man is a person or individuality thanks not only to what is unique in him, but taken as a dialectical unity of the general, particular and single". Pavlov detailedly elaborates the philosophico methodological questions of *historiography*, proving the inconsistence of the comprehendings of Rickert, Bergson, the pragmatists and others, that in real history there were no regularities. He analyses from the Marxist viewpoint a number of important events and the deed of a number of eminent personalities in the history of Bulgaria. He utters original thoughts also on problems of the political economy, archeology, linguistics, axiology, futurology and other sciences During his last couple of years the Bulgarian philosopher guides a team of Soviet and Bulgarian scientists, who write a four volume research work on studies about the theory of reflection and on the problems of contemporary science.

Like his teacher and inspirator Lenin, Todor Pavlov is a great humanist, he loves the people and helps anyone who applies to him. His author's emoluments he usually gives to the printing workers. Although after his retirement he continues to occupy high posts, he rejects any other rewards except his pension. He dies on the 8th May, 19J7.

The president of the Soviet philosophical society, academician Ivan Frolov, points out that Todor Pavlov's work "The Theory of Reflection" "stimulates the development of... a new complex of problems", having thus "an essential influence upon world's science". Pavlov is the author of more than 1200 scientific works. Most of the older Bulgarian philosophers and aestheticians, and a number of foreign scientists as well, think of themselves to be disciples of Todor Pavlov. Not occasionally, at the suggestion of the *foreign* members of the scientific council of the International Marxist-Leninist Philosaphical School, that sits in Varna, this school is named after academician Todor Pavlov, There is no doubt that the young generation of philosophers and aestheticians will master and further develop the rich ideal heritage of the Bulgarian revolutionary and thinker.

## 2

# On the Epistemological Heritage of Todor Pavlov

## (Todor Pavlov about reflection)

*Ilia Tassev*

In his fundamental scientific investigation "The Theory of Reflection" Todor Pavlov elucidated the basic problems of Marxist-Leninist epistemology. Even their simple enumeration would take up a lot of space. That is why I shall quote only the most important of them. They are: reflection as a universal property of all matter; consciousness as the highest form of reflection; the unity of object and image; the unity of theory and practice; the unity of logical and historical methods of investigation and exposition; the identity of logic, epistemology and dialectics; the problem of truth; ideology and science; philosophy and the non philosophical sciences, etc.

The whole diversity of investigated questions, however, is subordinated to an inner logic of its own, has its own corner stone its unifying centre. It is reflection, examined in an essential, structural-and-genetic and functional respect, with the accent laid on its supreme form—man's consciousness.

*The immediate initial theoretical base* in this case is the thought of Lenin: "But it is logical to suppose, that all matter has a property essentially kindred with sensation—the property to reflect".[1] In this logical supposition, which he assesed as a supposition of genius[2], T. Pavlov saw "... a tremendous, unsuspected by many, scientific and methodological significance"[3] He characterised it as a logically built up hypothesis, underscoring its logicality. In this connection T. Pavlov quoted also other thoughts of Lenin's and, more particularly, the thought that "at the foundation of the very edifice of matter, the existence of a property similar to sensation could only be supposed"[4].

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[1] V. I. Lenin. *Works*. Vol. 14, Sofia, 1951, p. 88 (in Bulgarian),

[2] Cf. T. Pavlov. *Selected Works*. Vol. 5, Sofia, 1962, p. 60 (in Bulgarian),

[3] Ibid.

By placing Lenin's hypothesis at the foundation of his investigation, T. Pavlov supplemented it and adduced arguments in favour of it, without essentially changing it. He maintained that reflection was kindred, similar but not identical with sensation.[5]

Although in Lenin's formulation, quoted above, the terms "kindred" and "similar" contain in an implicit form the fact that reflection is not identical with sensation, the express, open underlining of their non-identity is important from the point of view of demarcating dialectical materialism from hylozoism. Here again is one of the contributions and one of the great accomplishments of Todor Pavlov.

Stepping firmly on this foundation, T. Pavlov substantiated it in an all-round way, availing himself of the possibilities of scientific deduction and of the data of natural science and of social science. At the same time he made a successful attempt to develop Lenin's logical supposition. We have never even thought", T. Pavlov wrote, "to remain satisfied with this most general logical deduction of reflection as a property of all matter, proceeding from its most general properties, laws, etc... the logical deduction in question fulfils only the role of an initial and guiding idea hypothesis".[6]

Of course, the result achieved by our prominent philosopher is for all of us of greatest interest, but, it seems to me, of no less interest is the approach (method) of investigation and exposition applied in *The Theory of Reflection*. This interest is natural, because method as a form of scientific investigation and of presentation of the results achieved, is applicable many times also to the investigation of other philosophical questions. Besides, the results achieved by T. Pavlov in the *Theory of Reflection* have been the object of manifold investigations and profoundly studied, as a result of which they are familiar to our philosophical public. Not such, however, is the case about his method, That is why I shall try to outline briefly what is specific in this connection.

The approach (method) of T. Pavlov in *The Theory of Reflection* rests on the well known thought of Marx that "the key to understanding the anatomy of the monkey's brain lies in the anatomy of the human brain, and not vice versa"[7]. Theoretically, this question is elucidated later, in the chapter entitled "Unity of Logical and the Historical Method of Investigation and Exposition", but it has in fact been used in the process of the investigation itself and in the exposition already from the beginning.

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[4] V. I Lenin. *Works* Vol. 14, p. 37.

[5] T. Pavlov, *Selected Works*. Vol. 5, p. 36.

[6] Ibid,, p. 42.

From the initial position—the "idea-hypothesis" of the existence of a general property of all matter to reflect, he proceeds to make it concrete, which is implemented by following it in an order reverse to the genetic development of reflection He starts from the beginning of the highest form of reflection man's of consciousness. Its existence and universal presence in all normal representatives of the human species are undisputable. By assuming, with full justification, that consciousness has not come into being all of a sudden and out of nothing, its immediate genetic basis is looked for It is reflection inherent in the biological form of motion of matter. By following, in a reverse order, the genesis of the forms of biological reflection, he arrives at the forms of reflection in non-living matter, from which living matter originated. Here again the main argument is that something cannot arise out of nothing. Thus, gradually, he arrives at chemical, physical, etc reflection.

This approach is logical and necessary with a view to establishing the forms of reflection. so that the universal character of reflection should be proved and, after elucidating its essence, a definition should be given of it. The investigation has shown that two different components are present in this case, different in their scientific value. The one is the formulation, having the character of a theory, that human and biological reflections are universal, respectively for the social and biological form of the motion of the matter. The other component referring to the lower than biological forms of motion of matter, had the character of a hypothesis, also with two components unequal in value from the viewpoint of their scientific substantiation. The one is the assertion of the *existence* of reflection in all known forms of non living matter. It can be accepted as being partly substantiated. The other is the assertion of the *universality* of reflection in these form of motion of matter. It cannot be considered as substantiated, because *all* forms of reflection have not been revealed and it can hardly ever be established that all material non living formations reflect. The logical grounds for this conclusion are not sufficient, and the description (the indication) of the facts can never be complete, because of the inexhaustibility of matter.

As it is well-known, besides what is known in objective reality there is and there will always be the unknown, which, however, is not in principle incognizable. This is absolutely valid for the material objects on the structural levels situated, for example, below that of the elementary particles. Analogous is the situation with the cosmic formations beyond the metagalaxy which are also unknown to us.

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[7] T. Pavlov. *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 307.

This difficulty, pointed out on many occasions, is expressed in an explicit way by T. Pavlov himself. It is connected with the teaching about the inexhaustibility of the electron and the infinity of nature.[8] In this case both the thesis about the universality of reflection and its antithesis have an antinomic character and can be solved only by logical means.

Particular attention in this respect he devotes to the thought of the great Soviet physicist S. I. Vavilov[9], regarding the possibility that future physics could include within the circle of its analyses the ability kindred to sensation and explain many things on this basis. T. Pavlov considers this thought as "metodologically sound and exceptionally valuable"[10], underlining on one hand that it has nothing in common with hylozoism and, on the other hand, that experimentally this problem has not been solved, and, what is more, has not even been put forward clearly and definitely. In my opinion T Pavlov's considerations on these questions have gone far ahead of the present stage of physical knowledge.

The establishment of the forms of reflection in the known forms of motion of matter is an essential aspect in *The Theory af Reflection*, because it is only on this basis that the essence of reflection can be established. Present here is T. Pavlov's opposite train of thought, from the separate type of reflection, through the particular to the universal—a result of which is the definition of reflection as a particular kind of motion. Then we have again a return to consciousness as the highest form of reflection with stress laid on the problems of theory of knowledge. All this looks like a spiral and is a manifestation of the law of negating negation.

*The logic of the conception* on the great Bulgarian philosopher, by running the real risk of allowing a certain inadequacy of the exposition, is :

The initial position, already on a logical plane, is interaction, because "reflection, taken as a property of all matter, is impossible and does not exist without or outside the universal interaction of objectively-real things"[11] Interaction is divided into: action

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[8] Cf. V Lenin *Works*. Vol 14, p. 275.
[9] Cf. T Pavlov *Selected Works*. Vol, 5, p. 43 sq.
[10] Cf. T. Pavlov. *Selected Works*. Vol. 5, p. 45 sq.
[11] T. Pavlov. *Selected Works*. Vol. 5, p. 46.

(impact) and counteraction (responsive reaction). This is necessary prerequisite for every reflection. The delineation itself has a relative character, in the sense that action and counteraction are such in a strictly defined concrete respect. In another respect they change their places and are mutually transformed into their opposites.

Being permanently conscious of the relativity of action and counteraction in the process of interaction, we cannot but also establish a certain aspect of determinatedness, and in this sense of absoluteness, of the difference between them. This gives ground, in spite of all possible reservations, for the interacting sides to be distinguished as acting and counteracting, which in different respects become also mutually transformed into one another. On such a ground T. Pavlov delineates the subject of reflection from the object of reflection. In this case he is very cautious and, taking into consideration the criticism, in the later editions of *The Theory of Reflection* he underlines that of a true subject we could speak only in connection with conscious reflection.[12] But, together with this, T. Pavlov points out that "the body as a bearer of unconscious reflection, without being identical with 'the subject of knowledge', possesses something kindred with it, in essence namely, as a *bearer* of reflection in general"[13].

Further analysis shows that in every direct interaction changes of the interacting things set in. The delineation of the reflecting and the reflected opens up the possibility for reflection to be accepted as a particular change of the reflecting under the impact of the reflected thing. Well-known in this connection is thought of T. Pavlov that "reflection— is one of the forms of motion, change and development of all material things, taken as components of the 'natural' whole"[14].

The logical character of the formulation of reflection as a particular form of motion stems from the fact that reflection is connected with the formation of "traces-reflections". The presence of "traces-reflections" is impossible without a particular manner of change of the reflecting under the impact of the reflected object. This formulation is reaffirmed by data from a number of sciences and especially from the data of the physiology of the highest nervous activity. This sector of the logical structure of T. Pavlov is also to a considerable degree a hypothesis. Its hypothetical character becomes stronger upon entering the sphere of human consciousness, because of the sensory unobservability of the investigated object. And this is

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12 Ibid., p. 48.
13 Ibid.
14 Cf. T. Pavlov. *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 41.

characteristic not only of T. Pavlov, but also of all authors who have written or are writing now on this question. In this case of ipmortance is the fact that the assumptions are reasonable and help to a considerable extent the solution of the problem in the future.

The following stage in the logic of T. Pavlov is the elucidation of the nature of the "trace reflection". On this problem he also expresses a number of thoughts, which develop, enrich and substantiate certain assertions of Lenin.

The thesis which is defended is that the "trace-reflection" is a specific inner condition— a property of the reflecting thing formed as a result of its change under the impact of the reflected object.

Expressed in a more general way, this formulation assumes the following aspect: "Every (both the conscious and non-conscious) reflection is a peculiar internal condition of the reflecting object. When the external real object, which *in the process of its interaction* with the reflecting object has been reflected in the latter, has disappeared, the reflection does not disappear at once and absolutely, but continues to exist as a 'trace', as a simple possibility or as a predisposition in the reflecting object"[15].

This solution, which is contested by certain authors, means that the traces-reflections exist apart from the object which they reflect but do not and cannot exist apart from that which reflects; they cannot in any way and by any means and methods be separated from it. Naturally, here we find ourselves faced with the great question to explain from this point of view the information exchange which is an absolutely real fact.

In explaining the difference of the trace reflection from the object of which it is a trace-reflection, T. Pavlov underscores the relativity of this difference, pointing out that the trace carries the "nature of the natural whole". It is not matter but property, a real property of material formations, which disappear when they cease to exist.

Besides, the trace reflection resembles in something the reflected object. Otherwise it would not be a trace reflection. However, the similarity is not absolute. Had it been absolute there would not have been any trace reflection. On this general theoretical basis the more concrete question about the truth has been solved, both from the viewpoint of its objectivity and concreteness and from the viewpoint of its relativity and absoluteness.

With his typical thoroughness and profundity T. Pavlov elucidates reflection as a property and knowledge as the highest form of reflection, as complex dialectical processes both in a geneting and in an actual processing aspect. In a genetic aspect he reveals the different forms of reflection in the development of material reality and lays bare their qualitative specificity. As a red thread through the whole text runs the understanding that among the forms of reflection there is, besides common elements, an essential difference. In connection with this, particular emphasis is placed on the radical qualitative difference between human consciousness and the lower forms of reflection, as well as on the inconvenience of speaking about consciousness prior to man. At the same time T. Pavlov points out that the higher forms of reflection dialectically 'take down' (aufheben) in themselves the lower ones; they can neither exist without them, nor be thoroughly reduced to them. He devotes special attention to the creatively transforming character of human reflection, to the fact that it is not a merely mirror-like, passive, mechanical reflection of objects.

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[15] Ib.d., p. 44.

The logic of T. Pavlov's conception of reflection in general, followed up so far, is also applied by him in the investigation of human consciousness and knowledge. What is interaction for the reflection, consciousness and knowledge for the human form of reflection, is the many-sided and complex practical activity of the people. It is the foundation, goal and criterion of human reflection of reality, including knowledge. This could explain the fact that in *The Theory of Reflection* the question of practice is examined after the quesrion of consciousness and the unity of object and image, but prior to other epistemological problems and, more particularly, prior to the problem of knowledge and truth. At this point T. Pavlov deviates from the traditional structuring of the theme of knowledge, where by practice is examined after truth. If we are to judge which is more correct, then I think that from the point of view of logic, the structure of presentation adopted by T. Pavlov is preferable. It can be better coordinated with the objective logic of development.

Human practice is elucidated as a supreme type of interaction, the highest manifestation of objective dialectics. This means that social practice carries the profoundest essence of interaction, but is not identical with interaction, because not every interaction in objective reality is practice. This formulation has also been an object of criticism by the opponents of T. Pavlov and an object of perfection on his part. In this case the generic category is interaction. Social practice is the highest form of interaction.

With T. Pavlov however, there is a trend for over expansion of the notion of practice. This can be discerned, for example, in the following thought: "Practice is not an object, or a substance, or a particular kind of being—an individual, but is a *relation* and inside the objects, among and inside the different kinds of individual existences, among the electrons and nuclei, atoms and molecules, macrocosmic bodies (suns, planets, constellations, galactic systems) and inside them, among the personalities and society, the classes and the different socio-economic formations, etc."[16]

Interesting are the thoughts developed by T. Pavlov also about consciousness as a supreme form of reflection of reality. The practical interaction of man as a subject of reflection with objective reality is perceived by the human sense organs. As a result, neurophysiological processes take place as a "transformation of the energy of external excitation into a fact of consciousness" (Lenin). With the neuro-physiological processes is connected also the creative processing of the sense data in human brain.

Without these processes consciousness is impossible. It, however, is not in the least identical with them. T. Pavlov does not miss any occasion to underline this.

In elucidating the specificity of consciousness, T. Pavlov lays the stress on its subjectivity. The idea image, unlike a photograph, "is something precisely ideal, psychic, inner, and in *this sense something subjective*, which we experience as a component or moment of our psychic mental life and which can neither be photographed from outside, nor sensorily perceived by other people at different times and places".[17]

It must be admitted that this is the less elaborated part in "The Theory of Reflection" by T. Pavlov and in general in the teaching of consciousness. Consciousness is accepted as a property, an inner state of the brain, but the nature of this property, of this inner state is not elucidated. It is only pointed out that it is inaccessible to sensory observation, and that it does not have a mechanical, physical, chemical, in one word—material character. It is pointed out what it is not, but nothing is said about what it is, i.e. the judgements concerning it are all of a negative character. The general lack of clarity in respect of consciousness continues. It can hardly be considered that all possible hypotheses on the question have already been formulated and that a field has already been created of the possible hypotheses covering thoroughly the object of knowledge. The result has been that the most human thing—consciousness—is the hardest achievable thing in epistemology.

The subjectivity of consciousness and of the subjective images that make it up is conceived by T. Pavlov as referring to both their

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16 Ibid. p. 251.

17 T. Pavlov. *Brief Expose of the Marxist Theory of Reflection in Connection with the Teaching of. I. P. Pavlov.* Sofia, 1954, p. 55 (in Bulgarian).

form and their content. The considerations of T. Pavlov about the subjectivity of both the form and the content of the ideas that make up consciousness are in brief the following: "Ideas are ideas *in all their being as ideas with all their character and significance.*" They "may have only in *ideal* content of their own and only an *ideal* form of their own." But this is only one side of the question. The other side is that the ideas, both in form and content "*can and must rightly reflect the objectively real things and phenomena*".[18] In this scientific and cognitive sense they have an "*objective scientific meaning*", while by their nature they remain ideas.

Logic further requires that the cognitive images and the objects reflected in them should be examined from the point of view of what is common and what is different between the former and the latter in content and form, from the viewpoint of their coincidence, correspondence, similarity, likeness, etc. T. Pavlov prefers the word coincidence and sometimes also accordance. Thus we arrive at the problem of truth. He points out that the dialectico-materialistic teaching of truth rejects : its identification with the objective reality; its conceiving as an absolute coincidence of the images with the objects, i.e, as an absolute truth; the replacement of the reflection character of knowledge by signs or hieroglyphs. According to him, truth is "an eternal process of *dialectically contradictory coincidence* (accordance) of the idea with the object reflected by it".[19]

An essential point in T. Pavlov's views is the thesis about self-consciousness and self-knowledge as one of the most characteristics peculiarities of human reflection. In its development it comes to a point when it begins to cognize itself, to think of itself. (T. Pavlov uses also the well-known Hegelian expression "to reflect on itself"). Thus the theories of consciousness and knowledge ariess. Knowledge and self-knowledge are not counterposed to each other.

The evaluation of the epistemological heritage of T. Pavlov would not be complete, if it is not established whether it is a real foundation for the further development of the epistemological thought and whether it can serve as a basis for dialectical negation.

It seems to me that in this respect again the epistemological heritage of T. Pavlov deserves a very high evaluation. It does not close, but opens the way for further development and perfection.

Because of all this the name and deed of T. Pavlov will forever remain in the golden treasury of Bulgarian thought but also of the world's Marxist-Leninist epistemological thought.

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[18] Ibid., 64 65.

[19] Ibid., p. 76.

# 3

# Academician Todor Pavlov—The Philosophy of Art in Action

*Zdravko Petrov*

The philosophical and scientific work of Todor Pavlov is extremely rich; it spreads over many fields of science—philosophy, aesthetics, history, pedagogics, publicism. In his superb works he outlines a number of new ideas, estimations, characteristics, analyses, conjectures which theoretically refresh our ideologic front. He is not alien to encyclopedism, because he has to fulfill allsided tasks of his epoch.

As a student I have heard some of his lectures and have always been impressed by the width of his views, the variety of his spiritual interests. I was also impressed by his knowledge of a multitude of concrete facts, as they are known by any specialised on the topic of Vasov, in the way known only by specialists on Vasov. At the same time he has also a wide view on the cultural and historical processes, as only few people have.

Now Todor Pavlov is a scientific heritage. The 10 volume edition of his works (an eventual academic publication would be quite bigger) lies before me and I think of a calmed down epoch, which for the younger generations has entered the museum of history. But he has not started with Marxism at once, in a conversation Ivan Meshekov told me that the late historian of philosophy Ivan Gergov set to the young Todor Pavlov (on occasion of a report of his) the task to examine from a critical point of view Marx's teaching. In this way he surely would clean up his way to a scientific carreer at the bourgeois university. Pavlov read the works of the foundation layers of Marxism and from now on adopted another way of development. Not once in the history of the mental streams of development abrupt spiritual changes have taken place. Saulus, when hunting the Christians (happened to be in an orchard where he suddenly became enlightened) changed from Saulus to Paulus, i.e. like the one known by the Christian church. Paxlov preferred the way of truth to the temptations of the bourgeois university.

A number of young, promising students have become assistance professors thanks to the criticism on a revolutionary stream like Marxism. But Todor Pavlov is not one of them. He preferred to starve, his writings to be confiscated by the police, but he remained fathful to his philosophical conviction, to his proletarian blood. During nearly half a century he has been the banner of proletarian thought in Bulgaria. He acquired admiration not only from admirers of the creative Marxist thought, but also the admittance of his opponents. Still before the 30's on the pages of the white immigrational press we shall meet valuations of his "Theory of Reflection" as one of the most serious acquisitions of the Soviet philosophical literature. Pavlov is somewhet like a Bulgarian Kroche, a man with a large scaled taste also towards the aesthetical theory. Such people are not born every day. They are the result of an intensive activity and at the same time a product of class struggle within the sphere of ideology at a strictly definite historical stage.

The theory of reflection lies in the base of Todor Pavlov's aesthetical understandings, they establish his realistic conception of art, his acceptance of literature as a peculiar kind of knowledge, "a subjective image of the objective reality". Pavlov explained the role of the creative personality in the field of art. Objectively the supporters of idealistic aesthetics inconceivably blow up the role of the author's personality. Todor Pavlov quite well foundedly shows the enormous significance of the author's artistic and talented personality. But it is wrong to reduce such a complex activity as art it to the creative whim of this or that personality. Those who think that with it art begins and ends, are severely mislead. This would be an idealistic simplification of art. If we admit the creative personality, the artist, the talent for a leading power, this means to reduce art to the sinister wells of the intuitivistic experience, to change into a dark and inconscient elemental force, to wrap it in a veil of half-mystics.

He made a lot Marxist criticism to become really an art criticism deeply penetrating into the aesthetical world of the creator and becoming at the same time a weapon for changing the reality.

This is what Pavlov says about literature criticism :

"Literature criticism is a peculiar kind of socially and historically conditioned and significant (classful within the class and classless within the classless society) ideological activity. This peculiarity of its lies foremostly in that, that literature criticism interlaces both with art and the theoretico-scientific and socially-practical human activity, but does not overlap them and has its own tasks, essence and forms".

His statements about criticism have two points—at the one hand they are directed against schematism in literature criticism, and on the other hand—against all who went to turn criticism into a bearer of Sybarit enjoyment, into a weapon of aestheticism, into a sort of epicurean delight.

For him it is not a somewhat simple agitational task, a flat publicism (although having a big socially-active role), it is something much bigger, a creative deed requiring intellectual tension, many-sided talents difficulty combined in one personality.

The big crriticism cannot be exhausted with one fresh impression, one artistic whim. A critic who closes himself up in his subjectivist impressions, hardly could give a lasting explanation of a given creator. Notwithstanding his receptivity, for him writers will remain a book, stamped with seven stamps, a strong enigm.

Literary criticism contains the impressionistic moment, but is never exhausted with it.

Todor Pavlov, unlike some other Marxist critics, brought in a theoretical pathos into our criticism and gave it a bigger philosophical depth. He aligned the Marxist orthodoxy with one dialectical explanation of the world and its spiritual processes, and struggled against the scholastic sectarianism and the simplificated view of the world.

To become a Marxist Todor Pavlov had to go through complicated paths. He had to reject some early influences upon his spirit, coming from another epoch. Todor Pavlov was prepared by the epoch of individualism and symbolism so as to be able later to esteem the creative work of Yavorov, Trayanov, etc. Gone through a severe ideologic struggle against the representatives of the non-Marxist thought in Bulgaria during the 20's and 30's, he keeps his admiration towards the author of "Bulgarian Ballads" and "Pantheon" from the virtuous poetry of the master of speech P. K. Yavorov. During the second half of the 30's, following the Dimitrov course of the party, he helped our Marxist intelligentsia to survive the left sectarianism, to rationalise anew the significance of the literary heritage to the proletariat. He has especially big merits in the Marxist preestimation of our literary heritage.

Now the critical struggles about Vasov's name have faded away, nobody is able to shake our national pride. But there have been periods in our literary development when our great writer had been attacked "from the left" and "from the right".

Even g person like Blagoev, having a wide personal culture and literary taste, cannot evaluate Vasov because of tightly ideological motives. Not to speak of Georbi Bakalov, who had a sharply negative attitude towards Ivan Vasov's creative work. Dr. Krastev and Pentcho Slaveykov on their side severely attacked Vasov for his democeatic sense and Renaiscence traditions.

Todor Pavlov made a Marxist survey of Vasov's creative work before the 9th of September and after the 9th of september. He had in mind the significance of the world outlook, but especially stressed the significance of the artistic method of this realistic author. As it is known, in our Marxist literature the question of the world outlook and the artistic method have been most exhaustively elaborated by Todor Pavlov.

He gave us beutiful Marxist analyses also of the poetry of Botev. He defended Botev's poetry from the criticism of the pedantists and of all those who wanted to accept Botev as a "national" vision, to free his poetry from its concrete-historical sounding, from its artistic turning and its publicistic passion.

He wrote not only about Bulgarian writers with a national significance, but about world authors as Pushkin and Ibsen as well. He interpreted Pushkin differently from the traditional treatment of his "nobleman's realism", elucidated Ibsen's work in a new way, beyond the Plekhanov access on this question. Pavlov already applies the measures of a Lenin attitude towards heritage. He himself wrote the for its time interesting book on Vladimir mayakovski, where he in details examines his innovatory poetics.

Todor Pavlov would not be so significant as a philosopher and aesthetician if he were an ordinary cabinet, teethless scholar, writing one book after the other, but detached from the struggles that tore the society. Whatever big erudition and cretive abilities a scholar may just have, he would not leave a significant track behind him, if he were not tightly connected with the social struggles.

While Todor Pavlov was hunted before the Ninth of September because of his communist convictions and was thrown into jail and camps, he acquired his meritable acceptance hardly in the conditions of the peoples rule. After the Nineth of September he occupied high state and scientific posts. He became the by all esteemed president of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences he was elected as member of a number of foreigh scientific institutions and academies. His works acquired great popularity. A lot of foreign learned men declared themselves in favour of his contribution in clearing up a number of questions of Marxist philosophy and aesthetics.

## 4

# A Daughter About Her Eminent Father...

*Vera Todorova Pavlov*

My father, Academician Todor Dimitrov Pavlov (14, Febuary, 1890—May 1977), was born at Stip (Macedonia) in the family of a secondary-school teacher, a distinguished Bulgarian leader of the national revival, participant in the struggle of the Bulgarian people for an independent church; highly educated for his time, speaking 15 foreign languages—classical and modern West-European, Slavonic and Turkish ones. He has been headmaster of the first Bulgarian gymnasium at Stip, and later on teacher of history and foreign languages at the so called "Robert College" in Istanbul. He makes close acquaintance with our notable renaissance poet and enlightener democrat Petko Slaveykov. My grand father died with a book by Jean Jacques Rousseau in his hands. My grand mother was also for the time a highly educated and ethically brought up woman, civilised by self-education, deeply benevolent towards anybody and ready to be helpful at any moment. She has been an unrealised writer. The stories she told my father in a charming and inspirited way, were warmed up by the ideas of humanism and the Bogomil movement (Xth—XIVth century) in Bulgaria. She dreamt to get rich like Rockefeller, so that she might be able to spend her money on the poor. In the family reigned glorious peace and love, mutual respect under the necessary deep esteem towards the Parents, fraternal understanding and wholeheartedness and an exclusive assiduousness, self-sacrifice to each other and a sharp social feeling towards all suffering, a tolstoyan "active goodness", a fresh and wise atmosphere.

My father went to school still at 5 years of age. At once he showed an inclination for thought, extraordinary industriousness and passion for study. Little Todor had in his early youth a time-table on the wall for his daily work and he was seen even at earliest hours of the day reading and writing in the yard-arbour. A photo from these years shows him with his hand upon a big, open book, his face showing a wise pensiveness and inspiration.

Still as a student at the secondary school in Sofia, he publishes his first literary work having a stressed social aspect. His parents had immigrated to Sofia, haunted by the Turkish authorities for their participation in the Bulgarion liberation movement. He absolves the faculty of arts at the Sofia university, at this time already showing inclination towards theoretical thought. He works as a teacher in many towns and villages of Bulgaria. He teaches pedagogy and develops an untired social and general cultural activity—he manifests himself also in theatrical art as an exquisite stage director.

At the beginning of the XXth century in the whole world and in Bulgaria as well, lively discussions take place on the questions of the spirit and rather especially on the teaching of Karl Marx. My father takes active part in them and starting with some infatuations even from Nietzsche, he makes a deep study of the classics of marxism and becomes so a conscious marxist.

In 1919 he enrolls in the rows of the party of the Bulgarian communists. He starts on the glorious and difficult path of a proletarian revolutionary and ideologist. He attends the workers clubs and leads their educational party and cultural mass activity. He often took me along with him. He was sociable and communicative with an unchangeable respect towards all working people, radiating goodness and nobility, a very bright wit. For me he was the standard of an ideal person. He taught me at 7 years of age to recite the poems of our poet of genious—the singer of the revolution—Christo Botev. I bear him in my heart as a fire-breathing sun, on his road of heroic deed.

I saw my father at the head of gymnasium students to join the railwaymen's strike in Kazanluk (in 1919). And when he was arrested they all daringly struggled with all their craft to free him from the arrest. They loved him with all fibres of their souls And when I saw him marching with his noble bearing and good and glaring forehead, surrounded by a group of his disciples, by analogy ' Christ and his disciples" came up in my mind. He was a folk teacher. And he remained such a one till the end of his life for the whole Bulgarian people working and fighting for freedom and socialism. He loved and he was loved.

During the 20's and 30's his figure extols on our general cultural and scientific front as a large.scale philosopher-marxist and learnd encyclopedist, leaving out some of the eaaly influences upon his spirit that inevitably come along from another epoch. He burned with his own hands one of his early compositions entitled : "Marx—Christ—Nietzsche", in order to go through the "purgatory of mind" on the way to Marx.

His first printed work was "About the working education" (1922, Lom). I remember him sitting at the table in our single room, with his coat put on only into the one sleeve, the other one free, so that he could freely hold the pencil. Night vigils in the cold room. Hunger and misery. But brilliant movability. The ideas elaborated in this first book of his sound actual also today.

During these years—between the two world wars—he writes a great many works on proletarian art and national heritage. A large aesthetical outlook and theoretical swing. An unusual variety of his creative interests, combined with a sharp feeling towards life are at hand. He struggles against the non-marxist thought. His scientifically-philosophical and literarily-critical deed orientates in the complex problems of the marxist gnosiology, throws critical lights upon Remkeism, upon Freudism, the neo Bergsonianism. He searches the truth in many fields of culture. Towering, fighting and passionate in his criticism, but it is also scientifically founded. With a philosophical profoundness he, as the first among the philosophers-marxists, studies a number of private scientific and generally ideological problems; philosophy, aesthetics, literature criticism, common history, pedagogy, sociology, natural science, publicity. A mass of new ideas, assessments, characteristics, scientific conjectures and foresights. They do refresh the ideological front of the country.

His capital work ' The Theory of Reflection" was for the first time published in Russian—in Moscow 1936; after that it underwent to many publications also in a number of foreign languages. The leading thought was the state of Lenin on reflection. as an attribute of the matter, the basic quality adherent to any matter and congeneric in its essence with the feeling, but not identical with it. This fundamental thought of dialectical materialism stands out during the whole further manyfold creative work of the scholar problems already dealt with from the height of the theory of reflection. Todor Pavlov is one of the four learned philosophers-marxists, who contributed for the development of this theory. And these are : Marx-Engels, Dimirer Blagoev, Vl. Lenin and T Pavlov. And this is certainly a proud fact of our national spiritual history.

After the victory of the socialist revolution on the 9th of September, 1944, in our country, the so far haunted and prosecuted, 17 times been in prison and concentration camps scholar T. Pavlov receives the full opportunity to unfold his abilities of a huge, generally cultured political and scientific functionary. He occupies high state and scientific posts, becomes regent of the first Fatherland Front government after the victory of the socialist revolution. He was elected first president of BAS (the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) of socialist type, member of the Politbureau of the Bulgarian

Communist Party (1966—1976), he heads a great many other scientific and culture-social institutions and organisations.

The Theory of Reflection stands in the foundation of all theoretical, incl. aesthetical comprehensions of Todor Pavlov, the theoretician of art. It defines his understandings of art, literature as a *particular* kind of knowledge: "a subjective image of the objective reality" He founds the situation that only on the basis of the marxist philosophy the "scientific aesthetics taken also as a theory of art" can be built up (T. Pavlov, General Theory of Art, 1938, v. VII). He deepens his criticism of aesthetism, started formerly by Dim. Blagoev. He rejects the tastiness. Without denying the impressionistic moment in literature criticism he proves that if criticism is only a taste-impressionistic, subjectivist activity, it could not perform its role to direct aesthetically the literary process, to shape the social taste, to build up a world view; T. Pavlov introduced a theoretical pathos into our art-expert criticism and big philosophic depths, the principle of the partyspirit.

During this mostly mature period (the 40's to the 70's) T. Pavlov responses to the newest problems emerging from the dashing speed of the scientifico technical and social revolution. He creates and heads the Institute of Philosophy and its printed organ, the magazine "Philosophska Missl" (Phil. Thought). He is the initiator and chief editor of the mutual Bulgarian-Soviet work "The Lenin Theory of Reflection and the Contemporaneity" (S., 1973) which is a further development and a concretisation of the Lenin theory of reflection. The questions of the outstripping reflection, about the link of dialectical materialism and private sciences are treated in a new light: informatics, genetics, sociology, physiology, physics, kybernetics, mathematics, common history, history of art. Only the annotated bibliography of his works are shown in two voluminous books. His works are translated into Russian, German, English, Hungarian, Czech, Greek, Chinese and other languages. He is a world reknown learned philosopher. Some of his colleagues non-marxists call him even "a contemporary Plato", although he is surely not an idealist, but thus underlining his big presence in the history of philosophy. He has been elected member and hon. member of tens of foreign academies and other institutions. He was honoured with highest awards by the Bulgarian and the Soviet governments and scientific societies: twice the Lenin order and gold medal "Karl Marx", the Dimitrov award, twice as hero of PRB, and many other high distinctions.

But he was and remained poor and endlessly humble up to the end of his life. He gave his money from author's pay away to needing comrades. He did not leave me any material heritage. Because there was not any. But he left a priceless spiritual heritage. It will from now on be studied and rationalised. The return to this inexhaustible source of wisdom helps me too to orientate within the newest problems in my field of knowledge—the history and theory of science. I am thankful to the fortune that it gave me such a father. This gift enriches and obliges. "May the hands of the giver not dry out"! "May the successors be deserving!" And: "Not a disciple is he who does not overcome his teacher"—in the sense that the emptiness of the revealed truth is inevitable in the conditions of the limited possibilities and situations.

# 5

# Religious Principles of Tagore

*Sunita Sinha*

Religion is one of the primary and universal means to search the deeper truths of life and existence. Through religion man tries to achieve the supreme value, the summum bonum of life However, the forms and contents of religion have drastically changed with the paesage of time.

Tagore has also accepted the value and importance of religion in human life. His whole philosophy is surcharged with the religious thoughts. His religious thoughts or principles are the main theme of all his writings. Tagore was essentially a religious poet, and it is from his poems that we derive his religious principles. As he admits himself in 'The Religion of Man', "I have already made the confession that my religion is a poet's religion".[1] Rabindra Nath Tagore was greatly influenced by the principles of Brahmosamaj. Brahmosamaj developed its spritual thoughts from the sacred literatures of the Upanishads, Bible and Koran. Brahmosamaj conceived of an universal religion by uniting the essential principles of these holy books.

Tagore propounded a universal religion by uniting the main tenets of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. For him, there is only one God and men belonging to different faiths worship Him. There is no Muslim, Hindu or Christian God and God is the one infinite Being or Personality. He is the Supreme Person. We dont have many gods, but one only. Whatever faith or religton one belongs to, one worships the same God. Rabindranath Tagore therefore departed from the orthodox Hindu religion, which is full of dogmas and sacraments. He lifted the boundaries of Hinduism and made it all comprehensive and universal religion. For Tagore, there can be no boundaries to the religion. The religion, he wanted to establish is a religion of unity of plurality, based on the truths received from different faiths.

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[1] The Religion of Man, p. 67.

Tagore was against the Varna system and advocated that all men are born equal and because of the different social structures, they became different. He also advocated the unification of man belonging to different faiths.

The religion of Tagore is the religion of Man. For him, God is the Supreme Person. He has all the qualities of man. In reality, God is one, and yet people see him differently. Our conception of God are relative to our traditions, training, history, and geography. Tagore decries the view the one's God is different from God of another faith. He also decries narrow, dogmatic and exclusive views of religion.

Tagore's religion is the poet's religion. The poet is not interested in the transcendent one, but in its varied expressions. He does not concieve God of a formless being, but the poet has the vision of God in form of Krishna. He hears the voice of the flute. He enjoys the beauty of God in nature. Wherever, there is beauty, there is expression of God in fullness. A beautiful flower manifests God in full. The expression of Beauty, Love and joy are the expressions of the Supreme. Tagore writes, "I was born in a famsly, which at that time was earnestly developing a monotheistic religion based on the philosophy of Upanishad"[2]. Monotheism is different from Monism based on abstractions. Monotheism is based on the conceptions of God as the Lord of Love.

For Tagore, God has the supreme personality. Man and nature are the real forms of His own existence. All souls are particles of God. God, man and nature are bound in a single unity. Nature is the manifestation of Supreme. This world is not an illusion or Maya, but it is the manifestation of God. Both man and nature are God's own existence. For Tagore, the world is God and nature is the concealed form of God. In all beautiful things God manifests in full God is beauty, which means, in nature, wherever we come across beautiful objects, God is fully open and manifested in them. He reveals himself in beauty and conceals in ugliness. Wherever we observe beauty in nature, we come in direct touch of the manifest God.

God is fully revealed, manifest, open and exhibited with the beautiful things of nature. Nature conceals God as well as manifests Him. The manifest form is Beauty. That is why, God is conceived to be Beauty, and Beauty is God. God is infinitely beautiful and he reveals himself in nature. Nature is the illumination and manifestation of God. It is the real exposition of the veiled spirit.

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[2] The Religion of Man, p. 57.

God is all existence. God is soul and nature, and the world is God. It is said in the Upanishads that everything is God. God is also love. Monotheism of Tagore and conception of the human God finds that God is fully expressed in love. For Tagore, the human love manifested in self-sacrifice and identity with mankind manifests Him.

God is the artist, the music-maker and the lover of the mankind. Tagore conceives that religion of man should be based on the love for mankind. Not only man loves God, but God loves him too and tries to come down on earth to make friendship with mankind. Tagore does not follow any tradition or ceremony. Tagore writes, "For the sake of this love, heaven longs to become earth and gods to become man."[3]

Rabindranath Tagore conceives of human beings as godly and God for him is like a human being. In 'Gitanjali', he makes God a person. The poems of 'Gitanjali' are the offerings of man to God, of the finite to the Infinite. The relation between the two is conceived as that of the lover and the beloved. He further says that If man is not material but divine and godly in nature, the communion and union of man with God would take place again and again in this world. God is not an abstract Being he is in the form of a human being with whom men may come in contact again and again. Tagore says that the main theme of the book entitled 'The Religion of Man' is, "The idea of the humanity of our God, or the divinity of Man the Eternal, is the main subject of this book."[4] In these lines, Tagore emphasizes that God is very similar and close to man. Man is also very similar to God. The personal relationship between man and God has been emphasized by Tagore in all his works.

Tagore says that the source of his religious principles is the mystic experiences, it is not by logic or reasoning, but by his intuitive experiences, that give us all the truths of religion. Tagore says that the union of man with God is possible only because God is similar to man. Though people may point out that God is infinite and he mav not be a human being in form. But, Tagore savs that man cannot conceive of God as other than the Supreme Man All religions speak "about the God of human personality."[5] The religion of God is not confined to temples, ceremonials, scriptures, images or idols. Tagore conceives of God's religion, which is universal in nature. Tagore's religion does not have cults, idols temples or ceremonials.

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[3] The Religion of Man, p. 69.

[4] Ibid. p. 11.

[5] Ibid. p. 12.

It is in one's intense feeling that one identifies Oneself with God. Tagore says, "I mention in connection with my personal experience some songs which I have often heared from wandering village singers, belonging to a popular sect of Bengal, called Bauls, who have no images, temples, scriptures, or ceremonials, who declare in their songs the divinity of Man, and express for him an intense feeling of love."[6]

Tagore writes further, "The Isha of our Upanishad, the Super Soul, which permeates all moving things, is the God of this human universe whose mind we share in all our true knowledge love and service, and whom to reveal in ourselves through renunciation of self is the highest end of life".[7] Tagore says that he is not a philosopher, but a singer and it is only as a singer that he can touch the feet of God. When in course of singing his soul rises to touch the feet of God, he forgets that he is a human being. In course of the joy of music, he calls God as friend, though he is a humble creature. Tagore says that he is not a Yogi, nor a Sanyasi, nor an ascetic, he is not well-versed in the practices of pranayama, it is by music alone, that wings of his soul spread all around. He rises high and touches the feet of God. In music alone, he calls God as friend, though He is the Lord of the universe and he is a finite being. Tagore writes, "I know, thou takes pleasure in my singing, I Know that only as a singer, I come before thy presence. I touch by the edge of the far-spreading wing of my song thy feet which I could never aspire to reach."[8] In the above passage, he re-emphasizes the human nature of God and calls him as friend. He also emphasizes that music makes his small soul universal and all egoistic thoughts are removed by the current of music. The music of God is universal and all comprehensive. One may join in that divine music. Tagore says, that he wants to sit by the side of God. He wants all worldly affairs to be put aside, without the vision and sight of God, all our works become useless. Toil to higher the sight of God, is to join the music of God. He further says that it is time to sit quiet, face to face with God and to sing songs of our surrender and dedication to Him. Rabindranath asks to keep our mind and body pure, so that God may touch our limbs and body. He says,

> "My whole body and my limbs have thrilled with his touch who is beyond touch; and if the end comes here, let it come—let this be my parting word."[9]

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Gitanjali, verse II, p. 2.
9 Ibid. XCVI, p. 64.

Tagore emphasizes that human beings are burdened with work. He keeps his burdens on his shoulders and thinks that he is greatly tired to keep the worldly burdens. Tagore asks us to give all burdens in the hands of God and be happy in the joy of communion with Him.

The religion of Man is not to follow the religious practices, ceremonials and chanting of beads. It is wrong to think that God is in temples, mosques and churches. He is there in humanity and not in the dark caves of the mountains. He is there, where the laboures are working in the field. He is with the poorest, the lowliest and lost. It is useless to forget humanity and to sit in the temples and repeat the name of God. Therefore for Tagore, the real prayer to God is service to humanity. God lives not in the temple, but out side in the mankind.

He writes,

> "Leave this chanting and singing and telling of beads. Whom dost thou worship in this lonely dark corner of a temple with doors all shut ? Open thine eyes and see thy God is not before thee".[10]

He further says,

> "He is there where the tiller is tilling the hard ground and where the pathmaker is breaking stones. He is with them in sun and in shower, and his garment is covered with dust. Put off thy holy mantle and even like him come down on the dusty soil."[11]

We find the echo of same thoughts in Kabir's teachings also. Kabir asks men to find God "in the here and now; in the normal, human, bodily existence, the mud of material life".

Tagore says that the real worship of God is not to sit in a temple wiih doors all closed. To chant names, tell beads and to close one's eyes do not help an individual to realise God. God does not live in the temples, but outside in the masses of men. The worship of God is possible in the human society by the love expressed to mankind. God lives and come closed to mankind, where the poor and the lowly works in the field. The garment of God is covered with dust. Let every individual put off the saffron clothes and come down to the dusty soil. God is there, where the poor and humble lives. He is not to be found away and aloof from humanity.

If anyone seeks God, it is through mankind and through service to humanity, one realises union with God. The ascetics, the sanyasi, and the recluse, who renounce the world, do not realise God. One who dissociates himself from society and humanity cannot realise

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[10] Ibid. XI, p. 6 7.

[11] Ibid.

God. God lives with mankind, the seeker of God can find him in mankind alone. One, who renounces humanity and mankind cannot realise God. The ascetics, who renounce the world and humanity cannot realise God. Tagore says that the union and communion with God is possible within the world.

He says that it is no use renouncing the world. One should not run to forest and leave humanity, God does not live away from humanity and there is no use to go to forests to seeks God. God does not live in the loneliness of the forest. The bondage with the family, sons, daughters, husband, wife has been created by God. If God has created men to live in bondage in mankind, why should he try to be away from bondage? God wishes that man lives in bondage of love. The expression of love reveals the love of God. The love of an individual for his wife, sons, daughters and mankind is divine and spiritual love. The human love is actualy spiritual love and by loving each other, we are loving god.

Tagore rightly observes, that the whole world is full of love. The manifestation of God's love is pervading everywhere. The world is lovelorn. Even, the creation is out-come of love only. He quotes in 'Sadhana' "From love the world is born, by love it is sustained, towards love it moves, and into love it enters."[12] Those, who are selfish, egoist and isolated, have no love for mankind God is far away from such persons, but one who has no ego, no selfishness and no isolated existence and has love for mankind, God is very close to them. God himself has created bondage of love and it is a mistake to decry bondage. If God has created bondage for us, let us be bound with mankind. Tagore repeats that for him the salvation consists in the life of bondage in humanity. God is also bound with us for ever. He says, "Deliverance ? Where is this deliverance to be found ? Our master himself has joyfully taken upon him the bounds of creation; he is bound with us all for ever"[13]. In this passage, Tagore says that God has created bondage and he is also bound with us. Therefore the bondage and love expressed in a family, society and mankind is the expression of divine love.

Tagore has written in his poems that the fragrance, beauty, joy and love of God is all pervasive. God has filled this world with the light, the joy, the illumination. He has filled this earthen vessel to the brim. The poet says in Gitanjali, "This frail vessel thou emptiest again and again, and fillest it ever with fresh life"[14]. There is in nature and mankind God's manifestation and the illumination of

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[12] Sadhana, p. 94,

[13] Gitanjali, verse XI, p. 7.

[14] Ibid, verse, I p. 1,

God is every where. This world is not nothingness nor Maya, nor illusion. The world is God. The manifestation of God in the world is taking place all the time. Tagore says that he will not shut his eyes, not close his ears, skin, nose and tongue as all our sense organs feel joy, when in touch with beauty of nature. He says that he will not shut the doors of his sense. It is through these sense organs, one comes in communion with nature. It is through them that he comes to have the experience of God. Therefore these sense organs are medias through which we come in contact with God. We should not close our doors nor deny the pleasures of beauty, joy and love. All these minifest God and man should join in union with them. Tagore writes :

> "No, I will never shut the doors of my senses. The delight and hearing and touch will bear thy delight. Yes, all my illusions will burn into illumination of joy, and all my desires ripen into fruits of love."[15]

In the above passgge, Tagore says that the world is real. It is not unreal, Maya or illusion The world is God. God conceals and manifests himself in the world. He plays hide and seek with us. Sometime she is fully manifest in beauty, love and joy and sometimes he hides himself in nature. The religion of God advocated by Tagore is the religion of humanity.

Tagore says that the word dharma is not fully translated into English as religion. Dharma has a far deeper meaning in it. Is is the inherent truth, the inner-most nature and essence of man, whereas religion is associated with certain beliefs, cults, creed, nation and dogmas, Truth is one and universal and it is not bounded by any presupposed beliefs, notions and assumptions. When any wrong is done, it is said that Dharma or truth has been violated. He illustrates in 'Sadhana' thus, "The Sanskrit word dharma which is usually translated into English as religion has a deeper menning in our language. Dharma is the innermost nature, the essence, the implicit truth of all things. Dharma is the ultimate purpose that is working in our self. When any wrong is done we say that dharma is violated, meaning that the lie has been given to our true nature. But this dharma, which is the truth in us, is not apparent, because it is inherent".[16]

Rabindranath Tagore conceives that his religion is the religion of wholeness and unity. There is no division of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity in his religion. He says that his religion of Man tran cends all sects, schisms. His religion combines the best of all religions. He reconciles East and the West, the Indian and Semitic religions, in the comprehensible wholeness of his religion. True religion is the product of the harmony of all religions. Radhakrishnan observes, "Rabindranath's mission was one of reconcilation between East and West in a spirit of undersianding and mutual enlightenment. 'All humanity's greatness is mine' 'The infinite personality of man can only come from the magnificent harmony of all human races. My prayer is that India may represent the co-operation of all the people on this earth. For India unity is truth and diversion is evil".[17]

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[15] Gitanjali, verse LXXIII, p. 49.

[16] Sadhana, p. 61.

The poet's religion has no place for any fixed doctrine. Truth is not the exclusive possession of any one religion, class or race. It has many faces. The real is one, wise men speak of it in many ways. On this basis Tagore has tried to establish the unity of all faiths, Sarva Dharma Samanyava. Tagore rejects narrow, dogmatic and exclusive views of religion. It is wrong to think that God has preference for any religion or creed. Tagore says "we should remember that the doctrine of a special creation is out of date, and the idea of specially favoured race belongs to a barbaric age. We have come to understand that any special truth or special culture, which is wholy dissociated from the universal is not true at all".[18]

Tagore is a humanist. For him, there is no conflict between social aims and spiritual life. The society has to be moralised and spiritualised. Man's worldly aims are not contrary to his special pursuits. We cannot reject the world for nature. The world is the concealed form of God and we live in the divine universe. Renunciation of the sages have no relevence in the spiritual life of man. What is necessary is not abstention from worldly activities, but self-control. To know oneself as a separate from the humanity is untruth. Man knows himself in so far as he knows and unites himself with world. The more a person is religious, the more he is God intoxicated. The more he is united in the relationship with the humanity and universe. There are persons, who seek knowledge and others who seek wealth, but Tagore seeks the company of mankind. Tagore says, "My heart throbs to mingle with the heart of humanity. Some seek wisdom, others wealth but I seek thy company so that I may sing".[19]

Tagore says that the house-holder realises God, when his life has become established in the Divine. One, who is united with God serves the society. He is more in tune with the Infinite. It is not by stopping Karma or actions, but by performing actions in the presence of God, that reveals the true message of India. It is not in

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17 Quoted by Radhakrishanan, Living with a purpose, p. 91.
18 Ibid p, 98-99.
19 Ibid p. 103-4.

action or negation of work but the action done ceaselessly in the service of humanity, that one realises the fullness of his spiritual life. Tagore does not believe in a life of ascetism.

Man is within nature and yet understands nature. Nature has become conscious in man. There is no distinction between man and nature. Though man is the product of nature, it is through man that nature comes in union with God. It is God or the universal Man, who is all pervading in nature. It is the universal Man who lives in the finite men and humanity.

Tagore says that, "The individual man must exist for the Man the Great, and must express him in disinterested works in science and philosophy; in literature and arts, in service and worship. This is his religion which is working in the heart of all his religions in various names and forms".[20] Tagore says that God's place of work is the world of humanity. The activity of God can find expression in the human universe alone. God loves, plays, expresses affection and offers to man. All the activities of God are for man alone. God has created the innumerable human beings, so that he is able to express his activities in the universe of mankind. Tagore says in 'Stray Birds', "God finds himself by creating".[21] God loves man. It is not only man, who loves God, God loves human beings much than one can imagine. All religious, spiritual, moral and social activities of men concern their worldly activities. It is not by going to the forest and being cut off from humanity, but within the humanity and mankind that man comes in union with God.

Tagore conceives of a religion, which has its significance in the phenomenal world. He conceives that man is divine and God is Man and the God is not impersonal 'It', but he is superself or Man, the Infinite. He says that in his religion there is no place for an abstract Absolute, unrelated with mankind. Religion seeks God, who has human character and who is the spiritual hero of the mankind. In the conclusion of his book 'The religion of Man' Tagore writes, ' our religion can only have its significance in this phenomenal world comprehended by our human self. this absolute conception of Brahmana is outside the subject of my discussion. What I have tried to bring out in this book is the fact whatever, name may have been given to the divine Reality it has found its highest place in the history of our religion owing to its human character, giving meaning to the idea of sin and sanctity, and offering and eternal background to all the ideals of perfection which have their harmony with man's own nature"[22] The Upanishad says, "Know him the Person who is to be realised; For this Person is deathless in whom the individual person has his immortal truth. This is the divine being, the world-worker, who is the Great Soul ever dwelling inherent in the hearts of all people".[23]

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[20] The Religion of Man, p. 11.

[21] Stray Birds p. 46.

[22] The Religion of Man, p. 127-28.

Tagore says that God's activity is world wise. He dwells in the heart of humanity. In order to have unity with him, we have to be the world-worker. We must work for all, without selfishness. Living in God or in the Infinite means that the finite soul of ours identifies itself with the Great Soul. Tagore quotes the following Buddha's teachings in support of his views in his 'The Religion of Man';

"Above thee, below thee, on all sides of thee, keep on all the world thy sympathy and immeasurable loving thought which is without obstruction, without any wish to injure, without enmity'.

'To be dwelling in such contemplation while standing, walking, sitting or lying down, until sleep overcomes thee, is called living in Brahma".[24]

Tagore, in the above passage, says that perfection of the finite man depends on his relationship with Man the divine. Whatever be one's religion, the infinite Man, the Father, the Friend, the Lover is the ideal of man who unites with him serving all mankind. It is man's service and man's love that God has put himself in bondage with humanity. It is the purpose of God to serve mankind and to seek men's love. Tagore writes "For the God in Man depends upon men's service and men's love for his own loves "fulfilment"![35] To live in the universe of God is to realise salvation. The perfect man lives in the presence of God. It is to have presence and communion with God that man finds his fulfilment. For that, spiritual union is called Mukti or Salvation.

For Tagore, religion cannot be confined to be in a group, sect, tribe or nation. He says that the true religion manifests the sublime nature of God in man. Religion is constant endeavour of man to cultivate sublime nature of God in him. He warns of ever growing materialism and supremacy of machines over man. He is of the view that without true religion, men will become mechanical, without the light of Divine in them. If a man loses touch with God, he becomes a machine. He says, "Upon the loss of this sense of a universal Personality, which is religion, the reign of machine and of method has been firmly established and man, has been made a homeless tramp"[26].

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23 Ibid. p. 42.
24 Ibid. p. 43.
25 Ibid. p. 44.
26 Creative Unity, p. 125.

Tagore's religion of humanity reunciates ascetism. He does not want to be an ascetic. He does not want to go to forest leaving mankind. He says in 'The Gardner', "No my friends, I shall never leave my hearth and home, and retire into the forest solitude, I shall never be an ascetic"[27].

According to Tagore, the true religion is not as much defined as the dogmatic religions.. He believes that religious organisations have almost debauched religion. While the religious organisations lay emphasis mainly on cult, dogmas, sacraments and superstition, the main spirit of religion is absent. He says, ' When the religions have to make way for religious organisation, it is like the river being dominated by its sand beds, the current stagnates and its aspect becomes desert-like."[28]

True religion preaches freedom, whereas religious organisations are closed religions. Tagore denounces this outlook of religious organisations in the following lines, "The same blindness which impedes them to rush to bath in a particular stream, renders them indifferent to the suffering of their unknown fellowmen. God does not appreciate this prostitution of his most precious gift''.[29] Thus, the institutional religions are dogmatic and false. According to Tagore, the true religion has spontaneity and naturality inherent in it. True religion is free and spontaneous, it is not limited, fixed and compulsive. Tagore says, "In dogmatic religion all questions are definitely answered, all doubts are finally laid to rest. But the poet's religion is fluid, like the atmosphere around the earth where light and shadow play hide-and-seek... It never undertakes to lead anybody anywhere to any solid conclusion; yet it reveals endless spheres of light, because it has no walls around itself".[30]

The poet's religion is fluid, but it is the essence of all religions. It is the wateriness of water, the spark of the flame. Man's religion is his inner most truth. Tagore says, "In my language, the word religion has a profound meaning. The wateriness of water is essentially its religion, in the spark of the flame lies the religion of fire. Likewise man's religion is his innermost truth".[31] But, Tagore says that love, sacrifice, sincerity and innocence constitute a religious life. In such a religious life, the human personality finds its worth and essence Tagore says that the religions are gloomy and dark. He likes to run away from the temple and sit outside in the open and play with God. He says, "From the solemn gloom of the temple

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27 The Gardener, Poem, 43, p. 64
28 Modern Review, p. 435, Sep. 1917.
29 Creative Unity, p. 19.
30 An Article, Tagore Testament, tr. Indu Datta, p. 37.
31 Fire Flies, 23.

children run out to sit in the dust' God watches them play and f rgets the priest"[31].

Rabindranath is against the idea of fixing any particular date or place for religious purposes. For Tagore religion is universal, and so all days are auspicious and all places worth while. People arbitrarily fix some date, time, or place considering them auspicious for religious purposes and teus differentiate them with non-religious practices. To create difference is against the nature of religion. Religion is always a uniting force. The poet is against the use of religion as a cosmetic one an affair of luxury or an outward show.

True religion is like the morining light. It is immense and simple. It is God's gift of Himself. It is eternal and great. Religion surrounds us, is spread before us. We have to open our hearts, free us from false pride and ego to understand true religion. There is the highest order of simpleness in religion, but it is we who have complicated it. We have made religion highly complicated and twisted with so many dogmas, ceremonies, cults, tabbos and superstitions.

Tagore advocates for an open religion and is against the sectarianism in religion. For him, sectarianism, is a religious evil, so it must be wiped out. As a truely religious man, he has always fought against it. The sectarianism in religion shows narrowness of our hearts, which is even worse than raw materialism. The pursuit of self towards the Infinite lies in openness, not in sectarianism. In sectarianism there is more of ego and less of God. One cannot achieve salvation through the closed sectarianism. In the words of Tagore, "Sectarianism is a perverse from of worldliness in the disguise of religion; it breeds narrowness of heart in greater measure than the cult of the world based upon material interest can ever do. For undisguised pursuit of self has its safety in its openness, like filth exposed to the sun and air. But the self magnification with its consequent lessening of God that goes on unchecked under the cover of sectarianism loses its chance of salvation because it defiles the very source of purity."[32]

According to Tagore, religion is necessary for human life. It is his basic urge. It is inherent in human nature. The lower creations have no religion, they do not require it either. But man needs religion and it is his supreme need. The need of religion cannot be compared with the need of daily bread. It is deeper and more important than the need of bread. It is the basic need of human life. The poet expresses his views in the favour of urge of religion in 'Sanchaya; "The primal urge is the urge of religion and this is why humanity can never deny it. Here and there a particular individual may deny religion in a debating mood but whole mankind can never do so. There is religion in the diverse activities of man, in his needs, successes and failures. Lower creation has no religion and it does not require any. But man can never be without religion, for religion forms his very nature. Just as the nature of fire is to burn, so man's nature is to seek and fulfil religion".[33]

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[32] Thoughts from Tagore, p. 73.

Religion, according to Tagore cannot be taught. The religion is not a subject having fixed syllabus. It is a thing to be experienced in one's life. It is the consciousness of our relationship with the Infinite. We can attain religion during our childhood by leading a simple life, surrounded by nature having peace and purity of atmosphere, where the men have complete faith in the eternal life. Religion cannot be obtained, where there is a hankering for lust and desires. Tagore says, "It is the truth of our complete being, the consciousness of our personal relationship with the Infinite; it is the true centre of gravity of our life. This we can attain during our childhood by daily living in a place where the truth of the spiritual world is not obscured by a crowd of necessities assuming artificial importance: where life is simple, surrounded by fullness of leisure, by ample space and pure air and profound peace of Nature".[34]

Thus Tagore's religion is an open and univeral religion, whereas other religons have aimless wandering. According to Tagore, religion is like home sickness. Like a flock of home-sick cranes, who after day and night flying return to their mountain nests, religious man is also on his pilgrimage to his eternal home, God. In Gitanjali, He says that he is tired of wandering from one religion to another, which are closed and narrow. He is fully tired of dogmatic religions. His body wants to live in peace into the deathless God. He says,

> "No more sailing from harbour to harbour with this my weather-beaten boat. The days are long passed when my sport was to be tossed on waves. And now I am eager to die into the deathless".[35]

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[33] Dharmer Artha, Sanchaya.
[34] Thoughts from Tagore, p. 203.
[35] Gitanjalt, verse C, p. 66.

## 6

# S. Radhakrishnan : World Philosopher

*Archie J. Bahm*

"One need have no hesitation in honoring S. Radhakrishnan for here is a person to whom honour is due. In America his name is better known than that of Shankara or even Aurobindo He is better known in the United States today than any other Indian except Gotama, Gandhi, Nehru and perhaps Tagore. His command of Western philosophy makes Western philosophers respect him quite apart from his other achievements."[1]

A best way to demonstrate Radhakrishnan's commitment to and competence in world philosophy is through direct quotations from his numerous works. I select these to illustrate his views about the common nature, needs and interests of mankind, about comparative philosophy, about world philosophy, and about the future of philosophy

### COMMON INTERESTS

"It is the faith that man is the same everywhere, in spite of different attitudes he has adopted to life, in spite of the differences of his cultural achievements, that is the motif of the editors of this volume."[2] "Man is essentially the same everywhere and is in need of all values."[3] "Our review indicates that the varieties of ideas and methods in European, Chinese and India philosophy has nothing exclusive to any one tradition. The differences are only in the matter of emphasis. Philosophy as such has no frontiers."[4] "The activities and achievements of art and science, of morality and religion, are the highest manifestations of the human spirit assimilable and communicable across barriers of blood and race. This is not to deny or underrate the importance of group life, but the highest values of art and literature, science and philosophy, have, in principle, a universal appeal."[5]

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[1] Bahm, Archie J., "Radhakrishnan: From An American Perspective", in *Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Souvenir Volume*, edited by J. P. Atreya, p 31, Darshan International, Moradabad, 1964.

[2] S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, *The Concept of Man : A Study in Comparative Philosophy*. p. 34. London. George Allen and Unwin, 1960.

[3] Ibid., p. 375

All religious spring from the sacred soil of the human mind and are quickened by the same spirit"[6]. "many of our religious paradoxes and perplexities are due to the narrowness of our horizon. By enlarging our sympathies we raise our thought above the narrow controversies of the day"[7]. The most remarkable feature of the scientific culture is its universality .........In the geographical sense it is universal in that it has penetrated all parts of the world. Nature is one, and therefore science is one. A universal human community is the social aspiration of science"[8]. "Since 1500 mankind has been steadily marching towards the formation of a single society"[9].

"In the world today we have pledged ourselves to international cooperation and peace. There is no isolation any more, geographical political economic or cultural. The spirit of cooperativeness is to be carried byond the nation to the community of nations"[10]. The basic issue is no longer the victory of this or that nation, or of this or that group or that religion or ideology. It is the survival or suicide of man. It is a dime for decision, not despair The choice is either exinction or human brotherhood. It cannot be left to the vagaries of chance. The test of a nation's right to survive today is measured not by the size of its armaments, but the extent of its concern for the human community as a whole".[11] "The commonwealth of humanity has no written constitution; it is based on community of ideals, freedom and dignity of the individual, role of law, economic opportunity for all citizens and love of peace".[12]

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[4] S. Radhakrishnan, *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, Volume II, p 439. London; George Allen and Unwin, 1953.

[5] S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, second Edition, pp. 182-183 London: University Press, 1940.

[6] S Radhakrishnan, *East and West in Religion*, p. 19. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953.

[7] Ibid., p. 38.

[8] S Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession", in *The Philosophy of Sarvapelli Radhakrishnan* edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, p 17. New York; The Library of Living Philosophers, 1952-

[9] Ibid., p. 24

[10] S. Radhakrishnan and P. T Raju, *The Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*. Second Edition, p. 24. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966.

[11] Ibid., p 26.

[12] Ibid , p. 23.

## COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

"The comparative method is relevant in the present context, when the stage is set, if not for the development of a world philosophy, at least for that of a world outlook, The different parts of the world cannot any more develop separately and in independence of each other."[13] "They cultivated in both east and west desire now a mutual understanding and nothing is so useful as comparative studies."[14] "But mutual udderstanding is not possible without mutual respect and sympathy born of it. If we are true to history, we shall see that each nation has had its own share of the inner light and spiritual discovery. No cultural or religious imperialist. who has the settled conviction that he alone has all the light and others are groping in darkness, can be a safe guide in comparative studies. The reliable interpreter should adopt the empirical method of investigation with a reasonable exercize of intelligence and imagination".[15]

"A certain pre-eminence of religious interest has been characteristic of Asian peoples, though it is by no means peculiar to them. Greek science and humanism determined the development of the West, though they are not unknown to the peoples of the East. Those of the West are distinguished by a restless activity of the mind, by boundless curiosity, by insatiable idealism. As the spirit of perpetual search and exploration dominates the Western mind, stability, serenity, certitude are somewhat alien to it".[16] "East and West are complementary to each other; the Eastern man has something to teach the Western man and the Western man has something to teach the Eastern. The difference is only a difference of emphasis."[17]

"Man is the common denominator of comparative philosophy".[18] "Comparative philosophy cannot accept man as the common denominator".[19] "If the existence of man is doubted, there will be an end to all philosophy".[20] Without faith in the universality of man, comparative philosophy will be of little use."[21] The aim of this book is to discover the content of the concept of man... The other aim is to find out a basis for comparative philosophy."[22] "Here comparative philosophy broadens our vision and acquaints us with ways of life and thought which realily belong to the intricate web of experience, but the reality and importance of which are missed by some traditions for one reason or another".[23] "Man becomes the common denominator of all thoughts and values and therefore of all philosophies. All truths and values have to be integrated without losing sight of their reference to man, who is already an integrality given in reality".[24]

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[13] S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession", in *The Philosophy of Sarveballi Radhakrishnan*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, p. 13. New York; The Library of Living Philosophers, 1952.

[14] S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Volume 1, Revised, Second Edition, p 672. George Allen and Unwin, 1931.

[15] Ibid p 673.

[16] *S*. Radhakrishnan, "Reply to Critics", in *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, p. 821. New York: Library of Living Philosophers, 1952.

[17] S, Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, *The Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*, p. 376. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960.

[18] S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, *The Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*, p. 34. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960.

## WORLD PHILOSOPHY

"Philosophy is a sustained attempt to understand the universe as a whole, not some section of it as sciences do."[25] "Philosophy is nothing if not universal in its scope and spirit."[26]

## FUTURE PHILOSOPHY

"The more important thing is the future. We are able to see further than our predecessors, since we can climb on their shoulders. Instead of resting content with the foundations nobly laid in the past, we must build a greater edifice in harmony with ancient endeavor as well as the modern outlook".[27] "The task of philosophy is not merely to reflect the spirit of the age in which we live but to lead it forward. Its function is creative, to state the values, to set the goals, to point the direction and to lead to new paths. It must inspire us with the faith to sustain the new world, to produce the men who subordinate national, racial and religious divisions to the ideal of humanity."[28] "Dynamic civilizations are distinguished by their capacity for growth and their ability to communicate to posterity the results of their adventures."[29] "If we in the commonwealth of man produce a few leaders of understanding, courage and conviction, the consciences and good will of many will support them."[30]

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[19] Ibid., p. 23.

[20] Ibid., p. 28.

[21] Ibid., p. 29.

[22] S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, *The Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy, Second Edition*, p. 11. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966.

[23] *The Concept of Man*, First Edition, p. 38.

[24] Ibid., p. 378.

[25] S. Radhakrishnan, "Reply to Critics", in *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, p 789. New York: The Library of Living Philosophers, 1952.

[26] S. Radhakrishnan, *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, Volume II, p, 448. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953

[27] S Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Volume I, Revised Edition, p. 768. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931.

[28] S. Radhakrishnan, *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, Volume II, p. 448. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953.

"The world proceeds not in an incessant fluctuation comparable to a surging sea, It is a movement with a direction and a goal."[31] "The mind of the world requires to be pulled together and the present aimless stare of dementia replaced by a collective rational purpose. We need a philosophy, a direction and a hope, if the present state of indecision is not to lead us to despair."[32] "Looking back on the millions of years of the steady climb on the path of evolution, it seems presumptuous for us to imagine that with thinking man evolution has come to an end."[33]

"The unity of the modern world demands a new cultural basis; the real issue is whether it is to be guided by the economic and the pragmatistic mind, which is the more dominant at the moment, or by the spiritual."[34] "The world is seeking not so much a fusion of religions as a fellowship of religions, based on the realization of the fundamental character of man's religious experience."[35] Our historical religions will have to transform themselves into the universal faith or they will fade away. The prospect may appear strange and unwelcome to some, but it has a truth and beauty of its own. It is working in the minds of men and will soon be a realized fact. Human unity depends not on past origins but on furhure goal and direction, on what we are becoming and whither we are tending. Man is yet in his infancy and has a long period ahead of him on this planet. He will work out a higher integration and produce world-minded men and women."[36] "We must regain health, physical and spiritual. With this in mind let us proclaim our leadership towards the future."[37]

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[29] Ibid., p, 448.

[30] S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, *The Concept of Man, A Study in Comparative Philosophy, Second Edition*, p. 27. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966.

[31] S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession", in *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, p. 27. New York: The Library of Living Philosophers, 1952.

[32] Ibid., p. 25.

[33] Ibid., p. 29.

[34] S. Radhakrishnan, *East and West in Religion*, p. 44. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953.

[35] S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession," in *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli, Radhakrishnan*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, p. 75. New York: The Library of Living Philosophers, 1952,

[36] Ibid., pp. 81-82.

[37] Ibid., p. 842.

# 7

# Myth and Miracle of Criminal Justice

*J. Rajendran*

After 20 years of my legal practice in Indian Courts of Law and hard work at a Research in Law—Bible—Shakespeare, I have evolved certain rare points by which I can show and establish that Law originates from Bible. I can illustrate these principles on the following heads:

( i ) Philosophical
( ii) Historical
(iii) Comparative
(iv) Analytical
(v ) Sociological
(vi) Critical
(vii) The final end on International level promoting peace and tranquility.

I want to give more importance to proper administration of justice by courts of law and proper functioning of the legal, governmental institutions. As far as I experience, if this is perfectly achieved in the world, everything is achieved and complete harmony will automatically be the order in the society. I have evolved out a thesis on Law, Bible, Shakespeare which will completely answer all the problems of the world.

What is Law ? I find God's words or words loved by God are incorporated in Law. Only when these secrets are understood by men who deal with Law any society can prosper. This is the hidden wisdom of God. It is a mystery as God is invisible the secret is also invisible.

1 Corin 25 16 We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery even the hidden wisdom which God ordained before world

unto our glory which none of the princess of the world knew.

Colossians 2 (III) In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.

There are trinity in Law. I find one in trinities and trinities in one. This is hidden secret of Law.

As we are told that there are secrets in Sanskrit Vedas I find very many secrets or insights in Law and Law practice or in administration of Justice. This vision will show the manifestation of God in the legal system. This is my humble opinion. This understanding of the mystery will lead to glory and correct understanding of Laws, legal terminologies, justice, judiciary, police and systems of Governments, etc. My research will be of highest talent and the ripest scholarship of the world which will show the Divine Origin of Law in Bible.

The study is very difficult. I have devoted 20 years for the study. When I have developed a taste for reading I have found out one and the same points in Law, Bible and Shakespeare. The study is of the world importance because it will develop humanity in toto. I want to bring it to the notice of the world.

I am simple in expxessing my idea. Instead of great people. only for babies God reveals himself. I am not a christian but still I have developed a taste in Bible. It is a revelation as it were.

**Revelation to baby**

St. Matthew 11 Chapter para (25)

Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father Lord of heaven and earth because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes,

Truth is revealed to the baby; the wise people are neglected and the God out of sympathy reveals himself in toto to a baby and the baby is endowed with rare gifts to realise god. It is a rare phenomenon in which one has to realise what is Law. I am having the blessings of God to have this rare realisation of the phenomenon.

10 or 15 years back I was sick continuously for 6 months then I had the opportunity of reading the Bible. There was a sentence "Owe unto the Lawyers"

St. Luke II (46) para

Woe unto you also ye lawyers: For ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne, and ye yourselves touch not the burdens with one of your fingers.

This was the line which struck me very well. I was wondering with searching question with in me. What mistake a lawyer has done? Why he has to undergo the owe? This searching question compelled me to go through the Bible completely cover to cover. Then I found the answer that the lawyer who exploits the clients and takes money out of his pocket without sharing his agony, alone has to undergo the owe and this is the word of God. God is word and Word is God. This is Bible. So I attached more divinity and authenticity to the words in the Bible and probed the same matter in Shakespeare. I found very many answers I will deal with it subsequently.

Regarding judges the Bible says that they should not judge "Mathew 7 (1) Judge not that ye be not judged" Judges activities are being judged by God himself on the day of judgement so they should not judge. God is the centre of power ultimate authority or almighty himself; he has to judge every one "O. T. Psalm 50 (6) And the heavens shall declare his righteousness For God is Judge himself, Selah".

My personal experiences in courts also taught me certain lesssons in my early practice 20 years back. When lawyer was not appearing in cases the presiding officers used to say that they will dispose of the petitions written by petition writers in certain cases. They also asked just to show where is the law that the lawyer has to compulsorily be engaged in a case I also searched the codes in India; they did not show that the presence of lawyer is compulsory in courts.

But when I studied Bible, gone through the Christian principles, and Shakespeare, I was alble to find out the proper answer for this question.

The presence of a lawyer or the function of a lawyer in the court is a divine function. Jesus has discharged the function of a lawyer. He has come on land for redemption of mankind. His function is said to be the propitiation.

Regarding the dress of a lawyer, Black Coat, White Shirting, the decorum in the Court, the arrangements of benches, the lawyer appearing on the right side of the judges in the Criminal courts especially, have got great significance. The gown of the Advocates is symbolising peace. It is a toga of peace it has got very long tradition. The white colour of the dress represents the righteousness of Jesus himself. When Jesus came on land he had the righteousness. The same righteousness is put on by lawyers. The word put on: this is being used in Bible and in Shakespeare and the true meaning is puting on the saintly feeling inwordly in and out and dedicating one for the cause of others. "Ephesians 6 (11) (12) (13) Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the viles of the devil". "Romans 8 (4) The righteousness of the Law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit", "Philippians 3 (9) Through the faith of Jesus Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith.

When I understood all these meanings I was very much pleased about it. The white colour represents the righteousness, the Advocates job was called the white collar job in those days.

When the notices are issued to the parties by a lawyer there the word used is "constrained" when a person is realeased on bail the Advocates has to write in the petition that the accused may be enlarged on bail. The Advocate has to plead the case before the court, he has to make compromise. These things have got great significance. The word constrained is a divine word Jesus himself is constrained the word "compounding" is to make compromise in the court, so the word "compounding", "pleading" these are all divine words. These words are being used in the Bible. I found all these words and the true meaning there on only from the Bible. Saint Paul was seized after 7 days notice, so the convention is being practiced in issuing lawyer notices. God himself has constrained, Jesus himself has constrained, these are all Trinities. Christianity works on the principle of Trinities. I find the same Trinity in the court practice. The judge, the lawyer and the accused are all the Trinities. Trinities in one and one in Trinities. This is contained in law. So law is not a common subject but a divine subject. This is the secret, hidden secret I will prove this through the study of Bible and Shakespeare.

Enlarged on bail "God enlarger": II Corinthians II (10) para we shall be enlarged by you according to our rule abundantly". God is enlarger of mind, heart, liver. He is enthroned there. The accused is a man seeking to be saint. Sinner seeking to be a saint. His heart is being enlarged to become a Saint. This is the function which an Advocate is discharging in the Court. This function is said to be propitiation "I John 2(1) My little children, these things write I unto You that ye sin not. And if any man sin, we have an advocate with the father Jesus Christ the righteous: (2) And he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world". "James 5(20) He which convertes the sinner from the error of his way shall save a soul from death, and shall hide a multitude of sins". "Counsel Revelation 3 (18) Counsel thee God's function".

## SHAKESPEARE

"12th night act 1 scene 1 lines 35, 40. When liver brain and heart these sovereign thrones, are all supplied and filled her sweet perfections with oneself King. "Cymbeline Act V. S. V. Line 12 To you, the liver, heart and brain of Britain by whom I grant the lives, Cymbeline : Act III S. IV 63-72 :

The innocent mansion of my love, my heart fear not: it is empty of all things but grief. Thy master is not there, who was indeed the riches of it".

Loves Labour's Lost Act IV S. III 73-75. This is the liver, vein which makes flash a deity".

So necessarily there should be lawyer in the court. As there is a father in the Church there should be a lawyer in the Court. So the lawyer's functions is a divine function and a religious function which makes the sinner into a saint by his propitiation.

The lawyer was to please the judge under the principle that after birth every man is entrusted with a duty of pleasing God by his services for God by the praises of God and the services to his brethren and he has to pray God and Thank God.

One has to admit ones offence or one has to be courageous enough as to admit his mistakes. The admission or the confession is the new thing under the new testament. Jesus is on the right side of God he is praying and he is answering all the accusation of the devil on the left. Devil is the accuser of mankind and for the entire mankind Jesus enters into intercession, intercessory prayer and gives redemption definitely. On the left side in Indian courts we have the Public Prosecutor: that is being represented under these principles.

# 8

# Buddhism and Primal Therapy : Who is Right and Who is Wrong ?

## (A Dialogue)

*Mishka Jambor*

In order to present the pros and cons regarding the Primal and Buddhist theories, I have constructed and diologue between two representatives of these disciplines; Karl, a primal, theropist, and Katrina, a Buddhist one.

Buddhism is entering the arena of psychotherapy, A collection of essays and reports, "Beyond Therapy" (Ed Guy Cloxton, 1986) show some aspects of recent (le in the Bo's) developments of Buddhist therapy in Great Britain. It is under the inspiration of this book that I wrote this dialogue. Let the diologue begin ;

Katrina : "I appreciate your deep committment to the cause of helping people rid themselves of suffering. I have read Arthur Janov's books, and I participated in a few primal sessions in Australia".

Karl : "But you have some reservation about the effectiveness of primal therapy".

Katrina : That is correct. I doubt that re-living pain can reach and transform the source of pain in an individual. Moreover, I doubt that re-living could prevent the pattern of pain—repression—suffering from recurring in future".

Karl : "What is the basis for your scepticism ? It is some Buddhist belief ?

Katrina : "You may call it a belief—I treat it as a hypothesis which has been supported to my satisfaction : The root causes of pain are selfish desires based on an incorrect idea of the self.

This is not something you have to blindly believe. You can easily establish for yourself at least the first part of the hypothesis—that so- called psychological suffering springs from disappointed expectations, while these expectations are based on selfish desires which do not take others into consideration, which put 'I' before Them;

Karl : Oh, I agree with you. But the root of selfishness, if you like, may be something much more tangible than a false sense of the self. As Janov says, when you can feel, you will feel for others too: until then, a concern for others is just a pretence.

Katrina : Well, I am not discounting the usefulness of the ability to feel for others. But I am questioning the claim that reliving painful experiences or painful feelings will necessarily make you a selfless person. Selflessness is a condition which alone remains, according to Buddhism, when selfishness has been eradicated. In order to become a selfless person, the false idea of an independent self has to be grasped and renounced,
Primal Therapy aspires to free individuals from unnecessary pain, but does not, as fas as I can see, uncover the true causes of suffering.

Karl : Well, you are unfair to Janov. His hypothesis about the cause of suffering points to unfulfilment of fundamental human needs: physiological needs, the need for physical closeness, and the need for love. This hypothesis is being verified in the area of the physiology of repression, and the physiology of recovery through primal.

Katrina : This is precisely what I see as the weak point of the theory. You treat pain as a simple response to objectively noxious or damaging events or lacks (such as the lack of love) in the world. Many researchers have showed however, that pain is mediated, that the response to pain as well as the evaluation of the intensity of pain, depends on many factors: cultural notions about pain, one's sense of control over the pain, one's mood at the time of the occurrence of the pain... You must have heard about Melzack and Wall's research on this subject.

Karl : The puzzle over pain arises when one overlooks the possibility of repression. What looks like a multiplicity of variables which relativise the response of pain becomes a multiplicity of factors all affecting the repression of pain to a larger or smaller degree. When you take into account repression, then you can view the response of p is anaa standard response to an objective harm — only now the response is repressed.

Katrina : I want to go back to the issue of unmet needs for love. In the Primal framework, the child, (or the child's brain) is held always to be correct when it reaches the conclusion: 'unmet need for love'.

The theory does not; allow for an element of interpretation, and thus of subjectivity, to enter the child's process of evaluation.

A conclusion 'not enough love', whether consciously maintained by the child, or just the brain's note to this effect, might nonetheless be mistaken.

Karl : You are speaking from the point of view of someone who is not in touch with their feelings: Thus the judgement of 'being loved' or 'being rejected' comes as an intellectual inference. Small children however, before they develop a great deal of repression, feel spontoneously: They feel, rather than 'think of' rejection. They sense it as you might say.

Katrina : I agree that children would feel more spontaneously than we adults do. Even with feelings however. one cannot dispense with the element of interpretation: The child *feels* pain because she *interpreted* particular behaviour of her parents as threatening or rejecting. Another child in this situation might not feel pain because she interpreted the same behaviour as neutral: Say, for example, that the parents left the child home with a baby sitter while going to the theatre.

Karl : I can see the logic of what you are saying. Certainly some children would tend to feel rejected even if they are not in fact being rejected. Those children probably already accumulated some pain already in their earlier life, even whilst in the womb, so that their response to events is compounded with the pressure of pain.

Katrina : My point is that there seem to be no grounds to hold that any feeling can be an unmediated response to an event. There will always be some mediating beliefs and desires which would be the basis from which an emotional response arises. The very sense in a child that it *needs* the parents love without reference to their needs (or without awareness of their needs in the caee of a younger child) epitomises what the Buddhists call the selfishness of human beings, and children are not excluded from this characterisation.

Karl ; Perhaps your logic seems to show that there are no appropriate feelings to particular situations. But post-primal people however would tell you (and show you) how freely and naturally they respond with feeling-and that in fact they do not need beliefs to justify their feelings.

Katrina : The fact that people may not be *aware* of beliefs underlying their emotional responses does dot prove that they do not act on the basis of some unacknowledged beliefs. Primarily may rid people of some irrational beliefs, but but does primarily actually leave people with wisdom ? A Buddhist therapy would aim - in the long run - to help the client to develop wisdom.

Karl : Tell me more about the Buddhist approach to psychotherapy.

Katrina : We attempt to equip the patient or client with an internal resource which would counteract the negative effector some events, such as the death of dear ones, ones own disability or death, etc.

Primal therapy, as far as I can tell, does not help people to cope with such serious life problems.

Buddhism stresses the preparation of people to be able to face all potentially painful situations and live through them unharmed. The techniques used in the therapy, as well as in the spiritual training are those of meditation, visualisation, gradual acquisition of the ability to control one's own mind without repression...

Karl : But meditation is precisely another sedative which facilitates repression. If you meditate, you do not go to the root of the problem, which is repressed pain. Instead, you build a layer of artificial 'peace of mind'—in fact, a numbed mind.

Katrina : That is correct to a ceriain extent: In its initial phase, meditation may function that way, but more advanced stages of meditation do in fact, reach that layer of repressed emotions. Specific meditative techniques are available so that meditators can work through their repressed feelings and release them: not through entering them fully, but by allowing them to emerge and remaining detatched from them.

Karl : I would doubt whether one can fully release pain in this way- without immersing one self fully in the primal scene.

Katrina : Neither can you prove that this is a practical impossibility. Let us now examine the strength of the post-primal personality. Even assuming that primal clients can release all of their stored pain, they would not leave therapy as particularly compassionate or wise people...

Karl : Why not? to be free from the garbage of doctrines, fears, and phobias makes you immediately a much wiser person in comparison with the average burdened individual.

Katrina : O. K. Let us follow those free individuals, when they encounter a stressful situation—the death of a loved one, for example. You would agree that the free person will feel sorrow, regret, and even rage, much more intensely than we who are still anesthetised with repressed pain. So the post—primal person would suffer even more than a non primal person, and finally a new process of repression is likely to settle in. Thus, the heightened sensitivity and receptivity will leave the person more vulnerable to pain, and therefore a prospective candidate for future repression.

Karl : I think you have exaggerated. Primal clients are adults, and thus much less likely to be crushed by a single event Even if you consider the death of a spouse or a child, the pain of this event is not going to be over whelming as the disappearance of the parent for a small child. The pain over the death will be there, but other emotions—joy over a sunny day, admiration for someone elses achievement—will be present as well, due to the very openness of the person.

Katrina : This is a very optimistic prognosis. I think it is safer to assume that a catharsis therapy will leave clients vulnerable. Buddhism would serve both categories of people—those open and vulnerable, and those with repressed pain.

Karl : So you suggest that post—primal clients take still another therapy-Buddhism.

Katrina : Precisely. Primal clients may have some advantages, but we would assume they need further training to develop a stable strength—in order to be able to cope well with any life situation—including the time of the client's own death.

Karl : It is that extra wisdom which you think might be lacking in primal clients.

Katrina : Yes, Eventually, the theraphy should lead the person to develop wisdom via the training of the mind.

**Karl :** You and Buddhism assume that a client has to be burdened with dogmas, religious beliefs, obligation to do certain practices such as meditation, and that would produce wisdom in the practitioner. But wisdom is spontaneity, responsiveness, capacity to feel appropriately, lack of anxiety, freedom from dogmas...

**Katrina :** Oh you sound like a Zen teacher. The Zen Buddhists would completely agree with you. But paradoxically, this very freedom and wisdom is the result of severe discipline.

Let me explain. By the development of wisdom I did not mean acquiring more new beliefs. The specific techniques Buddhism offers—various types of meditation, training of mindfulness in ordinary activities, studying of scriptures—aim at exposing and later freeing the mind from stagnant negative beliefs (dogmas). and thus developing or uncovering the original spontaneity of the person.

**Karl :** Well, we agree on the validity of the outcome, but we disagree about the method.

Primal therapy predicts that re-living pain is sufficient to free the person from the constant pressure of pain. Later, the person will use her/his unobscured wisdom in directing their life and letting themselves be... spontaneous.

**Katrina :** While Buddhists predict the same results from Buddhist practice, Hmm... I can bring myself to accept that primelling helps people to achieve the same goal we aim at in our practice. But let me raise the last issue.

Buddhism strongly states that no development of a human being occurs where compassion is missing. Primal theory does not preclude the spontaneous arising of compassion, but it does not particularly attempt to encourage the process.

In Buddhism we do not leave this important element of human growth to chance. The cultivation of compassion is facilitated through specific meditations and exercises.

**Karl** Here I take my chance, and suggest that perhaps the Zen practitioners have more faith in human nature... and let that quality appear spontaneously by itself — when the obstacles to it have been removed.

**Katrina :** I am afraid that is spot—on. But this human nature they call—Buddha Nature.

# 9

# The Practical Aspect of Buddhism

*R. K. Deswal*

## INTRODUCTION

The Buddha was a great religious teacher of the world. He was the son of a king. He gave up his heirship to a throne, put on the grab of a mendicant and devoted his whole life in the most self-sacrificing manner to the spiritual well-being of the people. Buddha taught an important faith to the mankind, i.e. Buddhism. In fact, the old religions of the land viz., Vedism. Brahmanism and Hinduism in later years had become burdensome and tyrannical as Catholicism had become in Europe. Buddhism being a religion not belongs to any caste, creed and colour. It is ethically also of a higher type. Buddhism teaches salvation from sufferings and sorrows, the attainment of Nirvana or perfect peace. This salvation is to be attained by means of eight steps. viz., Right view, Right thought, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Living, Right Efforts, Right Mindedness and Right Meditation. The Buddha also laid down five moral precepts which his followers were expected to obey and to preach These were: (1) not to take life, (2) not to steal, (3) abstain from sexual misconduct, (4) not to lie or deceive and (5) not to drink intoxicating liquors.

Buddha taught the doctrine of non- resistence. that evil can't be overcome by evil, but only by good. He taught the doctrine of human brotherhood in a most impressive way, both by precept and example Buddhism became a great religion and a great influence for peace, gentleness, toleration and goodwill. Buddhism became the dominant faith of India. The widespread and ethically noble religion of the Buddha also became a world religion.

## II. IN PRACTICE

Buddhism teaches the highest possible doctrines of purity, kindness and justice. It makes the lives of monks and the ordinary householder an example of noble virtues. It discourages openly and utterly all superstitious and unscientific teachings. Buddhists believe in using sober argument in the proper place and abstaining from abuse of other faiths, which signify immense toleration.

The final goal of a living being according to Buddhism is the solution of the problems of the suffering world. The world is full of suffering. Suffering is the salient feature of all sentient life. The body and the mind are impermanent. And that which is impermanent is liable to suffering. Hence, it is not right to say 'this is mine, I am this, this is the soul of me'. It is the certainty of impermanence that makes life unsatisfactory. Where there is birth, there is also death. This is transiency. Because of transiency there is suffering (dukkha).

According to Buddha, the method (upaya) which will give release from suffering (dukkha), sorrow, pain disease, loneliness, old age, and death lies in "the Four Noble Truths" which inter alia include "the Eight Fold Path". These Four Noble truths (Catvārī ārya Satyānī) are : Suffering (dukkha), the origin of suffering (dukkha samudaya), the passing beyond suffering (dukkha Nirodha), and the way to the cessation of suffering (dukkha Nirodha Mārga). Buddha gave emphasis on the existence of evil as well as the cause and the method of its extinction. It represents the three characteristics of Buddhistic Philosophy, which are as follows : (1) Pessimism, (2) Positivism and (3) Pragmatism.[1] Buddha avoided to extremes and gained the enlightenment through the middle path, which produces insight and knowledge and tends to lead to Nirvāna.[2]

Here it should be noted that Five Precepts are also designed by Buddha to neutralise some defilements, because these defilements are also causes suffering. The Buddhist ideals of morality, in fact, are summed up in the form of certain rules of conduct (precepts). It shall be more accurate to describe it (Buddhism) as an ethico-philosophy to be practised by each follower in his practical conduct. Let us briefly review each precept.

**(a) I undertake the precept to abstain from taking of life :**

According to the first precept, a follower of Buddha, is supposed to abstain from destroying, causing to be destroyed or sanctioning the destruction of living beings including anything that has life right from a small insect upto man. A Buddhist recognizes his relationship with all living creatueres which is so close that the harming of any living being inevitably the harming of himself. Comparing one's own life with

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[1] Sharma, I C., *Ethical Philosophy of India*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London—1962, p. 155.

[2] Burtt, E.A., *The Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha*, New York—1955, p. 29.

> that of other beings, Buddha declared, "Everyone fears violence, everyone likes life; comparing oneself with others one would never slay or cause to slay.[3]

The extent of moral guilt in killing depends on the physical and mental development of the being that is killed and the circumstances under which the deed is committed. The particular injunction has been rendered in the following words :

> "Do not kill a living being. You should not kill or condone killing by others. Having abandoned the use of violence, you should not use force either against the strong or the feeble".[4] Therefore, we should actively promote the physical and mental welfare of all beings.

**(b) I undertake the precept not to take that which is not given to me:**

The second precept implies attitudes of non-acquisitiveness and non-attachment, a utilitarian use of resources as opposed to squandering them. This precept is, therefore, an injunction against any form of dishonest dealings.[5]

Whilst governments or monopoly organisations can afford to adopt spend thrift or uneconomic policies, support can be given to conservationist bodies that seek to secure scarce commodities or amenities for the enjoyment of all life, without expectation of reward.

**(c) I undertake the precept to abstain from sensual misconduct :**

The man who solemnly undertakes to observe the third precept of right conduct should therefore purify the source from which actions follow, namely, his thoughts, remembering that 'The harm that an enemy will do to an enemy is not so great as that a wrongly directed mind will do to oneself".[6] But, unfortunately, in the west this precept has come to assume a purely sexual connotation. Of course, the Buddha was concerned with controlling all the senses—five physical and one mental. Apart, therefore, from obeying the customary social dictates of a particular society, the prime intention is to root out unhealthy or unwholesome desires and motivating factors. In view of the conditioning processes that influence us—kama, genetic, educational, domestic, environmental—it is doubtful whether one's personality can be totally transformed in the space of a single lifetime. However, the influence of mental cultivation (meditation) acts in such a way as to effect gradual changes in our

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3 Dhammapada, 130 (quoted : Norman. H.C. ed., *The Commentary on the Dhammapada*. (PTS London - 8914), Vol. IV).

4 Sutta Nipata, 394. (quoted : H. Saddhatissa. *Buddhistic Ethics*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Londoo—1970.

5 For details see Kanikhavitarani, 26-30 (quoted Ibid ).

6 Dhammapada, VV. 13,14: (Op. cit., *The Commentary on the Dhammapada*).

psychic make up. Outwardly, as Buddhists, we can try to influence society to the extent that books, films or adverts that promote or condone a misuse of the senses—and not merely limited to the cruder manifestations of sex and violence—are rendered bereft of popular support.

**(d) I undertake the precept to abstain from false speech :**

Reflecting deeply on this injunction, we find that lying is applied to the effort of the body and speech, on the part of one who is deceitful, to destroy the good of others; the volition setting up the bodily and vocal effort to deceive, with intent to cheat others[7]. It means that the fourth percept implies an aura free from deception and half-truths, let alone outright lying and chicanery. The kind of speech that is extolled is that which produces peace and harmony, not that which inflames the passions. This should not imply compromising basic moral and intellectual principles but obviously a conciliatory attitude is sorely needed in the present world where artificial divisions are deliberately culttivated and false grievances made to justify displays of greed and hatred.

**(c) I undertake the precept to abstain from drinks and drugs :**

Perhaps many people did not consider the importance of the final rule of training until the advent of hard drugs that were used for a time to induce artificial states of euphoria "heightened awareness", as they were collectively termed by the disciples of Timorthy Leary. The "acid scene", in which many misguided Buddhists participated, has mercifully passed, but our social concern should impel us to ensure that all stimulants of this nature are totally eradicated In some ways this precept is more important than the others in that the whole health and personality of the human being is involved. A complete break down of such can only be avoided by eliminating these deadly substances at their source. At a governmental level much more pressure can and should be exerted to ban, for example, cultivation of the poppy where the trade in opium is conducted.

**Conclusiuo :**

Buddhism, of course, discourages the intake of all stimulants which have a deleterious effects on the brain cells or are otherwise harmful to the mind or body. Here stimulants can mean undesirable or unnecessary influences and the mass media can be cited as a collective example unless we can train our minds to withstand such "opinion making" and understand things, "as they truly are". Therefore we should make determined efforts to control our minds and bodies, beginning with the grosser sense activities and culminating in complete purification of view and mind.

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[7] Dhammasanganī Atthakattha—Atthasālinī, p. 130 (Op. cit., Buddhistic Ethics).

## 10

# Types of Rationality—Marx, Freud and Fromm

*Reni Avramova*

The mode of thinking, typical of a given time is usually denoted with the term 'type of rationality'. The concept of type in this particular respect reminds not only of a process of abstraction from the peculiarities of the individual minds, as of the circumstance that the way in which man perceives and analyses data from social and non social reality does not naturalty spring from his individual cognitive abilities, his level of intellectual development or his theoretical inclinations. The type of thinking is a social product—i e, a common activity, from whence it can be defined as a mental form, which stays above the individual and passes beyond his power of control. Thus within the framework and the social limitations of a certain kind of culture, different schools and theoretical movements, associated with the names of individual thinkers appear, proving thus the controversies, characteristic of the corresponding type of thinking and offering a chance to bring together tendencies which seem on the surface to be incompatible.

Such is for example the case with Marx, Freud and Fromm—three types of thinking, shaped on the background of 19th and 20th century culture. At a first approximation, the relations between the first two thinkers can be expressed with the help of the two poles in the dialectical triad—the contradictory sides of the thesis and the antithesis, whereas Fromm should be placed perhaps to stay for a possible synthesis of psychoanalysis and Marxism as regards their claims about human nature. 'The theories of Erich Fromm show on the psychological side the influence of Freud and Rank, on the sociological side the influence of Marx'.[1]

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[1] J. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, Penguin Books. 1985, p. 149.

This is the remark, made by J. Brown in his book 'Freud and the Post-Freudians', which alludes not only to the theoretical sources of Fromm's conception of man but to his well thought of desire to supersede the extremities or the oppositional views of two theories, which have inspired enduring traditions in social thinking. I should like to briefly outline some aspects of the psychoanalytical teaching on the one hand and some peculiarities of Marx's methodology in the field of cognition, on the other, which made possible in my view Fromm's related way of raising the same issues in a way of uniting the opposite theories of his predecessors.

Describing the varied impact of Freud and his thinking on the social sciences, Will Herberg will turn out to be right when he asserts that 'least enduring, perhaps of all Freud's contributions have been his own particular ventures into sociological and anthropological speculations'.[2] It is a well known fact that as early as the appearance of the 'Interpretation of Dreams' (1900, Engl. transl. 1913), the founder of psychoanalysis has been clearly expressing his desire to enlarge the sphere of reference of his theory by passing from the field of research into pathological in human behaviour and the creation of a corresponding therapeutic procedure for treatment of psychoneurotic symptoms, to the more general sphere of metapsychological explanation of the sane society and the normal life of its members. Thus the Freudian model of the prehistory of mankind was shaped, which as Herbert Marcuse claims 'defines the essence of being as Eros in contrast with its traditional definitions as Logos[3]. The universal biological validity of the proposed statements in this regard has been strongly doubted even during Freud's lifetime mainly by the representatives of accademic experimental psychology The same is the case with the public acceptance (almost equalled to 'fury, resentment and disgust')[4], of the total picture of personality, provided in addition to the historical explanation of the origin and character of civilisation in Freud's last theoretical considerations, in the form of a system of three levels, organized according to the degree of consciousness in id, ego and super-ego. When taken together, these parts of Freud's analysis, being evidently separated from the pure psychological context of his theory and almost completely 'emancipated from its medical background'[5], mark a new direction in Freud's biological approach—its enrichment with cultural or sociological emphasis in general.

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[2] Will Herberg, Freud, the Revisionists, and Social Reality, In: Freud and the 20th Century, London, 1958, p. 143.

[3] Herbert Marcuse. Eros and Civilization, Boston, 1955, p. 248.

[4] Hale, Freud and the Americans, Oxford, 1971, p. 5.

[5] Ibid

However there is still enormous resistance to the possibility of accepting sociologically orientated assumptions in Freud's psychoanalysis and lack of sociologism is considered to be perhaps one of the most popular accusations ever raised against the orthodox, classical Freudianism. But it should be noted as well that the statement about the lack of sociologism in Freud's psychoanalysis can not be taken just for granted. Marcuse for example begins his 'Philosophical Inquiry into Freud' with the statement: 'In contrast to the revisionists, I believe that Freud's theory is in its very substance sociological and that no new cultural or sociological orientation is needed to reveal this substance[6]. And it is also a well known fact that when the daughter Anna Fraud begins research in the secondary functions of the ego, her main theoretical assumptions are proposed by Freud himself at the end of his life. They lie in the supposition of the double nature of the mechanism of defence of the ego and the necessity for invettigations of the process of repression on two levels—interactions of the ego and the layer of the unconscious on the one hand, and the ego and the factors from the external world—on the other.

That is why I think we shall be nearer the true state of things If we accept the existence of a sociological side in Freud's psychoanalytical theory, for it is not only in the sphere of the sexual roots of neurosis, that Freud seeks for the determinants of human essence and behaviour. The question is, however, what is the character of the social determinism, adopted by Freud and what are the ambitions of his followers who try to find out new sociological ways for the further developments of psychoanalysis.

As often happens in the historical development of scientific knowledge, the future life of a given hypothesis is ensured by means of its partial, or entire negation or revision. Thus the second country of psychoanalysis — The United States of America — the place, where Freud received his first academic honour during the visit, paid to Clark University—accepted Freud's teaching and secured its great popularity and fame, by adopting parallely to the orthodox version, the revised one as well. Revision is the price, paid by orthodox Freudianism in order to be preserved in the different schools of Neo-Freudianism.[7] The characteristic features of the new intellectual current are summarised by Clara Thompson as a 'shift of the emphasis from the past to the present, from the unconscious to the conscious, from the biological to the cultural level, from the constitution of the individual to the environment[8]. Or to say it in other words, despite of the numerous differences among the various trends in the American culturalist school, connected with the activity of Horney, Sullivan and Fromm, a strong common theoretical attitude unites them and it springs precisely from the scientific imperfections of Freud's anthropological and sociological views. According to Fromm's own confession, the unity of the cultural revision of Freud is based upon the critical attitude towards the libido theory. Nevertheless, the unity turns out to be variety of differences even greater than the similarity. 'Horney and Sullivan thought of cultural patterns in the traditional anthropological sense, while my approach (Fromm's) is based upon the analysis of the economic, political, psychological forces that form the basis of society[8]. Thus the idea of a possible synthesis of psychoanalysis and Marxism occured, which was realized as a new possible direction in the critical school. I am leaving at present the scientific possibilities of making such a synthesis, having in mind the logical totality of both systems when taken independently and taking into consideration the fact that every arbitary or mechanical attachment of new elements which are not contained in the premises of both theories, or do not consequently evolve from them, will result in lack of systemness of the new form. For all that Fromm is unique in discovering and taking into consideration a viewpoint, typical both of Marx's and of Freud's teaching although in a different aspect. The common intellectual spirit of Marxism and Freudianism is expressed by Fromm by the motto, taken from the Introduction to the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' — man lives with illusions, because these illusions make the misery of real life bearable. Later on Marx will add that the social illusions not only make life bearable but constitute under certain social conditions, the only forms in which the world is intellectually constructed for the individual, 'the only language that expresses the social in consciousness, the only forms in which the subject fixes and experiences his social life, being oblivious to their real path and genesis [9]

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[6] Herbert Marcuse, Eros and..., p. 4.

[7] Ibid., p. 249.

[8] Erich Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, Essays on Freud, Marx and Social Psychology, Harmondsworth, 1978, p 34.

This gives evidence for a new epistemological situation when a cognitive pessimism is substituted for the old rationalistic optimism. In order to explain this interesting metamorphosis in the history of cognition, I need to give a short description of the principles of classical rationalism. Its epistemological optimism is based on the theoretical prerequisite that being—as posited in thought and reproduced by reflection, is precisely the being as it is, essence is given together with the intellectual procedure through which it is attained, even more, essence is considered to be the a priory rule of the intellectual construction of the object. Man's attitude to the world turns out to be nothing else but the attitude of reason towards itself, realized in the form of self consciousness, 'measured uniquely by perception and representation as actualized in the reflexive knowledge of the individual and at the same time independently of whatever subjectivity.[10] The abstract subject like an absolute modality personifies the universal viewpoint, and no barriers come to disturb or to conceal from him the transparent subject object relation. Or simply put—the strong traditional belief in objectivity necessity, totality and general validity of knowledge is elaborated by the naive conviction in the rational character of being. In all cases cognition turns out to be an instrument to get hold of the absolute. And it could not be otherwise since classical rationality aims at defending the absolute nature of ideas, the final and universal didactical purity of the cognitive acts. The rationalistic theoretical assumptions are constructed in such a way as to provide for an absolute prediction of the cognitive content of human knowledge, on the one hand and its absolute correctness—on the other. For this purpose classical rationalism has removed whatever prerequisites to consciousness, which lie outside of the cognitive process. The image is so and so because it is a necessary one, and could not be otherwise since its necessity lies in the rational character of world organization, settled once and for ever. That is why it is no good asking 'why does the object occur in consciousness just in this form rather than in another'[11]. The classical idea of reflection has presupposed the answer even before having formulated the question. Something more of such a question seems to be quite artificially imposed on this kind of thinking.

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[9] M. Mamardavili, Analysis of Consciousness in the Works of Marx. Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 32, No. 2, p. 102.

But lots of things can not be accepted by reason—i.e as being rational. The absolute charmony, proclaimed and accepted by the uncritical justification of reality can not hide the bitter discrepancy between a rational construction and irrational world, which contrary to man's expectations is not always favourable to him. And one more additional argument against the absolute validity of knowledge. Neither the subject nor the object or the very social mechanism of cognition are absolute. They are changeable. In this respect, historical approach to thinking, adopted by Marx, reveals itself to be the new methodological platform, the new type of rationality, which makes possible the theoretical transition from 'dealing with human nature in general to dealing with human nature as modified in each historical epoch'. On the background of this theoretical platform the necessary content of our ideas is sought in quite a different direction—in circumstances, placed outside of the pure cognitive field, and due to which our ideas of the external world are shaped to acquire distorted, false, converted or in short—illusory cognitive content. This misrepresentation of reality, provided by false consciousness is caused by a complex process of metamorphosis of the essential characteristics of the social objects.

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[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.

False cognition is possible only in a world in which essence and appearance of social things change their places—appearance is substituted for the real essential characteristics and acquires the illusory quality of being the thing in itself, while the true state of things is that appearance corresponds to the way in which things are given to us. The pseudo-essence is called ay Marx converted forms of real social relations. They are absolutely independent from self consciousness This is in fact one of the most strange things about social convertions and the knowledge of them They are also called by Marx objective conceptual forms of real relations. The process of metamorphosis of essence into appearance and then of appearance into false, illusory essence, is constituted by the following stages or elements. First comes reduction of social quality to abstraction, i e. reduction of the universality of the social bond to abstraction as an expression and consequence of the abolition of the state of 'cosmic unity with nature and society... to the present state when the individual has become isolated from both'[12] The alienated man has become robbed to abstraction because the only sphere of functioning of his sociality—i e., the field where his work receives a social recognition is the market and the relation of exchange, a simple quantitative ratio in which the activity of the individual matters only with its characteristics of being and expenditure of human power deprived of individuality or concreteness. Then follows the attachment of the abstract relation to physical bodies, a process which results in the appearance of the abstract universality of the social bond at the same time and in the same realm of actuality with the ossified results of its estranged existence. The phenomenon is called reification, or convertion of social relations into entities which become signs of social significance and thus the whole movement of the social substance 'assumes in man's eyes the fantastic form of relations among things, presented as suprasensible properties of these things'.[13] The last stage in the precess of convertion is a personification of reified social relations in the diversity of social roles and institutions—i.e. personification of institutionalized social life.

As far as the contradiction between the abstract universality of the social bond and its concrete actuality is reproduced in society, social essence cannot be saved from false objective appearance, because it must constantly attach itself to the objectified results of man's activity 'omitting real relations and substituting them by certain transformations, leading through confusion of the social meaning with the physical properties, to naturalization of meaningful signs'[14] That is why converted forms can be regarded as the conceptual objectifications in which the misrepresentation of reality is contained, inavailable to introspection. The kind of reality they offer to consciousness are physical appearances, 'occuring out of social relations of things as suprasensible properties of these things'[15] The replacement of real structures is achieved in the form of creation of certain sets of significant objects. They are the forms that serve to present the real relations in consciousness. But what really is presented in consciousness are not the social objects in themselves, but things, separated from their initial content, deprived of their social essence, things which have acquired the status of ossified products, opposed to social substance. After the process of transformation has been completed, one is left with the false impression, that the signs of social significance he perceives are constant and irreducible objects of knowledge, constantly reproduced by the social relations themselves, but presented at the same time to belong to natural bodies.

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[12] J Brown Freud and , p 159.

[13] Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. III, Moscow, 1977, p. 830.

[14] M. Mamardasvili, Analysis of.. , p. 110.

Marx's analysis constantly deals with such practical appearances, destined to construct the final objects of human cognition. Consciousness assumes a special function of producing ideas as an abstract expression of abstract relations. Man can no longer deceive himself that being—as posited in thought and reproduced by reflection, is precisely the being as it is, as it exists. What is presented on the surface of social life are not real relations but their substitutions which provide the cognitive material, A pseudo-world is established for the real world and a pseudo self is established for the real self. The idea of a pseudo-world constitutes perhaps the most interesting aspect of Fromm's approach to classical psychoanalysis It is revealed on the background of a parallel, made by Fromm between the Freudian concept of the unconscious and the individual repression and the concept of 'social unconscious', interpreted in terms of 'totality of forces, which work behind man's back, while he has the illusion of being free, the economic forces and their political representations, or the social filter in short. It is covered by ideologies (rationalizations) which are subjectively experienced as being true, when in reality they are nothing but socially produced and shared fictions[16] Thus the social status of man, described by Marx, the explanation itself being accepted by Fromm to a great extent, seems to be very close to the neurotic personality, described by Freud and classified later by his critics as one of the three possible ways of human behaviour in our time: ... the usual solution—conforming completely and willingly to the standards of society; the neurotic solution— secretly rebelling while outwardly conforming; the creative solution— realizing himself as an individual.[17]

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15 Ibid

16 Erich Fromm, The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx's Theory. In: On Disobedience and Other Eassys, London, 1984.

17 J Brown, Freud and ..., p. 159.

18 S. Stoev, The Neofreudism of E. Fromm and H. Marcuse (A Critical Analysis), In Darshana International, Vol. XV No. 3, 1975.

## II

# The Moral Vision of Charles Dickens

*Parveen Kaur Khanna*

An artist achieves a moral influence as well as aesthetic beauty because the work necessarily springs from his whole personality, including his moral nature. And the basic quality of Dickens's writing is a sort of moral centrality, a directness of relation to moral fact. As early as 1838 the Edinburgh Review, says Humphry House, saluted his work as a moral force, one of the qualities we most admire in him is his comprehensive spirit of humanity.

Dickens was at heart a moralist to the extent of an idealist. He was no believer in the theory of 'art for art's sake.' He took a more serious view of art and of the artist's duties to the public His serious purpose was to make the novel the instrument of morality. Joseph Gold rightly asserts "The moralist starts from faith, from a hard foundation of belief that what we do and what we are, matters and can be changed. Dickens, as moralist, moves with increasing penetration to the expansion of how this can be done,"

Dickens acted as the dianostician of the social evils of his contemporary society. He used his novels as vehicles for his social ideas. The moral teaching is present in every book he wrote. Diana Neill says: "his novels, humour apart are morality plays in which the good angels win the battle for the soul of man, which is just what the majority of the Victorians were sure they would." Thus *Chuzzelwit* is a condemnation of selfishness and greed, *Dombey and Son*, a condemnation of pride, *Great Expectattions*, an illustration of the corrupting influence of money and *Hard Times* embodies a moral problem an issue between ways of living in the machine age. The major message of *David Copperfield* is that if a man has moral energy and fortitude in him, the adversity of circumstances cannot suppress him, for it is essentially one's moral force that constitutes the very foundations of one's life.

In spite of Dickens's presentation of sinful and sordid life in his novels, he had no sympathy with it. He depicted scenes of crime and degradatioo only to condemn them at the end. He has presented the gleam of beauty from the midst of ugliness and the example of virtue from among the multitudes of the vicious, and it is virtue that makes the foundation of morality.

The novels of Dickens belong entirely to the humanitarian movement of the Victorian age. In his novels, he has struck from first to last a clear note of humanitarianism. His aim was to arouse the public conscience to various evils and making them feel the pulse of society. Through his novels, Dickens also induced practical social reformers to introduce healthy reforms in the contaminated stream of social life. He has thoroughly exposed man's inhumanity to man. His attacks covers a great part of English life, public and private-education, the cruelities of school-masters, religion, social morality in its broad sense and so on. Through his child characters of those who are alienated from or threatened by children." Dickens's whole work was penetrated by a consciousness of the gulf between the classes His whole working life was a crusade for better homes, hospitals and better schools. He awakened the Victorian conscience and stirred it for a better way of life.

George Orwell considers Dickens to be a radical moralist. According to him "Even if Dickens was a burgeois, he was certainly a subversive writes a radical, one might truthfully say a rebel". Likewise Joseph Gold has pointed out: "not only did Orwell see that the moralist and the radical meet in Dickens but he also managed a penetrating glimpse into the method by which reforms could be envisioned by the moralist. 'It seems that in every attack Dickens makes upon society he is always pointing to a change of spirit rather than a change of structure'.

Dicken's world-view can be interpreted from the Marxian angle because the ills of human society are directly attributed to maldistribution of economic resources. Human life is not always coloured by the glories of happiness and joy. The society in which we live is evil. Dickens has highlighted the areas of darkness and has drawn our attention to the fact that the human civilization in its present form is not desirable. He directed his pen to root out the evils of the Victorian society, but his themes have a universal significance because in the final analysis his novels present a better but authentic comment on human nature in general.

Dickens's moral influence has been on the whole, robust and rational. His moral imagination is ever on the prowl in his works.

He wrote his novels with the definite purpose of helping the community to discover itself. The over whelming popularity of his novels in his own days and in ours is proof enough that he fulfilled this function most successfully. To conclude in the words of William J. Long Dickens "fought against injustice: he championed the weak against the strong; he gave courage to the faint. and hope to the weary in heart, and in the love which the public gave him in return he found his best reward".

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## 12

# Violence in Indian Society–A Philosophical Study

*Indra Prasad*

This paper makes a modest attempt to study a particular manifestation of human state of imbalance called violence. Though, violence has become a normal phenomenon of almost all over the world, still Indian society seems to be suffering from it badly. Some foreign countries have somehow this impression that India is now among the most violent and turbulent society. Indian society is called to be a secular and tolerant one, still, it has become frazile and vulnerable to violence even on the slightest pretext, as if violence is in the hearts of men. The most threatening problem is that the line between violent and non-violent movements is fast disappearing and if situation is not controlled, the end is virtual disaster of human sepecies. Violence has routinized and no more it creates ripples in our minds. The normal expression of any dissatisfaction is agitation. One trembles to see the cult of gun and bomb. Every moment, we are moving with a sense of insecurity, uncertainly and tension and we are robbed off our peace and equilibrium of mind. What type of this modern civilization is ? Does progress mean modernization, industrialization and explosion of scientific technology only ? Is not the welfare of Indian society in jeopardy ? Should the well-being of this society not be made the central basis of each progress ? Thus, a challenge to a cooperative enterprise is there to deal with this problem of violence. Philosophy can also contribute its share to this understanding. This is the justification of this paper. But, this study of the problem of social Ethics is not formalistic in character like recent Ethics, which has confined itself to the investigation of the general logical properties of moral discourse and has largely ignored the broad psychological context of motives and purposes in which that kind of discourse has its life". The study is undertaken with reference to the concrete and specific human interests with which moral discourse is connected. The present paper plans to discuss the following questions in this connection.

( i ) What is the meaning of the term 'violence' ?
( ii) How to make distinctions in social actions ?
(iii) What are the manifestations of violence ?
(iv) What are the causes of it ?
( v) What is the moral justification of it ?

The dictionary meaning of 'violence' is excessive, unrestrained or unjustifiable force. It includes outrage, confrontation, injury, rape etc.[1] Wilkinson states, 'violence is the illegitimate use or threatened use of coercion resulting, or intended to result in, the death, injury, restraint or intimidation of persons or the destruction or seizure of property[2]. Gandhiji says 'violence is the law of the brute'[3] This concept of violence must be very old, so far Indian Philosophy is concerned. It is at least as old as the vedas because the command of the Veda, 'Ma himsyāt sarva bhutani', means 'Do not kill any living being. Buddha and Mahabir called Non violence as the highest virtue which evidently expresses the concept of violence as vice. For Jaina truth is the necessary corollary of non-violence which again indicates that violence never leads us to truth, Buddha means by non-violence, a universal compassion which is a positive content. So, violence appears to be negative one which ignores the ethical relations with others.

Gandhiji says "Ahimsā means love in the pauline sense and yet something more than love defined St'Paul, although I know St.' Paul's beautiful definition is good enough for all practical purposes[4]", For Gandhiji, if non-violence is the law of our species, violence is the law of the brute. The brute does not obey any law except that of physical might.

Thus, both the concepts of non-violence and violence go together and the latter is as old concept as the former one. The term Non-violence though appear to be negative, still has a positive import. All the positive feelings like love, compassion, justice etc. counteract the feeling of violence. So, violence appears to be negative term because it would be absence of all the above positive feelings.

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[1] Quinton, Anthony in the article 'Has man an essence'? in Thoughts and Thinkers, p. 4.

[2] Wikinson Paul 'Terrorism and the Liberal State' p 23, Macmillan Press Ltd., London.

[3] Gandhi, M K. Young India Aug. 11, 1920.

[4] Gandhi M. K. Harijan March 13, 1936.

(ii) The second question to be discussed is as to how to judge the acts of violence. Being a negative term it will never get approval of the society and its members. So, approval or disapproval follow from the particular structure of the society with which that act of violence is related. The formulas of social ethics may be fundamentally same in the different levels of the development of a society, but its application would differ which can never be known apriori. The social ideal is not absolute but grows out of the social reality. The role of justice develops in societies. Buclile[5] maintains that the progress of the society is not determined by the discovery of aprioris ethical truths. These truths are handed over from one generation to another generation and even from civilization to civilization, still do not indicate the degree of progress. It depends chiefly on the discovery of scientific truths and attitude of modernity.

To add further, in the societies which have reached high degree of civilization, the ethical relations between men and the conscience of that society amply express that progress. Every society is governed by certain rules of conduct. These principles are manifested in the declared policies and consequent activities of the members of that society. Indian society is similarly guided by certain norms prescribed on the basis of the constitution of India. Government's policies through many deliberations are legitimised in the mind of a common man and once legitimised it takes the form of a code of conduct manifested in the policies and actions of that society.

These policies and actions reflect and also are consequent upon the socio-economic-political-religious culture of that society. The Indian society is multi-lingual, multi religious, multi-cultured etc. Based on the basic philosophy of one ultimate Truth manifesting itself in the different forms of Nature, the political concepts of democracy, equality, freedom, fraternity are entering strongly in the minds of Indian people. The ancient traditions also influence our actions but the progress of society always reminds us that the traditions are not to be taken as idolatorous. Whatever changes are to be brought must be in the prevalent framework of society. Any change entirely foreign in its mode may not be successful in the living trends of that society. So, cultural traditions are to be analysed judiciously to sort out the living and dead.

The contemporary Indian society due to many exposures have assumed changes at all levels of its cultural life. "Culture is understood broadly as a body of shared values, beliefs, norms, modes of thought and actions, techniques, institutions, art forms, world views, philosophies and so on of a given society".[6]

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[5] Henry Thomas Buckle 'History of Civilization'.

[6] I. P. O. Vol. XII No. I Jan. March 1985, p. I.

The individual members of the society though differ many times on a particular issue, still the total culture organizes these differences without discarding them The whole structure includes both subjective and objective elements The interiorization of the culture would depend on the psychological make up of the individual. But, the individual though interprets the culture and responds to it in his own way, still the role of the externality of the social environment cannot be denied All these together produce a culture in which variety of factors work and it becomes a way of looking at the external environment, at others and at one self.

The most current factor of Indian culture is the political one. People are becoming politically aware due to its electoral system and political participation is no more limited to chosen few Thus the total culture is now socio-economic religious-political and any evaluation of the social conduct would be deceded by this whole structure. Violence would also come in this view.

Secondly, distinction of acts can be based on their ethicality. Moral judgments can be passed on these acts. The moral concepts involved are of freedom and responsibility behind doing acts. Is the person indulging in violence totally free from any consideration either of society or of otherselves or of nation etc. Is such freedom posible and if possible, is it applicable in the case of person indulging in violence ?

Here, reference to individual member of the society is made because it is an integral part of the society, which is organization of these individuals. So, the moral progress of each individual would automatically lend to the progress of the society and a level of conscience is achieved.

Accordingly, one cannot say that an individual indulging in violent acts is totally free to the point of being non-responsible. Non-responsibility is possible in some cases like when one is a moral or non moral or supra-moral. For example, if a person is a sort of eccentric, whimsical and arbitrary one lacking minimum level of moral progress, his actions will be of a moral type. Non moral actions include involuntary acts like spontaneous actions, actions of inanimate objects, abnormal persons, children, accidental actions etc. Supra-moral person is he who attains liberation and is above the concept of responsibility, Is a person or a group indulging in violence is non responsible in any one of these senses ? The answer would be an emphatic No, because he is not free in any of three senses. His freedom is connected with his sense of responsibility. He has to take responsibility of his actions and consequently would be morally judged.

The third point considered for judging the act of violence is the Jaina concept. This paper without any bias has selected this view because Jaina philosophy keeps Ahimsā[7] on the top of the virtues and its opposite himsā is to be discarded. A brief reference is given, related to the purpose.

In Jainisum one finds a broad division of Dravya himsā and Bhāvahimsā. The former is killing or torturing any living being without any intention. The latter is done deliberately in the form of killing or attacking some life. This is himsā in the real sense. A jaini resorts to Mahavrata if he rejects deliberately violence, untruth, theft, sex and greed for ever. Jainas classify the society into four steps of Bhiksu, Bhiksuni Srāvaka and Srāvika. The former two have to follow the path of virtue essentially without exception. The latter two are expected to follow the virtuous path to the best of their capacity. Saints have to reject both intentional and unintentional forms of himsā but a householder has to reject 'Bhāva-Himsā' positively. So a distinction between responsibilities and duties is observed within the same society. A Sādhu has to discard himsā at any cost from his thought, speech and deed But, a bread-earner can be excused in certain cases depending on his vocation, status and responsibility etc. We find mention of Virodhi himsā which means violence committed to protect oneself, one's nation and other members of the society. Jaina's analysis of violence seems to be liberal and relative one and not absolute.

(iii) One can observe now the different types of violence. One finds that there is violence of all kinds, intensity and duration, violence erupts at the slightest provocation. There are galore of pretexts like caste and community loyalities, ethnic issues, defence of identity, customs, traditions, language, religion etc.[8] Recently, one mostly observes that communal violence is erupting in the areas least thought of. Even those celebrations which were innocent are being disturbed now a-days Destruction of public property, massive threats to public order, mass rape, terrorism of various kinds are the news items. The most brutal kind of violence is seen in the case of war.

Thus, violence can be categorised. Sugata Das Gupta[9] classifies it into (a) societal violence (b) violence of protest and (c) counter violence Another classification is given by Dr. Sarojini Sharan (i) violence of Assertion (ii) violence for political power (iii) violence among religious communities (iv) Custodial violence (v) violence by establishment.[10] The first one includes violence by dominant groups losing grip over economic and social powers, for example, violence by students and violence for getting equal treatment by the north-eastern region of India. The second includes violence connected with election The third type has communal and sectoral notes. The fourth one refers to violence and injury perpetrated by police upon the citizens Violence of farmers and industrial workers has been placed under the category of violence by Establishment.

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[7] 'Paramarsh' No. 2 March 1986 p. 192.

[8] Das Gupta Sugata 'A Gandhian Analysis' in 'Violence erupts' edt. by Udayana Sharma p. 13-14.

[9] Sharan, Dr. Sarojini 'Predicting Fluctuations in Domestic Violence', Studies in violence, National Integration and Non-Alignment p. [illegible] Janaki Prakashan, 1989.

The present paper intends to discuss the violence which brings the society on the verge of disaster. With this point of view violence can be subdivided into organized and individual or epiphenomenal. The paper restricts itself with the organized incidence which is further sub-divided into political and non political. The case of political violence only has been taken here. Political violence can be of different shades but recently, Terrorism has become a threat to the peace of the society, nation and individuals living within it. It has become a world wide phenomenon. Terrorism has ingredients of force and violence. It can be defined as the activities of the organized terrorist groups perpetrating terror upon individuals, communities, and government for attaining some political end[11]. It is a technique of psychological and political warfare Political terror, if it is waged consciously and deliberately, it is politically prepared to sacrifice all moral and humanitarian considerations for the sake of some political end.[18] It is a coercive intimidation to create fear into the hearts of individuals, groups, communities and Government to concede their so-called political demands. Terrorists use psychological force also to break the resisting capacity of the victimized. As Chinese motto goes, 'kill one frighten ten thousand.' They want lot of people watching rather than a lot of people dead. India is prone to it because of its infrastructure of liberal democracy. Earlier reference has been made of its multi-lingual multi-religious and multi cultural nature. Each point comes in clash with another for its identity which takes violent form due to being politicized. Each citizen enjoys fundamental right of freedom of expression, association, government, religion and access to mass media criminals exploit on these points with their criminal and brutal attitude. Typical acts of terrorism are bombing, mass murder of innocent persons, hijacking of planes, looting of banks etc. The terrorists believe that terror would bring the desired end quickly and is best available method for the success. They would endorse its corollary that extreme violence is good for the society.

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[10] Sharan. Dr. Sarojini 'Terrorism as a political Weapon—India and Sri Lanka' in Studies in violence. National Integration and Non-Alignment, p. 46.

[11] Ibid, p. 48.

[12] Jenkins, Brian 'International Terrorism A balance sheet, survival Vol. 17, No 4, 1975 p. 158.

Examples of repressive terrorism is used sometimes by government in order to suppress or constrain groups or individuals. Government uses force and violence for the welfare of individuals, society and nation when no other method is workable. But sometimes distortions are found. Provocations for political violence are provided by tactless oppresive rulers in their effort to eliminate dissidence which is a threat to them. When the authoritarian regimes and immature democracies find themselves in precarious condition due to persistent and potent opposition to their regimes, they resort to violence with a vengeance. So, violence used as a political weapon is most dangerous.

In some cases violence is imitated as a technique which is generally used by the government in the form of constant force. It creates a vicious circle, each act serving as a fuel to stir up further trouble. This is too familiar phenomenon.

The use of non-violence by Mahatma Gandhi is unique example for achieving poltical independence without which Indian society was totally deprived of its progress from all aspects.

(iv) The paper also probes into the causes of violence. An elaborate enumerations can be made of these causes. For the convenience of understanding reference can be made to basic principles causing acts of violence. These principles may follow from our metaphysical, psychological and psysical constitution. Some causes may be natural.

Aquinas, Augustine and other christian thinkers believe that the true cause of disorder animostities, war and revolutions is ultimately traceable to man's disordered interior, his sinful and corrupt nature.

There is vast material progress due to advance technological explosion. But, besides fostering the attitude of modernity in a wide scale, it has caused enormous tension also. Speed which is the topmost value of this age has thrown everybody into unresolved competition. Short cut methods are being extensively used for the desired good. This overthrows all obedience to values essential for human security and peace. The failure to cope up with the speed leads to hatred, depression, dissatisfaction, anger, alienation etc.

Due to other familiar problems like expansion of unplanned cities, educational growth in quantitative forms, population growth, increasing number of unemployed youths, in short the quantitative growth of immense measure has produced imbalance in the society and minds of peaple. When goals are not achieved, negative feelings are created in the minds of unsuccessful persons. This again is a helping factor in the eruption of violence.

Political participation of high level by Indians seems to be a significant cause of violence. The introduction of universal franchise has acted as catalyst. For solving national and sectional problems all important strata of society as well as the masses are taking active parts. Indian society has become politically awakened community. Violence is resorted to affect government's decision by creating terror of all sorts in the society.

Besides all these factors, most surprisingly the scientific developments which are not balanced, have deepened the frustrations, and tensions of all sorts. The 'have nots' are jealous against 'haves'.

The other peculiarities of Indian Society like varieties of language, religions, culture, art etc. are perhaps the points on which the whole issue is politicised and in reality are not direct forces accentuating the violence rather violence is resorted in the garb of these issues. All these make a man suspicious of every thing, his own neighbour, relatives, friends, environments etc. He has lost his way because he is not definite of his identity. Nothing concrete and positive can follow from it. What type of progress is that ?

According to Gandhiji whenever one resorts to violence one does so because one has lost faith in the dignity of man. The duty of respect for life is forgotten. Gandhiji is convinced that violence is the proof of bankruptcy of reason, pre-dominance of brutal instinct over our spiritual nature and transgression of humanitarianism.

In Western philosophy also, one finds similar reflections. Plato believes that positions and appetites cause degradation of the social aspect of man. Hobbes is of opinion that men are continuously engaged in competition for honour and dignity which results in envy, hatred, anger and violence.

Marx atributes the causes for man's inhumanity on national as well as international level as socio-economic.

Kant believes that violence though is a problem since the advent of man upon earth but today it has assumed a terrifying problem because of man's control over physical nature and command over the weapons of life and death.

The above analysis definitely causes concern for peace and security and politicians, theologians, philosophers and common man are evidently disturbed enormously. One trembles due to the horrors of the dangerous effects of organized activity because one cannot imagine to counter-act that. Spontaneous violence is not of much worry. Violence tends to recoil upon its initiator. It demoralizes the person resorting to it. Violence breeds violence. It brings unending process of chaos. It attacks and poisons the foundation of social life.

(v) In this part, paper would undertake moral understanding and justification of this act of violence. Our task will be facilitated if we apply the three considerations discussed earlier.

The group of individuals indulging in violence is part of the culture of present Indian society the complexity of which has been outlined. Either we blame the culture which produces such dangerous acts or we blame the act which is incoherent with the environment manifesting it. Any act is the outward manifestation of certain belief conviction and will. What is that belief which is leading to such barbarous acts ? Is such belief necessary product of culture or distorted and arbitary looking towards things ? It is politicalization of everything for one's own selfish ends the root cause of this distorted view ? If political participation has become a universal phenomena and legitimized in the minds of men then it is the demand of the liberal culture and democratic set up of the Indian society. If there is progress on the basis of modernization then it is in keeping in with the attitude of people. One is forced to reflect upon the element which has created so much gap between advancement based on scientific and secular ideas on the one hand and decadence of values on the other hand. One cannot harp on restoring old traditional values which may not appeal to the awakened society, values are to be sought within this social reality. Society can thrive and survive only when Indian citizen is able to face the challenges of advanced science and technology of the present time. If the absolute abstract ethical ideals are not workable in the existing system of complex society, then it is of no use going back for them. If we want to work out the system of values which will suit to general culture and incorported by all the services of a civilized society, then it will be a long-term process which might be left out in incomplete stage. Speed is definitely the value of this contemporary society and the slow process will throw us back in the scale of progress. So, the value which will counteract the short cut methods of achieving goal like terrorism etc. is to be thought out.

Another consideration of ethical justification of violence is also relevant. The person indulging in violence cannot be a free person in the sense of a-moral, non-moral and supramoral person. His freedom is connected with the responsibility which he cannot refuse; The act is deliberate, organized and planned towards the fulfillment of some motive. So, it comes within the purview of moral judgment.

It is not only clandestine but essentially brutal. It overthrows all codes of conduct.

Terrorists can argue that violence is good for the society. The end is to be achieved by any means. They are not bothered about the moral qualities of means selected for the success. But, one is reminded of the ethical quality of the means also without which, end even of highest moral quality is not justified. Gandhiji and ideal moralists prefer those acts which are absolutely moral.

But doubt prevails when one observes acts of violence resorted to by legal authorities for the betterment of society and nation Government is recognised by its power machinery without which it cannot hope to maintain peace and security of people. For the welfare scheme the repressive violence becomes an essential policy. Here Gandhiji's principle of the brevity of both means and end will not appeal to Govt of people. Gandhiji's belief that end of violence is its own surest defeat does not seem to be forceful. Gandhiji we feel, makes too much of non-violence. Extreme non-violence is never preferable. Though, he was all for non-violence to achieve his end, he also sometimes prefers violence to cowardice and weakness because for him non- violence is the symbol of strength, spiritual force. It is the weapon of the confident and strong and not of weak. So, it appears that preferability of means and end cannot be fixed for ever in abstraction to the weight of the problem.

When one casts one's eyes upon Jaina's concept of violence, one finds that its rod of meauring the ethicality of violence is relative to man's intentions and status in the society. A distinction is made between responsibilities and duties in the same society depending on his vocation and level of metaphysical freedom. For a Sadhu, moral principles are to be strictly followed. He is forbidden from doing both Bhava and Dravya himsa but it is relaxed in the case of householder. But there is clear moral disapproval of intentional himsa. Here one finds strict application of moral principles. However, the concept of virodhi himsa which is committed to perfect oneself, one's nation and others indicates the relative view in such special cases where end is so high that it over shadows the means.

Thus, the paper in its conclusion can highlight certain reflections. A very judicious view of violence in the Indian context is to be adopted. One has always to remember that neither the tradition is to be worshipped blindly, nor modernity is to be viewed with contempt. A balanced view is to be worked out which is within the framework of this complex culture of Indian society. Any view entirely foreign in its make may not be successful in the living trends of the society. If violence is being routinized, if agitation is the way of articulation and if politicalization of everything is being legitimized in the minds of common people gradually then justification of violence should follow from this social reality and its newly found values. We should not think it a fashion to say that there is moral decadence of values and we are reduced to the lowest level of barbarous state of society. If we reflect deeply then we find that demand for justice, freedom, fraternity democracy etc. cannot come from the society where the minimum level of civilization is not achieved. Today, society is towards progress from a total point of view. So, how can the ethical progress be on its lowest ebb ? So, we have to bring back, our sense of justice on its right track, and have to admit that nothing is absolute. Human nature is a mixture of good and evil. Sometimes this evil nature and disordered interior mainfesting in violent acts upset the social order and it becomes imminent duty to supress it by coercion and violence. Moral persuation, softer virtues like love and compassion may fail in many cases. So, for self preservation and preservation of the society and race one may use violent means. Violence is not a necessary evil. When properly regulaled and controlled, the weapons of force and power help to restore the equilibrium of the society and nation. Violence under certain circumstances is justified or in other words non-violence under all circumstances is neither practicable nor justifiable. One has to be very cautions in making distinctions. It can be further added that every act has to be measured in terms of quality and quantity both, Violence in itself is never fruitful But, under certain circumstances to counter act greater violence and to guard against the threat of insecurity of public existence and property, the authority has to use its power and force. However, power is always to be applied with control. According to Indian concept a king is vested with maximum power, still he has to use minimum control over it, in this lies his wisdom and success. This control is to be decided by certain quidelines. The means should always be proportionate with the end. For a trifle end, one should not resort to greater violence. International law and morality also have its guidelines. The use of gun to kill an ant is ridiculous. The mass killing of innocents and attack on public property can never be justified. So, the ethicality of violence is always to be decided, keeping in mind this relation of means and end, freedom and responsibility, social ideal and social reality. Responsibility is the term of moral language and one cannot shirk from it.

## 13

# The Humanism of Swami Vivekanand

*Rajni Sharma*

Swami Vivekananda's philosophy of Humanism is spiritual, divine, rational, universal, practical and dynamic. Humanism is a way of perceiving things by relating them with man. It advocates that all the capacities and qualities of man should be given full expressions. Basically Humanism is the philosophy of man and the entire humanity is its field of work. Being a great man worshipper Vivekananda's philosophy centres round man. The central theme of his meditation was man, his problems, prosperity and the processes to restore the glory and degnity as a child of 'immortal bliss', on this earth. He asserts that in real sense, 'Man is Amritasya putra'. In this context his following statement is. Ye are the children of God, the sharers of immortal bliss, holy and perfect being. Ye divinities on earth— Sinners ! It is a sin to call a man so, it is a standing libel on human nature[1].

Vivekananda's Humanism is based on spiritualism. There is no contradiction between Humanism and spiritualism. He emphasises on spiritual aspect and ideals of human beings. Man's spiritual nature is an embodiment of greatness. Although outwardly man is a psycho-physical being but in reality there is soul in man which is the spark of the Divine within him. It is man who himself can make his own destiny.

Vivekananda's humanism has been derived from the India's Adhyatma Vidya which is the science of human possibilities.

It proclaims that in man the energy resources are organised in an ascending processes—beginning from outer physical body, through more inner and subtler nervous system to the subtlest self of man, the Atman. Soul is the infinite and spiritual energy resource. Man possesses a tremendous capacity to transform himself and rise higher in the scale of spiritual development. Enormous possibilities that lie hidden in every human being and that need to be manifested in the course of man's life and work. He teaches that physical as well as spiritual education and methods are required to bring out the enormous possibilities of man. He was deeply interested in total development of man. The human possibilities are of three categories. Those are— physical, mental and spiritual. He says that when man's physical possibilities develop then he becomes physically strong. Development of mental possibilities makes a man intelligent and sensitive. It gives a man thinking and reasoning power. Spiritual possibilities enhance divinity in man. Like Vedanta Vivekananda has insisted that, "If man grows only physically and mentally but does not side by side grow also spiritually, he will actually use his strength to exploit others, express himself in violence and war, to harm and destroy others and to harm and destroy even himself. But when he grows spiritually also and manifests his ever present divine dimension, he becomes, capable to express himself in love and compassion, becomes capable to radiate humanistic impulses towards not only other human beings but also animals[2]". Buddha, Jesus, Sri Ramakrishna Vivekananda etc. are examples of fully developed great men. That is why they were able to conquer hatred through love and gave peace to the peaceless and joy to the grief stricken people in the universe.

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[1] Vivekananda Swami, Complete Works, Vol. I, p. 11.

Vivekananda preaches the divine humanism according to which "Each soul is potentially divine". Essentially man is living God and the only God towo rship is the human soul in the human body. He asserts that, "Never forget the glory of human nature. We are the greatest God that ever was or ever will be"[3].

The goal is to manifest this divinity. The renunciated individual perceives God every where as the spirit, as the sum total of all souls. Such man dedicates his life to the service of humanity. Worship of man is worship of God. The spirit in mankind is one, therefore, the humanity as a whole is bound in unity. Unity is life and separation is death.

Vivekananda pleads that man is visible Brahman, our duty is to search Brahman within man not in the external world. Once he asked his disciple : "where will you go to seek Brahman. He is imanent in all beings. Here, here is the visible Brahman ! Shame on those who neglecting the visible Brahman ! set their minds on other things". This is realised and experienced truth by Indian sages, Swamiji has stated that, "After so much austerity, I have understood this as the real truth---God is present in every Jiva; there is no other God besides that. Who serves Jiva, serves God indeed.'.[4] He was interested in the divinisation of whole human race in this world.

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[2] Ranganathan and Swami—Swami Vivekananda His Humanism, p. 13, Ed. 1982.

[3] Vivekananda Swami Complete Works, Vol. VII, p. 78.

Vivekananda's humanism is Universal. He presents man is his universal aspect not in the narrow racial, national aspects. He has done untiring effort for the all round development of man, that is, economic, social, moral and religious. He advocates that "Let every man and woman and child without respect of caste or birth weakness or strength hear and learn that behind the strong and the weak, behind the high and the low, behind, everyone, here is the infinite Soul, assuming the infinite possibilities and infinite capacity of all to become great and good"[5]. He teaches us that each man is great in his own place. Human birth is the greatest birth in the universe. We should respect the human beings because they are highly respectable.

Vivekananda laid great stress on the concept of strength which is an important aspect of his humanism. Strength is a spiritual force which is the most significant feature of man's personality. He gives the message of strength, boldness and hope. He suggests that strength makes a man able to follow the programme of life. Strength produces harmony and inspires a man to do self sacrifice. He gives the message of courage, boldness, fearlessness. On the other hand, weakness produces sin. inhumanity, selfishness, weakness, is the source of all miseries, That is why he teaches that, "strength is the medicine for the worlds disease".[6] He encouraged man to search his true identity. be an integral and useful part of this universe. Strength is life and weakness is death.

Vivekananda advocates that faith is essential for salvation. It is faith that makes a man great. One should keep faith in himself and in God also. Faith that makes world better. His assertion is as followst "Faith. Faith in ourselves, faith, faith in God. this is the secret of greatness".[7] All progress of man depends on faith.

Swamiji pleads that the concept of service is an important feature of his humanism. He preaches that the service of man and worship of God is the same. The suffering people should not be object of our pity. That is why he asks us to be good first and then do good to others. His teaching is; Not mercy but service to man must be regarded as service to God. He has given the doctrine of "Daridra Narayana" which means to see God in the poor, ignorant, weak and in the diseased and down trodden. That is the real worship. His proclaimation is; "Above all, my God the wicked, my God the miserable, my God the poor of all races, of all species is the special object of my worship.[6] By service to the suffering humanity we can establish peace, harmony in the world and attain salvation.

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[4] Vivekananda Swami, Collected Works, Vol. VII, p. 247.

[5] Ibid. Vol. III, p 193.

[6] Ibid. Vol. III p. 201.

[7] Ibid. Vol. III, p. 196.

Swamiji proclaims that the universal peace and toleration can be derived from universal vision. that is, vision of one self in all. It is our duty to treat all as brothers. His humanism is expressed in service to humanity; universal brotherhood and equality in the world. Humanism is very dominant in the philosophy and religion of Vivekananda.

Directly and indirectly Vivekananda's Humanism has influenced India in he past and even today. Our younger generation should take advantage from his teachings. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has correctly remarked that". He (Vivekananda) came as a tonic to the depressed and demoralized Hindu mind and gave it self reliance and same roots in the past"[9]. In fact Swamiji has moved India forward to defend its much suffering people from injustice and brutality. By establishing Sri Ramakrishna Mission all over the world he has made his theory practical and useful for human life. He has combined both humanism and humanitarianism, because he makes his philosophy humanistic and at the same time recommends strongly humanitarian work and service. His statement is: "The older I grow, the more everything seems to me to lie in manliness".[10]

Swami Vivekananda's inspiring messages for whole humanity are :

"Truth is one; Sages call it by various names";
"The Divine is manifest in man more than any object".
"Each is great in his own place".
"Help and not fight".
"Assimilation and not destruction".
"Harmony and peace and not Dissension".

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8 Vevekananda Swami, Collected Works, Vol. V, p. 137.

9 Nehru Pandit Jawaharlal, The Discovery of India, Meridian Book Ltd., London 1960, p. 338.

10 [illegible], Swami, Teachings of Swami Vivekananda

# Book-Reviews :

**D. S, Snbbaramaiya :** *Shri Dakshinamurti Stotram*— (A Study based on the Manasollasa and the Tattvasudha) Vol. 1, Dakshinamnaya Sri Sarada Peetham, Sringeri 577139, Pages xxxvi+722 (1986).

Prof. Dr. Subbaramaiya, the author of this great learned work is a rare combination of modern scientific knowledge and traditional Advaita Vedanta. The author was a close research associate of Noble Lauriet Sir C. V. Raman, over three decades he taught physics at Central College Bangalore. This study is based on the Manasollasa and the Tattvasudha with Sanskrit Quotations from Prasthanatraya and other standard texts on Advaita Vedanta and translations thereon in Englsh.

A naisthikabrahmachari, he studied Vedanata under great traditional masters and he is at present teaching Vedanta, leading a life of piety and contemplation.

Sridakshinamurtistotram, the Supreme teaching, is a precious gift from the Acharya Sri Sai Sankarabhagavatpada to the humanity seeking a way out of the turmoil and strife in the ocean of samsara in which it is immersed. In a short compass of ten verses, Sri Sri Bhrgavatapada has graciously brought out the essentials of Vedanta in a concise form, at the same time in an inviting manner. Pointing at every step to Brahmavidya, the Mahavakyartha, the basic hidden experience, the endeavour of the hymn is to establish the ardent seeker Sarvatmatva as proclaimed by the hymn itself. It draws attention to the Vedantic method which is to search and find out directly as to wherefrom the knowledge of anything whatsoever stems. The present study of the hymn based on the commentaries is an attempt at understanding the significance of the hymn in greater detail. This might help in making the teaching of the hymn accessible to sincere seekers who have not had the opportunity of studying the originals in Sanskrit and who are influenced by the modern thought. The ideas and concepts brought in this detailed exposition are sought to be supported by pramanas quoted from the Prasthanatraya and the Bhashyas thereon.

English translations of all Sanskrit passages are also given The author says in his preface that original passages are quoted profusely to arouse interest in Sanskrit knowing readers. The intention is to introduce the seeker to the source books in Advaitasastra and to provide an access to the most important passages in them on all topics dealt with.

The Contents of the book are: The Hymn with translation, Invocation 1. Introduction 2. Sriguru—Sridakshinamurthi—The Sakshatkritadvaya pratyagatman; 3. First Stanza and Rest of the Hymn, 4. Eigth Stanza—Sriguru as transcending all concoctions and Prakriyas as well; 5. Second Stanza-Sriguru as Creator—'Mayaviva', 'Yogiva' 6. Third stanza-Sriguru as Sphuranam Sadatmakam—Mahavakyopadeshta.

In two pages quite an exhaustive list of Abbreviations have been provided In the whole text transliteration has been provided, and Sanskrit texts have been given and makes this book scholarly contribution to the Vedantic literature.

Prof D. S. Subbramaiya work is a very thorough voluminous and exhaustive work on Sridakshinamurty Stotram. The book will attract both the English and Sanskrit Scholars. Professor Subbaramaiya deserves our most heartfelt congratulations on bringing out this great Advaitic work. We are sure that the second volume will soon appear, Our congratulations and sincere thanks are due to Dakshinamnaya Sri Sharada Peetham, Sringeri and the Sponsors of this work Sri Sanakara Vidya Kendra, Vasant Vihar, Paschimi Marg, New Delhi 110057, for the all help rendered by them in publishing this work.

**Dr. Satya Deo** Misra (Editor) : *Modern Researches in Sanskrit*, Dr. Veermani Prasad Upadhyaya Felicitation Volume 1987, Indira Prakashan, A—11, Sector—D, Kankarbagh Colony, Patna (1987), Price Rs 200/—

The Editor Dr. Satya Deo Misra, Reader in Sanskrit, Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, Rajasthan has edited this volume. This volume is felicitation volume and includes 29 scholarly articles on various subjects contributed by eminent people from various fields. The contributions include: 1, The Mantras of the Prayaniya Section (introductory sacrifice) as prescribed in the Rigvedic Brahmanas; Prof. Dr. J. Gondo Utrecht, Netherlands, 2. Hitavakya Sutra-A Parosista of the Samaveda, Prof. . .V. Sharma, (Vishveshvarananda Institute, Panjab University, Sadhu Ashram, Hoshiarpur) Adyar Library, Madras; 3. The mahabbarat and the Ramayana-Myth or authentic works ? Prof. Anant Lal Thakur, Retired Director, K P.Jaiswal Institute, Patna; 4. Philosophia perennis it the Bhagwad-Gita, Prof. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Director Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras 5; 5. Puranas: The Diorama of Indian Tradition- Dr. J.L.Sharma, Head Department of Sanskrit, Birla Public School, Pilani; 6 Symbolism of Saptasati-Some Aspects—Dr. A.C.Banerjee, Vice Chancellor Audh University, Faizabad; 7. The Date of the Yogavasistha Dr. Satya Deo

Shastri, Professor of Sanskrit, Delhi University, Delhi' 8. Philosophy of the Yogavasistha: Padmabhushan Dr. B L Atreya, Retired Professor and Head Departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Indian Philosophy and Religion. Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi; 9. Sanskrit as a spoken Language: Hints from Panini—Prof. Tulsi Ram, Professor and Head, Department of English University of Rohtak 10. Origin of Poetry—Dr Satya Deo Misra, Reader in Sanskrit, Birla Institute of Technology and Science Pilani; 11. Imagination in Literature—Dr. R.Dhanayudham Department of Indian Studies, University of Malaya, Kuolalampur, Malayasia; 12 Anandavardhan and Abhinavagupta Professor T.G.Mainkar.Professor of Sanskrit, Bombay University; 13. Sanskrit Dramaturgy in a Comparative light—Dr. B. Bhattacharya, Professor Department of Sanskrit and Pali, Banaras Hindu University.; 14 The position of Yamaka Kavya in Sanskrit Poetics: B.C.Saviestava: 15. Kosalananda Mahakavya—Prof. A. C. Swain, Professor of Sanskrit, Utkal University, Bhubaneshwar; 16. Social Conditions in Dandin's Time— Dr. Mann Singh—Department of Sanskrit, Himachal Pradesh University, Simla; 17. Is Meghaduta a Lyric Poetry ? Dr. (Mrs) Savitri Srivastava, Bharatiya Anusandhan peeth, Varanasi; 18 The Stotra Literature in Sanskrit—Dr. Mrs. Rama Pandeya, Bharati Anusandhan Peetha, Tulsi Ghat, Bhadaini, Varanasi; 19. Conceptualization—Dr. Vishwanath Prasad Varma, Retired Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science and Director Institute of Public Administration, Patna University, Patna; 20. King Gods and God Kings: Symbolism and Significance for Hindu Culture and Polity—Prof V. Subramaniam, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; 21 Sri Laksmi in scientific Literature—Dr. U N. Dhal, Department of Sanskrit, Utkal University, Bhubaneshwar; 22. Middha and Middhavadins,—Prof. P. V. Bapat, Retired Professor of Buddhism, (University of Delhi). Patna 4; 23. Buddhist References in the Nyayabhushanam—Dr. Karunesh Shukla, Professor and Head Department of Sanskrit, University of Gorakhpur, Gorakhour; 24. Verbal Testimony: A Distinct Instrument of Verbal Knowledge— Dr. N. Chatterjee Reader in Sanskrit, Banaras Hindu University. Varanasi; 25. The meaning of Mahajana parigraha according to Udayana—Dr. Hem Chandra Joshi, Professor of Sanskrit, University of Gorakhpur; Gorakhpur; 26. Panini's Concept Karman and the Samkhya System—Uma Shankar Sharma; 27. Sulabha on the nature of Sentence; Professor and Head Department of Sanskrit, Kashi Vidyapeetha, Varanasi; 28. Sankara's Exegetical Method: Anvaya and Vyatireka-Prof- Mayeda Sengaku Associate Professor of Indian Philosophy. University of Tokyo, Japan; and 29, Conception of Moksha—Dr. Siddheshwar Bhattacharya. Retired Professor and Head of Sanskrit and Pali, Banaras Hindu University, Vishwanath Temple Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi.

The Second Part consists of 15 chapters written by very eminent personalities on their reminiscences with Dr. Veermani Prasad Upadhyaya which speaks of scholarly acumen of Dr. Upadhyaya. The authors include Dr. B.L. Atreya (Varanasi) Dr. Ram Karan Sharma, (Delhi), Dr. S. Bhattacharya (Varanasi), Shri Adya Charan Jha (Darbhanga), Dr. Dashrath Dwivedi (Gorakhpur), Shri Bhagwan Datt Mishra (Ranchi), Dr. Satkari Mukherjee (Nalanda), Dr. Vaneshwar Pathak (Ranchi), Shri Ram Vachan Pandey (Patna), Dr. Rajmani Pandey (Allahabad), Dr. Devendra Sharma (Patna), Shri Raghunath Sharma (Varanasi), Dr. Ganga Datt Shastri 'Vinod' (Shimla), Dr. Uma Shankar Shukla (Balrampur) and Shri Shiva Dani Singh (Varanasi),

It is a good Felicitation Volume honouring a great Sanskrit scholar. This volume contains about 29 Scholarly contributions by eminent men in the field of Sanskrit, Philosophy and other subjects. In the second part we have 15 scholars who have paid their tributes and respects to Dr. Veer Mani Upadhyaya who has been an eminent Sanskrit scholar. This is a very befitting Volume honouring great scholar, containing scholarly articles of great men of learning. This is one of the very important literary contributions to the field of learning by Dr. Satya Deo Misra, who has done a great service to the cause of Sanskrit by editing this good work which is of lasting value.

**Dr. R. S. Srivastava :** *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, pp.400. Published by Sharda Publications, 433F, Nagra Toli, Ranchi 834001 (1984)

The author of this book Dr. R. S. Srivastava is an eminent Retired Professor of Philosophy who has contributed much to the development of Philosophy in Bihar. He was several years professor and Head Philosophy Department at the University of Ranchi, Bihar and has to his credit of producing a large number of Ph.Ds and D Litts. in Bihar during his Professorship. He has been to Europe as an Exchange Professor and delivered lecturers in different Universities of European countries. He has been President of the 1983 session of the Indian Philosophical Congress., and author of several Philosophical publications both in Hindi and English.

The present volume Contemporary Indian Philosophy is a good attempt to acquaint the philosophy world of several Contemporary Indian thinkers, such as Swami Ramakrishna—Vivekananda, Rabindra Nath Tagore, Sri Aurobindo, Mahatma Gandhi, Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and

Dr. Shaikh Mohammad Iqbal. He has very clearly expressed the views of Eight great Indian Contemporary thinkers. He has studied the philosophical views of these thinkers and discussed in Part I Swami Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Introduction and dealt with the Absolute, Maya, the Soul and Its liberation, Jnanayoga, Bhaktiyoga, Karmayoga, Rajayoga, The Neo-vedantic Religion of Swami Vivekananda and lastly A General Estimate, Part Two Rabindra Nath Tagore consists of Introduction, The Self, Salvation Evil and General Estimate, Part Three Sri Aurobindo consisting of Introduction, The Absolute, The Supermind, The Nature of Mind, The Soul and Its Salvation, Cosmic Evolution, Theories of Evolution and Sri Aurobindo, a General Estimate; Part Four Mahatma Gandhi consisting of Introduction, God, The Soul and Its liberation, Principles of Non violence, Renunciation and Truth, Satyagraha, Mahatma Gandhi's Conception of Religion, Mahatma Gandhi's Religion in Practice and a General Estimate; Part Five Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya—Introduction, the Branches of Philosophy, Absolute, The Self or Subject and a General Estimate; Part Six Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan consisting: Introduction, Modern Philosophical Trends against Religion, Intellect and Intuition, Religious Experience and Its Affirmations, Ultimate Reality, The Self and Its Salvation, Matter, Life, Mind and Self-Consciousness, Karma and Rebirth, Human Personality and Its Destiny, and General Estimate; Introduction, Intuition, God, The Human Ego—Its Salvation and Immortality, Time and Space, The Material Universe, A General Estimate and Conclusion. In the end quite an Exhaustive Bibliography of more than 200 b oks have been provided which will help the researchers to a great extent.

The whole book has been written in a simple, clear connected, critical and constructive survey of eight philosophers' thought and dealing with important ideas contained in their thinking, All main points have been thoroughly examined and has dealt with common topics as well as their special contribution to several points which are their distinctive characteristics,

The book is very well documented on the original sources and vast literature available on these philosophers and has a very scholarly Foreword by Professor Paul Arthur Schi pp, Professor Emeritus, North-western University, Evanston, Illinois, U.S A. has added to the beauty of the book. Dr. Srivastava has done an admirable work and deserves our congratulations in bringing to the lime light the ideas of several Indian Contemporary thinkers. Professor Schilpp has rightly said in his Foreword that Dr. Srivastava has rendered a real and valuable service,

**David P. Jackson & Denice A Jackson :** *Tibetan Thangka Painting Methods and Materials*, illustrated by Robert Beer, Snow Lion Publications, Ithaca, New York, U.S.A., pp. 202 (1988).

Tibetan Thangka Painting is one of the great arts of Asia. It is rich in iconograppy, religious content, Stylistic Development, and also in terms of the materials and skills that the painters and their patrons lavished upon it. These scroll paintings (Thangka Paintings) impress by their exquisite materials and consumate skill that went into their creation. The autnors took much pain and 5 times visited several Asian countries and met about 20 artists who helped them in finishing this great work on Thangka Paintings. In Preface the authors have mentioned the help provided to them by three main teachers, viz., Thargye, whom they met in Nepal the second main teacher was Legdrup Gyatsho a monk and artist from Phenyul Nalendra near Lhasa, and the third main teacher Wangdrak from Shekar Dzong in Western Tsang. In many ways Wangdrak Was a great quintessential Tibetan Painter who was quiet, unassuming and modest but a living treasure trove of knowledge concerning the techniques, materials and lore of every branch of Tibetan Painting. Venerable Lama Dezhung Trulku Rimpoche, though he was not a painter gave insight to many of the figures and symbols appearing in thangkas, and to the religious culture that is the basis of Tibetan Art. The book contains numerous line drawings by Mr. Robot Beer, formerly a student of Lhasa Jhampa and Au Leshey, and now one one of the finest Western exponent of Tibetan Art.

The contents of the book have been divided into twelve chapters as follows besides Preface, Appendices A, B C, and D , Glossary, Bibliography and indexes: I The Artistic Wealth of Tibet. II The Preparation of the Painting Surface, III Composition, IV Sketching and the Theory Iconometry, V Iconometric Practice and further techniques of sketching. VI Pigments, VII Colour, VIII Techniques of Paint Preparation and Application. IX Brushes, X Shading and Colour—gradations XI Outlining, and X Finishing Details Appendix A: Iconometric Controversies and Sources, Appendix B· Resurces, Appendix C: Motifs and Symbols and deities, drawn by Robert Beer D: Guidelines for Thangka Painting using modern techniques and commercially available materials.

Hundreds of Plates of Paintings hve been printed in this book which give clear impression about Thangka paintings. This is a very well written book on Thangka paintings and demonstrated by a large number of Paintings. The authors deserve our most heartfelt congratulations on bringing out this lively book on Tibetan Thangka Painting. The Publishers Snow Lion also deserve great appreciation for publishing this great volume on Thangka Painting for the use of English speaking world.

# I

# Is Reason Sexist ?

*Joseph Wayne Smith*

## 1. THE CRITICISM

The feminist movement[1] is important for the challenges which it has made to received scientific theorizing, for feminist thinkers have an acute cognitive sense of smell which has enabled them to accurately detect ideologies[2]. This sense is not however infallible. In this essay I shall review some major feminist theorists' attitude, towards and critiques of, critical rationality, principally in philosophy[3]. These feminist theorists propose that reason is sexist, and practices such as philosophy are drastically in need of a major conceptual overhaul.

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[1] It is a non-trivial task to define 'feminism'. J. R. Richards in *The Sceptical Feminist*, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983) defines feminism as a belief that society has *unjustly* treated women. But as John Charvet in *Feminism*, (J M. Dent and Sons, London, 1982) points out (p. 146), someone who believes that justice requires that women should remain in the domestic sphere be a feminist on this account. The basic idea of feminism is the social equality of women with men. Women should be treated equally with men because of the moral necessity of giving common respect to all rational agents. cf C. McMillan, *Women, Reason and Nature : Some Philosophical Problems with Feminism*, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982), p. ix.

[2] cf. R. Hubbard, M. S. Henifin and B. Fried (eds), *Women Looking at Biology Looking at Women*, (Schenkman Publishing Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1979).

[3] For some recent works on feminist philosophy cf, M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. A. Elliston and J English (eds), *Feminism and Philosophy*, (Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, New Jersey, 1977); J. A. Sherman and E. T. Beek (ed ). *The Prism of Sex*, (University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1979); N. O. Keohane, M Z Rosaldo and B. C. Gelpi (eds), *Feminist Theory A Critique of Ideology*, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982); M. Midgley and J. Hughes, *Women's Choices : Philosophical Problems Facing Feminism*, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1983).

I would like to begin my discussion by discussion by distinguishing the target position from some earlier feminist criticisms of rationality. But before doing so it is necessary to respond to an objection which may be made. The direction may be stated as follows. People may be sexist insofar as they unjustifiably discriminate on the basis of sex, but science and reason itself cannot be sexist. How, it may be asked, can the inference 'x is square, therefore, x is not round' be in any way related to matters of human sexuality? The claim that reason is sexist would seem to commit a category mistake, ascribing a property to an object which it could not meaningfully be said to have. In reply to this objection it can be argued that the view of science and logic which it presupposes is questionable. It is presupposed that science and logic have no metaphysical and evaluative commitments, and this I have argued elsewhere is incorrect[4]. The evaluative ladenness of logical statements could obviously not be such that the statement 'x is square, therefore x is not round' is sexist, but it would more plausibly be along the following lines: (1) the standards of logical correctness have built in sexist biases or (2) the methods of critical discussion have sexist biases. We will review one such argument along the lines of (2) below. Here I note that the question 'is reason sexist?' is by no means conceptually absurd[5].

There is something resembling a cult of unreason in feminism that runs like a subterranean stream, occasionally bursting to the surface with violence[6]. Germine Greer for example has said:

> The rules of logical discourse are no more relevant than the Marquess of Queensbury's are to a pub brawl. Female hard-headedness rejects the misguided masculine notion that men are rational animals. Male logic can only deal with simple issues: women ......are more aware of complexity[7].

Whilst these remarks are vague, Greer does not fail to give one the impression that reason, "male logic", can be of little use to the practical feminist. Other feminists, as Richards points out,[8] see theories and arguments as merely ways of expressing their gender experience. Reason according to this view is just a way of experiencing the world, ourselves and others and it by no means supplies universal standards of judgement and criticism. Still other feminists may accept that reason supplies universal standards of judgement and criticism, but feel that men have monopolized conceptual weapons and used them as a tool for oppression of women. They conclude on this basis the reason is bad in itself, and that a more intuitive or mystical approach to the under-standing of life and the world must be adopted.

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[4] J. W. Smith, *Reductionism and Cultural Being*, (Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague, 1984). On the metaphysical presuppositions of logic cf R. Routley, *Exploring Meinongs Jungle and Beyond* (Australian National University, Canberra, 1980).

[5] cf. also M. Ruse "Is Science Sexist? The Case of Sociobiology", in his *Is Science Sexist*? (D. Reidel. Dordrecht, 1981). pp. 219-244.

[6] cf. Richards, op. cit. note 1, chapter 1 for a less concise discussion.

[7] G. Greer, *The Female Eunuch*. (Paladin, Herts, 1971), pp. 108-109.

[8] Richards, op. cit. note 1, p. 33.

There are a number of responses which could be made to the feminist criticisms of reason. One general criticism can be made of all of these arguments, as McMillan has recognized[9]. This is that the feminists are sharing with their antagonists a problematic distinction between women as emotional, and men as rational and that reason and emotion are the sorts of things that can be compared and preferred. To be rational is to experience the triumph of reason over emotion; to live an emotional life is to be open to inclination, to be spontaneous and free. Traditional sexist writers with rationalist inclinations have claimed that reason is intrinsically superior to emotion, and since men have a greater capacity for reasoning and women excel at loving—kindness, men are therefore intrinsically superior to women. This tradition has been faced with the embarrassing difficulty, that the faculty of reason has also been taken as that which distinguishes human beings from animals. Women thus could be viewed as merely a human like animal, yet strangely enough, an animal capable of loving and nurturing *real* human beings. The feminists who are attracted to the unreason characterized above, merely invert the rationalistic sexists' position. They claim, either explicitly or implicitly, that women are superior beings to men, even though women are oppressed by men. This is because women are more emotional and open to compassion than men, and emotion is superior to reason.

Even if we grant that women as a group are more emotional than men as a group and men as a group are more rational than women as a group(and ignoring the difficult statistical problems which would arise in testing such a vague claim), little philosphical interest would adhere to such a claim. It is the additional thesis, that reason is superior to emotion or emotion superior to reason that generates this problem. There is little reason for accepting this thesis. The notion of "superiority" is very obscure. If we attempt to explicate this notion by means of the notion of *preferability*, then by virtually any account of preferability neither thesis can be accepted. Conceptually cashing out the meaning of the term 'preferability' by means of 'rational choice' trivializes the question for it is obviously a *ratianal* choice to be rational. But if we say on the other hand that 'preferability' means 'that which satisfies the greatest number of human interests in a given circumstance', then in seme circumstances reason is

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[9] McMillan, op. cit. note 1, chapters 1 and 2.

"superior" to emotion and in other circumstances emotion is "superior" to reason. Therefore the claims that reason is *generally* superior to emotion *generally* superior to reason, are false.

In any case it is an unjustified thesis to propose that reason and emotion are *necessarily* in conflict and are the sorts of things that are capable of being exclusively preferred. That conflicts occur is undeniably true, but it is also true that the sane person attempts to resolve the conflict as soon as possible by solving the problem of life which generated the conflict. If this cannot be done, suffering usually occurs. If reason was 'superior" to emotion or emotion "superior" to reason, any conflict between reason and emotion could be easily resolved by following the dictates of that which is "superior". That we agonize so acutely when coflicts occur between reason and emotion, strongly indicates that reason and emotion do not stand in any master-slave relationship (as even "great" philosophers such as David Hume thought), but are two important components of a flourishing human personality. To be a person, rather than merely an organism that reasons, one must have an emotional life; together they form an orgaic unity.

The feminist critique of reason which we have just considered is very vague and basically sexist itsef. There are however more sophisticated arguments, worthy of more extensive treatment.

## 2. THE ADVERSARY PARADIGM

Janice Moulton[10] has criticized a paradigm in philosophy which she calls the adversary paradigm. As she characterizes this paradigm, all philosophical reasoning is, or ought to be, deductive. Philosophical research consists in the presentation of counter-examples to general philosophical claims. Philosophy on the adversary paradigm is a debate between adversaries who advance general claims and try to defend these claims against counter examples. It is believed that this method is the best way of subjecting general philosophical claims to the most rigorous and searching criticism possible. A Darwinian method of argument is often advanced in justification of the adversary method. A theory or general philosophical claim which does not survive criticism is not fit to survive. But claims which survive criticism may be held until refuted by future counter-examples. Multon believes that the adversary paradigm is inherently aggressive and individualistic, and further, is open to a series of logical objections.

First, the adversary paradigm is said by Moulton to work well in the consideration of particular arguments, but not so well in considering interrelated systems of ideas. If we are to take each claim one at a time then a provisional acceptance must be made of some premises for the sake of argument. Whilst these premises may in due course be questioned. · We would have to provisionally accept most of the ideas we disagree with most of the time. Such a method can distort the presentation of an opponent's position, and produce an artificially slow development of thought".[11]

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[10] J. Moulton, "A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method", in S. Harding and M.B. Hintikka (eds), *Discovering Reality*, (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983), pp. 149-164.

Second, the adversary paradigm requires us to withhold evaluation of a system of ideas until we can find a common ground for debate. Further, "the adversarial criticism of some arguments may merely strengthen support for other ideas in the system, or inspire makeshift revisions and adjustments".[12]

Third, the adversary paradigm allows exception from criticisms of programmatic claims in philosophy, that is, claims that are not fully worked out. Counter-examples cannot refute these claims because any counter-examples will be taken as meraly research problems yet to be solved. In fact Moulton believes that this in in itself not an intrinsically bad thing; philosophy should become more concerned with the relationship between reason and larger systems of ideas, such as philosophical systems and scientific theories .In doing so it will accept other methods of evaluating, reasoning about and doing philosophy.

Moulton's objections to the adversary method are in my opinion reactionary and it is against the interests of feminists to accept them. I began this essay by pointing out that feminist literature is important precisely because of its challenge to received theoretical opinion. To do this it is necessary to adopt the adversary method if one relly does want to establish that some particular claim is false. Feminist criticis of sociobiology for example[13], have not been content with educating ignorant and unenlightened sociobiologists, but have strived to criticize the many sociobiological theories of human sexuality because they are both false and sexist. This is ideologically importact because the uncommitted may become committed on the basis of such arguments. The adversary method is a tool which the feminist can use for this purpose. If men have used reason as a weapon of oppression, then woman can in return use reason as a path of mutual emancipation, by debunking pseudo-science, exposing ideology, and giving reasons for political action.

In fact it is Moulton's own unsbstantiated opinion that the adverary method is opposed to systematic philosophy. As I have seen the matter in my books *Reductionism and Cultural Being*, *The Progress and Rationality of Philosophy* and *Essays on Ultimate Questions*, adversial methods are important to the system builder because there are *competing systems* and if one is to make a rational choice between such systems, criticism is necessary. The adversary method allows such criticism to be possible. Indeed Moulton herself *criticizes* the adversary method by arguments, so her paper is self-refuting. Thus she is inconsistent: she too is within the scope of the adversary paradigm and has given no serious challenge to this position.

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[11] ibid, p. 154.

[12] Ibid, p. 155.

[13] cf. Hubbard (et al), op, cit. note 2.

It may be thought that the criticism of whole systems of ideas or philosophical paradigms is impossible because some common ground for debate is needed. Now whilst this is true in general, it is false in particular. The feminist and her antagonist may disagree in matters of public policy and sociology, but not necessarily about the standards of a good argument. Debates in the philosophy of logic may exist about the nature of such standards, but they are not usually of relevance to matters of public policy for example. Such systems of ideas can be criticized by means of the organons of reasons of a theory of rationality. For example, a system of ideas may be demonstrated to be contradictory, and hence false. This is a common method of criticism employed by feminists against their intellectual antagonists. Whilst an opponent may be led to revise his ideas, this is not necessarily a bad thing as Moulton believes. It shows a conceptual victory, the success of the argument. To regard this as a bad thing is an unintelligible attitude and an attitude which is not in the interests of feminists to accept.

## 3. CONCLUSION: FEMINISM AND REASON

In this essay I have examined and criticized a problematic and undesirable current in feminist thought: the distrust of reason and critical rationality. This orientation is based upon distinctions which are accepted by the antagonists of feminism, and which the sceptical feminist need by no means accept. Even the more sophisticated arguments of Janice Moulton are subject to these difficulties. Her attack on what is a paradigm of "being rational" in philosophy, the "adversary method", is severely mistaken and ultimately self-refuting. It will do feminist theory nothing but harm to be sceptical about reason. Rather, feminists should strive to be more rational, argue more clearly and produce work which lacks the dogma, narrowness and pettiness of an alarming proportion of feminist writing. To do so would be to engage in a truly emancipatory theoretical practice, rather than engaging in a practice which undermines the credibility and respectability of feminism as a cognitive enterprise.

## 2

# A Forgotten Indians Philosopher

*K. S. Yadurajan*

Not many today, outside the old Mysore State (now part of Karnatake) are likely to have heard of the late Professor K.R. Sreenivasa Iyengar or his book *The Metaphysics of Value*. It might be, therefore, in order to begin with a quotation from the review of the book in the American Journal, *ETHICS* by Charles Hartshorne of the University of Chicago.

> "This is an important work. The author seems to have absorbed occidental value theory *in toto*, but he sees everything in a fresh light. His thought seems to me for the most part careful, subtle, profound and clear......So far as I happen to know, this is the most important work in technical philosophy to come out of the orient in many years." (*Ethics*, Vol. 54, pp. 230-231).

Surely, this is high praise and calls for a closer look at the book and the man who wrote it.

*The Metaphysics of Value* by the late K.R. Sreenivasa Iyengar appeared more than forty years ago. It was published in 1942 by the Mysore University in the series *Studies in philosophy* The book, running to more than 600 pages, is the first volume of a magnum opus on the theory of value which the author did not live to complete. He passed away in the summer of 1943 before the second (and final) volume could be completed.

As Hartshorne noted in his review. the work is wide ranging. 'It deals with not only every problem in the philosophy of value but with almost every problem in philosophy.'

The book is divided into two parts. Part I is concerned with the general principles of value; Part II with "the kingdom of values". I cannot do better than quote from John Laird's review in *Philosophy*, Vol. 19, pp. 163-164 (1944) to give the reader an idea of the scale and complexity of the discussions in these two parts.

Professor Laird begins with a summary of the leading concepts of the book. "The author's chief concepts are "validity", "value" and "Worth", the middle term "value" dominating the stage in the present volume. In rough outline, x is "valid" for y when x is usable by y in furtherance of y's trend of behaviour. Thus the breast is "valid" for the infant. At the conscious level such validity describes an "interest", a human interest for conscious human beings. According to the author such an "interest" is not "value". He therefore differs from Perry, Prall and other well-known American writers in this field, although accompanying them gladly for a good part of their way. There is "value" he maintains, only when the subject values, i,e, consciously (and indeed reflectively) appreciates the "validity" which serves his "interest". Such value is conditioned and is also relative in the appropriate sense or senses, and it *requires* thought although it is not true that "thinking makes it so" in all relevant senses of "make". Human values are always teleological, but "worth" (or perfection) is beyond the quicksands of end and means. If perfection would come, action would flow from it but would not be an object of pursuit".

He then goes on to give a detailed analysis of the book.

Part I of this volume is analytical. "There has been a "great confusion" (we are told) between "a general science of human welfare" and philosophies which presuppose a moralistic interpretation of "good". The former is the subject of the present work and is sometimes called "axiology"; but our author prefers the term 'normatics". "Value" he says, "is the status of satisfyingness of an object emerging out of its contemplation by a subject, both determined by a universe of desire which is realisable by means of the former and to which the latter is attracted". This definition includes the marks of teleology, instability (value is a "transistent") relativity, norm-patterns and width of the same. An account of certain questions, viz. the extent to which value is "objective", "existential" and of the way in which it is relative follows. Thereafter we have an account of the psychology of valuation and of the implications of the emergence theory in this application. The former is scarcely avoidable in discussions of this kind and gives the author his chance to make several acute observations upon purpose, choice and desire. The latter is 30,000 words long, but of course if you take emergence seriously you have to take "time" and "novelty" seriously.........The author has his own considered views on these topics, and is too well informed to be content with a sketchy presentation of them.

The second part of the book......is a phenomenology of the subject, i.e, an attempt to induce each great department of human "value" to reveal its secrets by sedulous and detailed self-description. There is ample precedence for such a method, e.g. in the work of Von Ehrenfels.

First we have a chapter on body-values, pleasure and play, including among many points of interest, a subtly qualified acceptance of (psychological) hedonism, and a treatment of play which allies it with art. Next the economist's conception of value is discussed and denounced, not from the outside but, learnedly, from within the economic field. The chapter on "Personal and Social Values" which follows is largely about the Green-Bosanquet way of treating the "State", appreciative but critical, and again proceeding learnedly and acutely, from within outwards. Thereafter we have the True, the Beautiful and the Good, in that order. The first, in the main is a critique of British idealist logic in the light of the author's theory of presuppositions. The second passes with ease and competence into the language of contemporary aesthetics. In the author's opinion art brings us very near to the top of value. It would be quite at the top if it did not need to have a product outside the spirit. Morality, or the "self-creation of spirit", "the artistry of *life*", is higher still. It has no product outside itself and falls short of worth only because it remains teleological.

Mr Iyengar's account of moral value suffers in an expository sense because he thinks it necessary to refute the new Oxford deontology at great length. (To this he devotes an entire chapter, valuable and searching in its special field, and better than most such discussions.) His own view is that moral value is self creation including self-expression, and self-expansion in their most liberal sense. He sums up in the formula: "So act that the line of your action may purify your desire. weaken the hold of possessiveness and enlarge your spirit".

I make no apology for this extensive quotation, It sums up, in a way I can never or dare to, the sweep and breadth of this original work on philosophy. The reviewer in the Bombay University Journal (1944) aptly closes with these words: "It has not been possible to give the reader more than a very sketchy idea of the catholicity and comprehensiveness of the author's mind which has swept on from one argument to another wither with a force and subtlety which is as rare as it is refreshing. Here there are many things which are difficult to understand, many more difficult to accept, but hardly any which it is possible to ignore". "I know of no superior presentation," writes Hartshorne in his concluding paragraph, "of the theory of self-achievement (it is also called "freedom") as the ethical objective. Nearly every problem and theory in the philosophy of values...... seems to me wisely and freshly handled."

K R. Sreenivasa Iyenger was born in 1898 in Kattigenahalli, a village in Bangalore District. An instinctive love of learning prompted him to leave his village—he was the younger of 7 children and none of his brothers or sisters went to school—and pursue his studies, in very difficult circumstances, in Mysore city. A brilliant student right from the beginning, he made his way through school and college on sholarships and prizes, getting his B.A. degree in 1919 from the Mysore University (Maharaja's College, Mysore) with a First class in Philosophy. He did his M A. from the Bombay University as a student of Wilson College (1922).

In 1924 he was appointed a Tutor in Philosophy in the Maharaja's College, Mysore, but even as a Tutor he was assigned to teach M.A. classes, a rare diitinction. He became an Assistant Professor in 1938. For a brief period—a little more than 3 months in 1941) he was Acting Professor. After a brief illness he passed away in the summer of 1943

These faccts of his official life give no idea of the impact Sreenivasa Iyengar had made on the world of philosophy and on generations of students who passed through Maharaja's College from 1924 to 1943. A profound scholar and a brilliant lecturer with an amazing command of the English language, Professor Sreenivasa Iyengar hae become an institution by himself. Even as a lecturer he was selected as a Symposiast in connection with the Symposium on Sarva Mukti opened by Dr S Radhakrishnan at the Mysore Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1932. He was elected President of the Ethics, Social Philoshphy and Religion section of the Indian Philosophical Gongress at Waltair, in 1934, while still a lecturer. Again, in 1938, he was selected as a Symposiast to take part in a Symposium on "Authority and Freedom in the Modern State" at the Allahabad session of the Congress. These were great honours at a time when the world of Indian philosophy boasted of such luminaries as Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Professor A. R. Wadia, Professor Haridas Bhattacharya, Professor A. C. Mukherjee, Dr. D. M. Datta and Sri P. N. Srinvasa Chary, among others.

Besides being an active member of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Sreenivasa Iyengar was a Prolific writer who published more than 50 articles on various topics in philosophy in learned journals in India, Europe and America. Among these may be mentioned; "The Notion of Dependence" in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XLVII, No.5 pp.506-524 (1939); "Outline of an Emergent Theory of Value" in *The International Journal of Ethics*. Vol. XIV. No.4; "The Nature of Descarte's Method" in the Proceedings of the *IX International Congress of Philosophy*, 111, pp 15-30 (1937); and "The Role of Emotion in Art" in the *Proceedings of the II International*

*Congress of Aesthetics and the History of Art*, Paris, (1937). This paper was written at the express invitation of Monsieur Raymond Bayer who. as the Secretary of the International Congress of philosophy had seen Sreenivasa Iyengar's paper on Descartes. (These last two papers were so much appreciated by the Congress authorities that they repeatedly wrote to Sreenivasa Iyengar urging him to attend the Congress in Paris ) The paper "Outline of an Emergent Theory of Value" was selected for inclusion in the Metaphysics Section of the Repertoire Bibliographique of Revue Neoscholastique De Philosophic of Louvain, Belgium. Writing on the paper 'The Notion of Dependence', in a personal communication to Sreenivasa Iyengar, Professor M. Hiriyanna, the doyen of Indian Philosophers said: "Considered in itself your paper, as I have already told you, is excellent; and in my opinion, it marks a new contribution to modern philosophical thought (8th January 1942).

When it is remembered that Sreenivasa Iyengar was only 45 when he passed away and that his work spanned a brief 18 years (from 1924) culminating in the monumental work *The Metaphysics of Value*, one will get some measure of the quality of his mind.

Besides these publications in English, Sreenivasa Iyengar had a number of publications in Kannada also. The most outstanding of his work in Kannada is *Greekara Tatva Shastra Saara Sangraha* (The Essence of Greek Philosophy)' running into more than 400 pages published by the Mysore University (1941).

Sreenivasa Iyengar's professional career was dogged by ill-luck. In 1930 he was strongly recommended by the Selection Committee and the University Council for the award of a Damodardas Scholarship to go to Cambridge for higher studies. But when he was almost expecting orders the whole thing miscarried and one of his students (both in the B.A and M.A. classes) walked away with the scholarship. In 1931 Principal Rollo of the Maharaja's College recommended him for a grant of £320 for one year study in Britain from the Carnegie Corporation grant administered by the universities Bureau of the British Empire. But he did not get the grant, Again in 1937 it looked as though he was sure to sail to France to participate in the IX International Congress of Philosophy which was meeting in Paris. Again, fate intervened and nothing came of his efforts,

But these disappointments were nothing compared to the final disappointment. When the post of Professor of Philosophy in the Maharaja's College fell vacant (on Professor A. R. Wadia being appointed Director of Public Instruction), Sreenivasa Iyengar was the sole candidate unanimously recommended for appointment by the Selection Committee. The recommendation of the Selection Committee was approved by the University Syndicate and the Vice Chancellor. But at the highest level—Mysore was then a princely state the recommendations of all the duly constituted bodies were ignored and a person who had not even been called for interview by the Selection Committee (as he did not possess the basic qualification of an M.A. in Philosophy) was appointed Professor of Philosophy. This was too much for the philosopher who had braved ill-health and other disappointments earlier. He took ill, was hospitalized and, in less than a fortnight, passed away.

Even in the matter of his book, *The Metaphysics of Value*, on which he had laboured so hard and so long (for more than 10 years), Sreenivasa Iyengar was unlucky. The book was published during the Second World War. When copies were finally sent out for review to journals in India and abroad, the war was still on. By the time the first reviews started appearing—in 1944—Sreenivasa Iyengar was no more. He did not have the satisfaction of seeing how well his book had been received by the philosophical world.

John Laird in his review in *philosophy* already referred to, opens with these words. "There may be differences of opinion concerning precisely how good a book this is, but few could deny that it is a very good book......My first duty......is to say that this book should be widely studied in these islands. But as it turned out, few libraries either in U.S.A. or Britain could acquire copies of the book, thanks to the disruption caused by the war. (I have personally chekked that even the British Library does't have a copy.) With the author's untimely demise and in the wake of the tumultuous days following the war, the book went unnoticed.

Is it now too late for philosophers in India at least to take note of the book and place in perspective the author's contribution to the theory of value ? Apart from the main theme of the book, there are several other topics in the discussion of which Sreenivasa Iyengar had made a significant, original contribution. One of these, I think, is the distinction between Presupposition and Inference. I believe he was the very first to have identified presupposition as distinct from inference and analysed its logical character.

# 3

# The Concept of Idealism and Time in Yogacara, Kant and Berkeley

## An analysis of some of the similarities and differences

*A. T. Hopkinson*

## INTRODUCTION

This paper is a development of a dissertation I wrote in 1989 analysing the concepts of idealism in the philosophy of Berkeley, Kant and Yogacara.

## GENERAL OVERVIEW

We will begin with a general overview the philosophies of Yogacara, Berkeley and Kant.

**Yogacara :**

Yogacara philosophers declared that physical objects must be defined in terms of what can be experienced, but what can be experienced is not just sensations or mental events. The yellows and blues which are the objects of my immediate and direct awareness, are not the awareness itself, but that of which I am aware. It is also meaningless to assert that the colours which I see are physical.

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In references to Berkeley the following system is used (number)—paragraphs of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.

(PC number)-the sections of the Philosophical Commentaries

(TD number)-the pages of the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonopus.

Quotations from Berkeley are taken from "Berkeley, Philosophical Works" Dent 1975.

Quotalions from Asanga (except were otherwise, stated) are from Janice Willis, On Knowing Reality, Columbia University 1979.

To what physical object do the red spots belong when I get hit on the head. Seeing blues and yellows is mental, but this does not imply that what is thus seen is mental or physical. The mental and the physical are special constructs within the field of experience. Another such is the relation of externality which makes one think that things exist as such and are external to the observer. Once we appreciate that is experience that matters, we will never bring up any questions of things existing unexperienced Yogacara did not deny that there were things external to the observer but they disclaimed their independent existence and objected to their being equated with mind [1]

For the Yogacara, who were attempting to find a relation between the absolute and the individual, there exits only citta (citta-matra) or vijnana. The citta, better known as the Alaya vijnana (store consciousness—the substratum of samsara), though originally pure becomes polluted by delusions and dichotomises itself into subject/object i.e., manas and the external world. Nirvana consists in realising that there is only citta "Nirvana consists in the removal of the imagining intellect[2], the source of the seven vijnanas and that it is not any one of the following four as conceived by the heretics :

1 absence of any real existence

2 absence of the various forms of existence

3 realisation of the absence of the existence of one's own signs

4 destruction of the chain of continuity of the general characteristics.[3]

Four objections to idealism are mentioned by Vasubandhu in he Vimsatika[4].

1 Why does the image of a certain thing only occur at a certain place and not anywhere.

2 Why does the image of a certain thing only occur at a certain time and not at any time.

3 The illusion of a non existent hair occurs only for those with visual disorders. But a given thing occurs for everyone in the same time and place.

4 Vision disorders and dreams do not have efficacy. but things presented as images when one is awake do. Why ? Vasubandhu answers 1 and 2 by pointing out that in a dream events seem to occur in a specific time and place. 3 by the fact that all pretas see a river of pure water as a river of pus and watchmen on guard who are not really there. 4 bv the fact non existent dreams do achieve efficacy e.g.

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[1] H. V. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice, 1972, p. 16.

[2] D. T. Suzuki, Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, 1975, p. 126.

[3] Suzuki op cit p 157

a wet dream (Of course many dreams do not have efficacy. I once dreamt that I was dead appears but I am not. We have to admit that Vasubandhu's theory here appears to be somewhat weak.

Nirvana is the transformation of the vijnanas and is devoid of distinctions of existence and non existence, internal and non external.

However, the Yogacaras were sharply criticised by the Madhyamikas for their conception of the store-consciousness. Both schools hold that dharmas are non existent, without origin and decay, and the highest truths are unutterable, identical with thatness and unchangeableness. possess the signs of non taking and non rejecting and beyond every possible means of determination. The Yogacara concept of reality, apart from the Alaya vijnana, is the same as the Madhyamika. Like them they hold that the mind is under the delusion of imputing existence to no existent things and the Hinayanists could not rid their minds completely of the four viparyasas (misconceptions) in that they meditated on Pudgalanimitta (individuality as basis) only and not on sarvadhamanimitta (all things whatsoever as basis). They conceived of Nirvana as something existent, full of peace and beyond misery.[5]

**Representation only (vijnaptimatra)**

The mahayanasamgraha indicates that an object in the consciousness does not presuppose its existence in the phenomenal world for the following reasons among others

1 Being see this differently at different levels of existence
2 Cognition can arise even when there are no objects such as in dreams or yogic perception of future objects
3 Dhyana and samadhi give a person the ability to visualise objects at will
4 A practitioner of darsha-marga attains supermundane cognition (lokottara-jnana) in which there is no image of an object

Statement one above may be expanded by what Vasubhandhu says above about how Pretas see a river of water as pus etc and by how Asanga states that knowledge of reality is of two sorts concisely. 1. that which consists of knowing the noumenal aspect (yathavadbhavikata) of dharmas. or the true state of dharmas as they are in themselves (bhutata). 2 Knowing the phenomenal aspect (yavadbhavikata) of dharmas, as they are in totality (sarvata) Or in a four-fold way :

1 What is universally accepted by ordinary beings;
2 What is universally accepted by logic of reason

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[4] Hattori Masaaki, Realism and the Philosophy of Consciosness Only in The Eastern Buddhist, Spring 1988, p. 24ff.

[5] N. Dutt, Mahayana Buddhism, 1973, p. 280.

3 That which is the sphere of cognitive activity (jnanagocara) completely purified of the obstructions, of defilement (klesavarana);

4 That which is the sphere of cognitive activity completely purified of obscurations to the knowable (jneyavarana)

The first refers to the opinions of worldly beings who proceed according to signs and conventions so that they say that" This is this and not that" "This happiness, not suffering" "This is suffering and not happiness" (149).

Ordinary beings accept things, without pondering or investigating them, as reality[6].

The second refers to what is known from the personal eloquence of those governed by reason. It is based on the proofs of those learned in logic; direct Perception, inference and the testimony of worthy persons.

The third is the end of the outflows. It is attained by the sravakas and pratyekas. This reality is the four Noble Truths clearly comprehended. It is the realisation, the understanding of those truths on the part of those sravakas and pratyekas who have realised that there is no atman but only the skandhas gained by clear understanding of dependent arising. It arises from person. (150-151)

The fourth is the knowledge of the Buddhas ahd bodhisattvas who have penetrated the non self of dharmas, thereby they realise because of pure understanding, the inexpressible nature of all dharmas, know the sameness of the essential nature of verbal designations and the nondiscursive knowable. This is the supreme Suchness (152).

The correctly determined characteristic of reality is its not two (adyaya) nature or constitution (prabhavitam) The two are being (bhava) and nonbeing (abhava).

Ordinary beings regarded "being" all the way up to Nirvana as whatever is determined to have essential nature solely by virtue of verbal designation (prajnaptivada svabhava), (152) In other words what can be named e.g. a self is'What cannot be named or described is not Or to cite scriptural authority starting with a quote from the Bhavasamkrantisutra:

Indeed, by whatsoever name whatsoever dharma is mentioned, that dharma is not found therein. For that is the true nature of all dharmas. (164)

And:

Dharmas are not identical with their designations. Nor is there any dharma found outside of those that is identical to "form" etc.

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6 Op. Berkeley on exists

7 Op. Adhimoksha dharma, p. 27.

What does exist there in the ultimate sense, with an inexpressible meaning, is the true mode (dharmata) of essential nature (164).

Berkeley we note was also concerned with what people meant by exists.

**Modification of consciousness (vijnana—parinama)**

Consciousness consists of 3 strata

1 six kinds of consciousness;
visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mind
2 I consciousness (manas) which accompanies 1
3 Alaya vijnana in which impressions of past events are stored as seeds of future events

A seed planted by 1 and 2 becomes ripe in 3 and 1 and 2 arise from 3

3 lasts only for a moment and is replaced by another consciousness in the next moment and these successive moments form a stream which continues to flow until the seeds planted in it are completely destroyed. In each moment 1 and 2 arises and thus a consciousness complex arises.

**Three natures (trisvabhava)**

These are :

1 Imagined nature (parikalpita svabhava)
2 Dependent nature (paratantra svabhava)
3 Perfected nature (parinispanna svabhava)

This doctrine may be summarised as follows. The consciousness that arises in each moment with the image of an object is of dependent nature because its origination is dependent on the impressions in the store consciousness. Because of his false imagination, man ordinarily takes this image for a real object and applies a name to it. Asanga argues that whatever is a designation for the individual characteristics of the dharmas, for example, "form" or "feeling" even up to Nirvana, should be understood as only a designation (158). It is neither the essential nature of the dharma, nor wholly different from it. The essential nature is found by avoiding grasping the view which affirms the existence of what is non existent and the view which denies existence altogether (158).

Dharmas are not like verbal expressions of them in their essential nature. Because different men attach different expressions to things and which would be the correct one. And if the essential nature was the designation then before the designation was attached there would be no essential nature (159-160).

Asanga says that the concept of voidness is rightly viewed as seeing a thing to exist in such a way that it is neither totally existent nor totally non existent (163). This apparent paradox is explained in the Trishatitayah Prajnaparamitayah Karikasaptatih a; Assumption of dharmas is fourfold (though no assumption of dharmas is really possible) because all dharmas are non existent (notion of perceiver and perceived being impossible) but assumption of no dharma is impossible b; because there exists this non existence (as voidness, sunyata etc is possible). c; because there is nothing of which something can be postulated, but d; there is the conventional use of predicating something of something.

**Dharma theory in Yogacara**

Since objectivity is an illusion there can be no objective dharmas. When consciousness gets phenomenalised by being infected with the idea of objectivity, it acquires various forms or modes. When consciousness is diversified, its moments are qualified by so many overtones as it were; these do not form an integral part of consciousness, but nor can they be granted an independent status. These are the dharmas and they their ultimacy is rejected. They are yet real appertaining to the consciousness which never looses its reality in whatever form it may be. The individuality of consciousness lies not in the object cognized but in the attitude towards it. The same object may please one person and offend another. Since the object is merely a mode of existence of consciousness, the reason for the individuality or particularity of the latter must be sought in itself. Dharmas perform this function by setting each moment in sharp relief against all others.

For the interest of the reader we have included a classification of Yogacara dharmas in appendix 1. Suffice to say that they are a combination of moral acts and of looking at the world from an idealistic viewpoint.

As Navasloki of Kambalapada puts it:

ii 6 a world is created by force of actions ..it is unreal like a magic illusion.

vi 10 The various perceptions that arise every instant are similar to a mirage. They disappear as soon as they are seen and then have a different character at a different moment.

vi 11 All objects of mental perception arise in the mind which exists ab aeterno and are similar to reflected images. so also is consciousness which takes their from as a series of reflected images connected with one another as perceiver and perceived.[10]

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8 G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, 1956, p. 11.

9 Presumably therefore giving the impression of a real experience of an external object.

10 In G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts

Or the triple world is vijnapti, a mere subjective construction without reality or self substance. But the existence or the mind itself is not denied[11].

It has to be admitted that Yogacara's idea of fount of consciousness came very near to idea of a permanent self[12].

Buddha nature is here Mind Only and there is thus only one Buddha. But numerous Buddhas are projected into the world for the sake of beings[13].

**Kant**

We begin with an anatytic of concepts, asking ourselves what a Priori concepts are necessary for understanding. Analytic of concepts is not analysis of concepts, but of the faculty of understanding itself, as a means of the possiblilty of investigating the possibility of a priori concepts. Every concept is the predicate of a possible judgement and so a complete account of the pure concepts that are the especial functions of the understanding can be given by a complete statement of the logical forms of judgement.

There are concepts that cannot be given through experience because they are presupposed in experience. They are involved in every apprehension of the world that I can represent as mice; not to possess them is to have, not experience, but mere intuition, from which no knowledge can be derived. Kant called these catagories bearing similarity to Aristotelian logic:

1 Quantity
a Universal—All men are mortal
b Particular—Some men are long-lived
c Singular–Socrates is mortal

2 Quality
a Affirmative—The soul is mortal
b Negative—The soul is not mortal
c Infinite—The soul is non mortal

3 Relation
a Catagorical—The wicked are punished
b Hypothetical—If there is a perfect justice, the wicked are punished
c Disjunctive (only one condition is true)—The world exists through creation, inner necessity or blind chance.

4 Modality
a Problematic—The cat may be on the mat
b Assertoric—The cat is on the mat
c Apodeitic—The cat must be somewhere

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[11] Suzuki op. cit. p. 181.

[12] E. R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception, 1958 p88

[13] D. A. Fox, The Heart of Buddhist Wisdom, 1927, p. 59.

Three factors are involved in a priori knowledge

1 the manifold of our intuition-the spatio temporal frame work of all experience which is provided by our capacity for receiving sense impressions.
2 the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination
3 the concepts which give unity to this synthesis

1 is the passive side of the mental process. 2 and 3 are the active side—our imagination, which with the help of pure concepts provided by the understanding enables us to give structure to the material presented to us.

Transcendental logic provides us with twelve pure concepts of the understanding (catagories) ie

1 Quantity
a Unity
b Plurality
c Totality

2 Quality
a Reality
b Negation
c Limitation

3 Relation
a Inherence and substance
b Causality and dependence
c Community-reciprocity between agent and patient

4 Modality
a Possibility and impossibility
b Existence and non existence
c Necessity and contingency

We know the world not as it is in reality but as it appears to the senses. And therefor the way things appear to us depends in part on the structure of our minds.

Our empirical knowledge has two sources, sensibility and understanding. If our minds merely had the capacity to receive sensations passively we would have a manifold of intuitions (sensations) but would not be able to name or differentiate them. But in reality, through our intellect, we organize the audio visual tactile and, in general, the sensuous field into a set of objects with various qualities and attributes. This is the work of the spontaneous, active part of the mind as opposed to the passive function of sensibility. Our understanding must have particular set of intuitions into the objectable.

The organizing activitiy of the understanding is as follows. It is an act of combination or synthesis. A judgement such as This house is higher than that every alteration has a cause. is a judgement that two or more things are combined in reality and presupposes that they have been combined in the mind. It also presuppose a unity in the combining mind; any idea or representation must be relatable to previous and future ideas.

This unity is the transcendental or synthetis unity of apperception a pure unchangeable consciousness which logically preceedes the receiving of any empirical data whatsoever. Ideas are always ideas in a single mind which is conscious of its unity even though it is not thinking about it all the time.[14]

Transcendental apperception must be distinguished from empirical apperception. I am empirically conscious of my mental states as they successively occur. I am conscious that I am thinking about my paper and of the possibility that it might rain tomorrow when I go to have lunch with my friend. But behind all this is the fact that thoughts and reflections do not occur in isolation but in a mind that retains its unity through the variety of its activities. The mind is not a succession of perceptions for that would mean that no knowledge or organized experience would be posible.

To say If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight is to say something about myself viz. the perception of the idea of body has always been connected by me with that of weight. Bodies are heavy is a judgement about the two ideas of body any weight which does not depend on whether or not I am supporting a body or not.

The apprehension of a manifold experience is always successive. I observe a house as a succession of mental acts, but the house itself. is not a series of successive events.

Kantian idealism is peculiar in the fact that, though his "Copernican Revolution" claimed that objects conform to the senses, he does not deny the existence of "the thing in itself". We have to admit however that it is somewhat difficult to understand the necessity for the "thing in itself".

**Berkeley**

Berkeley was concerned with the meaning of the words 'matter' and 'exists'. He felt that we had no right to the concept until we know just what it is and how we came about it.[16]

He states that objects of human knowledg are either ideas imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas helped formed by help of memory and imagination either compounding, or dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways, e.g:—

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[14] J. Kemp. The Philosophy of Kant, 1968, p. 25.

[15] Kemp op. cit. p. 20ff.

[16] H. Palmer, Presupposition and Transcendental Inference, 1985 p114

A certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple. (For... besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them .. what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself (2). Thus...neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind.

He believes that objects cannot exist apart from their perception

"...can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them being unperceived?(5)"

... seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense... cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.(3)
(In other words, for all objects their esse is percipi)

The only substance is spirit

"...there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives... the sensible qualities are ideas perceived by sense. For an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction,(7)"

Since an idea can be nothing but an idea, they cannot be copies of things existing outside the mind (8)

Even number is a creature of the mind. Same extension is one three or thirty six depending on whether yards feet or inches are being used (12) (A somewhat fatuous distinction. The different units chosen to measure length exist whether or not objects are ideal or corporal).

Senses do not inform us that things exist outside the mind (18). All senses point to ts the existence of senses.

"In sense perception, what the perceiver in every case is directly (or immediately) or aware of is just one or more ideas of sense" [17]

Berkeley believes that his ideas point towards the existence of God for the following reasons: We perceive a continual succession of ideas .. therefore there is some cause of these ideas whereon they depend, which produces or changes them. Now there is no power in ideas to produce ideas (26) or in corporal or material substance and so the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit. (25) (i.e. God).

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[17] G. Pitcher, Berkeley, 1977 p. 95.

But the nature of this spirit is that it cannot be perceived by itself but only by its acts (27)

Since what is preceived by my senses does not depend on my will. I cannot choose whether to see or not in daylight when I open my eyes (29)' there is order and connection in the senses pointing to the wisdom and benevolence of its Author (30). Thus we have foresight which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. Unfortunately, this constant uniform working (regularity of the senses) does not lead our thoughts to a good spirit whose will constitutes the Laws of Nature but rather sends them wandering after secondary causes (31)

## ANALYSIS OF SIMILARITIES AND DIFEERENCES

Faced with objectiohs to his theories, Berkeley presents a number of counter arguments which in a few points bear a superficial similarity to Vasubandhu.

Everything becomes a chimera

Whatever we see, hear, feel, or in anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever. (34) Only corporal substance or matter is denied (35) For substace is a combination of sensible qualities and this Berkeley cannot be accused of taking away. (36)

The testimony of sense cannot be used as a proof of the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense (40) Objection that people believe that matter exists is answered in one way by the fact that a vast number of false opinions are tenaciously believed. (55) This is similar to Asangas statement that people believe things exist because they can be named.

If motion is an idea only then the movement of the earth, and thereby a fundamental mathematical truth, is not so. But the motion of the earth was discovered by the observation of the senses of astronomers and senses are in the mind. (58) Why is everything so complex and why do things go wrong when God could move them by his will without the complexity.

But corporal things, no matter how complex cannot be the cause of motion. Solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like, have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. And the fabrication of all the parts is necessary to the producing of things in a constant, regular way, according to the Laws of Nature. There are certain generel laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects: these are learned by the observation and study of Nature, and are by men applied to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life. (61 62

Might be objected that though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe matter: yet if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter, the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means only by the word, an inert senseless substance, that exists without the mind, or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us; it doth appear that matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. But it is no less absurd to suppose substance without accidents as accidents without substance. But where is this substance if it does exist? It is not in the the mind, nor in a place since extension is in the mind. (67)

Matter, though not perceived by us, may be perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of existing ideas in our mind But this merely states that there are certain ideas in the mind of God which we do not know about. (70 71)

Like Vasubandhu, Berkeley discusses the nature of dreams. But Berkeley uses his idea of dreams as part of his proof the existence of God. He states that ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct and have an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is real things, are more vivid and clear, and being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not a like dependence on the will (TD 186) Berkeley is concerned with refuting atheism by his philosophy, "How great a friend material substance hath been to atheists in all ages". (92) The supreme spirits operations are regular and thus it is only when miracles occur that we assign the event to him. (57)

In summary: For Berkeley there is no corporeal existence only sensations. An object exists because it is perceived or because it continues to be perceived in the mind of God. His philosophy is theistic and tries to prove the existence of God. The mind for him is acquainted with the soul and personal identity. He uses the terms interchargeably. (Unlike Hume who could discover no permanent underlying soul no matter how hard he analysed himself).

Kant rejects the possibility of proving the existence of God in the Ideal of Pure Reason section of the Critique of Pure Reason[16].

For him sense impressions do come from outside the mind there is the thing in itself and the mind makes sense of the manifold of sense impressions through the aid of the catagories. The radical idea behind his philosophy, as stated earlier is that objects conform to

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18 Though he does believe he has found a proof through ethics in the Critique of Practical Reason

the senses. Not because the mind creates objects, but because the mind organizes the countless manifold.

For Yogacara everything mind and the impressions on the mind depend on Karma and it is this fact that means that one cannot chose what to see on opening the eyes. The teachings work on three levels:

1 Meditation through the fact that true knowledge of its teachings are found in meditative experience.

Though he does believe he has found a proof through ethics in the Critique of Practical Reason.

2 Philosophical through the fact of philosophical works.

3 Ethical: Asanga talks of how the Bodhisattva remains in samsara to help others because he knows the true nature of the world and therefore does not weary of it, He states that because the bodhisattva has a firm conviction in voidness he understands the true nature of samsara as it really is, He does not weary his mind with the impermanence or other aspects of samsara. If he didn't experience the true nature of samsara, he would not, owing to the defilements of lust etc. he would not be able to render his mind equable and would mature neither the buddhadharmas or sentient beings. Conversely, if the wearies himself of the aspects of samsara, he will quickly enter Parinirvana and would again not mature the buddhadharmas or sentient beings. So he is neither frightened of, nor does he strive for Nirvana (153-54). It is apparent from this that Asanga's work has a soteriological and not just a logical aspect. It is the means whereby the bodhisattva gains the capacity to help sentient beings.

Through his long time engagement with the knowledge of the dharmas, having understood the inexpressibility of all dharmas as they really are, the bodhisattva does not at all imagine any dharma, Rather he sees all dharmas as absolutely the same as precisely Suchness only. And likewise his mind attains to supreme equanimity.

By that equanimity he gains skill in the sciences without fatigue. Nor is he puffed up with pride. He proceeds, without hindrance. Practicing steadfast mental armour to the extent that, circling in samsara, he experiences diverse sufferings and to that extent he generates enthusiasm towards incomparable Perfect Enlightenment. He also lacks pride towards any being because of the diverse bodies he experiences, the various acquaintances he experiences who have various defilements lead "even to greater measure his mind stays in equanimity", he grows in virtue, to that extent his goodness is unabated, he does not seek to know from others, nor does he seek or gain reverence for himself (155-56). Or as the Arthavargiya puts it ;

Whatever conventions there be among the worldly, all those the Muni does not take up. And verily not participating, how could he indulge, since he takes no pleasures in what is seen or heard ?

Designations are conventions which he does not accept because he neither exaggerates nor underestimates in his views. He neither affirms dor denies a given thing. By ending attachment, longing, or expectation one ceases to cling to the object or its designation and thereby gains equanimity. (Again the philosophy has transformed into soteriology). "In regard to what is seen and heard, he neither originates nor increases craving. Not otherwise would he rid himself of the object of consciousness (alambana) and dwell with equanimity; and having equanimity, he does not create desire (kantim) (165).

We note in passing that Berkeley does not rely on scriptural authority as proof of his views. His approach is solely one of reason. Though, like Asanga, he has a soteriological aim—the proof of the existence of God· (Asanga being concerned with how the bodhisattva should view the world).

Also we note that many of the dharmas have an ethical basis behind them. Now, in the Three Dialogues (p186), Berkeley does take pains to point out that people are responsible for their actions, but he mainly approaches his work from a philosophical point of view and acheives his proof of God from reason.

## The Mind

Let us turn now to a more detailed look at the concept of the mind. We will concentrate mainly on Berkeley as we have already looked in some detail at Yogacara and Kant.

In the philosophical Commentaries (PC 577) Berkeley felt that the mind was a "congeries of perceptions" Take away the mind and you take away the perceptions. For we are only aware of ideas not the alleged thing that has the ideas and indeed he says that in sleep or trance the mind "exists not" (PC651).

Later he becomes concerned (PC744) with the fact that we can perceive a multiplicity of sensations at once and that one and the same thing seems to be having these experiences namely "I" Though this does not take account of the Buddhist doctrine of no self.

A problem arises in Berkeley's thought because he regards the will as the only active thing and a congeries of individual volitions. They are not however something of what we are directly aware. We are aware of the idea of ourselves performing a certain action and of a feeling of uneasiness that the action has not yet been performed. The will is seen as part of the mind but it is not a congeries of ideas

(PC643) and Berkeley now changes to identifying the mind with the will and denies that ideas are part of the mind. "The Spirit the Active thing that which is Soul and God is the Will alone. The Ideas are effects impotent things (PC 712).

A person, is his mind, i.e. constantly performing acts of volition. However we are not aware of any volitions directly. So we have no idea of a volition because an idea of reason as opposed to one of sense or introspection must be a copy of something we can be directly aware of. In other words: since ideas are inactive none of them can be a body of a volition or will,

Berkeley changes his mind again by saying that "We see no variety or difference betwixt the volitions, only between their effects. His One Will one Act distinguished by the effects. This will, this Act is the Spirit, operative, Principle, Soul etc." (PC788) and he now sees the mind as immaterial or spiritual substance. (PC829). He sees our volitions as not a mere series of discrete, disconnected items but as possessing a fundamental unity, (As we shall see in chapter five, it is impossible, because of the nature of his religion, for him to ever conceive of the doctrine of momentariness). And since the mind is unknowable spiritual substance we cannot distinguish different mental faculties such as will understanding etc. All we can say is that there is a spirit that wills things and perceives ideas.

**Bekeley's relationship between the mind and the ideas it has.**

Berkeley asserts three propositions

A The mind perceives ideas

A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being; as it perceives ideas, is is called the understanding. (27)

B The mind is wholly distinct from its ideas its most sure that our Ideas are distinct from the Mind i.e. the Will the Spirit (PC847)

C There is no distinction between the perceiving of an idea and the idea perceived

Wherein I pray you does the perception of white differ from white (PC585)

It is not possible to separate any of the things we see feel etc from perception

B seems to rely on the fact thai Berkeley believes that ordinary Physical objects are nothing but families of ideas and therefore these ideas must be distinct from the mind in the same way as objects are felt to be distinct from us. He is thinking that the Cartesian statement" I allow only so much difference between the soul and its ideas as there is between a piece of wax and the various shapes it can assume" (Lettet 34) as meaning that the mind is a blue sphere when it perceives a blue sphere not that the awareness of a blueness and sphericity is a mode of consciousness which does not entail that the mind is blue and spherical.[19]

The question arises as to how we know of the existence of a plurality of finite spirits or selves. We know of our own existence by reflexion; we perceive ideas and are aware of the fact that we are distinct from those ideas. (PC581). But we know of the existence of other spirits by reason on analogy. We perceive several motion, changes and combinations of ideas which inform us, that there are several agents like ourselves which accompany them and concur in their production· (145) (In passing this seems to us an error in Berkeley. If one accepts the philosophy of Idealism, then one can only agree that evants occur in one's mind. It is not certain that one can accept the existence of other "agents"; for how is one certain that the events one thinks have ocurred because of other minds are not the work of one's own mind in a way not fully understood.)

For the Yogacara the objectes imagined is of dependent nature. Karmic acts (past events) become seeds in the store consciousness. They are like the hairs seen by a man with defective vision. For Berkeley, however, things exist because they are perceived either by men or God.

Kant's concept of the mind is in no way similar to Yogacara even though the use of the phrase ' Transcendental Idealism" may cause be unwary to think so. The sense impressions (manifold) come from outside the mind and are organised by it. We have apriori knowledge which we use to organise the manifold. But the existence of the thing initself is not denied.

## TIME

We now turn to the analysis of time

We will look at the concept in Yogacara, Kant and Berkeley separately before analysing some points in which they show similarity and difference.

### Time in Yogacara Philosophy.

For Buddhist philosophy all is in a state of flux, what does not change cannot be said to exist. For them that which is real is of the nature of a cause—it gives rise to an effect.[20] It is an apagogic proof depending on establishing that the momentary alone can be true through rejecting the permanenti.

Causal efficiency, they point out, can be exercised in two ways viz. succession or simultaenity. If the permanet exercises causal efficiency in the first moment then, being permanent it would produce its effect continually. Else it would be contradictory as it would produce its effect in then first instant and then not.

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[19] One wonders what the essence of the mind is when it is not willing or perceiving

[20] Paticcasmupapada is one example: Ignorance leads to karmic formations etc

If the permanent exercised causal efficiency successively it could be asked if when executing a present effiiciency it also has past and future efficiencies as will. If it did it would exercise them all at once. If it didnt it could never exercise past and future causal efficiency.

The thing produces its cause instantaneously for, if it waits, it has no causal efficiency

Because the posterior resembles the antecedent gives rise to the notion of so-called duration. In reality, this similarity is no continuity of an identical entical entity, but due to a lack of perception of the subtle distinction of similar moments[21]. Or as Ratnakirti, puts it. (His theory was solipsistic idealism ) From the standpoint of the highest truth an external nonmental continuum is impossible. In the ultimate reality the cognizing subject, the object and the cognizing subject's act of awareness all coalesce, the world is a transcendental illusion and language, including the terms real and unreal are linguistic fictions. To speak of objects is to speak, not of extra mental entities, but of interelated mental constructs.

But this network of mental construts does, nontheless effect the things we say and do and can therefore be evaluated as an instrument. Ratnakirti presents the theory that all real existents are momentary and what is non momentary is not real. Though ultimately, since the world is a mental construct. Ratnakirti is giving a systematic treatment to entities which are phenomenally unreal 77.11[22]. whatever is not successive does not have the capacity for causal efficiency.

77 12 It is impossible for succession or non succession to exist in a non momentary subject. (If there is succession between two moments they are diffierent. Difference and identity are contradictory and so succession is not possible in the case of an unchanging (nonmomentary).

77. 18 Nonmomentary identity keeps its identity through prior and subsequent times. But if succession is possible between two moments they must be different, and (77· 12) difference and identity are contradictory.

## Opposition to idea of momentariness

Udayadcarya's nyayakusumanjala points out that perception presupposes a contact between the visual organ and the entity and this proposition is outrooted by the proposition that that which exists is momentary.

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[21] I seem to be the same now as a moment ago but I am in fact a succesion of fluctuating skandhas

[22] Ratnakirti quoates are from the running translation in A C. Snapa—Mc Dermott, A Buddhist Logic of Exists, 1969

Kumarila Bhatta's Atmatattviveka (Mimamsa) says that there cannot be any cognition without an object. Nor can cause and effect be simultaneous. There must be a time lapse no matter how small. (This is hardly a fair opposition from an idealistic point of view. If there is no reality outside the mind then no time lapse between object and cognition is necessary and it is no way apparent that cognition requires the presence of a physical object. Of course, if time itself is an idealistic concept, the belief that there is a time lapse between cause and effect is itself mind made and has no basis in reality. It is simply the way the mind organises the world it creates and beings could, in theory, so organise the world, or rather their minds could so organise, that all events throughout eternity were known always in an eternal present in the way that Aquinas's God stands outside time. This would, of course, destroy the possibility of karma and samsara).

Jains point out also that the objects is prior, the knowledge latter.

Mimamsa philosophers point out that the fact of recognition clearly shows that the object must endure. If it was momentary and constantly different it could not be experienced at different times and and thus be recognized at different times[23]. (The fact that all existence is momentary does not mean that objects change their appearance at each moment and become unrecognisable).

**Time and the problem of change**

Buddhism rejects the idea of universal time. The instant alone is real[24]. (As we shall see below under Time as a form of intuition, section 5. Kant feels that the understanding of the nature of time requires the assumption of unlimited or infinite time.)

Realists point out to the Yogacaras that if consciousness is to be regarded as the only reality, no rational explanation can be given for Spatio temporal determination[25].

**Kant on time**

Kant's view of time in the Critique of Pure Reason was written within only five months and represented the hasty condensation of twelve years thought. Unlike Newton he could not agree that time was an entity having reality outside the mind of the individual. Kant felt that the uniqueness of time prevented it from being an abstraction from experience.

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[23] A N Balslev, A Study of Time in Indian Philosophy, 1983 p93ff

[24] Ibid. p. 80 ff

[25] See the Vimsatika of this paper

## Preliminary Definitions

1 Intuition: the direct experience of sensory contents' called phenomena, and the capacity of receiving representations of those contents i.e. sensibility. Evey phenomena contains matter and form. Matter corresponds to the contents of sensations and from affects the contents in such a way as to order them in to a manifold. Form cannot itself be a sensation. However, there are pure representations in which the matter of the phenomena is not present and only the forms are given. These are pure intuitions and constitute the forms of sensibility. They exist a priori and have no correspondence with anything in the sensations themselves.

## Time as a form of intuition

1 Time cannot be an empirical conception since its essential characteristics (coexistence and succession) cannot be perceived by us unless we know a priori these ideas. Sensations cannot be seen as temporal unless we already know what is meant by "coexistence" and "succession".

2 We cannot think of phenomena as being outside time but we can think of empty time. (Even when we think of time our thoughts follow one and other and are therefore in time) Objects can be eliminated from thought but time cannot. Therefore time is logically prior to phenomena.

3 It is impossible to think of a two dimensional time or of two coexistent times. This is due to the unthinkable character of such notions and not the non experience of such notions.

4 Time is not a generalization of different times. Different time are merely parts of one time. Thus time is an a priori form which interrelates phenomena into a temporal manifold. For Kant concepts are general admitting of plurality but there is only one space and time and therefore they cannot be a priori concepts but are intuitions.

5 Conceptions of time segments i.e., limited durations, are possible only on the assumption of an unlimited or infinite time; but this cannot be empirically derived and must therefor be given a priori as a form of intuition under which phenomena are perceived.

Time is a form contributed to reality by the mind and not a property of objects in themselves. It can be viewed as a form of internal experience as in dreams and of external experience in regard to successive change and motion of objects. Because time possess no shape or figure we tend to supply this by analogy and we find that we can successfully do this through the notion of a straight line extending to infinity. From the Hindu point of view we can conceive of time as being like the path of a wheel moving onward

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26 J. T. Frazer, Voices of Time, 1968 p262

through its journey but with rebirth as its constant turning. Buddhism idea of the instantaneousness of all dharmas is more like the path of the wheel made up of numerous dotes.

Time therefore, since it is not empirical, is the most idealistic concept, along with space in Kant.

**The problem of the Reality of Time**

The permanent feautures of a changing thing or activity are its form. Situations in space or space and time are invariant features of perception and therefore Kant speaks of them as forms of perception. Space and time are the spectacles through which our eyes are effected by objects and since they are irremovable, objects can never be seen as they are in themselves. But this argument of Kant's is inconclusive. For objects may still be seen as they are even though they are viewed in space and time just as objects may be pink in reality though they are viewed through pink spectacles.[27]

**Berkeley on Time**

Whenever I try to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly, and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others say, it is infinitely divisible, and lead me to speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life;both which seem equally ab urd. Time therefore being nothing abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence it is a plain consequence shat the soul always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go to divide in his thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cognition, will, I believe, find it no easy task. (98)

From the above it will be apparent to the reader that time is therefor mind formed for Berkeley too.

For Berkeley, the concept of time abstracted from ideas in the mind is absurd and for Kant time is not an empirical concept. For both, it cannot be eliminated from thought. Berkeley rejects the idea of momentariness. As a Christian he has to do so. The doctrine of the soul and of one life on earth would make it impossible for him to countenance a continuous cycle of moments of existence. For him time is seen by the succession of ideas in the mind; (By this he must also mean the perception which is the sine qua non of the existence of things esse is percipe. Which doctrine depends on the existence of God—unlike Buddhism to enable things to exist when not perceived by men. The existence of God is one way in which Berkeley differs from Yogacara Idealism. He shows some similarity in that he cannot conceive of the idea of matter but only of spirit (TD 184ff) or mind But his doctrine of the world is not that it is the result of an illusion caused through karmic ignorance as it were, but that true understanding of it, as propounded by him, leads to faith in God). However, Berkeley, unlike Kant, does not conssider the problem of whether or not succession and coexistence can be perceived if they are not known a priori.

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[27] W S Korner, Kant, 1982 p37ff

Now Kant said that we could only have a priori knowledge of appearances i.e. of things as they appeared to the senses but he did not deny the existence of the thing in itself (though he was most obscure on what this meant) and therefore his transcendental idealism cannot be equated with Yogacara idealism. For Kant Causality and dependance, as we have seen, is one of the catagories. It is not analysed through any concept of whether or not all that exists is momentary (unlike in Ratnakirti) for it cannot be found by analysis. Since, as mentioned Kant says that we can only know of time as in segments because of an infinite series of time, momentariness is incompatible with his doctrine. It is not analysed via cause and effect unlike Ratnakirti. Knowledge of cause and effect is necessary a priori, for Kant if we are ever to know that A causes B[28].

In summary, Kant takes one step back from the Buddhist idea that what is real is of the nature of a cause and thereby momentary by considering the nature of how cause is known (as one of the catagories) but does not consider that what exists must be impermanent or might be.

For both Kant and Berkeley, time is mind formed but neither of them subscribe to the doctrine of momentariness. Kant says that we envisage time as a straight line stretching to infinity which can be divided into sections. Buddhism has the concept of reincarnation an samsara[29]. For Yogacara time is one of the citta viprayukta samskara dharmas.

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[28] Kant is, of course, discussing Hume's doctrine that cause and effect can never be known but only constant conjunction as for can never be sure that the fact that A causes B will hold true we even be certain that A is causing B only that there is a constant conjunction betwen the two.
see D Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1 part III

[29] But compare Nietztche's idea of the eternal recurrence of all events expounded in Thus Spake Zarathustra" you and ... must we not all have been here before?—and must we not return...must we not return eternally? *Zarathustra*. Pen 1969 p 179

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion we have seen that there are a number of superficial similarities in the systems of Yogacara, Kant and Berkeley they are in fact radically different in their philosophical approach.

## APPENDIX

### Yogacara Dharmas classified

**I Citta**

Why consciousness and the other satellites are classified indifferently as dharmas, as though both enjoy the same ontological status, is perplexing. The theory is pragmatic not metaphysical. All kinds of catagories are classified as dharmas regardless of ontological status.

Consciousness, though fundamentally one, has various stages in the process of evolution viz the six senses of the empirical consciousness, the klista manas and the alaya

**II Mentals (cetasikas)**

Strictly speaking only these should be recognized as dharmas and Vasubandhu takes cognizance of these only.

They are classified under six sub catagories

1 Sarvatraga The universal features that are present whatever the type of consciousness and are five in number

a Sparsa are three factors present in every case of knowledge the content cognized, the instrument of cognition, the cognizing consciousness. The sense organ is excited in a certain way and gets a particular form, evoking a feeling. The content is accordingly determined by the consciousness

b Manaskara: the directing of the attention of the citta repeatedly to the same object

c Vedana: the reaction—pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent of consciousness towards its contents

d Samjna: Specifying the object according to its marks as in "this is blue, this is not yellow"

e Cetana; volition by which citta is impelled towards the content as iron to a magnet

**2 Viniyata caittas**

a Chanda—wish for a desired object

b Adhimoksa To determine an object as it really is by reasoning or testimony

c Smriti memory

d Samadhi: concentration of the mind on an object which gives rise to correct knowledge as the concentrated mind knows the object as it is

e Dhi: prajna or a metaphysical insight into nature of things (I is often forgotten that the Yogacaras, as their name implies where at meditative school originally. There insights into the true nature of things were acheived through meditation and not through mere intellectual debate. Though they did, of caurse produce great works of intellect)

3 Kusula (meritorious) caittas

a Shraddha: faith in the Noble Truth of Karmaphala and the consequent purity of citta. It removes all klesas and upaklesas and is the incentive to chanda

b Hri: shame at the idea of sin, weether committed or not, through conscience or religious injunction.

c Apatrapa: shame because of social disapproval

d Alobha; non desire or attachment for the world

e Advesa: benevolence and the absence of desire for bad conduct

f Amoha: knowledge of things as they really are

g Virya is enthusiasm for good

h Prasrabdhi It is only because the mind remains petrified and passive before the object that the object seems to be independent of it, and this leads to defilements. When the mind becomes active, it absorbs the object in itself, and the Alays ceases functioning.

i Apramada directs the activity of alobha etc; towards the akusals dharmas and thereby the accumulation of merit in this world and the world to come

j Upeksa: is meditation leading to the elimination of the waywardness of the mind

k Avihimsa: compassion, grief at the grief of others and desire to lead them from death and bondage

4 Akusala Caittas

i Klesas

a Raga: desire for phenomenal objects of enjoyment and for existence, It give rise to pain as it keeps the cycle of existence going and this is pain

b Pratigha: animosity and bitterness towards beings so that one thinks of their death and bondage. It results in uneasiness of mind and evil conduct.

c Moha; ignorance the good, Buddha and Nirvana and the means to it and their mutual necessary relationship. It gives rise to klesas, karma accumulation and rebirth·

d mana—false construction of an ego

e Drk: the false construction again, viz, of an ego, to take this as eternal of perishing, the denial of a causal relation, or of a real existent

f Vicikitsa; wrong interpretation of karmaphala and doubt regarding its existence.

### 5 Upaklesas

a Krodha has for its object the present injury to someone.

b Upanaha is the sentiment of enmity which is the aftermath of the anger felt to someone who has wronged you.

c Mraksa: deceitfully hiding ones faults and gives rise to repentance and uneasiness.

d Pradasa: the state of mind when uttering harsh and stinging words.

e Irsya: anger at anger at anothers prosperity or any superior trait in them

f Matsarya; the opposite of charity—the desire not to part with what one has.

g Maya: to interpret, with a view to deceive others, the meaning of sila etc, in a way inconsistent with their real meaning. It leads to false living

h Sathya: crookedness of mind consequent on the attempt to hide one's faults by misleading others

i Mada: conceit born of attachment to wealth, high birth etc. Because of the delight the mind takes in these it loses the power of judgement and this gives rise to all klesas and upaklesas.

j Vihimsa: causing harm to beings by death bondage injury, menace etc.

k Ahrikya: shamelessness of one's bad qualities in spite of realising one's worthlessness.

l Anapatrapya: indifference to others condemnation

m Styana: lethargy of mind.

n Auddhyatya: delight in the memory of pleasures

o Asraddhya: lack of conviction in Karmaphala and it gives rise to.

p Kausiday; lack of interest in the meritorious dharmas

q Pramada: absence of any attempt to protect the mind from the klesas of raga dvesa etc or concentration on their opposites.

r Musita smriti is defiled memory which gives rise to distraction.

s Viksepa: the tossing of the mind hither and thither. It is an aspect of raga dvesa and moha which distract the mind from the object of samadhi towards external things. It obstructs vairagya.

t Asamprajanya: defiled understanding whereby the discipline of body, speech and mind is not known arignt, and duties are understood not be duties.

### 6 Aniyata Dharmas

These can be good or bad

a Kaukrtya: repenting of an action done.

b Middha: torpor of mind, the contraction of its freedom towards its object, the inability to fix its attention to the body or mind. All the senses are deadened by it. It is an aspect of moha.

c Vitarka: "an indistinct murmur of the mind"...as to the determination of an object. It is an aspect of cetana and prajna. It is a subconscious aspect of the mind.

d Vicara is also a particular phase of cetana and prajna of the form "this is that"—an attempt of fix the object

III Rupas

These have no real existence and are forms of consciousness supplying the contents of the (apparently) objective world.

The rupas are 11 in number—the five senses, their sense data and dharmadhatu.

IV Citta—viprayukta—samskara dharmas

These 24 dharmas are not distinctly conscious. They are really forces or functions such as space and time, number and order, conjunction and separation, meaning of words etc.

V Asamskrita Dharmas

These are six. The last is tathata—the ultimate essence of everything. As there can be only one unconditioned it is really speaking the only asamskrita dharma. Since tathata is a dharma. Dharma phenomenology is unaffected by metaphysical considerations[30].

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# 4

# Down Syndrome

*Kamlesh Mehrotra*

## INTRODUCTION

Down syndrome is the most prevalent biologically caused retardation found in 5 to 6% of all retarded persons and 33% of all forms of genetically based mental retardation. Down's syndrome children born in approximately 1 of every 800 births in the United States.

Every human cell contains chromosomes which are made of genetic material that control bodily process and functioning. A human cell contains 22 pairs of chromosomes, known as Autosomes, matched according to size and shape and pair of Sex chromosomes for a total of 46 chromosomes. In an error causes either the ovum or the sperm to have 24 chromosomes, then 47 chromosomes is created.

## CAUSES

Studies show that there are there seperate chromosomal causes of Down syndrome—

1. Trisomy 21—Out of 23 pairs trisomy of 21st pair occurs resulting in the presence of an extra chromosome. Approximately 95% of Down syndrome people have this abnormality. Recent analyis indicate that in 20 to 25% of all cases of Trisomy 21, the extra chromosome is contributed by the father.

2. Translocation—It involves the breakage of chromosome 21 during the creation of either the sperm or the egg and subsequent attachment of the broken piece to either chromosome 14, 21 or 22. 4% of Down syndrome people have this kind of abnormality.

3. Mosaicism—In this type, an incomplete cell division occurs after conception. A mosaic is created with some cells having 46 chromosomes and others having 47 chromosomes. Approximately 1% of people.

## CHARACTERISTICS

Down syndrome people fall into mild-to moderate range retardation, with a ceiling I. Q. of 70. They generally have a small stature, decreased muscle tone, large protruding tongue, short hands and neck, broad nose, shortened fifth finger, and upward slanting eyes. Down Neurophysical studies have indicated that the rate of glucose utilisation in the brain is increased. Down syndrome have heart and immune defects. They suffer from Hypothroidism. Myopia ear trouble etc. But they have as yet unimagined and unrealized potential. They have serious problems with receptive and expressive language. There are signs. of dementia, mood changes, physical signs of premature aging. Usually they do not have full ilfe span.

## TREATMENT

Improved educational and medical support, development of infant stimulation and infant learning programmes, sensory stimulation, environmental stimulation, enrinched maternal care etc, and other treatments are provided to the Down syndrome children.

### Example No. 1—EXCEPTIONAL COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN PARTIAL DOWN'S SYNDROME CHILD

This is a study done for 5 years on a boy (1965-70) who had Down's synorome and showed exceptional intelligence. He Inherited normal 2I chromosomes in addition to D Group chromosomes with translocated extra portion, resulting in extra chromosomal material in total of 46 chromosomes. Physically he had most of the characteristics of Down's syndrome-flat nasal bridge short fifty fingers, palm lines etc. But he did not show, stereotyped behaviour of bland and docile friendliness. He presented overactive, aggressive, disruptive and negativistic behaviour at school and at play—Verbal and vocabulary expressions were superior to those normally found in Down's syndrome. He had high social, intellectual skills. The psychologic study revealed hight intelligence level for patient with Down. Cytogenic study showed translocation of part of chromosome 21.

He was placed in special class for educably mentally retarded but it resulted in boredom and behavioral disturbances in class rooms. He could not attend regular classes due to inconsistent academic functioning and physical appearance. His parents asked for a re-evaluation and this afforded an opportunity to obtain information as "partial mongloid" (down syndrome)—not available before this.

At the time of test his age was 10 years-displayed average intellectual performance in Verbal vocabulary. Resuls showed Wechsler Intelligence Scale (WISC) Verbal I. Q. 86 contrasting with performance I.Q, of 68 and full scale I.Q. of 75. On performance scale, he did poorly on block design, object assembly etc. but did well with a weighted scale of 10 for picture completion. Results on Achievement test showed 2.8 to 4.2 grade levels for arithmatic, spelling, word recognition etc. The Bender—Gestalt Visual—Motor Test revealed serious deficiency commonly observed in children with organic brain disfunction. His performance age was determined to be approximately 5-6 to 6 years i.e. 4-6 to 5 years below his chronological age.

Original study suggested that high intelledtual and social development was due to trisomy of only a portion of chromsome 21. But this is difficult to accept that it will cause all physical signs of Down but no effect of intellectual abilities. In this case some of defects occur in mixed degree from mild to substantial It is difficult to determine if the amount of extra chromosome has some relationship with degree of defects as no techniques exist.

## REACTION

The above article is an example of Translocation with most of characteristics of Down's syndrome. Studies indicate that the boy's high intellectual and social development was due to trisomy of only a portion of chromosomes 21. Santa Siwolop and Mayo Mohs in; THE WAR ON DOWN SYNDROME (DISCOVER Feb. 85) states that a mere one-third of chromosome 21 produces the characteristics facial features, mental retardation, and congenital heart defects.

Example No. 2—"OUR ADOPTED BABY"

In this example—a couple Pat and Tom could not have children due to miscarriages on a couple of occasions. They finally decided to adopt a child. After a number of disappointments, they adopted a girl born in Santiago, Chile. They named her Tammy. She is a normal child. Later they decided to adopt another child. As adopting a second child from south America should take a long time, they decided to adopt a handicapped/retarded child, After some search, they apopted Jason who was born with Down Syndrome.

Down syndrome children go through normal development but on different time-table. As such early stimulation and special education programmes are helpful in child's development. Jason was sent to Association for children with Down Syndrome in Bellmore N.Y This school is run by Fredda Stimmell who has a teen age daughter with Down Syndrome. Jason has been diagnosed as mildly retarded—He has developed motor skllis by practicing on slides and climbing on long steep stairs without help. He worked with blocks and assorted pegs. He can eat without aid and drink from a cup. He correctly points to various parts of body, clap hands and points correctly to things. He has learnt some sign language to facilitate communications.

Jason's health has been good and with opportunities now available for education, his parents expect him to grow into a fine young man.

## REACTION

This article is an example of a couple who do not mind to adopt a handicapped child with Down syndrome. They send this adopted child to Association for children with Down in Bellmore, N.Y. School where he developed motor skills, sign communications etc. It gave hope to the couple. It shows that the opportunities like "mainstreaming" laws, life skill courses in colleges and vocational schools, early intervention and treatment has opened doors and new hope for Down children. Beside this, this article is an example of human love, sacrifice and care for an unknown handicapped child. While in some of the cases even their own child with this disorder is divorced from his/her parents and can be given up for adoption, however not right not to do so.

## Example No. 3— MOTHER'S DIRECTIVES IN THEIR INTERACTIONS WITH THEIR CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT DOWN SYNDROME.

Mother's directiveness in mothers, predilection to control a child's behaviour. Some of the terms describing mother's directiveness are defined below:

Response Control: It is mothers' tendency to use commands, questions and other behaviour to elicit a response from the chid.

Topic control: It is the mother's tendency to redirect child's attention to mother selected topics by using utterances or turns that are unrelated to child's activity.

Turn taking control: This addresses the extent to which mothers' dominate the interaction by contributing long and frequent turns.

Marked differences have been observed in the above aspects of directiveness among mothers of normally developing children and mothers of retarded children. However it is not clear as to what extent a child's development is affected by maternal directiveness.

Mother of retarded children are frequently reported to be more directive but less responsive than mothers of normal children (Blackwell and Deck 1981). Some have proposed that mother's perception of mentally retarded child gives rise to relatively permanent style (Davis and Oliver 1980): others suggest it is unresponsiveness of retarded children that results in directive style designed to child's level of participation (Cunningham 1981). The child's behaviour preceding and subsequent to maternal directiveness has not been examined.

## EXPLANATION

Mothers of children with Down showed greater control in most of the aspects of directiveness. The two group differed in initiating behaviour. most of data supported that mothers use various controls primarily to support and encourage child's participation in interaction. The finding also challange the prevailing assumption that maternal directiveness is a unique characteristic of mothers of retarded children that may be detrimental to children development.

## REACTION

This article emphasizes mothers' directiveness to control a child's behaviour. Mothers of retarded/language impaired children are more directive but less responsive than the mothers of normal children. Studies prove that the mothers of Down children exhibited greater topic control in both frequency and proportion of turns that switched topics. Down children exhibited higher frequency of silent responses and their mothers showed higher level of instructional activity.

## SUMMARY

The above three examples tell us about facts of Down syndrome, its causes, characteristics, treatment and parents' experiences about them. It is a genetic disorder which takes place at the time or after conception but it is not hereditary. Now chromosomes can be rebuilt. if diagnosed in time. Dr. Krystyna Wisniewski of New York's Institute for Research in Developmental Disabilities, writes, "I think most Down syndrome children will be only mildly retarded or learning disabled if we can do early intervention". Jerry Adler in the Article, WAKING SLEEPING SOULS, Newsweek 3/88 writes that the solution to Down children's receptive and expressive language problems lies in the computer, augmented with a voice synthesizer. In American Journal of Mental Deficiency (July 18); Katherine A. Loveland and Michelle L Kelly in the article, DEVELOPMENT OF ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOUR IN ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG ADULTS WITH AUTISM AND DOWN SYNDROME writes, "with increasing age,however, persons with Down syndrome appeared to acquire adaptive skills in all domains ..." It was early in the century when Down victims were sent to institutions and their life span was very short. Now they can go to colleges, vocational schools and then work in community jobs and some can even live independently. Now many researches are going on. These Psychologists, educationalists, physical therapists, neurophysicians, pediatricians geneticists and others biologists are working hard to prevent and treat this disorder. Today Down has a new hope.

## 5

# Strawson and the Nyaya on Meaning

*B. Sansom*

This paper discusses Strawson's theory of meaning and contrasts it with the theory of meaning of the Nyāya system, set out in Shaw's papers: "Descriptions: Contemporary philosophy and the Nyāya"(1); "Proper Names: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya" (2); "Belief Sentences: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya" (3). In his paper, "On Referring" (4) of 1950, Strawson claims that the significance of a sentence is quite distinct from the utterance of the sentence and from its use to make a true or false assertion; the significance or meaning of a sentence is not dependent on its reference or truth-value; meaning is not be equated with referring or asserting. Rather, a significant sentence is a type-sentence, as he explains:

> "To give the meaning ... of a sentence is to give *general directions* for its use in making true or false assertions ... The meaning of a sentence cannot be identified with the assertion that it is used, on a particular occasion, to make. For to talk about the mening of an expression or sentence is not to talk about its use on a particular occasion, but about the rules, habits, conventions governing its correct use, on all occasions, to refer or to assert......" (4)

Later, he explains that:

> "... The question whether the sentence is significant or not is the question whether there exist such language habits, conventions, or rules that the sentence logically could be used to talk about something; and is hence quite independent of the question whether it is being so used on a particular occasion"... (4)

A significant sentence, then, gives a formula for the linguistic expression of a possible state of affairs in the world. A possible state of affairs is a state of affairs compatible with the logical structure of the world. The logical structure of the world is given linguistic expression by the general rules of language which are the rules of syntax. Accordingly, a sentence constructed in accordance with the rules of syntax is a sentence which expresses a possible state of affairs. A logical truth is also a significant sentence. What it represents is common to all possibilities. A contradictory sentence, however, is not significant as it does not express a possible state of affairs. if the world is assumed to be non-contradictory. A contradictory sentence such as "p and not—p", in fact, has said nothing. According to Strawson's eraser theory (5), "p" erases" not—p" and vice versa. In "On Referring", Strawson talks of giving the meaning of a sentence as giving general directions for the use of that sentence. General directions, however, are a purely linguistic phenomenon; we can talk of general rules, but only particular instances are perceivable in the world. General directions are based, therefore, on particular instances in the world. So, if the general rules of language are taken to be the rules of syntax, then those rules of syntax must rest, in the last analysis, on the particulars found in the world; that is, on semantics. It follows then that the meaning – determining rules of language cannot be purely syntactical' as Strawson claims.

In a later paper, "Meaning and Truth" (6) of 1969, Strawson talks about the meaning of a sentence as a function of the sum of the meanings of the parts of the sentence and the rules of syntax which govern the words of the sentence. He says: "The meaning of a sentence is a syntactic funtion of the meanings of its parts and their arrangement," (6) This definition of the meaning of a sentence as a whole distinct from its parts, leaves unanswered the question of whether a sentence such as "The red stone is hungry" is to be considered meaningful or meaningless in Strawson's theory. The problem centres on what Strawson considers to be included in the syntax of a sentence. It is not clear whether Strawson considers that the rules of syntax are purely rules governing the order of the words of the sentence or whether Strawson considers that more than order is involved in the notion of syntax. If the criterion of significance found in "On Referring" is applied to "The red stone is hungry", then this cannot be meaningful, as "The red stone is hungry" does not express a possible state of affairs. As "The red stone is hungry" does not express a possible state of affairs, it could never be used to express an actual state of affairs. "The red stone is hungry" is, therefore, not a mean ingful sentence in terms of the criterion of significance in "On Referring". However, the definition of meaning in "Meaning and Truth" can be interpreted in two ways, one of which is not consistent with the criterion of significance in "On Referring" and one of which is consistent with that criterion, If the syntax of the sentence is con sidered to involve nothing more than the order of the words of the sentence, then a sentence such as "The red stone is hungry" does not violate the rules of syntax and accordingly the sentence is meaningful and thus inconsistent with the criterion of signficance in "On Referring" and one of which is consistent with that criterion. If the sentence is considered to involve nothing more than the order of the words of the sentence, then a sentence such as "The red stone is hungry" does not violate the rules of syntax and accordingly the sentence is meaningful and thus inconsistent with the criterion of signficance in "On Referring". On the other hand, if the syntax of the sentence is considered to include more than the order of the words of the sentence, say, lexical presuppositions, then "The red stone is hungry" would violate the rules of syntax and would be meaningless and so consistent with the criterion of significance in "On Referring". This analysis solves the problem of consistency between the criteria of meaningfulness in "On Referring" and in "Meaning and Truth", but it raises further problems. If lexical presuppositions are considered to be involved in the notion of syntax, than a semantical dimension has been introduced into the syntax of the sentence, as lexical presuppositions may well be largely semantical in nature. If so, then Strawson's claim, that the meaning-determining rules of language are purely syntactical, cannot be sustianed. Furthermore, it may be the case, as Chomsky suggests in his book, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (7), that it is not possible to delineate the boundaries of syntax and semantics. This means, that it may not be possible to determine where syntax ends and semantics begins or where semantics ends and syntax begins. For instance, to what extent could we say that the lexical presuppositions attaching to "hungry" are semantical and to what extent are they syntactical? If it proves impossible to determine the boundaries of syntax and semantics, then Strawson's claim that the meaning determining rules of language are purely syntactical would not be a valid means of determining whether a sentence is meaningful. However, even if Strawson's claim, that the meaning determining rules of language are purely syntactical, could be shown to be valid, difficulties remain for Strawson's theory of meaning. Firstly, Strawson asserts in "Meaning and Truth" that the meaning of a word is a matter of systematic contribution to the meaning of a sentence:

> "...and we must acknowledge, as two complementary truths, first, that the meaning of a sentence in general depends, in some systematic way, on the meanings of the words that make it up and, second, that for a word to have a particular meaning is a matter of its making a particular systematic contribution to the meanings of the sentences in which it occurs." (6)

Unfortunately, Strawson does not say just what sort of systematic contribution it is that he considers the meaning of a word to make to the meaning of the sentence and it is not easy to think of any such systematic contribution which is not referential in nature. A referential system for meaning of words. would however seem to be ruled out by Strawson's insistence in "On Referring" that meaning is independent of reference. So, the first problem is to establish the exact nature of the non referential systematic contribution to the meaning of sentences which is the meaning of a word in Strawson's theory.

Secondly, a non-referential theory of the meaning of words would seem unable to account for the way that we know the meaning of atomic words, such as left, right, hard, soft, red, yellow, blue, that is, by direct acquaintance with the referents of atomic words. If Strawson's theory of meaning is non referential. then his theory would not seem to be able to explain the meaning of atomic words and therefore would not seem able to explain the meaning of sentences containing atomic words, such as "Red is a colour", if "red" is considered an atomic word.

Finally, Strawson's theory of meaning needs to demonstrate how language relates to the world in a systematic way. As Strawson's theory of meaning for sentences seems to allow no scope for a reference theory of meaning for words, so a sentence in Strawson's theory has no necessary relation to the world, that is, to reality. How is it then that language is systematically applied to the world and can systematically describe the world ? Strawson's theory of meaning is such that we may presume that he does not consider the essence of language to constitute the representation of reality, Strawson, in fact, in "Meaning and Truth" speaks of the essential role of language as that of fulfilling a quite different function; the social function of belief-communication. So, for Strawson, the notion of meaning is reducible ultimately to belief, not to reality. Strawson does not discuss his general theory of belief, but what can be said about belief in general is that any belief will be expressible by a sentence. We have already discussed how Strawson's theory implies that sentences have no necessary relation to reality. Accordingly, belief-sentences have no necessary relation to reality. As the notion of belief then has no necessary connection with reality, so the notion of meaning, which rests on belief, has no necessary relation to reality for Strawson. The Nyāya system of Indian philosophy holds a very different view of the notion of meaning to that of Strawson. The Nyāya system has a thoroughly realist and referential theory of meaning. All sentences, including beliefs-entences, ultimately refer to elements in the world: all the ultimate parts of sentences are about real things. Language, for the Nyāya, is important both as a possible means of acquiring valid knowledge of reality and as a means of expressing our knowledge of reality. Knowledge of reality itself is important as a means of attaining liberation from human suffering. So, the Nyāya is concerned with language in so far as language can represent reality. Meaning then for the Nyāya rests, in the last analysis, not on belief but on reality.

Strawson and the Nyāya both agree that the spatial and temporal entity which is a sentence consists of words arranged in accordance with syntax. However, while a sentence for Strawson is a grouping of words containing a finite verb, the Nyāya concept of a sentence is such that a sentence may not contain a verb at all. The Nyāya consider a sentence to be a dyadic and directional relation between two or more terms. For the Nyāya, "one table" is just as much a sentence as "the present king of France" or "the present king of France exists". Strawson, on the other hand, does not consider "one table" or "the present king of France" to be complete sentences; Strawson would only consider "the present king of France exists" to be a sentence. Furthermore, the Nyaya, unlike Strawson, is quite clear that the syntax of a sentence consists of nothing more than the order of the words, but that order makes its own contribution to the meaning of the sentence as a whole. For instance, " a red flower" is, for the Nyāya, a sentence in accordance with the rules of syntax, which are the rules governing the order of the sentence. "A red flower" is therefore a meaningful sentence, as is also "The red stone is hungry". The red stone is hungry" does not violate the rules of syntax. "A flower red", however, does violate the rules of syntax and is accordingly a meaningless expression. In other words, "flower" is not an entity which belongs to "red colour" anywhere in the world, so the expression "a flower red" has no meaning "Red colour", however, may belong to "flower",so "a red flower" is a meaningful sentence for tee Nyaya. In the sentence, "a red flower", the relation of inherence between the terms "red" and "flower" is the relation contributed by the order of the words. This relation is the meaning of the sentence; the meaning of the sentence is that" red colour" belongs to "flower':. So, though like Strawson the Nyāya considers that a sentence consists of words governed by syntactical rules, unlike Strawson the Nyāya is quite clear that those rules of syntax are purely rules of order and that order itself makes a contribution to the meaning of the sentence. Strawson considers that the meaning of a sentence has two items; the meanings of the words and the rules of syntax which govern those words, The Nyāya considers that the meaning of a sentence has three items: the meanings of the words, their order and the relation implied by that order. It is evident that in both the Nyāya theory and Strawson's theory the meanings of a sentence's constituent words are of importance for the meaning of the sentence as a whole. It is, then, surprising that Strawson does not offer a clearer theory of the meaning of words than he does. The

Nyāya theory of meaning for words is, in contrast, very clear and very precise. Whereas Strawson only says that the meaning of a word is its systematic contribution to the meaning of the sentences in which it occurs, in the Nyāya ststem, a word has a fixed primary meaning which operates so as to recall the object denoted by the word. For the Nyāya, every complex sentence or non-atomic sentence is ultimately reducible to sentences containing atomic words. An atomic word is atomic just in that it refers to one of the seven elements of the traditional Nyāya ontology: substance, quality, action, particularity, universal, the inherence relation and the element which is the absence of almost any of the obove six elements. The meaning of atomic word consists of three items: the referent of the word, say, any referent of "dog"; the common property peculiar only to all the referents of the word–in this case, the property of doghood; the implicit relation of inherence which links the second to the first item. Every one of the three items of the meaning of an atomic word refers to one of the seven elements listed above. A word, in the Nyāya system, then, has a direct and necessary connection with the world in that an atomic word refers to an element in the world. The ultimate parts of all sentences in the Nyāya system talk about real things. Therefore, the Nyāya theory of meaning has no difficulty in explaining how we hnow the meaning of atomic words and of sentences con, taining atomic words, such as "Red is a colour"; we know the meaning of atomic words by direct acquaintance with the objects they denote in the world. As every sentence can be reduced to a sentence containing atomic words, the Nyāya system can explain how we know the meaning of any sentence, while Strawson's theory of meaning cannot explain how we know the meaning of sentences containing atomic words. Furthermore, as the Nyāya theory is a reference theory of meaning, no problem arises for the Nyāya about how sentences can systematically describe the world, as in Strawson's non-referential theory of meaning. In the Nyāya system, every meaningful sentence must be either true of false. A sentence is true when the relation asserted implicitly by the sentence is the relation which in fact holds good between the referents of the terms of the sentence. So, "the present king of Spain" is a true sentence because the implied relation of rulership asserted by the sentence to hold between the terms, "present king" and "Spain", also holds good between the referents of those terms. A sentence is false when it asserts an implicit relation to hold between its terms but the relation which is asserted to hold is not the relation which does in fact hold good between the referents of the terms of the sentence. For instance, "the present king of France" is a false sentence, as rulership is not the relation which holds between any king and France. A relation which does not hold good between particulars in the world, is, however, real elsewhere in the world. For, if a sentence asserted an unreal, non-existent atomic relation, found nowhere in the world, that sentence would be meaningless; the Nyāya reference theory of meaning is such that we cannot understand a word representing an unreal relation. In a false sentence, the relation is real; it is simply not the relation which holds good between the referents of the terms of the sentence. So, the relation implied as a matter of syntactic expectancy to link the terms of a sentence, refers ultimately to an element in the world, whether the sentence is true or false. As we have already seen, the asserted relation of rulership is not the relation which links any present king to France; rulership, however, is the relation which links a present king to Spain. Ultimately, in the Nyāya system, a false sentence still talks only of real things; what is false is the particular way that the sentence asserts these real things to be combined.

A true sentence, for Strawson, is a sentence which predicates something true about a non-empty subject-term; a false sentence is a sentence which predicates something false about a non-empty subject term. However, because Strawson's theory of meaning draws a distinction beteen meaning and reference,so a sentence which purports to predicate something about a non-existent subject, remains meaningful but is neither true nor false. Strawson's doctrine of the spurious statement raises a number of queries. Firstly, what is the exact nature and status of a spurious statement? Strawson's theory of meaning because it is non-referential, requires not only sentences and statements but also spurious statements. Not only does strewson's theory of meaning entail complications when a meaningful sentence is used make a statement whether genuine or spurious, but it may also result in counter-intuitive truth-values being assigned to spurious statements. For instance, for Strawson to assing no truth value to both "The present king of France exists" and "The present king of France does not exist" is counter-intuitive on two counts: firstly, to assign the same truth-value to both the positive and negative form of a sentence is itself counter-intuitive; secondly, we would intuitively say that "The present king of France exists" .s a false sentence, while "The present king of France does not exist" is a true sentence. As an ordinary language philosopher, as opposed to a formal-language philosopher, it would seem particularly important for Strawson to assign truth-values which accord with the intuitive truth-values of ordinary speakers of the language. Count-intuitive truth-,values may arise in connection with spurious statements. Strawson asserts that as it is not possible to state anything at all, true or false, unless the subject of the statement exists, so no truth value arisef in respect of spurious statements. Strawson holds that, in fact, the subject-term of a statement carries with it an existential presupposition. In order to be a genuine statement, that presupposition must be fulfilled; if the existential presupposition is not fulfilled, then a spurious statement has been made. A spurious statement is meaningful but the question of a truth-value does not arise. However, there appear to be spurious statements, such as "The present king of France exists" or "The present king of France does not exist", to which it is counter-intuitive to assign no truth-value or an indeterminate truth-value. As mentioned above, an ordinary speaker of the language may well hold that "The present king of France exists" is a false sentence, not one with no truth-value as Strawson holds. Furthermore, an ordidary speaker of the language may feel that "The present king of France does not exist" is a true sentence.

The problem of counter-intuitive truth values for spurious statements seems to be due in part to Strawson's non-referential theory of meaning and Strawson's insistence that the meaning of a sentence is quite independent of its reference. The fulfillment of the existential presupposition of a statement is necessary for the assignment of a truth-value; it is not necessary for meaning, It would seem that Strawson would hold a sentence such as "John is a man" to be a meaningful sentence, whether or not any referent existed for "John".

In a reference theory of meaning such as that of the Nyāya, if there is no referent for a proper name—proper names are all atomic —then a sentence in which that name occured, would be meaningless. All the entities named by proper names in a Nyāya sentence exist or are real. Accordingly, the problem of truth-values for spurious statements does not arise in the Nyāya system. Furthermore, the Nyāya system can assign a truth value, which accords with the intuitions of ordinary speakers of the language to "The present king of France does not exist"; if taken to mean that there is an absence of monarchy in France "the present king of France does not exist" can be assigned the value, true, which accords with the intuition of the speakers of the ordinary language.

By way of a summary of the arguments presented in this paper to support its thesis that at least some of the problematic aspects of Strawson's theory of meaning are due to its non-referential nature, the following six points of comparison between the theories of Strawson and the Nyāya are put forward.

Firstly, the Nyāya relies on a reference theory of meaning for atomic words; semantics is involved in giving the meaning of atomic words. Strawson's theory of the meaning of atomic words is not clear.

Secondly, in the Nyāya system, the concept of syntax as purely order is clear. Strawson's concept of syntax is not clear.

Thirdly, in the Nyāya system, the concept of a meaningful sentence is any group of well-formed words. Strawson's concept of a meaningful sentence is not clear, because his concept of syntax has not been explained in detail.

Fourthly, the Nyaya holds that the syntax of a sentence makes its own contribution to the meaning of the sentence. It is not clear just what contribution syntax makes to a sentence in Strawson's theory of meaning.

Fifthly, the Nyāya theory of belief is that belief is the relation of the believer to the elements ultimately referred to in the belief-sentence. Strawson has not explained his general theory of belief.

Sixthly, in the Nyāya system, a sentence such as "The present king of France does not exist" can be assigned a truth-value which accords with the intuitions of speakers of the language. Strawson's theory of meaning, however, may result in counter-intuitive truth-values being assigned to a spurious statement such as "The present king of France does not exist",

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## 6

# T. S. Eliot's Concept of Living Death

*Rupakshi Sharma*

Eloit's Waste Land certainly deals with the blindness and numbness of the contemporary consciousness, its sterility. emptiness and aridity, its loss of vital relationship with the ancient values, and in general with the human heritage or tradition. Whether he agrees or not, but the poem does express the disillusionment of the present century which is heading towards a close in a decade's time. The author has also shown that if human beings today are leading a life which is also death in the emotional and spiritual sense, so was the case with the people in Dante's time. In his Limboo too, death had undone many as it has in the case of modern crowds on London Bridge or for that matter every where in the world. Sibyl and Tiresias too, though technically still alive, are withered in the body and are longing for death. And there is no death of Sibyls and Tiresias anywhere. The poem is crammed with the powerful emotion of fear which has been the man's accomplice since ages April inspires fear. Marie is frightened in her moment of sexual delight on her cousin's sledge. It is not much different from Lord Indira's terrorised mind at the time of a similar act with Gautam's Ahalya. The "son of man" is urged to endure the vision of fear in the desert and the lover in the garden is neither living nor dead. Madame Sosostris says, "Fear death by water". The anxious crowd of Londoners identified with the souls in Dante's poem exhale sighs. Belladonna, her lover and Lill are all afraid. Fear is common to all times and periods of history. The gods and demons, the 'surs' and 'asurs' cause terror and get terrorised. Fear has been responsible for good actions and bad. It has acted as a motive. It does so even today, and tomorrow too, its force is not going to be enfeebled. If human consciousness is to acquire an equilibrium, which is a sine qua non of seeing the world in the correct perspective, man has to acquire Buddha's or Gandhi's fearlessness. Eliot has thus a practical lesson to place before the world philosophies.

Eliot in his Wasteland has very successfully and forcefully cast his vision of the contemporary erotic and spiritual aridity into a general perspective beyond barriers of historical times or geographical boundaries. The framework of the myth and the recurrent allusions to it throughout the poem, the juxtaposition of the modern and the Elizabethan scenes in 'The Fire Sermon', the portrayal of monologuing characters, the images of dryness and absence of water, the literary reminiscences and quotations from numerous philosophic works—all these contribute to just one fact, the want for spirituality, spiritual thinking and spiritual living.

The most astounding image, created by Eliot is the reexpression of the truth of the concept of living death. Life in the Waste Land takes on the colour and nature of a living death, The concept is not new, but the perspective is surely novel. The image of Stetson's 'sprouting corpse'' is significant

That corpse you planted last year in your garden.
Has it begun to sprout ? Will it bloom this year ?
(The Burial of the Dead)

Again,

''Your arms full, and your hair wet, I could not speak, and my eyes failed, I was neither living nor dead, and I knew nothing''.
(The Burial of the Dead)

Is not the man, by and large, oscillating between life and death? Life seems to struggle out of death : 'lilacs out of the dead land'', ''branches out of stony rubbish'' and ''I will show you fear in a handful of dust'' are meaningful philosophies.

The Sibyl had asked for as many years of life as the number of grains of sand in her hand and to Ezekiel, too, dust is a symbol of bodily mortality (dust unto dust is a Biblical phrase).

In the Wasteland, the fear of death has become the fear of life itself. Unlike the Sibyl, the inhabitants of the Waste Land are too afraid to want to die but like her they are in a state of unwanted life. And unwanted life is no better than death.

The Fire sermon which is a purely Indian picture shows fear and anxiety paling into apathy, no less terrible, of the lovely woman stooping to folly with an indifferent lover. There is also the apathy of the Thames maidens—

''On Margate sands
I can connect

Nothing with nothing
The broken finger nails of dirty hands
My people humble people who expect
Nothing".

Terror is diminished only in 'What the Thunder said':
"We who were living are now dying
with a little patience".

But fear again returns when questions are raised and answers are attempted, the reality of knowledge is challenged violently:

Who is the third?
Who is that?
What is that sound?
Who are those hooded hordes?
What is the city?

The climax is reached when Eliot points out
"A woman drew her long black hair out tight
And fiddled whisper music on those strings
And bats…………
And voices singing out of empty cisterns and exhausted wells".

The responses to the command of the thunder are no less fearful:
"Blood shaking my heart
The awful daring of a moment's surrender"

and

"Each in his prison
Thinking of the key".

And finally, fear is the impulse behind the sharing up of fragments to ward off total ruin:

"These fragments I have shored against my ruins
Why then Ile fit you".

Where is the solace then? The reply is contained in the last one word, repeated thrice, after each of the three words said by Thunder ...Data, Dayadhvam and Damayata: Shantih, Shantih, Shantih.

Some may find no peace because the image of destruction in the Wasteland is overpowering; others may find peace resulting from the realization that a new life can be achieved through self-sacrifice, self-control and sub-mission to God. We can then live life by living and not by dying. Eliot leaves the 'choice' with the people.

# 7

# The Glowing Embers of Folk Medicine[1]

*Vera Pavlova*

"The curative activity is the coeval of the first human".[2]

During the discussions on the problems of folk medicine in our country, even some physicians showed a negative attitude in respect of it, entitling it despisedly as the "medicine of the stone era".

Let us try to clarify the question whether medicine, as well as the whole culture of the "stone era", is worth to be despised or on the contrary deserves a scientific interest and respect and appreciation of the inherited values. It is a collective deed, as the primitive society itself, a creation of the folk genius. Directly from it descended the scientific medicine, the creator of the first theoretical medical system Hippocrates (460–317 BC) being a progeny of the 18th stock of folk medicine men.

In his youth, as all the healers of that time, he is a periodeut, i.e. he goes the rounds of the peoples in the world in order to heal and accumulate wisdom. He created his own scientific system on the basis of the whole preceding history of medicine synthesis of the people of Greece, the ancient East, India, China, Persia and especially of the Egyptian priests, joining his personal experience as a genius healer and philosopher—a deserving disciple of Democritus.

The history of science, including medicine, reconstructs the image of the scientific knowledge genesis, including the medicinal one, dated back to the most ancient human—the archantropus—who lived in the conditions of the primitive human hard, a prehistorical community (2 million up to 200 thousand years BC). The first rudiments of abstract thinking appear with the paleanthropes, a sort of the Neandertalian (200 thousand to 40 thousand years back). Here begins the process of aimed, conscious rationalising of the accumulated empirical experience and observances of the natural experiment during the elapsed hundred thousands of years. The primitive conscience goes through three basic stages: the empirical experience and observance, its generalisation and abstract thinking.

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[1] Some aspects from the introductory part of the work which the author is writing now.

[2] Iv. P. Pavlov—On the mutual relations of physiology and medicine on questions of cooking (in Russian), Full Works. 2nd ed., M., 1951, vol. II, pp. 245-274.

There are no frontiers between the phases of history and thought, in spite of the fact that after a coutinuous evolution (in the primitive society it continues for hundred thousands of hard and painful years of trial in the fight against natural calamities) the jump in nature, i.e. the start of a radically new way of thinking sets in. The "flower men" found in 1960 by Soletski, are buried with a lot of flowers (their pollen is analysed), not whatever ones. but just different sorts of herbs—plants having healing properties. This shows that to the ancient hominids (a kind of Homo Neandertalis) they are already well known from the point of view of their healing properties. Simultaneously this same fact certifies also for signs of social relations—the care for the ill member of the community by the collective, and for the sepulchral life (an element of abstract thinking).

The learned Marxists do not absolutely cut off the history of the primitive society from the united process of the general history of mankind, they do not oppose the pre-writing period to the post-writing, as it appeared in the communities of the first class civilisations and use the method of the materialist dialectics.

Folk medicine is one, of the most ancient arts which began to take shape since more than 3 million years (a time that covers 99% of the whole history of mankind) and continued to develop also after the emergence of the scientific medicine and has not disappeared up to these days too. In the perspective future of the communist society there will be folk healers, because man will possess all sided knowledges. He will be a universal person. And this will be so until mankind and creativeness exist in this world.

On their side these questions bear a big ideotheoretical load. If it is accepted that the roots of science are not to be found in the material-productional working practice of the primitive people who first created and used the implements of toil, then the view would have to be accepted that science was suggested by some supranatural power—God, an absolute idea, spirit, free will, folk spirit and other similar idealistic categories.

The great act of turning man from the realm of animals towards the kingdom of human society is made true by two dialectically mutugenesis. "All the mediated (vermittelt), connected in one, connected through transitions".[3]

The science of the history of art, including the history of the primitive society itself, uses a wide spectrum of a continually enlarging and more and more complicating system of principles, approaches, archeological, ethnographic, historical, paleo-anthropologicl mathematical, kybernetic and other privetely scientifical methods.

But the richer and fruitfuller the contents of this system of methods will be, the conclusions will not remain onesided, scientifically inconsecutive, if the most general method, the one of the dialectical materialism and especially that one of the historical materialism is applied. Analogical is also the situation with the assessment of the historical advance of the first socio-economic formation itself, at the time of which two revolutions—the obtaining of the fire and the invention of the wheel, are realised.

"The white—haired antiquity"—Fr. Engels writes,—will under all circumstances remain for all future generations an extra ordinarily interesting epoch, because it lays the foundations of the whole subsequent later and higher development, because it has as a starting point the separation of man from the realm of animals and as its contents—the overcoming of such difficulties, which shall never more come across the future associated men".[4]

The end of the primitive classless society era coincides with the beginning of the era of class societies. Remainders of the primitive communal order also continue to exist on a still more limited territory at the periphery of the class societies throughout their whole history, These are the so called synpoliteian societies to be found even today in Australia, America, Africa, India, Oceania, China etc.

The study of their "traditional culture", inclusively the medicinal one, allows to penetrate into the essence of the medicine of the primitive society, to give them meaning and to fight for its intransitient values. This is especially important with the creation of national system of health services in the contemporary developing countries. And this again is one of the actual aspects of folk medicine today.

During the 70's AD. the American physician Henry Wright studied some tribes which during this century too, still continue living with their ways and habits, knowledge and skills of the "stone era" How unshakable traditions are! These ones are yet 2 million years old! Doctor Wright describes the representatives of the ancient medicinal art foremostly as people with a high professional preparation, splendidly commanding also skills of controlling the mood of the masses... What the moderm psycology hardly begins to guess for[5]. The folk healer—as Wright says,—realises and even does not attempt to treat illnesses which are not within the frame of the possibilities of his primitive "science". But he endeavours to cure with all his energy and... even with wisdom, when this is in his competence. He often copes with diseases. for which the contemporary scientific medicine is helpless.[6]

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[3] Vl. I. Lenin—Philosophical Copybooks, M., 1963, p. 92

[4] Marx K., Fr. Engels, Works, second edition, vol. 20, p. 118

But it must be remembered that the scientific medicine for ages... from Hippocrates and up to the beginning of the West European Renaissance—has something analogous. Because of the still not enough developed scientific medicine, diagnostics and therapeutics have not so much progressed as prognsrics have : This case is helpless and nothing can give aid". The folk healer, as described by Dr. Wright, is an artistic nature. He is a skillful magician and hypnotizer, he masters the methods of self suggestion. be is a fine psychologist and succeeds in some cases using simplest means to obtain for several minutes effects, for which .. the learned psychiatrists need months and even years",[7]

The Czech scholar Mnislav Zeleni—a traveller and ethnographer, has spent during the 80's for more than three years amidst the synpolitean tribes of identic Red Indians in the Amazons (South America) and also amidst vareias on the Persian coast of Mare de Dios. One of his reports about the results of his investigations he significantly calls "The new world of people". He made sure of himself that only a deep penetration into the sensitive world and philosophy of these people can help to decode the secrets, inherited to us by our most ancient predecessors.

Scholars of the whole world endeavour to find out the sense, the significance and wisdom in building pyramids in South America, subterranean tunnels in the mountains of Equador, called "cosmic runways", the mummies in Peru (older than the Egyptian ones), the whimsical ancient written signs and a lot of other similar things. The ageold inhabitants of the American continens knew the bayonettes as a means of closing up; they knew the wheel. The scientific hypotheses and assumptions for the salvation of these historical puzzles are useful and necessary, but the most important, according to Zeleni, is not in the dead monuments, neither in the contemporary civilised Red Indians, but in the live man, who still has not drunk the glass of sweet poison of the civilisation. Zeleni and his notable forerunners Albert Voitench Fritzshi, Erbike Stanko Barass (born in the Bulgarian town of Veliko Turnovo) foremostly strive just to penetrate into the depths of the psychic and mentaity of these direct progenies of primitiveness. "They are children of nature. They have all what they need—fresh air with a rich ornitologic world; pure waters full of fresh fish; clean forests with wild animals, bananas and manioca, They have no idea of riches. They do not feel the burden of ownership; they do not knew envy and greed and avarice at all. Their attitude towards every living creature, towards each little tree is as towards a deity. They receive many necessary things without effort, directly from nature (cumulativeeess) They do not rob it with grasping hands. They have as much as necessary for immediate needs. In nourishment they are original: one day thev eat and after that do not put anything into their mouth. They cannot understand why the whites kill all the living beings in the jungle, why they cut it mercilessly down, why they hunt for diamonds, gold, rubber, oil and everything in general what can be turned to money. The Red Indian philosophy is built up upon the principle of full merger with nature. They hunt as for millions of years and longer bank their predecessors did—with bow and arrow. And the tribe's priest is still the all—mighty with his skill to cure the ill and to kill the enemy from distance. This magician—shaman, is the ideologist of the tribe; the chieftain is elected and may be re elected, but the priest is eternal. He knows the secrets of the "white" and "black" magic. The "white" one cures, the "black" one kills. He mixes decoctions of herbs, knowing only he himself the draught of the narcotics as an anaesthetising means; he knows the knacks of hypnosis the subtletis of biomagnetism, of suggestion, he interprets dreams and even prognosticates climatic calamities (beginnings of meteorology). He gives jurisdiction. The education of the yong is put in his hands, he teaches them foremostly in bravery and endurance; he teaches them shooting, self-making of weapons and decoctions, how to over-come loneliness and surmount pains, to sing and dance. The shaman can help the lying-in woman in bearing with no pains, transmitting their pangs to the man, the so called birth "kuvade". The "green medicine" of the shaman helps also by eczema and fruitlessness (futility), he guards from pregnancy."[8]

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[5] Dr. Henry Wright, "A witness of witchcraft", transl. from English Molod. Guardia, M., pp. 72—73; cited after T.S. Sorokin (Modern presentation of primitive medicine, Asclpius, vol. VI, 1989)

[6] idem, p. 66;

[7] Ibid., p. 64

A special commission of scholars in the USA, sent to Oceania during the 70's, in connection with performing bloodless operations only with hands, without instruments, made by folk healers, explains this fact with the laws of bioenergetics.

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[8] Cited after Toder Kortzev. The white magic, Reb. Delo, S., 19. V. 1989.

The sexual relations of the tribe are very complicated (polygamy, polyandry, group weddings), there exist about 500 relative denominations, but there is no case of disorder and group sex. Nobody thinks of overstepping the matrimonial rules of a habitual law. The family structure is one of the bases upon which moral, ethics, politics and ideology of the tribe is built up.

The wars of the tribe could in fact hardly be called to be such. The sooner they are more like duels between knights. The fights do not leave behind a field of candvers. The authentic 400 thousand Red Indians living in the Amazons, which the lamia of civilisation has still not gulped down, are—according to Zeleni, the last "real people in the purest sense".

Here is a grain of truth that reflects the virtues of primitive communism, but is also a retreat from the theory of "the Golden Age" in prehistorian times. There has never been a 'golden age", as Lenin proved: people are collectivists, but how inhumanly hard is their life—they are torn to pieces by wild beasts, inhumen diseases put an early end to their lives and they are confronted by many other hardships, not allowing the growth of the population to the millions. But these same inconveniences harden them and make them inhumanly patient and obstinate, proverbially diligent and real creators of valuables. How much effort and patience is necessary to obtain fire by rubbing dry woods ? And the primitive communist ethics is also historically limited. The tribe rises and slaughters the neighbouring one only to take away its food.

The inherited values from the white-haired antiquity must be taken to war, but after having been evaluated historically.

It is possible that we shall reveal the roots of kybernetics in the building of pyramids and puzzling equipment, but no appeal for going back may exist. This is contrary to the iron law of progress. It could be both—yes and no. Dialectics! The aim is to take from the values of an ageold culture "the sundried bricks of the old", but only these that are fit for building up the new.

Today we see folk healers ordinarily as tight specialists in only their own field of medicine, coming down even to some distinguished organs of the human organism. But here they manifest them-selves as virtuoses and reap real success. This cannot be denied and neglected. A single disease, some other suffering or ailment, which they successfully cure is "their deed of their whole life "; They are telented creators in the chosen field of creative activity. Talent is a great craft, before which also unthinkable obstructions and barriers do retreat. (Among learned medicings similar things happen too). The deed of all his life for example is, that Hirsch sprung has treated one single disease, which now is named after him, but the contribution he made reveals the essence of this only one illness, but on a large plan in the pediatric clinic and in the normal pathologic anatomy and physiology, in the theory of heredity, etc),

But with all said above, the arsenal and possibilities of the healing means and abilities of the folk healer are still limited. And just for its compensation he aspires to create round him the so called "second nature", so that is could seem to be "the most powerful being on earth", a world transforming power (Wright, Cited Works.) The ill must inevitably believe and trust him, otherwise there is no effect. And these are the roots of all his curative strength In separte cases it is even a question of genius persons, with a clear purpose, devoted to life and death to their noble mission.

Arisen together with the first human, folk medicine—as a healing means (because it is just an art) continues to parade on its historical path, in order to come to us. In the conditions of the antagonistic class society it is really from the folk and for the folk. It is democratic because it is accessible for the discriminated and exploited and exploited masses. After the appearance of the scientific medicine, its daughter, it does not disappear and does not dagrade, but is unceassantly perfected, because it draws experience and knowledge from tradition and people, but also from scientific medicine. The Bulgarian folk healer Bardarov, from Teteven, studies during all his life the scientific anatomy at the deepest and most zealously.

But the interchange of values is a mutual one. Even the learned physicians often reach out to the treasures of folk wisdom, deeply esteeming and respecting the folk creator, Innumerable are the examples. Paracelsius untiredly goes round the world to learn from the mouths of the working people new knowledges. He passed also the Bulgarian lands. In the folk medicine papers a recipe of his was found.[9]

Often in folkwitten cure books references to Hippocrates, Celsius, Gallenus and Avicena are met. The discoverer of the vitamins—the Russian scholar Lunin, and the classicist of the Russian clinic Botkin, and the classicist of the Russian clinic Botkin, take from folk experience, the first—knowledges about vitamins, and the second—instills in the clinic the well known today in heart therapy medical preparation Convajalis majalis. The Caucasian mummie, the Siberian oblepikha, the "stamped red clay' from the isle of Cyprus, the Australian resin, the aloe of the Egyptian priests (Filatov) and more than 450 names of healing plants in the ' Canon of Healing medicine" of Avicena. are also borrowed from the folk genius and a great many of them have entered pharmacopoeias, reference books, schoolbooks and other official appliances for physicians.

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[9] See VI. Vassilev, "About Folk Medicine", Rab. Delo, S., 1967.

Now in India the system of Yoga and the medicine Ayurveda are profoundly studied on a scientific basis It proved to be that they as a rule are materialistic and involve worth ideas and skills, explained from the positions of modern science.[10]

We Bulgarians are also not lagging behind. We gave to the world significant things connected with folk medicine. At first this is the well know healer Asclepius—taken as a deity and later enclosed in the pantheon of deities of the Greek. And the charming folk singer and musician, geometer and priest, the healer Orpheus and with him connected and then developed by Pythagoras teaching of orpheism, built up on the basis of the principle of harmony and disharmony consonant with the one for symmetry and assymetry–the myst important in the epoch—teaching about the Noosphere of V. J. Vernadski

It is worth indeed to investigate deeply these "white spots" in the history of medicine and it is not quite occasional but necessary and regular, that today in the world still more int nsive and officially organised movement for investigation of folk medicine—its theoretical bases and valuable contents—takes place. The same can be said of investigation of the history of the investigation itself and its interpretation.

In a number of countries are already functioning special institutes for "traditional" medicine. Nearly every year national and international forums are taking place, as congresses, conferences, symposiums, sections within the frame of congresses, on the history of medicine and science, as well as systematic courses on folk medicine (in France, Mexico, India, China, Japan, West Germany, USA, USSR, PR of Bulgaria, etc,) and especially on problems of the needle therapy, the moxa, the irisotherapy, the phenomeana of the magnetic biofields, the telepathy, phytotherapy, etc. In Mongolia the written monuments of the Tibetan medicine are being translated and commented, a big contribution for which was given by the eminent family of scholars and artists Roerich.

We Bulgarians have given to the world the well known and admitted for their scientific contributions folk healers Ivan Radev ("Cura Bulgara") and Dimiter Dimkov, who compiled in a multivolume work the knowledge of and about the folk medicine by many authors and peoples in the world.

And it follows: It is simply inconvenient to demonstrate our ill informedness about such a principally significant medical problem both in its historical and actually theoretical aspect.

But we—the historians of medicine—are responsible for this lack of knowledge among the colleagues, because we have still not managed to develop in them a taste and interest towards self education in the spirit of historism—the contents of logic. The ethnomedicine is both as old as a historical fact, and as new as a scientific discipline! Let us give her way! Its time has come!

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[10] See Dr. M. S. Shastri—Samkhya and Yoga and their approach of Ayurveda. Scientific paper read at the IInd International Congress of the Society for stndy of the traditional Asian medicine, at Surabaya (Indonesia), 1984; and a notice under the same topic and title, published by the Bulgaria indologist K. Kanev, in "Asclepiad", V, 1980, and others.

# 8

# The Search of the Secret Self

*Shreenivas*

"The greater part of the deliberation of the World Congress of Philosophy, recently held in Brighton and attended by over a thousand professional Philosophers, reportedly consisted of what once was summed up as writing definitions on invisible blackboards with nonexistent chalk" (Times of India, Report, August, 1988) "TOIN",

"Philosophy is a route of many roads leading from nowhere to nothing" (Ambrose Brerce).

It is difficult to think of a rational man managing his affairs and life style without reasoning and Philosophy. And as such philosophy has been persued and perused since the very dawn of human civilization and the Vedas.

The most intricate problem that man is confronted with and has to tackle is about himself and his relatedness to others.

The 'I'—ness is a baffling curiosity.

It is "—a mystery wrapped in a riddle inside an enigma".

And since the 'I' is the crucial observer, perceiver, experiencer, interpreter and arbitrator, the 'I' becomes all important. But the problems concerning the 'I' (Eg. 'Who am I ?' and 'Where am I ?' the nature and the locale (station) of the 'I') have remained as ambiguous, vague and obscure as ever. And that is so even for the modern scientific minds.

The 'rational' and 'objective' consideration and analysis of the 'I—ness' by the 'I' through logical mentation, is called for. Equating the body with the 'I' further complicates and confounds the issue. Consigned, confined and consecrated to the body, the 'I' becomes a relative, changeful, decaying, perishing and dying mortal entity, mauled by entropy. The question of its immortality becomes outright incongruous. Moreover, the four *Mahavakyani* of the Scriptures (That is

(1) प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म (2) तत्वम्ऽसि (3) अहम् ब्रह्मऽस्मि (4) अयम् आत्मा ब्रह्म । become meaningless, ridiculous, irritating and mocking. Also since the individul needs of each and every 'body' generate mutual competition and conflicts, the passionate seeking of 'one-ness' of all mankind (and all creatures) (and the whole creation) becomes a far, faint and feeble cry in the cosmic wilderness.

Equating the 'I' with the mind lands us in greater diffiulties and dilemma. The mind is very ficle, funny and frustrating. It is, in fact, quite a stranger. One does not know its 'nature' and its alleged modus operandi of 'interactions' with the brain. The mind is always in a flux and turmoil, it is conditioned and prejudiced, and is hardly at peace with itself or with the world around. It does not know even the brain its substratum) or the body its courier or carrier). Even though the 'I' calls it as 'mine' (my mind), the mind is hardly under the control of the 'I', going its own way as it may. Even the 'wish' and 'will', the 'memory' and the 'instinct', 'intuition' and 'intellect', the 'thoughts' and 'feelings', etc., seem to have vague and vagrant connections with the brain—mind ('Bramin') duplicity.

What the 'I' would detest, resist and avoid, may be indulged in and patronized by the disobedient, truculent and truant mind. The mind has got a knack and prolcivity to get involved with things which the 'I' may hardly approve of. The surprize in roads of the mind make concentration difficult. And the un-called for interference, intervention and intrusion of the obstinate, sleek, slippery and sly mind create annoying disturbances for the meditator.

The mind seems to be operated, manouvred and manipulated much more by others (action—reaction, responses, and interactions) than by the 'I'. The mind can easily bring the 'I' into combat, and quite often it leads the unwary 'I' astray.

The debacles of the mind, create great problems for the 'I', and may keep the 'I' helplessly bound and tethered to the body and its 'needs'.

Although the 'I' as such seems to have remained 'static', the mind is ever on the move and constantly changeful. Even as a possible close associate (and accomplice ?) of the 'I' (not unlike the body-brain 'two-in-one'), or an ingredient of the 'personality', the aloofness (separatedness) of the mind with the 'I' and the 'body' is quite obvious.

The mind may be a link, a liaison betwen the brain (and body) (the bio-material or physical component) (the relativistic) and the 'I' (the non-material or ethereal, 'non-physical' component) (the absolutistic aspect). Atleast that is what it looks like.

As if it was enough, the 'Life', the 'Soul', the 'Self', the 'Ego', etc., etc., too clamour for definition, clarification and explanation. God gets abandoned and drowned in the cacophony of definitive and illustrative analogies, allegories and arguments. He is ditched and abrogated to the realm of the abracadabra. And what little guiding light is left to (for) man is devoured by *'Maya'*, the limitable 'waves' of mind spectrums and spectres.

But the enigma (problem) of the 'I' persists debunking and deriding the philosophical *and* the scientific quests. However, everything, nevertheless, hinges, ultimately, on the 'I' the poivot, the fulcrum and the centre of our 'personality', of our Being and Existence.

And yet the picture is not enough, the canvas is important as well; the portrita is not enough, the background too is essential "But you cannot see Me with your present eyes. Therfore, I give to you divine eyes by which you can behold my mystic Opulence" (—Krishna to Arjun, Geeta).

In this article we will investigate the perplexing and puzzling problem of 'I'-ness through the pragmatic and elementary technique of a discourse between two participants.

Let us involve ourselves to ponder over the following sequential train of thoughts:-

1 I Am.
That I am is sure and certain to me. It requires no proof. I know it without any doubt.

2 I Am=I EXIST.
I am existing.
My existence is (Also note—Persistence of 'I' in dream—states etc.)
I have existed with my 'I' unaltered all my life, while my body has changed and aged.

3 You are.
He is,
They are,
It is,
This is,
That is.
Everything exist, is in existence, is existing.
Therefore, Existence is a state common to all the existing (created) things (cosmic creation).
Existence is an abiding state (condition, principle, entity) pervading the creation (Cosmos).
The Universe exists with all its parts (individually) and in its entirety (totality).
This is a TRUTH.
It requires no proof.

4 I am ALIVE.
I am LIVING.

There is LIFE in me.

There is LIFE in all the living things, in all cells, in all Creatures.

Therefe, LIFE is common to all the LIVING things and Beings.

Thus LIFE is an abiding state (power, principle, entity) pervading the Cosmic Creation. (Compare, the Photons) (Compare, the preservation of seeds, spermatozoa, bacteria, Viruses, etc.) (Compare, frozen and apparently long time 'dead' creatures coming or brought back to life, and the continuation of life under very trying and difficult and abnormal conditions and situations, and extremely abnormal circumstances, and environments).

This is a TRUTH.

It requires no proof.

5 I am CONSCIOUS.

I am AWARE.

I understand. I REALIZE.

I can stop thinking and feeling. And stop it involuntarily, reflexly or voluntarily.

I find that my CONSCIOUSNESS is an entity beside, beyond and behind. (Compare, since 'Picture' is, the colour is, the CANVAS must be), my MIND and mentation, as I know it (my mind) (and irrespective of the 'nature' of my mind). In fact, MIND too IS (and dependent on Consciousness) (and is Conscious).

And, therefore, CONSCIOUSNESS is.

This is a TRUTH.

It requires no proof.

Note—Illusion, Delusion, Hallucination, Hypnosis, Mesmerism, etc.

Note—Psychodelic Drugs and Psychotherapeutics)

Note—Autonomic and Systemic, involuntary and voluntary, Nervous Systems).

Note—Neuroses and Psychoses.

Note—Congenital and acquired disorders and diseases of the brain and mind, the effects of Neurosurgery, the varied manifestations of epilepsies, and of other types of neurological lesions and hormonal and other affects).

'I' am conscious. My 'mind' is conscious. Therefore, Consciousness is vital to the existence of 'I' and of 'mind' and even of the 'body' (Compare—'Body'—Consciousness', Reflex phenomena, etc.) (Compare—Hybernation, Hypothermia, Hypothalamic states, Superconductivity, Genetic engineering, perspective aberrations etc.) (Compare and Contrast—the states of Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa SAMADHIES).

Note—Hyper, Hypo- and Para-esthesias, Anaesthetics and Acupuncture).

Note—Sensations may or may not reach our consciousness. Contrast—Spinothalamic and Spinocerebellar Tracts). (Compare and Contrast—Mental consciousness versus Cellular consciousness).

6 Pleasure IS
Pain IS.

But they are *not* constant and they are *not* always present. They come and go, wax and wane, appear and disappear). Therefore, there are occasions, situations, moments, psychomental states *where* and *when*.

Pleasure is *NOT*.,
Pain is *NOT*.

And we can experience (or have experienced) such a state (at least sometimes in our lives), An atmosphere, attitude, or state of 'mental' equilibrium and inactivity and quietitude, pervasive calm and abiding peace.

THIS (the state of mind—experience) is called BLISS.

Therefore, BLISS *is*.

This is a TRUTH.

It requires no proof.

(For a crude analogy, compare the BLISS of health without illness, the BLISS of sound sleep without dreams, the BLISS of Meditation without mentation. the BLISS of Desirelessness without egotism.

7 Summing up—

We came across the following TRUTHS—

(I) EXISTENCE
(II) LIFE
(III) CONSCIOUSNESS
(IV) BLISS.

Now, in order to experience Consciousness and Bliss, the existence of Life is essential. Only the *LIVING* can be consciously (aware of) (in) Bliss(-ful).

Therefore, this is a TRUTH.

And we give a name to this FUNDAMENTAL (BASIC) TRUTH to this Existence of Life or Existence+Life.

We call it (*SAT*).

Now *what is Living* ? Who is *living* ? *What is living in whom* ? *and where* ?

I AM LIVING.

LIFE IS (living) in me, in the 'whole' of me, pervading me, and I am CONSCIOUS of this FACT and TRUTH. There is 'nothing' in me which is life-less (dead). And when I am ONLY *Conscious* about this *TRUTH—AWARE* of IT—I am experiencing *ONLY* the awareness of this *TRUTH*...the conscious awareness of my existence —and I am *NOT thinking* of pleasure and I am *Not feeling* pain either. That means, I am in a state of BLISS, beyond mind and mentation involved with pain and or pleasure.

This is a TRUTH.

It requires no proof. no further evidence than the EXPERIENCE, the AWARENESS, the REALIZATION ITSELF.

8 So, now what has been revealed to us is

*A SET OF TRUTHS.*

This is a SET OF TRUTHS—fundamental and basic and essential—inhering in EXISTENCE as such (in its suchness). What are the members of this SET OF TRUTHS ?

1 LIFE
2 CONSCIOUSNESS
3 BLISS

This set of Fundamental Truths has been given a collective, unified, name (nomenclature, appellation) Satchidananda, (Sat—Chit—Anand). It has several Synonyms—e.g. GOD, ALLAH, Supreme Self, Universal Great Spirit. Primordial Power, Cosmic Creator, Vital Force, Eternal Essence, Buddha, Super-Space, etc.

Note—That the sat, chit and Bliss are inseparably blended and merged as one-and-the-same Single Entity and do not require the incompatible intervention of the (relativistic) mind and mentation (thoughts, feelings, imaginations, speculations) for ITS EXISTENCE or BEING. (However, It is expressed and manifested in a man's life through the (media of) (by way) mind(cf.—Understanding, Realization, Awakening, Awareness, Samadhi, etc )

All the synonyms (and may more) mentioned above mean (and refer to) the same Fundamentality—the Sachchidananda.

9 (Sachchidananda) EXISTS.

This is a TRUH.

It requires no further evidence and no more proof.

[Note—That Sat-Chit-Anand is ONE and the SAME entity, *wholly (totally) unified*, (*ONE WITHOUT THE SECOND. ABSOLUTE, NON RELATIVE*] [Compare and Contrast the Mind and the Brain],

[The purity of is, if anything, apparently disturbed, contaminated and vitiated by the commiseration, comport, complicity, and confederation of the burgeoning mind. Although the mind can not survive without consciousness, the latter can exist independently.

They can stand together in close contemporaneous company but, do not MIX (Cf, Seedful, and Seedless, the meditative STATE (states of Contemplation and Meditation).

10 WHERE does Sachchidanand live and sojourn ? where does it exist in the Cosmos or in the Cosmic Creation.

. where (at what place ?) (in which situation or formation ?) can Sachchidanand be found ?

Well, did we not find Sachchidanand within ourselves ?—as the TRUTH of Existence of Life Consciousness—Bliss in our experience, awareness and realization–the SET of the Fundamental Truths (vide *supra)* ? that we mentioned (realized) before ?.

(The doting dossier of the maranding mind maremma, create great problems for the 'I', and may keep the 'I' helplessly bound and tethered to the body and its earthly moorings of needs, hankerings, hinges, holdings, hodge podge and hocus-pocus).

11 Who was Aware ?
Who realized ?
To whom it was revealed ?
It was revealed to 'me'. 'I' became aware. 'I' realized it.

It was 'I' that became AWARE of the fuudamental existence of the Conscious Living in Bliss=Existence of Blissful Consciousness (Satchidanand) (Sachchidananda) *Within My self*, in *my* own experience. It got revealed unto me.

It was *my* realization. 'I' *realized it*

I realized it as a part and parcel of me and *my-self*, of my 'I'-ness, of my '*self*'. of my Existence and (my) Being.

Granted that YOU realized (Sachchidananda) within (and as) your own '*self*'.

12 But what do you think is the NATURE of the (THAT) (Sachchidananda) which was (got) revealed unto you ?

It is Abstract, Absolute, Non-relative, not changing, (of changeless essence) without any form or attributes. It is just as it is, Itself, Unique, unlike any other thing Neti. And absolutely real and authentic, known and knowable

It is to 'me' ('I' experienced it as) One-without-the-second.

I have known (or know) of nothing with which it has any semblance or with which it could be compared or contrasted or to which it bears any (even remotest) analogy, resemblance, or likeness anywhere (even partly or partially), anytime.

It is abiding, unalterable, invariable, constant, Truth, the whole Truth of it and nothing but the Truth.

And so, as it is, 'Truth' (Absolute) is its 'Nature' if you like to so understand and call it (it).

It is, however, very interesting to note that there is another Aspect (Facet) of That (Sachchidananda) too—the Relative, the concrete, the, creative—objective and subjective, felt, experienced. realized and even shared. It becomes a part of 'my' earthly (physical, material, corporeal) existence as an existence in (and part of) Nature, as a Being of Nature and as an exhibiter, expresser. projector, and affect of the Natural Laws and their consequences, a Natural Material Machine made up of and driven by the Physical, Chemical and Biological Laws of Nature, the BODY. This relative aspect of THAT inheres in my awareness and knowledge as 'SATYAM—SHIVAM—SUNDERAM' (Truth Benificience Beauty) and ITS varied and variegated manifestations, known, felt and experienced as such during 'my' stay in this Earthly Motel (Inn), in this Physical Body. But, the Truth the Benificience and the Beauty must be taken in their absolute sense—absolute Truth, absolute Benificience, absolute Beauty—TRUTH, Benificience and Beauty as such, in their suchness as candorous Conservation Laws. So that what is Sachchidananda THAT too is Truth—Benificience— Beauty. These are the two sides of the same coin—the ethereal (psychic) and the earthly (material) aspects—the psychomental, the psycho-somatic, etc.

13 Just one more question:

Does Sachchidanandasatyamshivamsunderam(=HE) (=SHE) (=IT) abide in *YOU* only ?

NO,—It must be the experience of each and every human-being that HE abides in each one of us, in them, as HE abides in your (or my) Being and Existence. And for every creature who can think and rationalize.

This is a TRUTH.
It requires no proof.

Any and everybody can experience It, HE can be revealed to and realized by anyone by everybody, *within himself*, HERE and NOW. HE is acquainted within man's (the seeker's) own body (brain and mind) and Being individually by all and, therefore, collectively. He is common to ALL, belongs to ALL

So long as you are 'experiencing' Him, with Him, that long you know, feel, and understand that HE is with you and within you and for you. That long the conglomeration and confederation is a part of your own make-up and self. He inheres in You, manifests to You; That means He is common to (in) all peoples' experience and existence—abiding, absorbing, involving, enveloping, and inherent in their Being as such, and the very stuff and essence and core of it.

Therefore, He is All-pervading (Omnipresent) (in all humans) (monads) consciousness of blissfulness or blissful consciousness—consciousness transcendental to mind, consciousness of the state beyond mentation (i.e, beyond pleasure, pain, thoughts, feelings, relativities) (beyond evanescence and changes and transitoriness and transformation, etc.) (beyond constraints of time).

This is a TRUTH.
It requires no further proof, evidence or logic

14 Sachchidanandam—Satyamshivamsunderam:

Omnipresent, all pervading—within and without, and all over, everywhere and everytime. Pervading the mind through and through and therefore, all minds of all times (past, present and future) (omniscient).

Omnibeneficience (Absolute, Beauty in its suchness) (Supreme beautyousness) (withot any blemish, totally beautiful to all and enery, time and matchless) (whatever is beautiful anywhere anytime)

The individual (monad) (creature) (humanbeing) partakes of THIS 'Trait', 'characteristic' quality, property, essence, of Him, after Him—of Him, In Him, By Him, For Him—an Aspect, a Ray, a Glimpse, a Facet, of Him. (cf. The Farthy and the Earth).

The miniature HE (godliness) dwarfed by the limitations of the body and brain and, therefore, imprisoned within, and trapped behind, the rough and tough walls of Relativity and marooned on the island of creature comforts and body needs.

'I' = Unit of Existence

GOD = Totality of Existence as the ONE (Truth Totality) and the ALL (Creation—Creator—Creatrix).

15 What them is 'I', 'Self', 'Ego' ?

It is like a drop of hrine in the Ocean, like a ray of light in the Sun, like a unit creature in the Universal creation, like a 'particle', a 'wave', of Godliness wrapped in the twilight of ignorance, caught in the mesh of Maya, the limitations of relativistic body and its Sense Organs the measures and manipulations of mento-Psychic conditionings and cravings (longings) The Grand Illusion created by memories impressions (conditioning), and the relativistic panorama of the natural 'show', the 'exhibition', creating formidable attractions—of 'varieties', offering staggering opportunities for preferances, selections,, likes and dislikes, hopes and fears, successes and failures, opinionated, vague, choices. And clouding the mind and shadowing the psyche. At best only translucent if not patently opaque.

The Grand Illusion exists and so does the Reality of the Illusion —whereby the evanescent, the temporary, looks permanent, the false is imagined as true, the dying seems living, the unity as the shattered and broken pieces of Units, the 'poison' as the potion and the salve, the rascal as the redeemer, the beneficient as the bogus and the bog, the rescue as the bondage, the filth and fog and forte and fortune held in confusion and in mental mirkiness.

A 'point', 'unit', 'element', 'wavicle', 'wripple' of (in) the Sachchidanandasatyamshivamsundaram—the 'singular' (individual), (divided, relative, varied) manifestation through (in) relativity of the Absolutely Absolute surrounded by the shell, the kernel, the atmosphere, the enigma, the illusion, the mesmerism of Maya.

The self-same ness tarnished and darkened by acquired individuality and separatedness through the severe limitations of the relativistic visions, (perceptions, observations, interpretations) of mind and Sense Organs.

When the ONE Absolutely Absolute burst into Many the ONE manifested the varied and variegated aspects of Relativity entrusted to the care of the simultaneously created Natural Laws. It was then (thus) that the realm of the 'self' (selves) woven by the material, earthly. body (brain)—mind (psyche) complexes come to be and exist. The 'show', the 'drama', the 'exhibition', the mela (and the melee) was on.

The DUALITY drawn on the canvas of the Absolute, the physical-material on the ethereal. The canvas is one but the pictures are many. The flute is one but the tunes are many. The earth mold is one but the statuettes are many. The electricity is one but the bulbs (burning, lighting, or fused) may be many.

The Absolute—Relative duplex, abstract-cum-concrete, psychic plus somatic, uncreated unmanifest as well as created manifest, the bundles of relativistic 'I'—s (ego) glued by the absolute 'I'—s (self), the 'two-in-one', the ethereal commissioning the material and committing it to the conservation of the Natural Laws (physical-chemical-biological).

On the physical plane the 'I' feels like being the body, qualified and quantized duality and individuality constantly changing in time), and belongs to the 'nature' of the relativistic (materiel, physical) (cosmic creation, fragment of the Universe)

On the mental plane it is a link betwne the Relative (Body-Brain-Mind) (Physical, material) (Concrete, individual) and the Absolute (pure all-pervading life consciousness).

On the plane of the Sachchidanand, It is Absolutely Absolute. Note:— (Creator—Creativity-Creation) (non—dual, unity, all.)

Through Samadhi (contemplation Meditation) one attains to yoga the Union (=the realization=revealation=awakening=awareness) (fundamentallity of one's own existence and being in HIM, and of His 'nature' and 'essence') (the merger of the *drop* 'of brine' with the *Ocean*).

'I', therefore, has two aspects (facets):

(A) Abstract, Absolute (e.g. Life—Consciousness—Bliss)

(B) Concrete, Relative )e,g. Body—Brain)

It ('I'-ness) is like a sandwich of Absolute (Immortal, Limitless, changeless) and Relative (Mortal, Limited, Individualsstic, measurable, ever changeful) with (Maya) (the Cosmic Illusion) in between as the filling, the stuffing, the joining-separating, the insulation, the limitation, the variable variety, the culinary art of the cosmic Cuisine, the cause of the Cosmic individuality, identity, (eveanescence changefulness). The ,intertwining' or 'double helixing' of

Absolute, the blend, the solvent and the solute in an universal 'solution', in a mysterions mixture, elixir, mritamrita the mysterious mesmerizing, Cosmic Cocktail.

It is the mind (the psyche) that is instrumental in discovering the self's double role and aspects, of the absolute and the relative, It is the mind that requires being trained cleaned, freed, adjusted and adapted and trusted for this purpose. The training is arduous but quite possible etc,

16 Now suppose you have realized God and God has been revealed unto you, *So what ? What next ?* Of what use and purpose will IT be ? Know that "Like-dissolves like" and that "as you think so do you become".

In man's make-up this potentiality and capacity is a built in structured component. It links the 'self' to the 'Supreme Self' and can thus contact and draw upon and beckon the Sachchidananda—Satyamshivamsunderam, to respond, to reveal, to help, to love, to illumine "Knock and the Door will be opened unto thee *you*".

Through faith, belief and devotion you could develop godliness in yourself amalgamation endowed with, acquiring, godly qualities) and become enamoured by (of IT, could become more and more Godly, God-like. You could become more genuinely, selflessly, efficiently, serviceable, loving and awakened. The darkness of ignorance is like the night's black sky without stars and moon. You could shed off the ignorance, the limitations of your mind, and soar high to the plane of enlightenment, awakening and wisdom, to the realms of absolute love and compassion. You could go beyond pain and grief helplessness, insecurity, frustrations and have a full control on your mind and Sense Organs (cf. reining the turbulent horses and being in full command of the Chariot.

You tend to imbibe and absorb His spirit, His Nature, and you tend to become like Him, of soaked in His Essence, of His substance, of His I'k and Type, And you attain to purity—Enlightement Freedom state of Existence and Being.

By knowing (of) Him and by liking (loving, preferring, Choosing) Him—you 'capture' His Spirit. You get enlisted for the 'endowment', and gradually, but surely and certainly, you get transformed You becom the steady candle ever burning bright and refusing successfully to yield to any wind, storm, tempest or holocaust. The steel is tempered and improved beyond limits. And if the individuals (units) become each an enlightened (wise and friendiy) human being (world citizen) The Globe is truly a village, a global hamlet, an island in (of) Space, or a colony, wise and friendly, enjoying the bliss of oneness and togetherness (Cf-Spiritometry)—then the Human Society and the earthly life as such—could (will) become Divine and Blessed. Man will evolve and become a Super-man.

And although even a delusion or an obsession about the self-and supreme self (might) (would) help, but ultimately the true 'awakening' to the Reality, the disillusionment, is all important. When the ignorant "ego" (EGO) (relativistic mind) is able to see through the game, the trick, the ploy, and the plot, it becomes 'awakened' (knowledgeable) to the realities of the Play the cyclic variable variegated, natural phenomenal drama of events, the Show, its impermanence and evanescence, and, therefore, unreal (illusory) nature of IT.

The mind delued by the allurements, temptations, the mundane compulsions, and the pleasantries of the world, and the ego obsessed and enraptured and entangled by it, is unable to detect and divine the crucial and critical temporariness of the mirage. Through the severe limitations of its perception, observation, detection, interpretation, analysis, etc., its conditionings and prejudices, and its deep attachment to things of the material world, the mind is duped and 'blinded' and likes to yield to the titilations, the thrills, the hypnosis, the 'orgasm', the clouding, the erosion, of rationality and objectivity.

(It may here be noted that we deliberately and purposely omit and keep out of consideration and deliberation the more abstruse and less useful 'problems', of Buddhism, for example, of Life-after Death, Re-birth. Destiny, etc.)

In our search for the Secret of the Self etc., the mind is the only help and hindrance. It is the mind which is the go-between, the messenger, the link, between the relative and the absolute, the dual aspects of our Being.

And the foolish, deluded, mind can be trained to "see" the truth, to note the 'existence' as it is, to sieve the chaff from the grain, to become directly aware of and acquainted with the 'I'-self as IT IS.

And how can this be done? The technique (the method, the way) is (has been) prescribed by many spiritual guides and teachers (cf. Patanjali's Ashtang Yoga, Buddhas' Paan-apan-smriti, Panapansati, Maheshyogies' Transcendental Meditation, etc. etc.) and can be easily followed, consulted and practised. A direct vision and view of the Reality is thus available for the Seeker. Man can realize Heaven on the Earth, where it's at.

9

# The Rise and Decline of Logical Positivism in Turkey

*Cemil Akdogan*

Following the Western tradition, some thinkers in Turkey have opted for logical positivism since 1933. Very recently, however, it came under heavy fire. The purpose of this paper is to examine, first, the rise of logical positivism in some detail and then the criticisms of this traditional philosophy of science by the new approach of Thomas S. Kuhn's work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

With the establishment of the University of Istanbul in 1933, new currents in philosophy were introduced into Turkey's intellectual and cultural pot. Among them logical positivism took root by the efforts of Hans Reinchenbach of the Vienna Circle when he headed the chair in systematic philosophy at the Faculty of Arts in Istanbul from 1933 to 1936. He arranged lectures and seminars in order to propagate his views with regard to logical positivism and theory of probability.

Nusret Hizir, the assistant of Reinchenbach, disseminated the ideas of logical positivism further by teaching the tenets of it to students and also by writing numerous articles about it from 1946 to 1968 at the University of Ankara. He basically defended the following standard ideas of the Vienna Circle :

(1) Philosophy of science deals with analysis of scientific propositions. It is a metalanguage.

(2) Scientific propositions have an objective validity, i.e., they are timeless and true at all times.

(3) The scientist is objective and therefore will discard a theory when he encounters with a counter-example.

(4) He also not explicitely but implicitely defended that with the addition of new facts and new theories science becomes more

objective and more enriched as time passes by, since the progress of science is cumulative.

Along with Hizir some younger academicians such as Huseyin Batuhan, Cemal Yildirim and Teo Grunberg also opted for logical positivism.

Cemal Yildirim endorses Reinchenbach's distinction between "the context of discovery" and "the context of justification". But although Reinchenbach and others see the context of discovery as a psychological process, Yildirim claims and tries to prove that the context of discovery has a logic of its own. In other words he is searching for a pattern of reasoning in scientific discovery. The context of discovery is not only psychological but also logical[1]. As for the context of justification, he establishes a relation between a belief and degree of support given to it by evidence[2].

Teo Grunberg also sees philosophy as an analytical tool. In numerous articles and in the books of *An Essay on the Concept of Meaning* (1970) and *Epistemic Logic* (1971) he grants that primitive terms of a particular discipline should be and can be elucidated conceptually by means of logical analysis. Thus statements involving these primitive terms are transformed into unambigious analytic or synthetic propositions with scientifically determined truth-values. This pocedure eliminates the metaphysical presuppositions of our knowledge.

In 1980'ies, however, mainly Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* reoriented the thinking of Cemal Yildirim, Huseyin Batuhan and Teo Grunberg.

In this later period Cemal Yildirim not only explicates the views of Hanson and Kuhn but also concludes that theories are essentially the contribution of mind. Facts gain the relevance and meaning only through a theory[3].

Huseyin Batuhan, mostly under the influence of Stephen Toulmin and Thomas S. Kuhn, thinks that without the contribution of history of science philosophy of science is a meaningless endeavor.

Finally Teo Grunberg argues for the conceptual incommensurability between a new theory and the previous replaced one in his latest article, "Thomas S. Kuhn and the Scientific Rationality".[4] But he emphasizes that the incommensurability is compatible with the comparability of the two theories with respect to their problem-solving capacity and the accuracy of the quantitative results. According to Grunberg Kuhn is not an irrationalist, since he allows for an objective and cumulative progress of science again with regard to problem-solving capacity and accuracy of quantitative result. In his own words Grunberg's approach can be called critical positivism which itself is not very far from Popper's critical rationalism.

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[1] Cemal Yildirim, *The Pattern of Scientific Discovery*, M.E.T.U. Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 1968.

[2] Cemal Yildirim, "Belief and Evidence", *International Logic Review* December 1975.

[3] Cemal Yildirim, *The Pattern of Scientific Discovery*, the revised editon, M E T.U. Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 1981, pp. 43-46, 98-103 and 120

As we saw logical positivism aims at static, logical and unhistorical reconstruction of science, whereas the new approach opts for a historical and sociological sort of science. Since the new approach is more realistic, today not only in the world but also in Turkey logical positivism declined to a great extent.

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[4] Teo Grunberg, "Thomas S. Kuhn and the Scientific Rationality". *Journal of Human Sciences*. Forthcoming.

## 10

# The Unnoticed Aspects of Srimad Bhagawat Gita

*Kamal Kishore*

Shrimadbhagwat–Gita popularly known as Gita is most systematically written religious book, without any ambiguity and is as realistic as a book of science or mathematics, but at the same time it has been made most *mysterious*, vague and unrealistic by commentators who were under the influence of their own *system* of thought or the thought trend of Guru of their sect. Gita has ten basic words and they are clearly defined in it.

The tragedy of Gith is that though these definitions are clearly written in Gita, yet they have been ignored by all the commentators. Consequently, the commentatators as well as readers are unable to grasp the theme of Gita. It is impossible to study Geometry if we refuse to accept the definitions of line, point, circle etc. as elucidated by Euclid. In the same way one cannot follow Gita by ignoring its basic definitions.

Ten basic words of Gita are: (1) Ishwara (2) Brahma (3) Atma (4) Maya (5) Bhakti (9) Antkal (7) Punarjanma (8) Janma (9) Karma and (10) Adhidaivat.

The above words are self explanatory. Let us study them one by one

1. *Ishwara*; ("I", God, Krishna and Vishnu).

"I" is the most important word of Gita, All about God is said by using the word "I". "I" is defined in the following manner:—

Adhiyanjno 'ham eva' tra
dehe dehabhratam vara.

Adhiyajna I am in evey body on best of embodied studying the above definition in detail.

(a) *Adhiyajna* : This word is used in Gita alone. No other scripture uses it. It simply means *supreme sacrifice*.

Individuals most valued possession is his own life and most cherished goal is one's own mission or 'Dharma'. Consequently to lay down one's life for one's mission is supreme sacrifice. No sacrifice performed by material articles can equal it.

(b) This supreme sacrifice is present in every body.

(c) Consequently supreme sacrifice or 'Martyrdom' is Krishna or "I" (the God) of Gita. To simplify there is innate inclination in every body to lay down one's life for his mission and this is the definition of "I" (The God). No where in religious literature God has been defined in such clear terms. With every faith God is simply a bundle of adjectives and we are left to guess or contemplate about Him and since centuries are groping in the dark

After deciding that martyrdom is God, let us study the second most important word :

2. *Brahma* : According to Jagadguru Adi Shankaracharya all the 'Upanishads' consider Brahma as 'Pran' or life. The ancient saints like Yajnavalkya, Kaushitki, Satykam Jawali etc., all declare that Brahma is life or 'Pran'. Brahma sutras also consider that 'Pran' or life is Brahma. Gita also defines it as follows :

Mama Yonir mahad brahma (Chap. 14 Sh. 3)

The word 'Yoni' needs consideration, In present sanskrit literature it stands for female external genitalia. To avoid vulgarity the commentators translate it as follows :

Mahad brahma is my womb :

All sorts of arguments are put forth to justify presence of womb or female external genitalia in Lord Krishna who to say the least was a man and not a woman.

Here Jagatguru Adi Shankaracharya goes to the extent of calling Brahma as maya though throughout his life he had been propagating Brahma as supreme and Maya as ignorance.

To solve the riddle it will suffice to say that the word 'Yoni' does not stand for womb in Gita it stands for nature

etadyonini bhutani Sarvani'ty Upadharaya

From this nature know all the beings. Nature is divided in two parts:

(a) Non-living:—Comprising five elements mind, self consciousness and intelligence. Beyond this is life or 'Paraprakriti' or 'Pran'; Consequently word 'yoni' stands for life in Gita and there is no problem in translating "Mam Yonir Mahadrahma as my nature is 'Mahadbrahma'.

Consequently Brahma is pran according to Gita and to underst and Gita we will have to abandon the theme "Krishna is Brahma", Brahma is life, this will take us a long way in understanding theme of Gita. After discussing Ishwar and Brahma let us study;-

*Atma*: This word is used daily by Hindus in their day to day life. Commentators of Gita use it very loosely, sometimes calling it God, Self or even the human body. All this confusion arises simply due to the fact that we ignore the definitions given in Gita.

"Nature is said to be adhyatma"

Question arises whose nature? definitely nature of life. There is no word in English literature to explain this word. Oxford learners dictionary defines Philosophy as study of nature and knowledge of existence Human existence or existence of every living being is simply manifestations of life.

Nature of life or "adhyatma" according to Gita is that "it is faultless and similar in every body". This is the most noble idea of Hindu thought that every being should be considered equal and similar due to presence of life in it. The word *atma* stands for '*adhyatma*' in Gita.

But this nature of life is destroyed by passion, anger and greed i e. man goes on living but his 'atma' dies. Some people are born without 'atma' and indulge in destroying the world. They declare that the world is without God, without sequence, it is simply for satisfying the passions and nothing else.

At the same time one should not kill his 'atma' by 'atma'. History is rampant by illustrations where extremists destroyed the noble idea of 'atms' and indulged in all sorts of atrocities against the people of other faith, their own countrymen and even against their own coreligionists.

Thus 'atma' perishes during ones own life and is thus unable to carry your sins or virtues to next life.

Above three words are very important part of Hindu thought but they have no rale in s ruggle for existence. You believe in God or not, you consider the life to be supreme or not. Your acceptance of Idea that life is faultless and similar are not going to help you in your struggle for existence, you will have to strive for your existence.

Illustrating the above thoughts are the following 'shlokas':

(1) God does not create power to work nor the deeds nor the occasion of achieving success in the deeds. It is man's own nature that works it out. (Chapter 5, shloka 14)

(2) God does not receive neither the sin nor the good deeds of of any body. Knowledge is covered by ignorance thereby are creatures confused. (Chapter 5, Shloka 15)

(3) All beings do not exist in me,see the supremacy of my Yoga, My Adhyatm that sustains the living beings and is source of inspiration for all is not present in them. (Chapter 9, Shloka 5)

(4) He who sees from all aspects that all actions are performed by nature and sees that Atma is not the door. (In struggle for existence). Only he sees the reality, (Chapter 13, Shloka 29)

**After enunciating the above idas which are rays of clear thinking in the mist of religious dogmas. The blessed Lord describes the fundamentals of struggles for existence.**

*Maya* : All the activities of living beings are under the three strands of maya.

(1) One exists and struggles by knowing his vitality, this is 'Sato guna'.

(2) One struggles under the influence of passion, greed and anger. This is 'rajo guna'.

(3) One works under the influence of Ignorance—this is 'tamo-guna'.

These three 'gunas' are present in every body. Each dominating over the other from time to time. All the activities of man are performed under the influence of these 'gunas'.

Gita totally differs from these systems of thought, which consider 'Maya' to be a veil ignorance or illusion. Gita deals with 'Maya' as a reality and Chapter 14 (Fourteen), 16 (sixteen), 17 (seventeen), and part of 18 (eighteen) are devoted to it. Chapter 17th (seventeenth) is unique in describing ones faith also under the three strands of 'Maya'.

No body can go beyond 'Maya' as it is difficult to ignore one's own existence. Every body in this world and the world of 'Devas' is not beyond the three essentials of Maya. All said and all done in favour of one's own existence, man is after all a social animal, of this stage begins the sermon of *Bhakti* of Gita.

*Bhakti* the sixth important word of Gita literally means to share, to divide and to separate. According to Gita to share one's achievements with society is Bhakti Gita devotes full six chapters to Bhakti.

Knowledge and science are basis of Bhakti, ignorance and blind faith should not be given to society. To follow the path laid down by greatmen is another aspect of Bhakti. Social upheavels, points of honour of your society, the famous battles and respect for modes of worship followed by your country men, are all parts and parcels of Bhakti.

This is the brief outline of Bhakti to get the clear concept one should go through the text chapter 7 to 12 repeatedly.

Seventh important word of Gita is *Karma*, it is often equated with work or profession but Gita's definition of Karma totally differs from the conception of work or profession.

Bhoot Bhavodbhav Kar
Visarg Karma sangitah. (Chapter 8, Shloka 3)

"Dedication that is source of inspiration for all beings is said to be karma".

Thus Karma is dedication that is source of inspiration. All the noble deeds written in books of history are "Karma" according to Gita as they are basically dedication and source of inspiration.

At the same time a man devoted to his profession or work dwells in "Karma". This dedication goes unhonoured and unsung but it is the basis of society. It is a well known fact that utility of anything is greater than its cost. This utility—cast is his unavoidable contribution towards maintenance of society.

It is not inferior to any heroic deed written in history, its importance cannot be denied Heroic deeds are performed once in centuries but "Akarma" keeps going the society, day after day, Month after month and year after year, generation after generation centuries afer centuries society is maintained by akarma i.e. dedication without inspiration.

Gita regards both Karma and Akarma as equal to each other.

"He who sees akarma in karma and karma in Akarma, is wise amongst men, is in Unison with his profession and performs all the karmas". (Chapter 4: Shloka 18).

It is on this basis the word "Karmaphal tyag" can be easily explained as karma is dedication its fruits can be nothing but achivement and to serve society through that achievement is "Karma—phal Tyag".

The next three important words of Gita are "*Antkal*", "*Punarjanma*" *and* "*Janma*".

"*Antkal*" is usually considered the time of physical death, stopping of heart-beat or of Breathing. But physical death or birth is not Gitas subject.

Antkal in Gita is considered as ' Pryankal", the time of moving forward. It is the moment when one takes final decision about on's mission in life. It is the moment when Siddharth left his palacee in search of truth and became Buddha. Moolshankar left Shiva temple and became Dayanand Saraswati. This is the most precious moment in man's life when he decides to move forward.

Birth or "Janma" abcording to Gita is not the time when man is born but it is the time when Kshetra or living body unites Kshetragya or God, i.e he gives up his life for the cause of mission either as a martyr or whole heartedly devoting himself for his mission.

In between these two points antkal and Janma lies the problem of punarjanma. Some follow the path, without clear conception again reconsider their position and come back to antkal and again try to achieve their goal. Some come under the influence of rich people. Philosphers and pheilanthrophists give up their path of dedication. Realising the short comings of these, again start moving towards his goal This is his punarjanma or Rebirth.

The tenth and the last most important word is "*Adhidaivata*" i.e. the deity supreme. According to Gita "Man himself is the deity supreme".

No where in religious literature man is given the status of supreme deity. This single statement relieves him from all sorts of inferiority complexes and makes him self reliant.

The above definitions of ten basic words and system of thought developed accordingly makes Gita, the book of clear thinking and easy to understand Let us pay our respects to Lord Krishna who narrated the theme clear, unambiguous without any confusion and everlasting.

But these definitions have been ignored by all commentators and this is the unnoticed aspect of Bhagwad Gita.

# Book-Reviews :

**Orville D. Menard** : *Political Bossism in Mid-America : Tom Dennison's Omaha. 1900-1933*, Landham, MD: University Press of America, 1989, pp. xiii+346, $32.50".

Thomas Dennison was a political boss of Omaha, Nebraska, during the first three decades of the twentieth century. This was a period during which the city developed into a regional metropolis for Nebraska, western Iowa, and South Dakota. The annexation of South Omaha in 1915, an industrial stockyards and packinghouse district with its "Zebra Stripped" neighborhoods, made Omaha a city of over 200,000 people, a volatile ethnic cauldron. During 1909 mobs enraged over the murder of a police officer by a Greek national drove all other Greeks out of town. In 1919 organized rioters stormed and burned the downtown Omaha public safety building, brutally lynching an accused black rapist who could not possibly have been guilty. The "blue collar" city, a product of transcontinental railroad promotion and the building of the Union Pacific Railroad, was a gambling and prostitution center of vast proportions. In the 1910s official surveys counted as many as 6,000 prostitutes, most concentrated in a clearly defined "crib" district. Through the 1920s Omaha had some 1,600 saloons, openly flaunting the Prohibition statutes. While Omaha's basic economy featured transportation, meat packing, and mercantile pursuits, its entertainment enterprises contributed an enduring image of a "Las Vegas-East". It was this environment over which Dennison ruled and sought to transform.

Dennison was not a boss in the mold of a James Marcy Tweed of post Civil War New York, Richard J. Daley of modern Chicago, or Thomas Pendergast of Prohibition and Great Depression era Kansas City. Tweed embezzled vast sums of money and became a symbol of the excesses of Gilded Age city government. Daley run a vast and efficient operation, considered one of the last great city political machines. Pendergast, from St. Joseph, Missouri, between Omaha and Kansas City, controlled his city and state with the help of organized criminal elements, a hundred thousand non-existent "ghost voters", and thousands of disciplined campaing workers. He cooperated on occasion with Dennison on a variety of matters, such as sending back to Omaha expensive furs robbed by overly zealous Kansas City hoods. But, Dennison was a totally different kind of boss from Pendergast, preferring to work behind the scenes in his pursuit of community power in the building of an Omaha that fit his conceptions of how a city should be constructed.

Dennison grew up and matured on the frontier. Born in Iowa in 1858, the son of two young Irish immigrants, he grew up in a small

Roman Catholic colony in eastern Nebraska. A rugged and powerfully built man, he left home in the late 1870s, living a nomadic life in the vast expanses of the American West. He labored as a blacksmith in Kansas, a railroader in Colorado, and a prospector in New Mexico, Montana, and Colorado. He lived on the edge of the law, by his own account botching an attempted robbery, and worked as a saloon bouncer. By the 1880s he had embarked upon a career as a professional gambler. He plied his trade in several Rocky Mountain states, most notably at the notorious Texas House in Leadville, Nevada, and the opulent Arcade in Denver In 1892,at of the age thirty four, he moved permanently to Omaha, probably at first as the representative of a gambling syndicate. A year after arriving in Omaha, he married the daughter of a Council Bluffs, Iowa, newspaper editor and settled down to what appeared a respectable family life. Dennison, playing his cards close to his vest and working with the business community, without fanfare gradually emerged as the boss Omaha.

Orville D. Menard, a political scientist at the university of Nebraska at Omaha and an international officer of Pi Gamma Mu, in his new well-researched study, *political Bossism in Mid—America*, has According to Menard, Deenison successfully created a community concensus that worked well in shaping modern Omabo. He manipulated calleagues and friends with great skill—especially long-time mayor James C. "Cowbody Jin" Danhlman, former jockey William E. "Billy" Nesselhaus, newspaper publisher Edward Rosewater, and printing plant owner Frank B. Johnson. Dahlman provided a populist public image, Nesselhaus worked with vice elements, Rosewater supported civic betterment projects, and Johnson acted as a conduit to the business community. Menard, in evaluating Dennison, concludes, "He moved among the city's financial elite, and he also knew the gamblers and thieves. He was the middleman, the power balancer, helping to run a steady city a safe city satisfactory providing for the upperworld a milieu where stability and financial security were also assets for the underworld and Dennison here too delivered stability and thereby financial security .. ..In general he made possible a city where anything was available for the pleasure serker,but controlled the elements providing pleasure. Both illegitimate and legitimate businesses generally found arrangements satisfactory." (p. 322)

Menard's study raises questions about not only the goals but the nature and methods of political bosses with a western orientation. Did Dennison operate differently because he came out of western gambling establishments rather than New York or Boston saloons? Why did he operate so effectively, even though he never held public office or built a huge organization? Did the free-wheeling frontier modify the way urban political bosses operated? In any event, Dennison, a professional gambler associated with know vice elements thoughout his career, successfully transformed Omaha from a wide open city into a regional metropolis with an outward reputation as a straight laced midwestern ' family town."

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**Panos D Bardis**, *South Africa and the Marxist Movement: A Study in Double Standards*, Edwin Mellen Press, Box 450, Lewiston, New York 14092; Queenston, Ontario; Lampeter, Wales; 1989, pp. xxi + 270, paper $29.95, cloth $59 95.

A great deal of publicity has been generated in the Western world about the evils of apartheid in South Africa, an evil which Bardis thoroughly condemns. One development in the world's rejection of apartheid has been a move toward divestment. The theory is that corporations working in South Africa are exploiting cheap black labor and providing the racist white government the taxes to maintain the racist system. By putting pressure on corporations to pull out of South Africa, apartheid opponents think they can deprive the government of revenue and thus bring about its downfall and end apartheid. Corporations that resist stopping their profitable operations in South Africa are being pressured by the various groups which buy stock and then work through stockholders' meetings. The pressure groups are also trying to get governments, labor unions, schools, churches, etc. to divest themselves of stock in these companies, hence the name.

Another side of the divestment program, however, is that when a corporation pulls out of South Africa, the black employees are stranded—they are left unemployed and hence unable to pay the rent, feed their families, pay their debts, etc. The apartheid government has not seen fit to provide them with substitute unemployment benefits. So workers and families are going hungry hundreds of workers from neighboring countries are working in South Africa, and sending their pay checks home, thus providing a large amount of income to these nations. When these "guest workers" are unemployed, the apartheid government refuses to renew their visas and sends them home, to the detriment of all concerned. Bardis tells "the other side of the divestment story" that is seldom, one should say "never", heard in the midst of the campus rallies for divestment.

The "story" comes from sources not usually cited in Western media, including black workers and black leaders who do not have the media's ear. It also comes from Bardis's own research and his own contacts in and out of the area. He is well aware of the complexities of the entire issue, which must be seen from a variety of viewpoints. As an objective scholar, he seeks this variety as a matter of course. But, because the divestment story is so well known, he deliberately emphasizes the other side as a way of giving the public a balanced view of an often distorted issue.

In 12 chapters, including an introduction and conclusion Bardis sketches the situation, aware that it will take volumes to tell the whole story. The whole story includes a strong South African government which has grown stronger under the impact of Western efforts to pressure South Africa on apartheid. For example, an arms embargo was imposed. Not everyone practiced the embargo,

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of course, for there are huge profits in armaments. Even so, the embargo led to South Africa's development of its own military industrial complex. which is so good, and so extensive, that South Africa not only produces its own arms today but has become a major exporter of arms. The result of the arms embargo is that South Africa is stronger, and richer, than ever. The double standard has been interesting for Ronald Reagon—as president of the US, he sold strategic materials and arms to the communists of both China and the USSR

Economic sanctions, of course, go much further than armaments, They cover all kinds of trade, including financial loans. Bardis notes that, among those who are most insistent on economic sanctions, are countries in black Africa. At the very time their leaders are making public proclamations against South Africa, their ministries are signing trade agreements with that very same country! In fact, many black African countries depend on South Africa for enormous amounts of their economy, in trade and in the guest worker salaries cited above. Hypocrisy speaks loudly in these public pronouncements versus economic realities.

But the greater hypocrisy appears among individuals and in the media of the West. Bardis notes that Desmond Tutu calls for sanctions while his personal economy is well protected He seeks new funds for his diocese which is already wealthy and financially secure, but does not help those unemployed because of his call for sanctions. Winnie Mandela praises the USSR while she and her jailed husband call for the overthrow of South Africa's apartheid government That government has offered to release Nelson Mandela from prison, where he serves a sentence for trying to overthrow the government, if he would renounce violence. He has refused.

In the meanwhile, one notes that the USSR has been the world's greatest threat to freedom. Westerners heap enormos amounts of negative criticism on South Africa while having little or on criticism for international communism Ronald Reagan began his presidency talking about the Evil Empire, but ended it whith his good old buddies in the Kremlin. The present volume was written before the latest violence of the People's Democracy against students inBeijing, but enormous amounts of violence, including the deaths of untold millions of Chinese, gets no negative reaction at all from critics of South Africa. Similarly, there is no critique of the USSR for the deaths of millions of its own people, for the war in Afghanistan, or for the enslavement of Eastern Europe, where we still have the Berlin Wall, an infamous symbol of communist despotism and imperialism

Bardis notes the interwoven relationship of the banned South African Communtist Party and the Africaan National Congress, which publicly sanctions, not only violence, but brutal murder by "necklace" The latter consists of tying the hands of a victim with barded wire, putting car tires filled with gas or fuel oil around his neck, and setting him or her on fire. It is an agonizing death, Most of the victims are black.

The hypocrisy of the double standard has a different ring in the West. While African Americans, and many others, are well aware that the US is a racist society, the hypocrites who escape university classes and examinations, or simple boredom, call for boycotts of South Africa and divestment from its economy. The protesters are silent about racism in America, including racism on their own university campuses.

Bardis himself has been accused of racism on different grounds. He notes that newly arrived Orientals, such as the boat people, who have nothing, get to work and are soon supporting themselves. Their self-help and their economic advancement are phenomenal. Unemployed whites are apt to blame themselves for their situation and proceed to look for a job. Unemployed blacks blame "whitey's" racist society and do not get a job. Bardis objects to insinuations of racial inferiority He cites cases, e.g., a Chicago school, where a dedicated teacher has inspired black children to spectacular educational achievement.

There is yet another kind of double standard, which Bardis exposes, in South Africa. He provides some historical and statistical background on the many tribal groups there. Much of the violence in that area has not been the South African government suppressing blacks through apartheid. It has been tribal wars in which one tribe or clan has attacked another. This is true throughout black Africa, as in other parts of the world, especially when one tribe gains power. It can then use modern military equipment to desttoy other tribes just as Europeans and their descendants destroyed the American Indian.

When intertribal violence becomes extreme, the South Africa government clamps down with curfews, prison, etc. Bardis sugge s that, if the government fell, the bloodshed would be enormous blacks killing other blacks. This includes Mandela, who would probably be murdered if he were released from prison. Most of the violence and deaths today are black on black. Some estimates in the US are that 75 percent of black crime is black on black.

But Bardis, along with many others opposed to apartheid, is not at all hopeless. Education and training can make a difference. Indeed, part of the objection to divestment is that the American companies in South Africa frequently folowed the Sullivan Principles, which include education and training programs for nonwhites, not just for common labor, but to increase their numbers in management. The Principles also call for fair employment practices, no segregation, and helping employees with housing, schoolicg, recreation, and health care.

Gradual elimination of apartheid, along with education and jobs, may not make South Africa a utopia, but it can preserve the economy and the country for blacks as well as for whites. And the blacks will be the major beneficiaries of such gradualism–and the biggest losers from violent revolution. In fact, enormous numbers of them will be dead when the shots and the fires quiet down.

This very welcome publication will probably not reverse the thinking of the unthinking on the subject of South Africa. But it will give thinking people food for thought. This book is must reading for all who are interested in South Africa and for all who are nut, for they should be, and this volume explains why.

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